

Washington and Lee University

Drivers and Success Measures of Populism: Case Studies on  
1930-55 in Argentina and 1979-2016 in Great Britain

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## **Epigraph**

“[I am] merely the executing arm of the popular will [whose] virtues must be based on the correct and honorable execution of the people’s desires” – Juan Domingo Perón

“The real question is, at the end of the day, do we want to run our country? Are we proud of who we are? Are we happy to be just a star on somebody else's flag, or do we want to be an independent nation?” – Nigel Farage

## Introduction

No leadership type has ever been as ambiguous as that of a populist ruler. History has known absolute monarchs, autocratic oligarchs, democratic presidents and prime ministers, and dictators – to any of these could be attached the label ‘populist.’ So what is the defining feature of a populist leader, if not the structure of the regime ruled nor the title of the leadership position? Scholars have contemplated this question and others like it for the past two centuries as each new episode of populism adds another layer to our understanding of what populism can mean. Each of these layers is consistently separate and disconnected from everything previously experienced. As Kaltwasser, et al. (2017) state, “empirical work on populism is almost invariably confined to specific countries or world regions [which] means that populism literature is not as cumulative as it should be” (1). Chapter one therefore is dedicated to examining the scholarly works of populism theorists in order to arrive at a definition of populism that is directly applicable to the two case studies that will be compared in chapters two and three. In those chapters, this paper will seek to identify several core components – or ‘drivers’ – of populist success that obtain across disparate cases: backing from elites, pandering to voter desires, and formulation of a populist rhetoric that can be adapted to further the influence of the party. Each of these drivers is examined in the case studies in the context of how it strengthened a populist movement that grew in response to an under-represented group or idea. To fully understand the life of each movement, I begin chapters two and three by examining the immediately preceding political environment in order to determine how a gap was created that populism could fill.

Economic, social, and political factors directly attributable to regimes in place at the time immediately preceding the rise of populist movements are key to understanding why and how populist movements emerge, grow, and succeed. The first case study will be an examination of

Argentina from the mid-1930s pre-Perón period to the 1950s during his leadership and ultimate decline. This research will then be compared to the rise of populism in Great Britain since the 1990s, beginning with a look into the organized labor policies of the Thatcher years in the 1980s. These two cases show that in democratic systems where a particular class or idea is not receiving satisfactory representation over an extended period of time, populism has greater opportunity to enter the political scene. Hence, the rise of populism is directly attributable to the permissive political conditions created by the neglect of certain classes or ideas, rather than by the power of an individual populist candidate or the irresistible appeal of populism as a political theory in all contexts. An environment of neglect facilitates the formulation of an alternative, found in the form of populism, to the status quo; however, the high degree to which this alternative is necessarily ‘different’ is due to the fact that often the populist group or idea is not being represented at all by mainstream politics. Therefore, extremity in differentiation develops and populism takes hold in a manner that often results in tangible success and a ‘wakeup call’ to established politics.

What constitutes ‘success’ for populist movements can be perceived through two different categories of outcomes: *fulfillment* success and *pervasive* success. After the case study analyses in chapters two and three, I compare levels of success between Argentine and British populism(s) in chapter four. Success is first defined according to the fulfillment of goals. Fulfillment success describes the degree to which these goals, explicitly set by the populist parties themselves, are ultimately accomplished; this can be either directly, through the electoral success of the party, or indirectly, through the co-option of the party’s positions by mainstream competitors. This can be measured objectively by evaluating how many of the promises made by the party (or movement) are actually carried through into policy. The second type, pervasive

success, describes the prevalence of a movement in the national discourse and the degree of institutional power or informal influence which its populist leaders are able to obtain. Those outside of the party determine pervasive success more so than those within; the more a populist party's methodology and presence is recognized as mainstream, whether that be in news media or by the power of positions held by populists, the more pervasive success it achieves. This is a more subjective quality to measure, and must be largely based on interpretation of how populist narratives are reflected in both the media and society at large. Taking both success measures into account, I then calculate the success levels of each of the two case studies and compare them. I conclude this thesis in chapter five with a final analysis of Argentine and British populism, their lasting (or terminate) natures, and the implications of populist ideology on democratic establishment politics.

## Chapter 1: Populist Theory Literature Review

### THE STRUGGLE FOR A DEFINITION

This project seeks to develop a scholarly understanding of populism – a fundamentally complex and deeply contested concept – through the comparative study of populist movements in Peronist Argentina and contemporary Britain. There is a vast existing literature on populism distinguished by a diversity of approaches to and understandings of this topic. Many academics have defined populism specifically for their purposes, as must this paper given the absence of a universally-accepted standard definition. However, there is a tendency among scholars, commentators, and the general public to ignore the specific contexts in which these definitions are formed, and instead apply them sweepingly to other cases. As Bale and Taggart (2011) suggest, these broad, often cumbersome and inadequate perceptions can be partly linked to the proliferating usage of the terms ‘populist’ and ‘populism’ in the absence of contextualizing comparison by major media outlets. Bale, et al. (2011), argue that when non-political experts try to apply the term casually, they further muddy the definitional waters by assuming its meaning to be self-evident (128). This escalating popular confusion reflects a broader dissensus within the community of those who study populism – after all, absent a commonly-held understanding of what it really means, can ‘populism’ ever be truly misapplied? Could it be that it is a fundamentally mutable, relational term that means different things in different contexts while lacking an objective core nature? These are the difficult questions scholars of populism must confront.

#### *Scholarly Definitions*

Though answers to the above questions have varied widely, the essential mutability of the term ‘populism’ is generally recognized. The origins of populism must be accounted for to



understand the roots of the term's adaptability. The concept of populism arose roughly simultaneously with the concept of modern democracy. By nature, a democracy is a system that is created by people, and then is responsible to the needs of those people. Populism, put most simply, is a movement in pursuit of the needs of a people. It is, therefore, a natural part of the concept of popular sovereignty, which holds that individuals are the "ground of authority" that can recover power to change poor institutions or remove "self-serving elites" (Kaltwasser, et al. 3). To wield this power is a great responsibility in that the purposeful dismantling of government throws all life under it into turmoil. Consequently, populist movements have often been looked upon negatively; their disruption of the status quo may achieve short term gains in terms of representation or freedom from oppression, but, as Hofstadter (1955) explains, can also cause long term unrest due to the encouragement of civil disobedience. However, the majority of scholars do not study populism to determine if it is 'good' or 'bad,' but rather to identify and answer questions of 'why' and 'how' specific cases of populism arose, persisted, and were resolved.

Many scholars examine the environment of populism to determine what necessitates populist movements. Students of 'Classic Populism,' such as Collier (1991) and Roberts (2008), focus their attention on Latin America in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century to analyze how periods of economic turmoil sparked "a legitimacy crisis and demands for political cooperation" (Kaltwasser, et al. 5). Populism in this context, as defined by Drake (1978) and di Tella (1965), is a political movement in which leaders, through "radical discourse[,] were able to construct heterogeneous class alliances and mobilize excluded sectors of society" (5). Germani (1978) elaborates on this definition to call populism

a multi-class movement that 'usually includes contrasting components such as claim for equality of political rights and universal participation for the common

people, but fused with some sort of authoritarianism often under charismatic leadership' (qtd. in Kaltwasser, et al. 5).

Other definitions, such as those offered by Priester (2007) and Rydgren (2005) in reference to 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> century populism in France, focus on the championing of the common people, as Germani indicates, but with specific regard to the countering of elite influence through pervasive anti-establishment sentiment (5).

The inclusion of 'anti-establishment' and 'anti-elite' terminology in definitions of populism is particularly common. Shils (1956) stresses the sentiment of the common man as better than the elite rulers, while Dahl (1956) claims that populism describes "a form of government that aims to maximize political equality and popular sovereignty at any cost" (Kaltwasser, et. al 6). In agreement with the previous two scholars, Kornhauser (1959), Germani (1978), and Lipset (1960) all include in their definitions of populism some form of the idea that populism includes the "destruction of social bonds and the emergence of new multitudes available to be mobilized by movements at odds with elites" (Taggart 12). The counter-posing of a people against the elites is another common component in definitions of populism, clearly underscored by scholars such as Mouzelis (1978) and Laclau (1977) who argue that populism fuels an "us" versus "them" dichotomy (Kaltwasser, et.al 6). While all of the various pieces of populism emphasize different aspects of populist experiences across time and borders, Canovan (1981) did try to find common themes throughout all populist experiences to date. Her conclusion however, was that the different variables of populism were "not reducible to a single core" (298).

### ***Nationalism and Populism***

As populism is often conflated with nationalism, a brief discussion of the characteristics of nationalism is necessary in order to elucidate the many differences between the two. While

they are critically two separate theories that do not always overlap, the varieties of populism expressed in the 1940s in Argentina and the late-20<sup>th</sup> century in Great Britain are two examples of populism strongly linked to nationalism. Lukacs (2005) notes that “nationalism is aggressive,” which fits with the active nature of creating the change in power dynamics that populism pursues, and that nationalism as evoked by populists is “the love of something less tangible [than a patriotic ‘love of a particular land’]” (36). This intangibility is due to commonalities found between groups of people, comprising the nation, that require immersion into the culture to be understood. He explains it as a type of “myth” of a people’s history, around which they can rally and try to restore their unity, or, as Anderson (1983) puts it, nationalism is based in “historical destinies” (Lukacs 36, Anderson 149). At the core of nationalism is the concept of nation-building. Nation-building is explained by Anderson to be socially-constructed, where a nation is nothing more than an “imagined community” that projects images of “social likeness” through commonalities such as shared language (6, 144). According to Anderson, a nation is imagined rather than being a tangible entity due to its sheer size; no individual in any nation will possibly know, or even know of, every other individual within that nation. As a result, Anderson argues that a nation is not built on relationships between people, but through an understanding of connectedness that is based in shared commonalities such as tradition, physical characteristics, geography, and language, to name a few (7). One nation is then distinguished from another “by the style in which they are imagined,” or, in other words, by what characteristics are imagined to be shared distinctly by a particular group of people (6). The strength of the imagined nation, however, does not just lie in these imagined commonalities, but rather in the belief that every other member in the nation is also aware of these commonalities. This understanding bonds those individuals together in a “deep, horizontal comradeship” that, in some cases, even creates a

willingness to die for the preservation of that imagined community (7). A connection to one's imagined nation is also strengthened by the fact that the characteristics that define the imagined community are not easy to emulate in their entirety. For example, while learning one language may introduce an individual to aspects of another imagined community, there are other aspects to that community which also need to be experienced, learned, absorbed and then incorporated into that individual's perception of the nation. Anderson argues that human beings are limited in their capacities to belong to multiple nations – in the psychological and emotional sense rather than in regard to citizenship – due to their mortality and the sheer limit of time individuals have to dedicate themselves to learning and absorbing the many characteristics and commonalities that are shared in each imagined community (148). Further, because 'nationalism' is based in the aforementioned terms of "historical destinies," to truly be part of an imagined community, a shared and clear understanding of where the nation is headed is necessary (149). Thus, in order for a populist movement to harness nationalism, the party must convey the vision for the nation that it hopes to achieve – the 'people' must strive to build and perfect 'the nation' through politics.

This is a logical relationship, in part because nationalism is one of few ideologies that spans both socioeconomic class and political parties, and populists often attempt to have their message span those very delineations. Consequently, nationalist pursuit of "historical destinies" can be used to unite disparate groups of people all in support of a party or leader that guides them toward representation within a nation. Often, a large portion of populist constituents are individuals who feel left out of the imagined nation as the "other" or the "them." For these individuals, Lukacs suggests, nationalism would be appealing because it would offer an opportunity to be a part of something bigger than class society, bringing a sought-after

“respectability” to all those united as a nation (44). Lukacs highlights the desire for respectability in terms of the working-class, but I argue that it can be applied to any group that is either not represented at all, or does not feel represented by the institutions in place. This desire for respectability can then be leveraged by populists to drive pursuit of change in these institutions that are not fully representative of all members of a nation. Such institutions, as described by Lukacs, are depended upon to restrain and redistribute power to create balance for various parties which are expecting representation (164). Thus, ‘incomplete’ nations that do not represent all of the voices of their people help spur populist movements due to the demand of respectability either in the form of inclusion into existing institutions, or the reconstruction of new institutions to include all areas of society.

Furthermore, populism driven by respectability is also underlined by a desire for legitimacy. Gidron (2013) believes that populism within the structure of a representative democracy “may serve to identify otherwise overlooked political problems and give marginalized groups a legitimate voice” (19). This legitimacy is what drives respectability, forcing the status quo contenders of politics to acknowledge that there is some power that lies in the hands of ‘the other.’ Kaltwasser and Mudde (2012) argue that although the political establishment fears populist movements, the movements can actually be, at times, a positive development in democracies because the core driver of each movement is better representation of the will of the people (17). Through nationalist sentiment, populist movements can achieve not only the power needed to increase representation for various groups within society, but populists can also then tighten the bonds between such groups through an affirmation of their shared national identity.

### *Classifications of Populism*

While not attempting to define populism itself, Gidron (2013) delineates different methods through which populism might be employed as a tool to achieve political success. He separates populism into three classifications: “[populism] as an ideology, a discursive style, and as a form of political mobilization” (5). Each of these categorizations takes ‘populism’ from being merely a label applied to a certain group or person, and transforms it into a strategic method for populist groups to employ. As an ideology, Mudde (2004) characterizes populism as rhetoric which reconciles bitterness between the common man and the elite (543). Under this view, populism is seen as the virtuous good, while the elite are corrupt and blameworthy for the plight of others (Gidron 6). The appeal of such an ideology is that it acknowledges the “ordinariness” of the common man, and connects his life and experience with that of others. In this sense, it builds the “respectability” that Lukacs discusses (Gidron 7; Lukacs 44). Similar to populism as an ideology is populism as a discursive style. In this latter sense, populism becomes a rhetorical tool that is applied by those “who claim to speak for the majority” (Gidron 8). What differentiates the ideology from the discursive style is that while an ideology suggests general beliefs of politicians, the discursive style is merely a tool employed to further the achievement of specific ends (8). Laclau emphasizes the utility of populism as a discursive style by suggesting that it is “discursive sequences through which a social force or movement carries out its overall political performance” (Laclau 13). However, it appears that in terms of lasting influence of populist goals, a movement sustained by shared populist ideology will have more persistent success and motivation than a movement sustained solely by a selectively-used discursive tool. Nevertheless, as Gidron notes, explicit expression of an ideology can be more implicating than an occasional promotion of a populist idea, which raises the benefits of the discursive style

(Gidron 9). Finally, populism can be seen as a political strategy, which can be similarly harnessed as the discursive style, however in a more consistent and long-term way. The political strategy shapes policy initiatives, and informs voters of where they can expect policy to go over time. All three of these utilizations of populism are critical to the forward progression of a movement, and the manipulation of them by various populist leaders will help build the framework of populism each desires to present to the world.

### **DEFINITION AND ORIGINS OF POPULISM**

After considering the existing scholarly dialogue, this project defines populism as a movement away from establishment politics toward leaders and policies that stress the need for a particular voice to begin to be represented, or to be better represented, in the political arena. Populist movements may center on representation of an underrepresented demographic group, or they may focus around the representation of an idea or policy. It is critical to note that the voices being represented by particular populist movements are often in pursuit of one main objective that is achieved through the attainment of political power at the national level. For example, a frequent goal of populist movements is the actuation of nationalist or nativist ideals; this can only be achieved through political organization and agitation, so the broad objective of ‘taking the country back’ translates itself into the fighting and winning of specific elections to gain positions of institutional authority capable of controlling policy over, for example, immigration. This concrete and immediate goal, the seizure of political power, thus facilitates the accomplishment of the larger, conceptual objective of changing the dynamic of politics in the nation.

The success or failure of populist movements is a subsidiary definitional problem. Though it is problematic to claim that populist movements share universal goals, there are

specific circumstances and relationships that serve as common influencers on, motivators of, and factors in their political programs. Populism's origin can be viewed as being dependent upon three concepts: the *seed* (the conceptual objective of populism), the *ground* (the socio-political environment), or the *farmer* (the leadership). I argue that the ground in which populism grows is most critical to the realization of the movement, as without the proper environment for populist sentiment to arise, the ideology of populism or a strong populist leader will not have the support to be successful. As will be developed further in chapters two and three, it is necessary to look at how an unequal socio-political environment permissive of populism arose. Here, tumultuous periods stemming from controversial leadership are common across cases, specifically the 1930s in Argentina, where economic and labor union policies set the stage for Perón's populism, and the 1980s in Great Britain, where Margaret Thatcher's labor union policies set the stage for UKIP's populism. The 'seeds' of populist ideology, as well individual populist leaders of significance, will be examined as secondary components of populist movements that have begun to grow out of politically fractured environments.

## **GROWTH OF POPULIST MOVEMENTS**

### ***Ongoing Drivers of Populism***

After a populist movement has grown in response to a widespread feeling of disenfranchisement, several key factors must be in place to continue to propel the movement forward. These drivers are: 1) backing from elite members of society, 2) the pandering of candidates to voter will through policy promises, and 3) the manipulation of populist rhetoric to perpetuate the mobilization of continued support for populist politics.



### *Elite Backing*

Although populism in the Argentine and British cases focused on the working class and middle class respectively, one key strategic factor for the rise and success of a populist movement is the support of elites who provide influence and funding to movements. This support can be voluntary or involuntary, but is nonetheless necessary to the legitimacy that populist movements will gain either through the power held by elites or through the increased publicity that can be achieved through high funding. Edwards (2014) concludes that elites and the working class can be voluntarily aligned through a “defensive mobilization by groups who had – or believed they had – much to lose” under a current or incoming administration (240). Therefore, the populist group takes on an outsider status that can be leveraged against the status quo (241). Elite backing consequently can be due to a belief that populists will benefit the elites somehow, or be due to a more charitable goodwill toward lower classes who are clearly not receiving proper representation. Leon (2014) supports this view of elites as the necessary component of a successful populist movement and argues that the power of elites is critical because whoever holds the money and resources holds influence over policy (40). Consequently, oligarchs begin to redistribute money because, by giving a temporary and small voice through the power of currency to the underrepresented, the elites decrease the incentive of the marginalized to revolutionize (41). In other words, so long as these groups feel as though they can buy the chance to speak, they will be less inclined to take more drastic measures. Elite funding in respect to redistribution emphasizes another benefit of elite support: increased recognition of the movement by members of all socioeconomic classes. To hear that a multi-millionaire is supportive of a particular campaign is significant in that it makes voters question what is so unique or beneficial about the group to attract such big-name investors. As the saying

goes, “all publicity is good publicity,” highlighting the fact that the more a populist group’s name and message is publicized, regardless of the tone surrounding the discourse, the more recognizable and legitimate the movement will become. As mentioned earlier however, elite backing may not always be positively portrayed; it may be the result of involuntary support, material or rhetorical, that the party has coerced out of elites rather than it being freely given. While coerced backing may not seem reflective of a legitimate democratic movement, it still results in many of the same benefits that accrue from freely-given support. The backing that elites provide gives an elevated awareness of populist movements, and this awareness is what allows the movement to increase its numbers, and consequently its power, to change the status quo political arena.

### *Pandering to Voters*

A second critical driver of populist growth is the ability of populist candidates to pander to voter wills. For the purposes of this discussion, ‘pandering’ is defined not as a negative act of indulgence, as it is often defined, but as a molding of priorities to the will of another. Pandering, in the political sense, is the promise of particular policy or a position of power in return for a vote. While elite backing focuses on the motivations of voters to support populist movements, pandering is centered on the motivations of the populist leaders themselves. Populists pander due to the ample evidence that voters shift directly in response to the promises made to them for the price of their votes. Leon, for instance, argues that incumbent candidates, populist or not, are more likely to appeal to the will of whatever becomes popular opinion, even if alternatives that would ultimately better serve voters are available (Leon 41); Downs (1957) makes a similar argument regarding organized political parties shifting entire policy stances toward the will of their core constituencies. Gidron suggests that, “populism as a form of political organization

typically place[s] an emphasis on the identity of the political leaders and their relation to other political actors” in order to emphasize differences between themselves as populist leaders and the status quo (12). Rather than attempt to steal voters away from the core of the traditional parties, populists look to the fringes to find votes, but mainly focus on appealing to their own core constituencies so that none of them move away to other parties. Ultimately, populists recognize that their success will generally lie in an increase in populist voter turnout to counter establishment voters, rather than in stolen votes due to shifting the policy direction of incumbents. Therefore, a strong candidate representing an already-existing constituent group must head the organization, rather than merely serving as a figurehead of populism without core backing; an expectation of gaining votes from other parties switching to the side of the populists is unrealistic and difficult to achieve without the freedom of unlimited sophistication that would make clear all voter desires (Leon 41). Recognizing this, pandering to core voter will is necessary to maintain their support, while also potentially drawing in voters from the fringes of other parties.

### *Manipulation of Rhetoric*

The manipulation of populist rhetoric is critical to driving populist movements forward. Populist rhetoric in particular has a focus on ‘the people,’ and the ways in which they share commonalities, rather than ways in which they are separated. As populist rhetoric often criticizes the failures of traditional politics, it attempts to show the various ways disparate groups people can be represented by an alternative to status quo politics. The manipulation of rhetoric therefore is the skill of populist leaders at processing what the emotional needs of various groups of people are, and targeting those needs through one aspect or other of unification or sympathy, often in the form of nationalism. A critical difficulty in this targeted approach to need-fulfillment is that it is

sometimes difficult to draw traditional political lines between varying components of different movements. For example, as is the case with Peronist and UKIP populism, left- and right-wing delineations can be blurred, and common denominators across supporters may be inconsistent. Therefore, to successfully achieve cross-partisan manipulation of rhetoric is difficult to achieve, but, when successful, highly enhances the growth of populist movements.

One key to being successful at manipulating rhetoric is being able to adapt the style in which populist messaging is disseminated. Rather than finding common themes within populist movements, Gidron views populism as an ideology, a discursive style, and as a political strategy that can all be manipulated for a variety of uses that may vary in form from movement to movement. To create a populist ideology and have it serve as a successful driver of populism, it cannot merely to be stated and then left to be interpreted by voters; rather, the message of populism and its goals must be critically formulated to highlight the benefits of nationalism to the populist cause. While pandering to voters reflects the substance of the ideological message in the form of promises, populist rhetoric itself is how the ideology is framed in a broader, more overarching, specifically-nationalist, form. In chapters two and three I analyze the framing of populism as an ideology through an examination of various examples of propaganda; these examples show how specific policy initiatives that have nothing to do with nationalism can be manipulated to create national unity by populist movements by emphasizing the benefits to the nation that would accrue from the diminishing of an ‘other.’ The importance of rhetoric to the driving and development of populist movements is particularly visible in the regulation of publications that are directly attributable to the movement.

In order to manipulate rhetoric, populist leaders must first have a clear understanding of what the ultimate goal of their movement is as well as the individual goals of various groups of

people. These goals may be policy-oriented, in which case rhetoric may be developed to offer all possible modes of achieving said policy while also detailing all of the benefits of the policy. On the other hand, these goals may be milieu-focused, in which case the rhetoric may highlight the negative aspects of the existing regime. The rhetoric is flexible in that as the political environment changes due to the increasing power of populism, so does the rhetoric in order to reflect the needs of the party while still maintaining the fundamental message of the movement.

## **CONCLUSION**

An analysis of populism specifically in Argentina in the 1940s and contemporary Great Britain will demonstrate that there is a distinct lifecycle process through which populist movements evolve. First, in order to take root, the environment for the seeds of discontent to be planted in must be present due to the failures of traditional politics. Once this environment is established and disjointed and under-represented individuals begin develop a conscious recognition of their disenfranchisement, a populist movement can begin to evolve. As is seen in chapters two and three, such movements cannot gain traction without elite backing, pandering to voters, and the manipulation of populist rhetoric. Once these drivers are in place, populist movements are elevated to positions of legitimate influence against the powers of established political parties. Drawing from the scholarly discourse, I have concluded that a pursuit of influence and power against the status quo is critical to the motivations of populists because it is this ability to affect change in the political arena that denotes an achievement of respectability and legitimacy for an underrepresented group. My analysis of Argentina and Great Britain will focus on this pursuit of power as a means to the expansion of representation within each nation as the rationale behind the actions of each movement. Examined in the light of nationalist sentiment, the pursuit of power is seen as a motivation to pursue representation for a united

people not defined by socioeconomic class as the established political environment states, but by a common understanding of what it means to be of a certain nation. What begins as loose dissent across disparate groups in a turbulent and fractured political environment grows to become a fully organized popular movement driven by elite support, pandering to voters, and the manipulation of rhetoric. In chapter four I then analyze the degree to which nationalist sentiment and the three drivers helped Argentina and Great Britain achieve power and success in terms of the achievement of the movement's goals as well as the pervasiveness of their message.

## Chapter 2: Argentine Case Study

### SOCIOCULTURAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND

In order to understand the rise to power of Colonel Juan Domingo Perón in 1946, it is necessary to undertake a thorough examination of the social and political context established over the previous decade of Argentine politics (reference Appendix A for timeline). The 1930s in Argentina, known as the ‘Infamous Decade,’ were marked by economic and social strife stemming from the Great Depression of the late 1920s and spurred on by the start of World War II in 1939. Throughout the Infamous Decade, leadership was disjointed and the nation was split along ideological lines dating back nearly a hundred years. Though the concept of ‘Two Argentinas’ simplifies a much more complex, divided nation, it accurately delineates in broad strokes a key line of division within Argentine society. Partly geographic in its roots, the social cleavage between the ‘internal’ society of countrymen and cattlemen in the Argentine interior and the more cosmopolitan, urban population of Buenos Aires was an instrumental factor contributing to the rise of Perón.

Both factions of Argentina had distinct historical origins. The ‘internal’ Argentina was characterized by a staunch defense of Hispanic traditionalism and culture, Catholicism, and economic nationalism based in an emphasis of supporting Argentine agrarian society. This tradition found its roots in the policies and lifestyle of Juan Manuel de Rosas, a wealthy military leader and dictator, who defended the ‘internal’ *gauchos* (cowboys) in the Argentine Civil War against the *porteños*, or inhabitants of Buenos Aires; though he was ultimately defeated and exiled, the principles he espoused remained sublimated in the culture of the interior. Similarly, the urban faction followed in the steps of a different, though equally-towering historical figure: Domingo F. Sarmiento, a liberal, Euro-centric author and eventual seventh president of

Argentina. He championed the ideals of laissez-faire economics and social conservatism, calling the citizens of the internal “barbarians” (Winston 308). By the 1930s, the ideas of Rosas and Sarmiento had politically evolved but nonetheless remained true to their lineages (reference Figure 2.1). For example, some argue that both Rosas and Sarmiento were embodied in President Hipólito Yrigoyen (1916-22; 1928-30). He blended aspects of both traditions into his policies, for instance by moving away from liberal, laissez-faire economics while simultaneously championing European-ness. However, despite his efforts to bridge the gap, he further exacerbated the division between the factions. While his semi-bridged politics were ultimately unsuccessful, they did begin to address a need that continually grew as the 1930s passed; in the wake of the Great Depression, the geographic lines separating the provincial internal and cosmopolitan cities became increasingly blurred as more farmers moved to the cities to find work in an industrial age.

<b>Conservative (Internal)</b>	<b>Liberal (Buenos Aires)</b>
Defense of Catholicism	Secular Society
Charismatic Leadership; Mass Politics	Anti-Mass Politics
Purity of Hispanic and Argentine tradition	Eurocentric; Spanish tradition
Socially Conservative	Socially Conservative
Emphasis on Hierarchy	Emphasis on Opportunity for Mobility
Regulated Market Control	Laissez-Faire Economics
Pro-Unions	Pro-Business

**Figure 2.1:** The ideological divides between the Internal and Buenos Aires by 1930s | Source: Winston (1983)

The internal migration to urban centers has been a point of controversy in the discussion of Perón’s popularity and its source. There is some debate whether or not Perón’s working class support in the elections was largely attributable to the numbers of existing working class citizens in cities, or to the number of new working migrants to the cities. The existing urban working class was comprised of European immigrants who came to Argentina throughout the late 19<sup>th</sup> century and early 20<sup>th</sup> century. The new urban working class was comprised of migrants from the




provinces, which ultimately decreased the agricultural sector and increased the industrial sector. It is difficult to determine which group had more influence on Perón's election because most analyses merely examine the general class makeup of voters, while data on the specific heritages of inner-class voters is disparate and contradictory. For example, Schoultz (1977) offers that the correlation between the percentage of blue-collar workers voting for Perón is around .81 while the percentage of white-collar employees is -.05 in 1946. However, the makeup of these groups is not developed further (1426).

Regardless, the reality is that the migrants to the cities did comprise a large base of Perón's support; combined with the existing "old" working class of foreign immigrants, and through continued migration between the 1930s and the mid-1960s, internal migrants continually added to the number of supporters. Statistics show that 50 to 70 percent of the old working class had been replaced by internal migrants by 1947, just under two decades since large-scale migrations began (Blanksten 116). The long, unbroken wave of migration began as a consequence of the Great Depression, and was spurred on heavily by the emphasis on economic nationalism and the consequent economic shift to import substitution industrialization.

Economic nationalism is critical to explaining the rise of industrialization in Argentina. From the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century through the end of the second World War, Argentina's economic policy was export-led growth. This model promoted trade relations with countries all around the world, particularly the United States and Great Britain, and launched the Argentine cattle-ranching business in *las pampas*, the fertile lowlands of the provinces, into the fore of Argentina's economy. The export market for Argentine beef was massive, with the tonnage of the famed beef exported increasing by 15 times the total exported between World War I and the Great Depression. Additionally, leading up to WWI, over half of Argentina's population was

foreign-born, and GDP was increasing at a rate of six percent per year, ultimately making Argentina the tenth largest economy in the world by 1913 (Eiras 2001). However, in the wake of World War I and then the Great Depression, dependence on foreign markets became increasingly less reliable for Argentina's economic stability. Due to crashing export markets in 1929, along with political instability due to a *coup d'état* in 1930, Argentina's economy fell into sharp decline and instability (reference Figure 2.2).



**Figure 2.2:** Argentina's GDP, % change on previous year | Source: Madison Project; IMF

In an attempt to recover stability, Argentina instated an economic policy of import substitution industrialization ('ISI') at the start of the 1930s. As formally theorized by Raúl Prebisch (1950), ISI promotes the replacement of foreign imports with domestically-produced and manufactured goods in order to boost a nation's economy from within. The imposition of high tariffs aimed to decrease the purchase of imports, while programs incentivizing purchasing from local agrarian centers attempted to redirect the flow of commercial activity back toward rural markets. The initial shift to ISI was significant and rapid, with import tariffs raised from around 16 percent to around 28 percent between 1930 and 1933 ("A Tragedy of Argentina"). The increased demand for domestic industrial production due to the costly price of imports continued

pulling waves of migrants to the rapidly-industrializing cities. However, the transition to the cities brought more than just industrialization; with the introduction of the ideology of the provinces to Buenos Aires, the shift to ISI brought new political demands to the capital city that were often not met or represented by the government at the time.

Although he was stationed in Europe for most of the 1930s, Perón was well aware of the need to bridge the Two Argentinas that had now geographically blended. However, given the example of Yrigoyen – an otherwise effective leader ousted in 1930 due to intra-party struggle – he knew that no existing political party could come to agreement over how to do so or would be willing to compromise its beliefs sufficiently to appeal to the other faction (Winston 309). Consequently, Perón set out to unify segments of society without the limitations of party politics, breaking from the failed attempts of predecessors the decade before him and the failed leadership practices of his fellow military presidents in the few years preceding his own presidency. However, before examining how Perón bridged the Two Argentinas before and during his presidency by harnessing the three drivers of populism explained in chapter one, I will analyze the political environment Perón was entering into in the 1940s.

### ***Instability in the Casa Rosada***

From 1943 to 1946, Argentina was ruled by three colonels, each of which alienated segments of society and quickly passed leadership on to the next. These unstable years began with a military uprising in June 1943 against then-President Ramón S. Castillo. A pamphlet distributed to the revolutionary soldiers describes Argentina as having lost its power in the wake of the Infamous Decade. The solution proposed by the insurgents was dictatorship to enforce harsh realities on the Argentine people so that they could work hard in the short term for long term rewards of guardianship over all of South America (Blanksten, 48-49). The dictatorship

envisioned by the military upset Argentines across the country. Due to a dissolution of Congress and a delay of presidential elections, for three years there was no representation of any voice except that of the army faction ‘G.O.U.,’ or *Grupo de Oficiales*. The few men at the front of G.O.U., which included Perón, believed that there was too much corruption in the hands of civilian leaders, and desired a full military dictatorship to maintain order and unity to preserve “Argentina for the Argentines” (52). This united nationalist sentiment was perhaps one of few points of growing agreement across the nation, serving as the “commonality” necessary in the creation of the Argentine “imagined community,” as Anderson would put it. Consequently, nationalist sentiment found a central position in Perón’s populism.

### **PERÓN: PRE-PRESIDENCY**

Political turmoil that had been brewing between 1943 and 1946 finally capped off with the victory of Juan Domingo Perón against the internationally-favored presidential candidate, José Tamborini in the 1946 presidential election. Running on a Labor platform, Perón’s appeal to the working class won him the presidency, culminating a three-year effort of relationship-building with unions, a process which began with his appointment as secretary of labor and welfare in 1943 (Blanksten 55). While in his office, he sought to address long-term issues with labor laws and union behavior; Perón struck a balance between appealing to union workers by first demanding the enforcement of existing labor laws, and earning the respect of union leaders by punishing noncompliant unions.

The story of Perón’s journey from army officer to the voice of Argentine labor is one of high ambition and smart political timing. Many labor-friendly measures had been passed into law in 1932, including increased wages, shorter working hours, and retirement and severance compensation plans, but a decade later these promises stood largely unfulfilled. This set the stage

for Perón, desperate to find a core constituency that would support his presidential ambitions, to use his demand for the enforcement of these laws and earn the support of unions (McGuire 49). Given that then-President Farrell granted the labor and welfare secretariat both executive and judicial powers with Perón as its leader, Perón was able to do much of what he would continue to do as Argentine president before he was even elected. Notably, he immediately increased wages for the working-class, giving “workers in months what they previously had been unable to achieve in years” (Buchanon 5). Additionally, Perón made it clear that the priority concern for labor was the state of the worker (Smith 44-47). This resulted in a mentality that stated that the worker was always correct, and that his needs must be addressed first (Buchanon 4). With workers in a position of appreciation to the state, the pressure for union leaders to comply with state expectations increased. As a reward for compliance, wages were continually increased and state recognition of the union’s legitimacy was granted (5).<sup>1</sup>

While Perón rewarded unions for complying to his labor reforms, he firmly cracked down on any and all uncooperative union organizations by punishing them for noncompliance; in doing so, Perón exercised a true carrot and stick approach to union governance. In order to increase his ability to punish unions, Perón legalized particular types of strikes, which also had the effect of giving Perón the power, as secretary, to declare other strikes illegal and criminal (6). This delicate balance of repressing and embracing unions created an atmosphere in which the consequences of defiance were known to be severe but the rewards of cooperation had great potential. To further compliance, Perón knew he needed to woo the directors of the working class, the union leaders. However, rather than woo the existing leadership, he deposed and

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<sup>1</sup> State recognition gave unions the right to go on strike, to negotiate wages, and to participate in the public sphere as a legitimate actor. Without state recognition, protests, such as strikes, were illegal and could result in criminal punishment (Buchanon 6).

replaced them with “henchmen of the ‘new Argentina’” (Blanksten 55). Such ‘henchmen’ were individuals who supported Perón full-heartedly, and who Perón relied upon to lead nationalist, morale-building initiatives in the workplace. Examples of such initiatives included pro-Perón worker demonstrations in factories, as well as to project Peronist propaganda throughout industrial plants, as seen in Figure 2.3 (55).



**Figure 2.3:** “Before” and “Now” for workers under Perón. | Source: Schembs (2012)

Leading up to 1946, the nation had appeared to have settled into compliance under Fárrell's strict rule. Labor looked positively upon the administration with Perón as their point person, and the military maintained relative peace among its ranks. Given the stability, President Fárrell lifted the state of siege in August 1945 that had been imposed by the government across Argentina from December 1941. However, this loosening of control resulted in massive backlash, and the united voice of the Socialist, Communist, Radical and Conservative parties rallied against the G.O.U. administration. Together, this uncommon, united front formed the Board of Democratic Co-Ordination, and demanded presidential elections be held. In response, Fárrell re-instated the siege, only further infuriating Argentinians. Thinking that anti-military sentiment would cease if Perón's power was reduced, in October 1945 Fárrell deposed Perón from his posts at the war ministry, the secretariat of labor and welfare, and as vice president of Argentina. Fárrell began to think that Perón was too pro-labor, and was stirring dissent among, and encouraging empowerment of, the working class against the military.

Following Perón's removal from his posts and his subsequent arrest, two distinct sides emerged in opposition to the military. One side, Perón's supporters, verbally criticized the military for removing Perón. The other side, primarily composed of urban elites, was upset with the military for allowing Perón to gain so much power in the first place and not taking action previously. The fight was now civilians against the military; the attackers, although they had the same target, were split between love and hate for Perón. Fárrell's plan to remove Perón, which was originally pitched as a peacemaking move toward the elites, turned into an anti-military movement spread across social classes (Blanksten 60). In the end, it was Perón's supporters who were victorious. As Blanksten states, "there were those who had forgotten that Perón's political strength rested on *two* legs. One of them, the army, was crippled [...], but the other [labor] was

whole” (61). While Perón was not supported by the core of the army during the protests for his release, the voice of labor was loud enough to demand his return to power.

On October 17, 1945, Perón was released by the military and declared his bid for the presidency. Thousands of working class citizens, later known as *descamisados*, or the “un-shirted,” were there to hear the announcement, having marched on Buenos Aires to show their support (Smith 46). From that day forward, Perón not only sought to further bolster the support of the *descamisados*, but to draw as many straying Radicals, middle-class fringe voters, domestic nationalists, church officials, and German Nazis into his fold as possible (Blanksten 66). His efforts along the campaign trail proved fruitful, despite violence and rioting by his supporters such as anti-Semitic protests near the Jewish quarter and tear gas attacks by nationalists against *porteños* at a rally of the later (68). While the violence was unjustified and denounced by Perón himself, the unity of the perpetrators highlights the early stages of cohesion among Peronists. These actors were for the first time united in their desire for a ‘new, pure Argentina,’ fighting against those who valued internationalism and foreign-influence. This nationalist sentiment propelled Perón’s campaign forward, and he assumed the Presidency on June 4, 1946 claiming the people as his “cause” and the flag as his “guide” (72). From here, he embraced the working man and the nationalist cause as his principle inspirations, even though ‘populism’ was not his explicit intent from the start.

### **PERONISM AS POPULISM**

Perón’s populism developed even before he entered the *Casa Rosada*. His populist ideology was exhibited not only in the policies he enacted as Secretary of Labor and Welfare, but also in his unique position as a military leader who defended the common man rather than just elites. His persona as president broke the mold of both traditional Western and Argentine



politicians - the Western politician being exemplified by the civilian intellectual leader, and the Argentine by the military elitist leader. Over Argentina's history, there was so much political turmoil that elitist military leaders were just about as common in the *Casa Rosada* as intellectual politicians such as Sarmiento. Using the failures of the civilian leaders as justification, the G.O.U. forcefully took power, turning the tide toward military rule. However, while working class Argentines wanted change from the leaders of the 1930s, the shift to military rule was not what they desired. Rather, the people envisioned a figure who could bridge the Two Argentinas, becoming a political type of his own. Perón, while a brigadier general, broke from this traditional mode of military-style rule and focused his attention on the working class rather than on appeasing the wealthy. This radical change from the civilian and military presidents of the 1930s to Perón was reflective of society's desire for someone to take the lead with new initiatives rather than continue traditional policies which, for over a decade, did not successfully restore economic stability and social unity to Argentina. Perón was able to do just that, harnessing his position with both the military and labor to meld their two interests. In the process, he established a political movement capable of maintaining and expanding its hold on power by harnessing three drivers of populist mobilization: elite backing, pandering to voters, and the manipulation of rhetoric.

### ***Elite Backing***

The first driver I examine is Peron's harnessing of support from elites. Importantly, this support from elite members of society does not just have to be fiscal. Instead, the support can manifest in the way that it did with labor leaders: these labor leaders did not fund Perón's campaign, but rather they offered important support as powerful ambassadors for Perón's

message. McGuire (1997) refers to these union leaders as the “sectoral elite” that served as the mouthpiece for urban businesses, landowners, and workers. He argues that these union leaders, constitute an elite because they occupy strategic positions in Argentina’s powerful labor organizations, and because influential members of the armed forces regard their views as important factors to be weighed when deciding whether to launch a coup (7).

The ability to dissuade a coup using the influence of such elites not only works to deter the military, but also to deter revolution from marginalized workers. As is seen by Perón’s arrest in 1945 by Fárrell, the military was overall wary of his power and influence. However, upon notice of his capture, Perón’s allies in the labor unions came to his aid. They did so by marching on Buenos Aires with the understood promise that upon Perón’s release, he would work to support unions in return for their loyalty. Upon his release, he did just that; he both sought to mend fences with the military elites who had opposed him with a gesture of magnanimity while consolidating his position with the labor leadership. Standing together in front of a plaza full of people, President Fárrell and Perón gave a joint-address focused on unity and forward progress, with Perón saying to the crowd, “do not ask me questions about things I have forgotten.” His words and actions in these tense days presented to the public a united military, while also highlighting his intention to move forward with his reformist, populist policies without allowing personal setbacks to hinder his plans (Blanksten 61-62). From then on, the support of elites in labor was secure, while military elites, having taken and missed their best shot at removing Perón, were increasingly resigned to accept his leadership due to pressures from the labor elites and some middle class members of society (Smith 47).

It can be argued however that Perón’s support from union leaders was false elite-backing because, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, most of the men in power were instated by Perón while he was secretary of labor in order to remove opposition leaders to his reform plans.

Consequently, can these elites really be considered critical to the development of Perón's agenda? While the union leaders may have been dependent on Perón for their titles, he in fact was highly dependent on them because they were the ones influencing the workers and controlling the inflows of money to Perón's campaign as the ultimate decision-makers. Ultimately, this relationship was balanced by Perón needing the votes, and the unions wanting the monetary rewards and prestige that resulted from supporting Perón's candidacy. Therefore, they did have the power to change the direction of policies or even shift their overall support to another candidate if Perón did not keep his end of the bargain by significantly rewarding unions that complied with his initiatives.

The second aspect of elite backing that was critical to driving Perón's populist movement forward was funding from the Eva Perón Foundation. Perón's wife, Eva María Duarte de Perón, fondly referred to as "Evita," grew up as a working class woman. Consequently, she fiercely pursued her husband's goal of improving the position of the working class (Guillermoprieto 7). She famously stated that "when the rich think about the poor, they have poor ideas," so she took it upon herself, as someone who knew life without wealth, to properly address the needs of workers. In 1948 she started the Eva Perón Foundation, which was dedicated to providing scholarships to gifted students of lower socioeconomic classes, and to opening other institutions, such as hospitals, schools, and orphanages, to support lower-class welfare. Within a few years, Evita was controlling millions of dollars in funding. However, the accumulation of these funds from landowning and industrial elites was not always through legal means or due to genuine interest in charity from the donors. Eva frequently utilized her husband's position as President to coerce elites into funding her projects. However, no matter if elite backing, fiscal or otherwise, was coerced or voluntary, it still offered necessary support to the growth of Argentina's populist

movement. Examples of Eva's manipulation included shutting down businesses that refused to donate, as she did at the Mu-Mu candy factory, and demanding donations in return for the partial forgiveness of debts to the government or tax evasion (evitaperon.org). Despite the instances of misconduct or fraud in the collection of funds, those who benefited under Eva and Juan did not protest. For them, Perón offered

a political movement that legitimated and ennobled the working poor [...] and – [by] institutionalizing a crony relationship between organized labor and the government – transformed Argentina from a sugar daddy for the rich into a sugar daddy for the poor (Guillermoprieto 8).

Regardless of how the funding arrived in the hands of Eva and her husband, it was the support of the Eva Perón Foundation that economically sustained Perón's campaigns through garnering vehement electoral support from those who benefited from the charity.

### ***Pandering to Voters***

Though the support of elites was important to Perón's ability to consolidate his hold on power, it was through promises made directly to voters that he laid the groundwork for a populist political movement capable of obtaining and exploiting the powers of the presidency itself. Indeed, the main driver of his success as a candidate and, later, as president was the effort he put into building public support in the years leading up to 1946. Although he was ousted from his positions in the secretariat of labor and welfare, the military, and the executive office in 1945, the alliances he had built prior ensured that once he was freed, there would be no further suppression of his actions in future years. Rather, the adamancy with which the public demanded his release essentially left no doubt that he would have his way when given power to exercise.

However, in order to first solidify that power in the presidency, Perón had to pander to voters. In this case, pandering meant not only forming policy discussion around issues directly purported by the core group of voters Perón was looking to win; it also included acts of

patronage, both by Perón himself and Fárrell in the presidency before him. As mentioned in chapter one, the promise of positions of power in return for votes can be a powerful method of pandering. Through patronage, Perón and Fárrell were able not only to secure the support of the people they placed into positions of power, but also the support of those who were loyal to those newly-appointed individuals. Therefore, pandering was both an internal and external operation that built populist support around the candidacy of Perón through initiatives taken within the government itself and along the campaign trail. Specific instances of pandering during the campaign included:

- Granting positions of union leadership in return for state recognition of union's legitimacy, thereby granting those unions the legal right to strike (Buchanon 6)
- Promise to dismantle the communist Federation representing packinghouse workers and replace it with a newly organized union that would consolidate all meatpacking workers under one union run by native Argentines rather than foreigners (Smith 44).
- Enactment of wage increases in return for the promise not to strike for at least another year (45).
- Establishment of a minimum wage and reduced working hours for the promise of union leaders to enter all future negotiations with attitudes of "good will" (46).

In chapter one, I explain that Gidron and other scholars argue that the key to pandering to voters is not for a populist leader to try to steal voters from opposing parties, but to embrace the desires of his core support to further strengthen those who already align with his ideologies and policies (12). While Perón clearly worked to pander to the desires of the working class, as seen in the examples listed above, Perón was not widely popular enough by the 1946 election to only depend on those voters. His growing, but still infant, populist support from the working class for the 1946 election required him to also pull together a much more disparate group of individuals to increase his overall number of votes (Blanksten 77). However, by the time his bid for re-election was cast by his *Peronista* party in 1951, his popular support had been developed. The trend from 1946 to 1951 shows Perón's support becoming far more institutionalized between

elections, with three main constituent groups growing out of the hodge-podge of voters supporting Perón in 1946 (reference Figure 2.4).

<b>1946 Perón Supporters</b>	<b>1951 Perón Supporters</b>
Collaborationists – Breakaway, middle class Radicals	<i>Descamisados</i> – the representative title given to the working class
Labor Party – working class	
Union leaders and workers	General Confederation of Labor of the Argentine Republic (‘CGT Union’)
Radical Orientation Forces of Argentine Youth	
Nationalist Liberation Alliance	<i>Partido Femenino Peronista</i> –Female Peronist Party established by Evita in 1949
Right-wing Catholic Church officials	
German Nazis	

**Figure 2.4:** Core groups of voters for Perón

As previously mentioned, in the 1946 election, Perón did not have a sizable group of people actively imploring him to pursue the presidency. While he understood that he had the support of the working class based on his years as secretary of labor, he recognized that these were not enough and that he would have to attempt to attract voters on the fringes of other political parties. This ‘stealing of votes’ is difficult to achieve, as explained by Binswanger and Prüfer (2012), because in order to pander to a specific set of voters, one’s policy must appeal to them while also not betraying the expectations of core constituents (368). Perón had to balance this act very carefully when he attempted to acquire Radical voters. While the Radical party drew much of its support from the leftist, urban middle-class and promoted wealth redistribution, the party looked negatively upon Perón as he was aligned with the military, which often upheld the right’s conservative values that protected elites. Additionally, the Radical party was initially formed to support the emerging middle class and increase its feelings of validity in a previously separated two-class society; Perón’s emphasis on raising the respectability of being a working class citizen was a threat to the power that had been instilled in the minds of the middle class by the Radicals over the years (Smith 34).

In appealing to policies of Radical President Hipólito Yrigoyen (1916-1922, 1928-1930), Perón hoped to show at least some of the Radicals that he too agreed with their tenets of social justice as exemplified through his work with labor (McGee *xvi*; Crasweller 173).<sup>2</sup> Ultimately, his efforts were rewarded when he gained the support of a small group of Radicals who became known as the “Collaborationists,” known as such for their transgressions in joining Perón. Once the seeds of alliance with Perón had been planted through social justice policy-talks, Farrell made his move to secure their support for Perón by placing the Collaborationist leaders on his Cabinet.<sup>3</sup> Perón followed this move with his biggest pandering initiative, making newly-appointed Interior Minister and Radical party member Hortensio Quijano his running mate for the Vice Presidency (Blanksten 65).

In addition to the Collaborationists, Perón garnered some support from various smaller, left-leaning political organizations that were unraveling due to lack of leadership and the repression of ideas under President Farrell’s siege. These groups included the Radical Orientation Forces of Argentine Youth (FORJA) and the Nationalist Liberation Alliance (ALN), both of which were staunchly nationalist and, although they disagreed with many of Perón’s policies, had no better nationalist candidate to vote for (Crasweller 174).

Perón was not dismissive of his supposed, and actual, pandering to voters. Winston quotes him as stating that he was “merely the executing arm of the popular will [whose] virtues must be based on the correct and honorable execution of the people’s desires” (325). With an ideology of populism, upholding the desires of the people through policy action was the most

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<sup>2</sup> However, it is critical to note that many of the Radicals did not agree with Yrigoyen, so when Perón appealed to them, he recognized that it was to a very specific group of individuals.

<sup>3</sup> Social justice policies, as will be developed later in this chapter, focused on elevating the lower classes through reducing underutilized resources and money of elites. Such policies included increasing state control over institutions such as social security, as well as over the utilization of natural resources to include the redistribution of land that was not being productively farmed.

logical way to prove sincerity of intention. For example, in 1945, after thousands of workers at a packinghouse were suspended, Perón, as secretary of labor, demanded the restoration of their jobs. When the factory stated that it could not afford their salaries, Perón said that the state would pay them, ultimately costing Argentina ten million pesos (500,000 USD today) (Smith 45). Perón, through state intervention, showed that he was not afraid to redistribute money and time that may have been previously given toward the interests of the elites, and direct it toward the working class to satisfy their needs.

The tangible benefits of Perón's actions to better the marginalized factions of society was very unsettling to various sectors of Argentina and the international community. Fear of Perón's presidency and the political upheaval it would cause was so strong that active initiatives were undertaken by opposition forces, both foreign and domestic, to decrease approval of Perón and his policies during the campaign. One of the most notable efforts was seen in the "Blue Book," published by the U.S. State Department, which highlighted the negative consequences of the "fascist-like military dictatorship" and attempted to state that Perón would be the same as the military dictators that ruled before him. Overall, the goal of the Blue Book was to reduce support for Perón; however, given that many of Perón's supporters were staunch nationalists, foreign intervention in an election campaign was highly unattractive and arguably bolstered support for Perón (Blanksten 70).

Ultimately, the 1946 race was still relatively close in the direct vote. While Perón had been able to gain large numbers of supporters from the old working class, the internal migrant working class, labor elites, and some Radicals, he earned just about 300,000 more direct votes than his opponent. The final election result, considered one of the most fairly and democratically run elections in Argentine history, gave Perón 52 percent and Tamborini 43 percent (McGuire



61). Based on the electoral college however, Perón won by a landslide – 304 delegates to 72 delegates (Blanksten 71). Perón had captured a critical mass of electors by successfully targeting key constituencies with transactional promises of justice, peace and redistribution; he thus captured the pinnacle position of institutional authority in Argentine politics for his movement, giving him the authority necessary to keep the promises he had made and, crucially, to credibly make more in the future if he needed to.

After his presidential victory in 1946, Perón realized that he no longer had to try to appease the various segments of the diverse political parties that had backed him. Just nine days following his election, he demanded that the parties of his three core constituent parties disband, and come together to create the *Partido Unico de la Revolución* (United Party of the Revolution). Two of the parties, the *Unión Cívica Radical-Junta Renovadora* and the *Centros Independientes*, immediately disbanded to join Perón's new party, with only the Labor party initially resisting. However, slowly, Labor dissolved as their resolve and organization thinned and as presidential pressure increased. By 1947, the *Partido Unico* renamed itself the *Partido Justicialista* (Justice Party), commonly referred to as the *Peronista* party (McGuire 61-62), and became the party under which Perón ran for reelection in 1951.

In contrast to the 1946 election, the 1951 presidential election was characterized by very different conditions. Whereas Perón was eager for the presidency but had to earn a support-base in the early 1940s, by 1949, Perón was in a much more secure position, and indeed had become something of an institution unto himself. Thinking his time in politics was coming to a close and that he was no longer the best person to lead the now-stabilized nation forward, he put little effort into pandering to bolster his already-strong position. He went so far as to officially state that he that he would not accept a second term in office due to health reasons. However, despite

his initial denials of a second candidacy, by early 1951 his three core constituencies were begging for his reelection bid: *los descamisados*, the G.C.T., and *el Partido Feminino Peronista*. By August, Perón conceded and was formally nominated as the *Personista* candidate (Blanksten 77-78).

Despite this large support base that Perón had, he still strongly attempted to shut down any opposition to his re-election throughout the 1951 campaign. Initially, the state of siege that had been in place under Fárrell's presidency had been lifted during President Perón's first term; however, on September 28, 1951, it was reinstated in response to a supposed plot against the government. Tensions were high in the Perón administration as it was uncovered that the *coup d'état* plans involved both domestic and foreign actors working with segments of the military, with whom Perón had always had strife. Following a declaration of "internal war," Perón's government instated restrictions that "made campaigning virtually impossible for the opposition parties" (Blanksten 83). For example, radio time was regulated, and the Radical party, the largest opposition at the time, was not given any air time. By October, two of the four opposition candidates withdrew from the race. Of the two remaining candidates, the Radical's Ricardo Balbín was the strongest opposition to Perón. Expecting his own victory in the November election, Balbín campaigned vigorously to remind his supporters that "Perón no longer is ruling this country" (84). In contrast to Balbín, Perón handled his second campaign in a very relaxed fashion. First, he signed a leave of absence for himself from the Presidency in October 1951 so that his presidency would not give him an unfair advantage over opponents. However, while on his leave of absence, he did not launch a campaign tour, and only gave four speeches total. Ultimately, Perón won over sixty percent of the overall vote, and was victorious in every Argentine province.

Perón's years of pandering ended with this election in 1951. While he still worked in support of the lower classes, he had consolidated his power, making Congress and other institutions more figureheads of democratic structure than anything with real authority, and Argentina became a nation fully subservient to Perón's will (121). However, the importance of Perón's pandering to the needs of working class citizens cannot be understated in their importance to the creation of his political movement and support group.

### ***Manipulation of Rhetoric***

As mentioned in chapter one, populism can be used as a tool by various political leaders or parties to construct their message either as an ideology, as a discursive style, or as a political strategy. As Perón's policies developed during his three years in government before the presidency, and then during his nine years in office, his rhetoric evolved from specific negotiating points to earn votes, to a full-blown populist political strategy. This development of policy initiatives into serious political action with clear direction stems in part from the fact that Perón viewed his opinions and goals as stemming from a people's movement, rather than from a rigid political party. This fluidity allowed for the utilization of the discursive style that would congeal over time into political strategy that is appealing to the masses. Such phenomena may be referred to as "Movementism" (Mainwaring 22). The malleable nature of Perón's movement facilitated the ultimate development of a coherent nationalist revisionism.

### ***Movementism***

Movementism is the spread of an ideology or theory by a united group of people that is not confined by the limitations and institutionalizations of formal political parties. Movementism is characterized by flexibility in structure, but often does not correlate to flexibility of message. First, there is flexibility in achievement of power. Unlike a political party, movements do not

need to gain power through electoral systems. Rather, power can be obtained informally, such as merely being influential over certain sectors of society. Perón himself provides an example of such informal, but still impactful influence during his pre-presidential period when, as secretary of labor, he moved beyond the expectations of his job title and actively worked to build confidence among the working class through speeches about their worth and value to Argentine society. Second, there is flexibility in how much power a movement is capable of seeking. In party systems, there is the expectation of winners and losers in every contest. However, a movement will never be constrained by proportional representation or limits on seats in Congress, and it need not be exclusively partisan in either fact or intention. A movement's ideas can be promoted by various officers across socio-economic and political party lines in ways simple partisanship cannot, potentially gaining universality of power (McGuire 4). An additional benefit to Movementism, and one realized by Peronists, was the ability to exert demands in non-political arenas, such as through mass union demonstrations or attacks on opponents through the media while remaining untethered by partisanship (McGuire 4-5). Furthermore, the strength of a movement may ebb and flow with changes in executive political leadership, but the reputational and economic risks faced by the group are reduced in not having to be held accountable in concurrent campaigns; acting as an informal pressure group, a movement can transcend the ebb and flow of party politics. While it is important to note that Perón did form the *Partido Justicialista* in 1947, this was merely a formality for the election. His ideology was just as pervasive outside the confines of the formal party as it was inside the party, giving it the character of movement more than an institutionalized party. As McGuire notes, Perón's reluctance to better-institutionalize his party "stemmed from the fact that a well-institutionalized

party was not strictly necessary for Perón to retain political power” (McGuire 77). Rather, he relied upon his personality and ability to uphold his promises to the working class.

President Perón’s movement grew increasingly strong over the course of his first presidency and into his second not only because of the specific tenets it was based upon, which will be developed in the next section, but also because of his charisma. It is this charisma that drew people to Perón, characterizing him in history as a *personalist* leader. The Calverts describe the personalism developed by Perón’s supporters as

to imply yielding support to an individual rather than an institution and possibly also accepting that the individual in question may use powers which go beyond the limits of institutional constraints (Calvert and Calvert 82).

This suggestion of allegiance to an individual rather than a political party or institution lends credit to why Perón was able to develop and maintain his political strength before the creation of his Justice Party. Consequently, however, Perón’s personalism may also have been the main reason for his movement’s downfall. The Justice Party’s successors were not as capable at harnessing popular support because, though handpicked by Perón, they lacked his personality and drive. Additionally, every individual chosen as a successor was inexperienced at running a political campaign against an opposition candidate because solely Perón had been head of the party since the founding of the party. Consequently, the Justice Party had little concrete foundation to stand on to propel them forward after the ousting of its personalist leader in 1955.<sup>4</sup>

Additionally, Perón was able to enact highly controversial policies that his successors could not due to the reputation that he had built for himself over the course of his time as secretary of labor. It is this reputation that caused supporters to willingly overlook or even actively

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<sup>4</sup> Note that after the 1955 *coup d’etat*, the Justice Party was forbidden, but its leadership still had potential to join together and keep the movement going.

accept instances in which Perón's laws toed the line of legality.<sup>5</sup> In 1950, he stated that, "in political action the scale of values of every Peronist is the following: first the Fatherland, then the Movement, and then Men," further emphasizing that all of his actions were in pursuit of the betterment of Argentina and its inhabitants (Guido). For Perón's successors, while the same goal existed, continuing in a questionably undemocratic direction proved to be too difficult for those without the charisma and God-like status of Perón (McGuire 78; Winston 323).

### ***Nationalist Revisionism***

Despite Perón's continual efforts to bridge the Two Argentinas, the one major area of reconciliation that did not require as much compromise from either side regarded nationalist sentiment. Perón's goal for Argentina was to uphold three tenets, as he specifically elaborated in 1949 upon the passage of various Constitutional reforms: "a fatherland that is socially just, economically free and politically sovereign" (qtd. in Winston 316). In this case, economic independence refers to increasing export rates while dissuading imports and focusing on building Argentine economic stability from within the nation's industrial sector through import substitution industrialization. Social justice refers to policies that are aimed at bettering the economic opportunities for the working class and other lower-income groups, while maintaining fairness in competition and compensation across social classes. Finally, political sovereignty is defined as the desire of Perón to restore the Argentine nation to a position of success based in self-determination rather than on foreign economic support. To achieve the three objectives of economic freedom, social justice and political sovereignty, Perón borrowed from both Argentinas. At the time, upholding political sovereignty was a tenet associated with the liberal

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<sup>5</sup> One example of this questionable legality is seen in the Eva Perón Foundation (FEP), which, as mentioned above, gave money from Perón and his elite supporters to the working class, but only in exchange for public statements of support for the regime (Wolfenden).

camp, while the conservatives defended working for greater social justice. However, both sides were relatively agreeable to each other's positions, even if not actively promoting them through their own policies. To bridge the Two Argentinas, Perón took a more conservative approach to social justice while upholding liberal values and policies that ensured political sovereignty and legitimacy. Economic independence, on the other hand, proved more difficult for Perón as both sides were vehemently opposed to each other's position.

### *Economic Independence*

While there was some agreement between conservatives and liberals on the concepts of social justice and political sovereignty, in contrast the two sides were harshly split along classical liberal and European-style conservative lines in regard to economic independence.<sup>6</sup> While left-wing progressive *Sarmiento* nationalism was characterized by glorifying European economics, institutions and trade, right-wing, *Rosistas* conservatives focused their attention on the exact opposite - eliminating close dependence on Europe. Perón leaned more toward the conservative model, although he avoided publically denouncing European influence on Argentina (Winston 316). Winston states that Perón left his "most specific condemnations of European culture [...] for the confines of the Argentine Academy [...] pandering to an audience of right wing intellectuals," rather than openly attacking European influence on Argentina in his public speeches (321). Despite this, Perón was outspoken in his direct desire for economic independence. In emulation of the nation's founding father, General José de San Martín, Perón traveled to Tucumán to announce that "we are also ready to die, should it be necessary, to obtain our economic independence," reflecting on the bravery of Argentines in 1816 who were ready to die for their political independence from Spain (Blanksten 238).

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<sup>6</sup> Classical liberals typically uphold principles of free trade, internationalism and small government, and European-style conservatives usually value strong central government, national defense and economic autarky.

When Perón spoke of economic independence, he meant full independence from foreign influence, specifically from monopolies in Argentina owned by corporations from Britain and the United States, which by 1940 comprised 55 percent of all industrial establishments in the nation (239). As Vice President of Argentina in 1944, Perón made all employees who were foreign-born and working in Argentina register themselves and their employment with the Argentine police. Commonly, the Argentine government paid bribes to such foreign individuals for information on foreign-entities and used them to shape rhetoric on foreign corporations aimed at garnering momentum for an economic system independent of foreign control (238). While this was a drastic first step at manipulating foreign influence, government regulations only continued to increase into Perón's Presidency in the late 1940s. The creation of numerous councils and committees to better the pursuit of economic independence resulted in military control of national budgets and marine trade. For example, in 1943 the Argentine State Merchant Fleet was created and charged with "the management of the country's entire merchant marine." The Fleet's responsibilities were increased under Perón to include conducting all possible seaborne foreign commerce so that government had direct control over trade (242-243). Through control of the economy by direct government influence, Perón hoped to build Argentina's international power and domestic civilian nationalism.

### ***Social Justice***

Continuing with conservative policy that usually defends the working class, Perón emphasized social justice across socioeconomic classes in Argentine society, implementing policies to fulfill his pre-election promises to work on behalf of the working class so that they may be in greater balance with the wealthy above them (reference Appendix B). Most critical to framing his political strategy for his second election in 1951 were Perón's amendments to the



Argentine Constitution in 1949, which created Argentina's first "social" Constitution. A social constitution is a constitution that dismantles oligarchic and elitist power to redistribute wealth and influence across class boundaries ("Social Constitution"). Perón's ambitions for the Constitutional amendments were high, as seen when he told Congress in 1948 that "he supported all of the reforms urged by his followers" (Blanksten 73). His goal with the Constitutional reform was to modernize Argentina's governance to reflect the growth and demographic changes that the country had experienced since its Constitution was first written in 1853 (Blanksten 75; Ilsley 226). The main changes that Perón made to the Constitution were in regard to the role of the state in various aspects of civilian life so that Perón's populist ideology of *justicialismo*, or justice, could be further spread. Justicialist scholars suggest that *Justicialismo* is "that doctrine whose objective is the happiness of man in human society achieved through the harmony of materialistic, idealistic, individualistic, and collectivist forces" (Blaksten 290). In other words, social justice is focused on finding a balance between different personal and group pressures to "preserve a peaceful working relationship [...] among the competing forces which make political Argentina what it is" (294). Perón once again harnessed nationalist sentiment in the Constitutional reforms to promote both the achievement of this balance and the consolidation of his power. A few of the many reforms of 1949 are listed below.

- All militias except those run by the state are forbidden (Ilsley 230).
- All natural resources in Argentina are state-owned, except for vegetable harvests (234).
- The provision of "national culture," in addition to the existing provision of "common defense" and "promoting the general welfare," was added as a responsibility of the state listed in the preamble (228).
- *Habeas corpus* was added to an existing protection "against arbitrary imprisonment" (229).
- Establishment of the "right to work, to a fair reward, to social security, and to defense of occupational interests" for the working class" (230).
- Establishment of the "rights to assistance and to physical and moral health" for the aged (231).

- A shift of primary and secondary education to the control of the federal government from local government, “with free compulsory primary education and state scholarships to ensure meritorious pupils the right to attain the highest grades of instruction” (232).
- Stipulation that private property is no longer “inviolable” but rather now “has a social function and it is incumbent on the state to control the distribution of land so as to ensure ownership by rural working families” (233).

As seen in the examples listed, many of the reforms had to do with empowering the working class or consolidating the President’s power, but very few limited the rights of elites. McGuire emphasizes this observation but argues that it ultimately proved harmful to Argentina’s democracy. He explains the harm to democracy as a result of too much equalization of the classes. While Perón, through unionization and better working conditions for laborers, raised the working class’ socioeconomic status dramatically between 1944-55, he did not take any drastic measures to directly decrease the power of the elite and landowners (76). Thus, the achievement of a lesser gap between the classes ultimately reduced the effectiveness of democratic institutions because while the previously-underrepresented group gained power, elites and the working class became too closely matched in power to effectively impose one agenda over another. This tradeoff of power is a requirement of an evolving democracy where policy and power shifts hands over time in a constantly evolving political environment (77). Overall however, Perón’s Constitutional amendments did give more rights to the working class, increasing their voice in the economy and politics, and empowered them to continue challenging the status quo by re-electing Perón in 1951.

### ***Political Sovereignty***

In regard to political sovereignty, Perón turned to a more liberal tradition with a focus on nation-building to establish a specifically Argentine political consensus. As political sovereignty emphasizes self-determination, Perón recognized the importance of building pride in identifying

as ‘Argentine.’ Using history, he emphasized the importance of various liberal nation-building efforts in the preceding half century such as “the federalization of Buenos Aires (1880) [...] and the adoption of the secret ballot in 1912.” (Winston 316). In addition to specific policy initiatives, Perón edged toward the liberal position on education, as Sarmiento - the “Schoolmaster President” - had done through his emphasis on increasing literacy and learning, particularly on Argentine studies. The men differed in two critical ways however.

The first was the role of religion in education. Sarmiento had proposed a law that removed compulsory study of Roman Catholicism in public schools, moving the nation towards a greater separation of church and state. This law was reinstated in the years prior to Perón, and maintained during his tenure (Blanksten 188). As previously mentioned, the role of the church in everyday life was yet another split between the Two Argentinas, with the internal exercising more pious and devout practice of faith, and the urbanites more loosely tied to religion. In another step to nation-building, Perón sought to unite people through faith, however, he strategically presented his level of faith differently based on geography.

*Peronista* propaganda designed for consumption in the ‘interior’ has painted the president as a very devout man [whereas] the people of Buenos Aires [...] are told that the regime’s is a *porteños* Catholicism – sophisticated, emancipated winking with ‘modern’ cosmopolitanism at deviation from formal religious doctrine and ritual (231).

Despite his efforts, Catholicism was not the bridge that would unite the Two Argentinas, largely because the two images painted were so variant, and the Church ended up withdrawing support for Perón (Winston 324).

In contrast to the first, the second major difference between Sarmiento and Perón did have a greater effect on rallying the masses. While Sarmiento focused his efforts on higher education, Perón funneled his energies into primary education with the intent of building nationalist sentiment from youth. He believed that it is in the early years that citizens learn what

it means to be Argentine; or, as Anderson would say, it is in the early years that citizens learn about commonalities that join them together as a community. This was a widely-shared conservative view, especially in the years of military-control over education. In 1944, the educational administrator Alberto Baldrich summed up this fundamental understanding of Argentine nationalism when he declared that schools must be “absolutely Argentine,” and free from foreign influence (Blanksten 187). In teaching all students at the earliest levels of schooling what it means to love one’s country, to be prideful of Argentine academic success, and to have Argentine values, Perón was able to instill nationalist pride in students, regardless of socioeconomic status. He realized that not all citizens went on to secondary schooling, and many of those individuals grew up to become part of the working class. However, Perón continually encouraged intellectualism, and spoke of workers in humanizing, academic terms rather than presenting them as the “vulgar, animal-like image held of them by the élite” (Winston 319). As mentioned in chapter one, there tends to be a high desire among working class citizens, who turn to populism for representation, to desire respectability (Lukacs 44). Perón gave citizens that respectability by telling them that they are intelligent enough to continue with school, and by inspiring them to pursue education through Argentine example in early schooling. These efforts ultimately served to “deepen[...] a sense of dignity among workers” (McGuire 75). This was yet another way to distance Argentina from foreign tradition, and empower citizens through their own past to then desire a better Argentine future.

## **CONCLUSION**

In understanding Perón’s populism as developed largely through his insistence on movementism rather than political parties and a policy of nationalist revisionism, it is critical to look back to the political environment of Argentina in the years preceding Perón’s 1946 election.

In his position as secretary of labor and welfare, Perón planted the seeds for social reform that would elevate the working class to a position of power and influence in the political arena. This is a position that they had not held in recent history, and also a necessary change given the massive increase in the working class given internal migration throughout the 1930s. In proving himself dedicated to working class needs through his rewards and punishment approach to dealing with unions, Perón built his support on tangible results. With this assurance of representation, plus the failure of both traditional and military politicians in the decade leading up to the 1946 election, Perón appeared as a beacon of change who might actually be effective at melding the interests of the Two Argentinas. While populist rhetoric and ideology were not Perón's intent, the raising of the working man to a position of respectability made Perón a savior for the previously underrepresented group. By positioning himself as a 'man of the people', Perón developed a populist political strategy that did not pursue anything that hindered the development of a domestically-supported Argentina for all Argentinians, regardless of class, job, or geographic location within the nation.

As explained by Perón's development of economic freedom, social justice and political sovereignty, the ideological gap between Argentines began to close, however, not to an equal degree on both the left and right sides. His presidency transferred more power from the left to the right-wing through labor policy, bringing the conservative, internal Argentines into the political spotlight in the urban centers that were traditionally monopolized by the left. The convergence of nationalist goals, however, was not as idyllic as perceived, as much of his policies were forced and questionable in their democratic legality (Conniff, Horowitz 28). The bridged policies that were achieved were not due to the coming together of the *Peronistas* and the Radicals, but rather through forceful suppression of opposition by the *Peronistas*. One common example of such

suppression of counteracting ideas was seen in Congress where motions were passed to expel members of Congress based on their criticisms of Perón and his administration. Most significant was the ousting of Ernesto Sammartino for his claims that Perón was a president who believed that “history begins and ends with him” (Blanksten 118). His removal from Congress and then his subsequent exile underground were severe consequences for choosing to raise a voice against Perón; such strong repression of dissent reflects Perón’s desire for limited expression and his fear of opposition. Ultimately, tensions between the Two Argentinas would remain for decades to come due to the inability to discuss them openly. While Perón’s presidency appeared as a brief attempt at reprieve between the two sides, the military *coup d’état* that overthrew him in 1955 revealed the true discontent brewing by the mistreated and manipulated elites. The coup not only took Perón out of power, but eliminated his party, its message, and silenced the voice of the working class in political discourse for at least the following decade.

## Chapter 3: British Case Study

### SOCIOCULTURAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Given the long and complicated history of the United Kingdom, a discussion of British populism can begin at many different starting points and take many forms; these can range from early modern peasant revolts to 19<sup>th</sup> century debates over the composition of parliament to 1930s fascism. Today, however, British populism focuses its energy toward – and derives its strength from – a critical understanding of the European Union and its relationship to an imagined British (or often simply English) nation. It was this combination of anti-elite populism and inward-focusing British nationalism that achieved one of the most shocking political victories in recent memory with the Brexit vote of June 2016. However, this populist discourse emphasizing reputed threats to the sovereignty of Great Britain at the hands of internationalist elites was actually many decades in the making, stretching back to the original referendum to join Europe in the 1970s; it was sharply brought into relief in the early 1990s when the Maastricht Treaty created the European Union as it exists today. An examination of the political climate that immediately preceded the contemporary period of Euroscepticism – the Thatcher years of the 1980s – reveals the creation of an environment of political instability that is necessary for the growth and success of populism. Thatcher's premiership violated the traditional political boundaries of the Conservative and Labour parties, creating a gap which populist rhetoric centered on nationalism and anti-elitism was later able to fill. While Thatcher's policies may not have directly caused Brexit, they did destabilize the British two-party system. Similar to how Perón bridged the gap between the interests of the internal working class and the *porteños* elites, the United Kingdom Independence Party ('UKIP') filled the British gap created as a result of the Thatcher years. UKIP, driven by its mission to achieve British independence from the European

Union, ultimately shifted the mainstream of British political opinions away from the Europhilic positions adopted by elitists in both major parties by successfully uniting the traditional Euroscepticism rooted in nationalism on the right with working class grievances rooted in anti-elite sentiment on the left.

### *Margaret Thatcher*

Margaret Thatcher came to power in a clearly-defined two-party system. On the right were the Tories, formally the Conservative and Unionist Party, while on the left was the Labour Party, still very committed to orthodox social-democratic policy focused around blue collar labor. Unsurprisingly, the parties were distinctly split across issues such as economic policy, social welfare reform, and the proper role of government (reference Figure 3.1).

<b>Conservative</b>	<b>Labour</b>
Fiscal Conservatism; minimal welfare	Social welfare
Pro-business	Pro-unions
Socially conservative	Socially liberal
Elite-backing	Working-class backing
Small government	Involved government
Free-markets	Regulated markets

**Figure 3.1:** Policy splits between Conservative and Labour parties | Source: Difference Between

By the end of Thatcher's decade in office however, the ideological and socioeconomic boundaries separating the two sides had blurred due to the cross-partisan policies enacted throughout her tenure. These policies touched both Conservative and Labour issues, blending the politics of both sides to ultimately break down some of the rigid barriers between the two parties. While there is significant evidence to argue that Thatcher was direct and stubbornly unyielding in her policies, it is important to note that at times her opinion was actually bipartisan (Smith 69). Such cross-partisan policies are reflected, for example, in Thatcher's "Right to Buy" policy which created discounts for first-time home owners, overall making it less expensive to buy a house. The critical cross-over of party ideology in this policy disrupted the previously-stable



alignments of British politics because it created four separate opinion groups: Conservatives who approved, Conservatives who disapproved, liberals who approved, and liberals who disapproved. Those on the disapproving side, although they disapproved for varying reasons, were forced to come together in a way they had not been pushed to before. The same happened for the side that was approving. Labour leader Ed Miliband said of Thatcher's policies upon her death that "it would be dishonest [...] not to be open [...] about the strong opinions and the deep divisions there were, and are, over what she did" (Faiola, *Washington Post*). The Right-to-Buy policy pleased Conservatives because it empowered individuals to move away from social, or welfare-supported, housing. However, it also satisfied Labour because in order to offer low-cost homes Thatcher had to keep inflation high, which meant that unemployment for the working class was lower. However, both sides also complained about the Right to Buy policy; because of cross-partisan nature of this policy, voters did not automatically know what opinion their party held based on traditional party leanings. What resulted was a disruption of party beliefs that at one time did reliably offer the proper party opinion of various policies, but now could no longer be depended upon to dictate voter opinion. Main points of issue for each party were that, for Conservatives, Right-to-Buy demanded too much government regulation, while Labour was generally frustrated by the consequent reduction in welfare housing available (Ball, *Guardian*). Similarly, this departure from conventional party positions and constituencies reflects Perón's cross-cultural blending of the Rosas and Sarmiento traditions; just as Perón was able to draw members from both the liberal and conservative parties by emphasizing how bettering the working man ultimately benefited all of Argentina, Thatcher's joint appeal to workers and homeowners challenged orthodox party politics. Other Thatcher policies that accomplished cross-partisan goals included British intervention to reclaim the Falklands Islands from

Argentine invasion in 1982. In this case, some powerful elements within Thatcher's Conservative party were highly against going to war to reclaim the Falklands, while some within Labour were more approving of this move (Marsden, *Telegraph*). Another cross-partisan stance was in regard to funding the National Health Service ('NHS'); to far-right Conservatives, supporting the NHS was not agreeable as they wanted to see the privatization of healthcare. However, centrist Conservatives and Labourites did not want to see national healthcare services fail, despite neither side not entirely taking a firm position on the most appropriate policy to address the inefficient healthcare system (Illife (1985)). Despite these examples, and others, of Thatcher's bipartisan initiatives did not have a bridging effect across the parties.

Crucially, Perón's blurring of party boundaries differs from Thatcher's in the ultimate consequence of their actions. Perón's cross-partisan actions had the goal of uniting different groups of people under a nationalist banner. By breaking down traditional sociopolitical boundaries, he brought forward a new grouping of people united under his populist message, increasing representation to a group that no longer felt, and at times never felt, represented by the existing political parties. On the other hand, when Thatcher deconstructed the stable political lines of Conservatives and Labour, she ended up destabilizing the political environment without creating a new party for the fringe voters to then turn to. Ultimately, her policies pushed the Labour Party more toward the center to try to recapture moderate voters, thus abandoning the "hard-left" working class voters that Labour had always represented (Applebaum, *Foreign Affairs*). Operationally, the distinction between Perón and Thatcher in regard to representing the working class is made particularly clear in their disparate approach to organized labor. While Perón focused on empowering the working class through a balance of rewards and punishments for union compliance, Thatcher reshaped the political landscape of Great Britain going into the

1990s through a relentless – and ultimately successful – attack on union power in order to pursue deregulation and the construction of a more laissez-faire society. It was this altered landscape that would provide the political oxygen conducive to a flare-up of British populism.

### *Anti-Union Action, 1980-1989*

By the time Margaret Thatcher came to office in 1979, unions had experienced over a decade of immense power over workers. Stagnant economic growth in Britain in the 1960s led to various labor reforms that attempted to spark growth, with many of such reforms restricting union power. Immediately, the unions resisted by employing strikes against various restriction measures. In reaction to growing discontent and imbalances of power, the 1971 Industrial Relations Act was passed both to reduce the power of unions and to increase the power of workers.<sup>7</sup> The act imposed strike-restrictions and judicial regulation on unions, attempting to limit the modes in which the unions could resist government restrictions. However, the act proved unsuccessful in this regard when the largest and most powerful union, the National Union of Mineworkers ('NUM') held a legal strike that had drastic implications. The strike caused such severe energy shortages across Britain that the government was forced to give into some of the demands of the unions, overall increasing union control rather than limiting it. This control was further harnessed and tightened by unions over the course of the next decade so that by the late 1970's organized labor's political power stood at an all-time high (National Archives).

While in Argentina members of the working class gave Perón their support for his empowerment of unions, members of the middle class gave Thatcher their support for her promise to roll back the power of unions. Thatcher believed that a freely-mobile capitalist

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<sup>7</sup> Some of the benefits for workers in the Industrial Relations Act included the right to compensation for unfair dismissals and the creation of a National Industrial Relations Court which had the power to deal injunctions in response to injurious or unsanctioned strikes (Moran 1977).

society would lead to economic betterment for the middle class and that the unions were suppressing this opportunity (Raines, NYT). The theoretic logical behind this argument rested on the fact that Britain was a highly-structured class society; for it to remain dynamic and responsive to innovation, free competition allowing for mobility up or down the socioeconomic ladder is absolutely necessary. More practically, union influence over British heavy industry, health care, and transport frequently irritated the middle class, members of which often found their lives inconvenienced by costs imposed by labor activism. Thatcher's critique of organized labor combined both elements, arguing that the power of private capital and employers had to be increased to counterbalance fundamentally self-interested and over-mighty unions. Her aim in boosting employer power was to give every citizen, no matter his or her class, the opportunity to grow without artificial restrictions imposed by unions or other monopolistic entities. Her positive message of social mobility has been summarized as

everyone should have a right to progress as far from his beginnings as his talent and ambition can take him, and no one – not least the state or its agencies – should despise him for the attempt (Daley, *Telegraph*).

Of course, this positive message would have to be expressed through much more conflictual policies. In order to pull away control from unions and redirect that power towards employers, Thatcher both instituted reforms to existing laws and also took an active role in suppressing strikes.

Most of the critical changes made to the Industrial Relations Act under Thatcher were the imposition of limits on the union leadership and their self-governance abilities. Many of these reforms were realized in the form of entirely new laws that overruled the original act. These new laws included the Employment Acts of 1980, 1982, 1988, and 1990, as well as the Trade Union Act of 1984. They promulgated such measures such as the removal of immunities enjoyed by

unions, increased restrictions on picketing and strikes, constraints on all secondary action regarding strikes, and the requirement of balloted elections for all union officials and union funding. While some of these measures only restricted the power of union leaders, others, such as the balloted elections, restricted the power of leaders while shifting power in the direction of either union workers or employers (Marsh 75). The key in either case was to reduce the influence of the unions as institutions and thus ‘take back’ British politics for the middle class and those members of the working class unhappy with imperious union leadership.

Thatcher’s battle with organized labor extended beyond simple legislation, and instead became a central pillar of her message to and vision of the British nation. Her most notable public showdown with the labor movement is her famous response to the miners’ strike of March 1984-85. The strike was sparked by the National Union of Mineworkers in response to the state-run National Coal Board’s decision to reduce production to cut losses from mine pits where costs were exceeding revenues. The strike lasted almost a year and was not called for by democratic ballot among the rank-and-file. Debate over its legitimacy, necessity, and the leadership’s demands sparked widespread contention in regard to bigger questions of what the social and economic fabric of British life was meant to look like. As Mansfield states, “For the Tories [...] this was a clearly planned confrontation between capital and organised labour, a necessary precondition for the establishment of a laissez-faire economy” (17). Both Thatcher and her counterpart from the opposition party, Neil Kinnock, spoke to Britain regarding the strike as if each of their positions was the only logical one to be supported by the majority of the nation. Thatcher knew that the debate over how to handle the strike was not just a question of sides in this particular instance, but rather that the outcome would reflect the direction toward which Britain would develop over the years to come. In Thatcher’s view, the best way to handle the

strike was to suppress it, and in doing so, a Britain by and for the middle class would be sustained. This meant the deployment of an immense police presence to Yorkshire and other striking regions. Police were essentially granted unofficial immunity in their actions during the strike, although many went to trial later for unjustified inspections and arrests for inciting violence at peaceful protests. Just a few months into the strike, already nearly 4,000 people had been injured, and the police were out in such strong force that on average an officer earned around 400 pounds in overtime pay per week (UPI Timeline). While Thatcher affirmed that her government would not interfere in the peace talks, she also did not encourage the resolution of the strike, and three peace talks failed before a compromise was reached just three days short of the anniversary of the start of conflict.

While the miners' strike and Thatcher's work-reforms were not the sole contributors to a changed political landscape by the end of her tenure, the divisiveness of these issues exacerbated existing mistrust between the working class and commercial and political elites while simultaneously weakening the standing of labor leaders vis-à-vis their rank-and-file. The working class thus found itself caught in the middle: in need of both union defense for protection of their jobs amid an increasingly sophisticated and globalized work environment, but also recognizing the opportunities offered by a less-regulated industrial sector. In terms of political parties, this helped set the stage for a major realignment. Thatcher's crackdown on the unions naturally infuriated Labour's key constituency, but greatly appealed to a middle-class that welcomed protection from illegitimate strikes (Marsh 76). Through her emphasis on homeownership, economic opportunity, and other policies targeted at the middle class, Thatcher had assembled a winning electoral coalition; it was these moderate, middle-class voters that deserted Labour for Thatcher and, ultimately, that would sustain Thatcherism into the mid-

1990s. The Labour Party, battered from a decade of defeats, would eventually chase those same middle class voters by embarking on a move to the center; this further exacerbated the feelings of despair and disenfranchisement that had come to characterize the working class in the 1980s.

The creation of the European Union in the early 1990s only accelerated these trends.

### ***1992 Maastricht Treaty***

Emerging from the political turmoil of the end of the Thatcher era, Britons sought to refocus and regroup their splintered political parties. Party lines were traditionally separated over economic and domestic-policy issues, and the early 1990s sparked a discussion of Britain's role within a greater Europe that mixed into these subjects essential questions of foreign policy and national self-understanding. Throughout Thatcher's premiership, particularly in its later years, she emphasized the need for Britain to remain independent from the demands and constraints imposed by the rest of Europe. Most significant is her speech at Bruges in 1988 where she stated that "We [Britain] have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level" (Thatcher 1988). Her engagement with Europe was highly conditional, favoring closer involvement only insofar as it promoted British prosperity and national interests – she did not imagine 'Europe' as self-evidently 'good' but rather as a complex policy challenge that held both potential benefits as well as potential dangers.

Moreover, she wanted Britain, in all of its stability and greatness, to serve as an example about the right way to do international economic policy; Britain and the rest of Europe would openly trade, but be free from limitations due to a supranational government.

In 1992, Europe underwent a change that would accelerate globalization and bring countries into closer relationships than ever before. However, this change created a major split among Britons. The Maastricht Treaty created the European Union ('EU') and divided new

regulations into three sub-categories: unity of European citizenship, the creation of the European Central Bank, and foreign and security policy integration. The initial responses to the treaty were mixed, and sparked a national debate. Devoted Thatcherites clung to their former leader's sentiments of Euroscepticism, but Thatcher's retirement had weakened her followers and ultimately allowed her more Europhilic successor, John Major, to narrowly push through the treaty's ratification. Vitally, the Labour Party's position on the treaty reflected its attempt to move toward the center in order to become electable after the turmoil of the 1980s; while many in organized labor were highly skeptical of the treaty and the implications it carried for working class protections, the party executive ultimately won the argument by blocking calls from the rank-and-file for a popular referendum to decide the fate of the treaty (Goodwin, Bevins, *Independent*). The party organization supported ratification and has maintained at least a formal Europhilic stance ever since; current leader Jeremy Corbyn, for example, modified his longtime Euroscepticism upon assuming party leadership and lent this support to the all-party 'stay' campaign in 2016 (Wilson, *Business Insider*).

The Thatcher years had disordered and ultimately reorganized British politics; with the debate over Maastricht, it was becoming increasingly clear which groups were left at the margins of the new order. Eurosceptic factions within both parties – Thatcherites among the Tories and some anti-elite, working class members of the Labour Party – felt betrayed and disenfranchised by the bipartisan acceptance of Maastricht. It was the former group, nationalist in ideological orientation, that formed the core nucleus of resistance to British membership in the EU. Its combination with the anti-elite sentiment of the latter would create contemporary British populism.



In reaction to the feeling of abandonment caused by the bipartisan approval of the supranational government of the EU, a number of dissidents sought to align themselves against the parties that were no longer representing their voice. Former Thatcherites, later known as Tory Rebels, soon came together to fight for British independence from the EU. They campaigned for a referendum in 1993 on the issue of British EU membership, believing that more Britons than just them would be against membership, but ultimately they did not succeed (BBC Timeline). It is from this group of rebels that visible, nationalist sentiment began pressing to the fore of British politics. The loosely-tied Tory Rebels grew methodically, developing from a crowd to a coordinated and goal-oriented group. Crucially, as the group sought to consolidate their purpose and message, it pulled in members of the Labour party. All those whom the group attracted believed British integration into Europe would hurt the livelihoods of the working class due to increases in the labor pool and distanced decision-making process in Brussels (Heartfield 2016). As support grew for the Tory Rebels and Labour and the Conservatives continued their Europhilic policies, British nationalists recognized a need to come together to form an official opposition party: The United Kingdom Independence Party.

## **UNITED KINGDOM INDEPENDENCE PARTY**

### ***Founding and Development, 1992-2012***

The United Kingdom Independence Party ('UKIP') was founded in 1993 in response to the unfilled chasm between Labour and Conservatives on the issue of British independence from a united Europe. The discussion of British independence has its roots in Margaret Thatcher's aforementioned 1988 Bruges speech in which she opposed a British union with the rest of Europe. After this speech, a group of academics and politicians, most notably Alan Sked, Kenneth Minogue and Lord Harris of High Cross, established the Bruges Group to continue the

discussion of British independence that the Prime Minister had brought into the limelight in her Bruges speech. However, from 1988 through the 1992 passage of the Maastricht Treaty, the group suffered cohesion issues due to differences over the rationale for British independence. In addition, the group could not agree on the best methods to promote their goal of 'independence.' In 1993 Sked withdrew from the Bruges Group and, with the support of about 150 others, created the UK Independence Party. The party's platform was single-issue: to resist European envelopment of Britain (Usherwood 1). In the upcoming 1994 European Parliamentary elections, the group's sole goal was to earn seats and then refuse to fill them in defiance of the EU. Sked's reasoning behind this initiative was to create an opportunity for secession from the European Union. He concluded that if the 87 seats available to Britain were empty, it would show the world that Britain was serious about its stance against the EU (Usherwood 2). While UKIP did not win any seats in the European Parliament ('EP') nor in the House of Commons, it was a significant breakthrough for the party in that they successfully competed on the national stage; from this point on, membership and contributions rose in a sudden burst. However, the momentum was not sustained, as various members of UKIP, unhappy with the stringent nature of the single-issue goal of secession from the EU, branched out and formed other parties and organizations.

The most notable competitor to UKIP through the mid-1990s was the Referendum Party. Its leader, James Goldsmith, was a multi-millionaire who pulled his funding from the Bruges Group to build up his own organization. This party's goal was still secession from the EU, but to achieve this it wanted to force a referendum allowing British voters to decide. However, with Eurosceptic voters split between parties, and both parties being so limited in their scope, neither was able to gain any tangible power in the next big election of 1997. It did not help matters that

the conceptual difference between them was slight, which diluted their respective strengths and promoted uncertainty; Nigel Farage, founding member of UKIP, was even rumored to have been in talks with the Referendum Party members that implicated him in betraying UKIP, further exacerbating internal tensions. Farage was even expelled from UKIP in 1997 by Sked, but was reinstated one month later after Sked adhered to legal advice on the matter. It soon was revealed that this legal advice was paid for with most of the remaining party funds, ultimately leading to Sked's resignation (Usherwood 4).

A further – and more serious – factor in limiting UKIP's early influence was its association (fairly or not) with the British National Party ('BNP') and its more extreme brand of Euroscepticism. The British National Party was at the time, and remains today, a far-right, fascist political party whose founding principles of British independence from any form of European union were driven by chauvinist sentiments; furthermore, the BNP not only believed, and continues to believe, that immigration dilutes the purity of British culture, but that all encouragement of multiculturalization in general must be stopped (BNP.org). The extremity of the party is further reflected in the group's history with an attitude toward political violence. While the group publically denounces violence – its website includes statements such as “violence used against political opponents is disgusting and must be stopped” (Culnane, BNP) – there is also an underlying sentiment that the violence is perhaps deserved. The same writer quoted followed her statement with another saying that the violence perpetrated against opponents is merely in response to violence perpetrated against the BNP (Culnane BNP). Comparisons to the BNP dogged UKIP from the beginning, but tensions particularly rose in 1997 as Sked faced internal fractures due to rumors of BNP infiltration into UKIP's power-structure; these rumors alleged that Farage was in talks with BNP leadership as well as former-

UKIP member, Mark Devin, who had been kicked out for extremism. The result of the rumors was increased fear of the imposition of the BNP's more extreme views through placement of some BNP supporters within UKIP's leadership and offices (Wheen, *Guardian*). Given the internal divisions, as well as Sked's resignation, by the end of 1997, the party recognized a need for reorganization.

From 1997 to the 1999 EP elections, the party refocused itself and consolidated leadership and membership. United under Michael Holmes, the party reorganized into a national organization with regional representatives, and worked to pull in former members of the Referendum Party. The Labour government in power at the time, under Prime Minister Tony Blair, instated proportional representation, thus giving UKIP a better chance at gaining seats. They focused their efforts on the southern part of England where they had the most existing support, and ran on a platform of independence for Britain. This election marked the first successful election for the party, where they won three European Parliament seats which were filled by Nigel Farage, Michael Holmes and Jeffrey Titford (Usherwood 3).

After the party's successful entry into European Parliament in 1999, it dipped into the shadow of political discourse until 2004. In the 2004 European Parliamentary election however, UKIP won twelve seats total, earning sixteen percent of the national British vote (Usherwood 3). The rapid turn toward success of 2004 was due largely to the introduction of a new party spokesman, celebrity TV-host Robert Kilroy-Silk, along with an official party manifesto that reemphasized the party's goal of British withdrawal from the EU. Kilroy-Silk's presence and continual push for UKIP voters to turn out to the polls helped fuel the party's success. Low turnout from Conservatives and Labour also bolstered UKIP's win (Tempest, *Guardian*). It is in 2006 however, that the party set itself up for its biggest period of political success. Under the

newly appointed leadership of Nigel Farage, UKIP sought to establish itself as a reputable contender in the British political arena by broadening its policy focus toward policies that ultimately supported British nationalism, but made the party appear less single-issue; these policies focused on lower taxation and a new British trade policy that excluded EU influence (West, BBC). With this broader reach, the party reinvigorated its efforts to promote British independence by attracting more voters.

### **SETTING THE STAGE FOR BREXIT, 2012-2016**

By 2012, the dynamic of world interactions and trade were changing rapidly. In the Middle East, revolutionaries overturned governments that had held power for decades in a period that became known as the Arab Spring. The Islamic State, then the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham ('ISIS'), was beginning to grow in influence and numbers, and the Syrian Civil War against President Bashar al Assad was in its second year. With all of this turmoil, destruction of livelihood, and growing fear, hundreds of thousands of refugees fled the Middle East for Europe, with Britain being an attractive land to reestablish and settle. While many Britons were sympathetic to this burgeoning wave of immigration, others, mainly the working class, were fearful of the implications an increased labor force would have on their jobs and wages. These fears were heightened due to the fact that Britain had faced massive immigration from Eastern Europe less than a decade before due to the 2004 introduction of numerous new members to the European Union, with immigration numbers nearly doubling from 2003 to 2004 (reference Figure 3.2) (Rienzo 3).

<b>Year</b>	<b>Net Inflows to Great Britain</b>
2000	162,800
2001	171,000
2002	153,400
2003	151,000
2004	222,600

**Figure 3.2:** Immigration into Great Britain | Source: Office for National Statistics

Further, the whole of Europe, was still recovering from the world financial crisis of 2008. More of the less-stable EU nations, such as Greece and Portugal, consequently required bailouts from their European neighbors. The compilation of these changes in the world's political and economic stability provided the perfect platform for UKIP to re-emphasize the benefits of British independence from the European Union. As discussed in chapter one, populism has its best chance at success when just such an environment for change exists. Thatcher had shaken up British politics by rallying Tories against unions and ultimately placing Britain under nearly two decades of Conservative leadership while spurring massive changes to the Labour Party in the process. Maastricht unveiled a new, more centrist look for both parties that paired with an openness to globalization and European integration. By the end of 2012, world events were contributing to a sense of uneasiness with these global ties, especially in relation to implications of migration into Britain. The compounding effects of Thatcherite politics, EU membership, and changing world dynamics led to a divided British electorate leading up to the Brexit Referendum vote of 2016.

During the referendum campaign, the Conservative Party leadership joined with those of the Labour and Liberal Democratic parties to form an all-party 'stay' campaign. However, other Conservative leaders such as Boris Johnson split from their party to join a vocal 'leave' movement that UKIP could fairly claim to have been championing for decades (Bunker, *Newsweek*). Similarly, Labour's official 'stay' stance belied a great deal of hesitation and

disillusionment at the highest level; though he officially supported the ‘remain’ campaign, there is ample evidence that party leader Jeremy Corbyn was at best a partial convert to Europhilia (“Insiders Struggled,” *VICE News*).

This electoral situation was unprecedented. All major party institutions (UKIP excepted) were strongly in the ‘stay’ camp, yet large portions of party faithful among both Labour and the Tories – including some key leaders – were, publically or privately, in favor of leaving. The mainstream party organizations were thus revealed to be out of step with large numbers of their own members. This was the gap spurred by the Thatcherite realignments – a gap in which populism could flourish as UKIP’s message of ‘British independence’ rang out clearly for both Eurosceptic Conservatives and marginalized, far-left Labour workers who wanted a hard stance against Europe for the protection of their jobs.

### **BRITAIN’S ‘INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT’ AS POPULISM**

Leveraging the context of change sweeping across Europe and Great Britain, UKIP engaged the three main drivers of populism discussed in this paper to campaign for their main party objective: British independence. The following sections analyze how in the years between 2012 and the Brexit vote in 2016, UKIP leveraged elite backing, emphasized the benefits immigration restriction and similar issues in order to pander to voters (Dennison 172), and manipulated populist rhetoric to actuate a political strategy pursuing the goal of British independence from the EU.

#### ***Elite Backing***

Although UKIP’s campaign funding never came reasonably close to matching that of the two major opposition parties, the party has relied on a number of serious backers both in its first

years of inception, and, more recently, with its push for support in the EU Referendum of 2016 (reference Appendix C).

Funding for a formal, Eurosceptic party was slow and minimal throughout most of the 1990s. The Bruges group, as mentioned previously, was funded by millionaire James Goldsmith, who then pulled his funding to redirect it to the development of the Referendum Party in 1994. This group overtook elite interest throughout the decade, and, as reflected in its poor election performances throughout this period, UKIP did not gain any noteworthy traction with the electorate. Consequently, the populist rhetoric of UKIP in the 1990s had the correct environment to grow, but did not have the funding to develop it. An example of the proper environment and funding working successfully together is seen in the Referendum Party, which spent more than both Conservatives and Labour on advertising for the 1997 general election, and consequently won a seat in Parliament as a very new party (Butler 1997). However, after its election victory, the Referendum Party disbanded due largely to the death of Goldsmith, reflecting, as in Perón's case, how the removal of elite backing can result in the demise of a party or movement. The removal of the Referendum Party left UKIP as the only other political party pursuing British independence from Europe, and consequently, the best recipient of funding. However, as seen in Figure 3.3, funding for UKIP was very low except around periods of significant party-reconstruction, electoral victory, or active campaigning such as during the Brexit referendum. In 2005, elite funding took a turn with the departure of one of the party's biggest backers, TV-show host Robert Kilroy-Silk. Kilroy-Silk had donated hundreds of thousands of British pounds to UKIP in 2004, quickly becoming one of the party's biggest donors and prominent figures. In 2005 he announced his bid for Party leadership, criticizing then-party leader Roger Knapman's performance. Another serious funder, Paul Sykes, threatened to withhold his donations if Kilroy-



Silk were not to be made leader. In the end, Knapman held onto the title and Kilroy-Silk and Sykes left the party, depleting it of significant funding (Ford 52; Carlin, *Telegraph*). From 2005 on, funding rose and fell along with major party developments, gaining the greatest increases after the possibility of Brexit arose (reference Figure 3.3).

Year	Total Donations Accepted	Total Value of Accepted Donations	Significant Events by Year
2001	26	£718,579	Jeffrey Titford elected leader of UKIP, refocusing the party
2002	-	-	Roger Knapman elected leader of UKIP
2003	30	£152,080	
2004	172	£1,714,886	UKIP reorganized as a private company; UKIP won twelve European Parliament seats
2005	110	£605,004	Kilroy-Silk leaves party
2006	53	£141,294	Stuart Wheeler enters as a donor; Farage elected leader of UKIP
2007	88	£373,147	
2008	94	£207,557	
2009	181	£1,402,987	Farage resigns; Malcolm Pearson elected leader of UKIP and appeals to more Conservative voters
2010	118	£1,006,372	Pearson steps down; Farage re-instated as leader
2011	89	£330,728	
2012	66	£314,410	
2013	111	£669,892	Party achieved strongest British election result yet; Referendum vote promised by Cameron
2014	343	£3,851,454	British Office of Communications grants UKIP 'major party status'
2015	207	£3,278,136	European Union Referendum Bill announced
2016	98	£1,577,488	Brexit Vote: Leave wins

**Figure 3.3:** Donations accepted by UKIP (cash and non-cash) | Source: Electoral Commission

After then-Prime Minister David Cameron promised in January of 2013 that he would arrange a British referendum vote on the status of British membership to the European Union some time before the end of 2017, UKIP began receiving significant funding; UKIP recognized that with these new funds it would have to brand itself and its message as widely as possible. The funding came from two main sources: the government and internationally-known billionaires. Given that UKIP secured its first Member of Parliament in 2014, it received a jump in funding in

2015 due to the government funds the party was then entitled to receive. The second major source of funding came from private billionaires; large donations from this category of elites came from individuals such as Ko Barclay, stepson of Sir Frederick Barclay who owns numerous media outlets including *The Spectator* and *The Daily Telegraph*, and Stuart Wheeler, founder of IG Index. UKIP's attraction to such individuals is in the party's basic goal of 'British independence.' While some of the financial supporters of UKIP, such as Arron Banks, anticipate certain potential financial benefits of Brexit and the 'leave' campaign, others, such as Stuart Wheeler, merely support UKIP because it most closely aligns to their goal of a 'Britain for the British' (Malnick, *Telegraph*). Regardless of the underlying cause for their support, it is due to the funding of elites that UKIP's populist message has spread through increased financing of advertising campaigns and election tours. UKIP clearly recognized this fact, and has continuously poured significant portions of its money into expenditures in advertising and unsolicited material to electors (reference Figure 3.4).<sup>8</sup> As stated previously, once the environment of world turmoil was set around 2012, UKIP depended on elites to be able to take advantage of the opportunity to spread their message as a solution to Britain's problems.

<b>Year</b>	<b>Election</b>	<b>Percentage of Budget Spent on Advertising</b>
2004	European Parliament	67%
2009	European Parliament	43%
2014	European Parliament	65%

**Figure 3.4:** Examples of Advertising Budgets  
| Source: Electoral Commission

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<sup>8</sup> Other expenditure line items include market research/canvassing, overheads and general admission, transport, and rallies and other events (Electoral Commission).

### *Pandering to Voters*

As a single-issue party, UKIP realized that in order to reach a greater number of voters, the party would have to emphasize the many benefits to the fulfillment of the single issue of British independence. While independence from Brussels and Strasbourg by any means necessary was the ultimate goal, the party eagerly linked its specific messaging to subsidiary issues that resonated with the working class, including immigration and economic benefits of leaving the EU. Together, these emphases allowed the party to change the norms of British political discourse by making hardline Euroscepticism an ideology with mass appeal (Ford, Goodwin (2014), 282; Ford, et.al (2011), 204). The diversification of its messaging and policies reflected the fact that the leadership recognized that while many people may not be inclined to leave the European Union initially, if the party was able to solve other grievances with British independence as the solution, it may become a more viable and respected option in the minds of the electorate.

### *Immigration*

While a wide-ranging and sometimes intellectual critique of the EU has always been present in British nationalism, focusing on the negative practical implications of political integration – and especially foreign immigration – became a particular concentration of the party. The two pillars of UKIP's critique rested on, first, the potential threat to the British working-class job market, and second, the posited physical danger posed by immigrants, particularly from those immigrants seeking asylum from the Middle East. (Ford, Goodwin 281) Then-party-leader Nigel Farage suggested on numerous occasions that there be “up to a five year” halt on unskilled migration into the United Kingdom (Deacon 5). This freeze was presented as a solution to the issue of unskilled migrants entering Britain, receiving benefits, and then applying for factory-

type jobs that British people were already competing for (reference Figure 3.4). There are echoes of this discourse in the Argentine case in which Perón used working class anxiety about foreign competition to unite working class populism with his vision of Argentine nationalism. In both cases, desperation for a party to stand up for the protection of their jobs and rights made it easy for Farage and UKIP to answer the working class call for help by pandering: vote for us, and the immigration with cease.



**Figure 3.4:** Negative impact of cheap foreign labor

In addition to targeting the negative effects of economic migration into Britain, UKIP targeted the British government's and European Union's policy of acceptance of asylum seekers from oppressed nations around the world (reference Figure 3.5). In 2015 Farage stated, "If we want to help genuine refugees, if we want to protect our societies, [...] we must stop the boats



**Figure 3.5:** Anti-Muslim immigration poster

[...] and then we can assess who qualifies for refugee status” (BBC “Migrant Crisis”). This statement reflects the recognition that the humane thing to do is to accept and integrate refugees into British society. However, and most critical to UKIP, Farage’s statement frames EU immigration policy as forcing member nations to take any and all asylum seekers, which counteracts Britain’s desire to admit only the most qualified individuals or individuals with the genuine desire to integrate into British society. Despite this viewpoint, UKIP’s racially-charged rhetoric in its famous ‘Breaking Point’ poster made the party’s point apparent, but ultimately may have upset more voters than it appeased given the media backlash to the poster’s appearance. While this may have been an example of pandering gone wrong, successful pandering to British Eurosceptics emphasized the degradation of British society by immigrants who posed potential threats to the safety and unity of the British nation (Ford, et. al 2009). For example, in the same discussion in European Parliament, Farage stated, “we see, as I warned earlier, evidence that ISIS are now using this route to put their jihadists on European soil.” Regardless of the fact or truth in this statement and others, the instillation of fear in the minds of the electorate both in speeches and in visual forms was a way to pander to a need vital to any nation: the need for an ‘other’ to delimit the boundary of an ‘us’ (Anderson, Schmitt). Here, UKIP framed itself as a custodian not only of British labor but of the British nation. Leveraging this fear of compromised safety within Britain due to increased immigration, UKIP sought to win over voters by appealing *not* to nationalist pride in Britain, but to xenophobic-dislike of foreigners.

While there is insufficient evidence to prove that immigration concerns were the primary reason voters chose ‘leave’ in the 2016 EU Referendum in Britain, there is evidence to suggest that a desire for more sovereignty, or control over Britain’s decisions in regard to immigration

and other policies was a significant factor (Ford, et.al (2011), 219). Lord Ashcroft, a political polling analyst, states that 49 percent of ‘leave’ voters claimed “the principle that decisions about the UK should be taken in the UK” as their main reason for voting ‘leave.’ A third offered leaving as “the best chance for the UK to regain control over immigration and its own borders” (Ashcroft). The data leaves no question that immigration was a growing concern. Furthermore, while immigration may not have been the only driver of Brexit or of UKIP support more generally, the party’s emphasis on immigration-reform and the need for Britons to control their own futures permeated through decision-making during the 2016 Referendum.

Thus, emphasizing the dangers of immigration and promising to remove those dangers drove the party’s success because UKIP and its leaders became the point-people for anti-immigration rhetoric across the national political discussion. Thus, the ability of the party to promise voters a hard stance against immigration actually brought anti-immigration discussion to the forefront of politics; furthermore, it brought UKIP increased publicity because it was a group talking about the negative consequences of European membership that the establishment parties would not acknowledge at the time. Consequently, UKIP made immigration an issue that could not be ignored, thus gaining a place in the national discussion.

### ***Manipulation of Rhetoric***

The use of rhetoric is critical to the success of British populism. While maintaining a steadfast policy geared toward ‘British independence’ was critical to the consistency and reputability of UKIP, it is *how* this idea was presented to voters that caused individuals to leave the established strongholds of the Conservative and Labour parties. Particularly in the years leading up to Brexit, which was the culmination of two decades of ‘British independence’ discourse, determining which consequences of Britain’s relationship with the EU upset voters the

most was a useful tactic for UKIP. In order to harness populism as political discourse, UKIP first had to understand its target demographic.

The general makeup of UKIP voters throughout the years has been white, older men with some to little higher education who, as a majority, qualify as being ‘skilled-manual laborers’ (Ford, et.al (2011), 212). A majority were former Conservative voters, however, former Labour members are also present. Additionally, UKIP voters mainly come from the Midlands and Southern parts of England, which are overall more prosperous than the rest of England and therefore do not directly benefit from the EU funds that are gifted to Britain to distribute based on the results of “equality assessments” (Ford, et.al 213; Dunford, *Telegraph*). Farage and UKIP targeted such voters by highlighting the common, blue-collar, everyday nature of UKIP’s cause, reflected in statements such as “before, Europe was about treaties, laws and our sovereign right to govern ourselves. Now, it’s about everyday lives” (*Snippets* 94).

Percentage who agree or strongly agree	UKIP	BNP	Cons	Lab	LD	Non-voters	Full sample
<i>Eurocepticism</i>							
EU promotes prosperity in Europe*	73	61	45	17	20	33	37
Britain should leave the EU	82	70	44	19	21	38	39
<i>Populism</i>							
Most politicians are personally corrupt	67	78	50	36	47	64	54
Don’t trust local MP to tell the truth**	73	81	60	48	60	71	63
No difference between the main parties	60	69	24	30	45	62	46
<i>Xenophobia</i>							
Government should encourage immigrants to leave Britain	43	72	31	19	16	27	27
Immigration have not helped the economy <sup>+</sup>	72	82	56	32	32	49	48
Further immigration to the UK should be halted	87	94	68	46	43	65	61
Councils allow immigrants to jump housing queue	77	87	64	43	43	59	57
Immigrants responsible for most crime	32	57	19	12	10	21	19

**Figure 3.6:** 2009 European Parliament election voter and non-voter responses | Source: Ford, et.al (2011)

While many of the above-stated characterizations represent between 50 to 60 percent of UKIP voters, the biggest trends seen across 70 to 80+ percent of UKIP voters are in their sentiments towards immigration and the political establishment (reference Figure 3.6). In particular, back in 2009, UKIP voters and BNP voters both largely wanted to leave the EU, but the next closest party for the Leave vote was Conservatives. Given this information, UKIP targeted Conservative voters with rhetoric reflecting how immigration had not helped the economy, and how immigration should be halted (reference red boxes in Figure 3.6). Examples of such specified targeting include Farage's statements such as

We have a Conservative leader that believes in green taxes, [...] that believes in continuing with total open-door migration from eastern Europe and refuses to give us a referendum on the EU (*Snippets 97*).


Such targeting of specific-policy issues, combined with reminders of the failures of the Conservative leadership in power, proved successful for UKIP. By 2012, “only 3 percent of UKIP supporters previously voted Labour while 37 percent previously voted Conservative” (Maunder 2013). The Party's single-issue nature, although expanded to include different areas of consequence, made repetition of purpose and policy simple for UKIP. This repetition and bombardment of consistent viewpoint stuck in the minds of voters, and ultimately drove votes for populist leadership who promised to be different than the establishment politicians holding the power at the time.

### ***Anti-Establishment Politicians***

To reach citizens tired of the establishment who had been ruling Great Britain for decades, UKIP aimed to highlight the failures of the existing government. In particular, UKIP sought to connect the failures of the British government with the potential for similar failures in a larger, supra-national government such as the European Union. For example, after the exposure



of the misappropriation of funds by Members of Parliament (MPs) in 2009, UKIP began to emphasize its distance from ‘establishment’ politics as a positive change for Britons. Tactics to emphasize this point included campaign posters with images of party leaders from all the other major British parties, with “Sod the Lot” written atop (reference Figure 3.7). Through initiatives such as the call-out posters, UKIP raised the question of the integrity behind the existing men in power, and the sincerity of their interests in representing Britain’s needs in the European Parliament. The thought was that if these men used British funds for their own betterment, why would they not also engage in such corrupt self-betterment opportunities elsewhere (Deacon 174).



**Figure 3.7:** UKIP Campaign Poster

UKIP leadership realized that in addition to attacking the deplorable actions of those in government, they had to build an image of the party as a suitable group of politicians to replace the status quo figures in power. Because of the fact that many of UKIP’s founders were radical-right leaders, and others were involved in scandals involving racism, sexism, etc., the party determined that in order to be respected, they needed to be respectable. As the party gained more

electoral power in 2012, they began making changes to the lineup of their officer-holders. One of the largest moves to cleanse the party was in 2014, when the party introduced a requirement that

all potential candidates sign a form confirming they have never had membership of an organisation considered ‘liable to bring the party into disrepute’, never been convicted of an offence punishable by a custodial sentence and never ‘engaged in, advocated or condoned racist, violent, criminal or anti-democratic activity’” (Deacon 6, Landale 2014).

To complement the removal of unfavorable publicity, UKIP focused on flooding Britain with its message, focusing voters in on the party’s objectives rather than its rocky history of the previous decade. The party paid heavily for increased publicity, with its campaign budget for the 2014 European election exceeding that of every opposing party, as well as for the 2015 British General election (Deacon 6). The funding for such action came from those elites mentioned in the previous section who were in support of Britain’s independence and the UKIP message. UKIP successfully infiltrated the minds of voters with its ideology, pandering to their desire for change in politics, while manipulating rhetoric to present to them a very simple formula for change: leave the European Union.

## CONCLUSION

In comparison to Perón’s manipulation of populist rhetoric to create a political strategy for his movement, UKIP’s is far more myopically-focused; Perón focused on building a state and movement around economic independence, social justice, and political sovereignty, while UKIP merely desired ‘British independence,’ and did not have a long-term institutionalized vision for the party after the achievement of this goal. However, it is not apparent that Perón’s populist rhetoric was ever intended to last long-term after his decline from power. What Perón envisioned with the creation of his three tenets was to have policies around which nationalists from all parts of Argentina could unite; this nationalism was inward-looking, and intended to draw various

socioeconomic groups together to build Argentine cohesiveness based on pride in being Argentine. This pride did not have an end-date, and could carry the nation forward through waves of change across the decades. UKIP, likewise, also tried to unite British voters around nationalism; however, UKIP's nationalism was outward-looking and often ultimately divisive; rather than build a positive vision of nationalist pride, it ultimately settled on a negative understanding of Britishness that excluded large numbers of Britons who supported the EU, elite governance, and/or immigration. Once this goal was achieved with Brexit, there was not a unifying sense of pride in a single British nation, but only uglier fights about the meaning of the referendum and the nature of modern Britain. Consequently, while the manipulation of rhetoric to underscore existing sentiments of frustrated voters worked in the short term for UKIP, in the long term, the rhetoric merely created populist discourse, and not lasting political strategy as did the manipulation of rhetoric in Argentina. Having said this, UKIP's goal from its inception has always been to achieve British independence from the European Union, without any long term plan after that. The positivity, negativity, or inclusivity of its rhetoric has always been secondary to the advancement of that goal.

The ability of UKIP to focus on this one goal has its roots in the last two and a half decades of dissatisfaction with the status quo political elites of the Conservative and Labour parties, which has been further exacerbated by heavy immigration into the country and all of the resultant consequences. Because of Margaret Thatcher's divisive premiership, a drastic change in politics allowed for the infiltration into the environment created by the aforementioned areas of discontent. Thatcher's sundering of the strict boundaries between Conservatives and Labour through various policies, particularly in regard to unions, as well as her planted seed of Euroscepticism in her 1988 Bruges Speech, gave UKIP the talking points necessary to address

public discontent and draw in frustrated voters. Through the use of elite funding during strategic political moments, combined with the manipulation of rhetoric to strengthen pandering to voters, UKIP was able to bring its populist message to the forefront of political discourse across the world, and achieve its goal of gaining British independence from Europe. In emphasis of the truly populist nature of this success, not only was British independence achieved, but it was won through popular vote rather than from the mandate of an elected governing body. It was a decision made by the British voters themselves.

## Chapter 4: Measurements of Success

Having examined the various drivers of populism in both Argentina and Great Britain, this chapter now analyzes the success of each movement by considering two metrics: first, the degree to which it actually achieved its stated policy goals, and second, the degree to which it gained widespread recognition within a national discussion, especially as witnessed through mainstream media attention. These two success types will be defined as *'fulfillment'* success and *'pervasiveness'* success, respectively. While fulfillment success is determined by the party and its ability to effectively implement its policy in the face of opposition, pervasiveness success is determined more by external factors driven by media coverage of the movement and the proliferation of its message in the political arena.

### **'FULFILLMENT' SUCCESS**

In order to examine the fulfillment success of the *Peronista* Party and UKIP, I analyze their respective party goals and to what degree each was actually carried into policy (reference Figures 4.1-4.2). In order to determine the level of fulfillment, I rank each stated goal as “unfulfilled,” “partially fulfilled,” or “fulfilled,” with a score of 0, 1, and 2 representing each level quantitatively. As the *Peronistas* never actually formulated a party platform, or at least one that is now widely accessible, I compile broader goals stated by Perón himself in two public speeches, one from 1948 and the other from 1950. On the other hand, UKIP published a formal manifesto with explicit party goals in 2005; I draw my analysis directly from this platform. Note that in the case of UKIP, all goals that are ‘more than likely to be achieved’ by the completion of the Brexit transition at the time of this writing are marked as “fulfilled.” Criteria for their likely fulfillment is based on precedent and current negotiations. For example, Britain’s renewal to the World Trade Organization (‘WTO’) as an independent state rather than through the EU is more

than likely because it has been a member state since 1995 and has independently donated significant sums to the WTO, most recently in December of 2017 (wto.org). After completing the numerical analysis, I add the values for the fulfillment of each goal for both populist movements and take the average in order to compare the success levels of both movements.

<b>Perón – Peronista Party – 1948-50</b>		
<b>Goal</b>	<b>Fulfillment Level</b>	<b>Score</b>
Humanism in action	Fulfilled	2
New political doctrine (1949 Constitution) which rejects the ills of previous politics	Fulfilled	2
Grants similar opportunities among men	Fulfilled	2
Assured economic future	Partially Fulfilled	1
Redistribution of wealth	Partially Fulfilled	1
Every man expected to contribute to economic betterment of Argentina	Fulfilled	2
No discrimination, particularly that of the anti-Semitic sentiment	Unfulfilled	0
Government carries out will of the people in democratic action	Partially Fulfilled	1
Citizens in service to Argentine goal of ‘Argentina for Argentines’	Partially Fulfilled	1
Produce at least what each consumes	Partially Fulfilled	1
National unity; abolition of civil strife	Partially Fulfilled	1
Balance between rights of community and rights of the individual	Fulfilled	2
Capital should be spent in service of the nation	Fulfilled	2
Equality of achievement of social rights	Partially Fulfilled	1
Rule by centralized government	Fulfilled	2
<b>AVERAGE FULFILLMENT OF PERONIST GOALS</b>		<b>1.4</b>

**Figure 4.1:** Fulfillment Success of Perón’s Vision and Goals | Source: Modern Latin America

<b>UKIP – 2005 – Party Manifesto</b>		
<b>Goal</b>	<b>Fulfillment Level</b>	<b>Score</b>
<b>‘BRITISH INDEPENDENCE’</b>		
Withdraw Britain from the EU	Fulfilled	2
Establishment of a transition committee for a two year transition	Fulfilled <sup>1</sup>	2
<b>THE ECONOMY</b>		
Reclaim independent seat in World Trade Organization	Fulfilled <sup>2</sup>	2
Re-affirmed commitment to trade and cooperation with European and global partners	Fulfilled <sup>3</sup>	2
Spend all funds previously directed to the EU on increasing state pension	Unfulfilled	0
Raise government borrowing to expedite tax cuts and increase defense spending	Partially Fulfilled <sup>4</sup>	1
Rewrite the tax code; supportive of a flat tax	Unfulfilled <sup>5</sup>	0
<b>HEALTH AND WELFARE</b>		

Transfer day-to-day management of healthcare to local offices from central government	Partially Fulfilled <sup>6</sup>	1
Allow general practitioners to practice on evenings and weekends	Fulfilled <sup>7</sup>	2
Rewrite welfare code; reduce means-testing	Unfulfilled	0
Reinstate tax exemption on pension savings	Partially Fulfilled <sup>8</sup>	1
Restore full pension rights to expatriates	Fulfilled <sup>9</sup>	2
<b>EDUCATION</b>		
Remove Standardized Aptitude Tests	Unfulfilled	0
Increase authority of the teacher in regard to discipline, expulsions, etc.	Fulfilled <sup>10</sup>	2
Withdraw government funding to underperforming universities and redistribute that money to successful programs	Unfulfilled <sup>11</sup>	0
Equalize fees for both non-EU and EU students	Unfulfilled <sup>12</sup>	0
<b>HOME AFFAIRS</b>		
Review minimum and maximum terms for prison sentences	Unfulfilled <sup>13</sup>	0
Limit immigration through more precise matching of needed skill in Britain to skills of immigrant skilled-worker	Fulfilled <sup>14</sup>	2
Implement “Britishness Tests” to encourage assimilation	Unfulfilled	0
<b>AGRICULTURE AND FISHERIES</b>		
Introduce minimum pricing to replace EU’s Common Agricultural Policy	Partially Fulfilled <sup>15</sup>	1
Reestablish British control over coastal waters	Fulfilled <sup>16</sup>	2
Implementation of “fallow” zones where fishing is prohibited to allow stock to restore	Fulfilled <sup>17</sup>	2
<b>DEFENSE</b>		
Deploy British forces only where national interest is at stake	Partially Fulfilled <sup>18</sup>	1
Increase defense spending particularly in nuclear development	Fulfilled <sup>19</sup>	2
Reaffirm stance in NATO while equally removing British military forces from any united European force or alliance	Partially Fulfilled	1
<b>OTHER</b>		
Place an immediate stop on the erection of wind turbines	Unfulfilled <sup>20</sup>	0
Prohibit planting of genetically-modified crops in Great Britain	Fulfilled <sup>21</sup>	2
Return railway and track governance to one body	Fulfilled <sup>22</sup>	2
<b>BRITISH GOVERNANCE</b>		
Change referendum laws so that increased possibility of occurrence exists	Unfulfilled <sup>23</sup>	0
Increase local council budgets and authority	Unfulfilled <sup>24</sup>	0
Reject all forms of regional governance in Great Britain	Partially Fulfilled	1
Repeal 1999 Human Rights Act	Unfulfilled <sup>25</sup>	0
Reject plan for Identity Cards	Fulfilled <sup>26</sup>	2
Repeal Hunting Act	Unfulfilled	0
<b>AVERAGE FULFILLMENT OF UKIP GOALS</b>	<b>1.03</b>	

**Figure 4.2:** Fulfillment Success of UKIP’s 2004 Party Platform Goals | Source: UKIP 2005 Manifesto

### *Analysis of Fulfillment Success*

Perón's fulfillment of his party's goals requires more of a subjective analysis than does the fulfillment of UKIP's goals given that the policy objectives listed for Argentina are taken from Perón's speeches rather than from a formal party platform. The two speeches, given in 1948 and 1950, publically addressed the driving question of "what is Peronism?" Consequently, Perón's answers to the question offer specific insight as to what he hoped the movement would represent and achieve while in power. Perón ultimately fulfilled a greater proportion of his party's goals than did UKIP, with parties earning respectively 1.4 and 1.03 average goal fulfillment. However, a critical difference in the success of Perón at fulfilling his goals may be due to the broadness of his statements and desires, whereas UKIP had a long list of specific policy initiatives. Despite this weakness in the comparison, overall, both parties were able to at least partially, if not totally, fulfill over half of their respective goals. The high fulfillment success of Perón was largely due to the significant power wielded by the *Peronistas* over the course of Perón's nine-year presidency. On the other hand, rather than being driven by electoral success, UKIP's fulfillment success was driven by its ability to shape the narrative of mainstream politics toward big-ticket issues such as membership in the EU and immigration into Great Britain. The divergence between the two cases in how they were capable of expressing their message is critical to the subsequent lasting success of each party. Whereas Perón held electoral power and consequently was able to affect change for nearly a decade, UKIP's lack of electoral power allowed for the fulfillment of its main goal and then the subsequent demise of the party. Perón's successful seizure of institutional power through the presidency allowed him to quickly and efficiently pass legislation. In contrast, UKIP was unable to exercise this direct form of change-making as efficiently given its lack of parliamentary seats, but its real strength was in



its ability to seize and manipulate political narratives, presenting alternatives to mainstream politics that embraced disenfranchised members of multiple parties. Consequently, it is not surprising that UKIP was most successful in achieving its goal of ‘British independence’ by a popular referendum that upended traditional party lines rather than by an election awarding control of institutional positions of authority. Had fulfillment of the party’s program been dependent on actually holding seats in Parliament – and, one might note, really *governing* the country – UKIP would be nothing more than a footnote in British politics.

Perhaps in self-acknowledgment of the party’s weakness electorally but strength in shaping discourse, UKIP continually stressed its single-issue stance of ‘British independence.’ However, the table above seems to imply that it had much greater aspirations than just its one driving goal. The party did clearly have hopes of shifting the overall political discourse in Great Britain, but it repeatedly acknowledged that no other goal was as important as that of ‘British independence.’ In the party’s 2005 Manifesto, UKIP leader Roger Knapman writes, “the point is that the single issue of freeing Britain from the EU over-rides all others – no other issues can be properly addressed while we remain in the EU” (UKIP 2005). Given this statement, it follows logically that most of the party’s other goals, many of which are tied to leaving an EU policy program and replacing it with a British version, could not occur prior to British secession. The clearest mark of fulfillment success is therefore seen in the British national referendum in 2016 on Britain’s membership in the EU. The victory for the ‘leave’ camp was a decisive win for UKIP, having consequently achieved its main goal and gaining the opportunity for every other goal to receive consideration thereafter.

Ironically, success in the referendum was a direct cause of a severe decline in UKIP’s influence, and thus in its ability to maintain fulfillment success moving forward. Victory over the

EU did not bring with it any real electoral power to implement other UKIP policy initiatives post-Brexit. Perhaps in recognition of this fact, almost all of the party's major leaders, including, critically, Nigel Farage, have retreated out of politics since the vote. Lacking both leadership and parliamentary seats, the party has been left rudderless, sidelined as the fate of its policy priorities was left in the hands of a governing Conservative Party sharply split over Europe policy. As one commentator accurately summed-up as the afterglow of Brexit faded, "UKIP has lost its capacity to dictate policy" and "the electorate stole it away and handed the task to the Tories" (Jenkins, *Guardian*).

This relationship between Tory and UKIP policy priorities is another issue is calculating the fulfillment success of the latter. There are multiple policies that were desired by UKIP and included in its manifesto, such as the merging of railway and rail-track agencies, that have been fulfilled not because of the party's direct success, but because of Conservative initiatives over the last few years. UKIP's ability to "piggy back" on such Conservative policies undoubtedly inflated the party's overall fulfillment success.

However, it is clear that no amount of secondary policy overlap with the Tories can outweigh the victory that Brexit was to UKIP, the only party of significance to take a firmly 'leave' position. But even this victory has created sustainability problems for the party moving forward. Now that the unifying goal of 'British independence' has been achieved, UKIP has witnesses an exodus of moderates due to disagreements with the party's more extreme ideas. As moderates have slid back toward traditional Tory and Labour politics as Brexit negotiations begin, UKIP is left with extremists unlikely to gain popular momentum without funding, an ability to pander to a wide audience, and without amendable rhetoric (Jenkins, *Guardian*). Despite all of these setbacks, disappointments, and 'piggy-backing,' however, given the

centrality of the goal of ‘British independence’ in the party imaginary, this one fulfillment success outweighs whatever else the party may lose as it struggles to maintain power moving forward. It has achieved what it set out to do, and that seems sufficient to count its overall two-decade political existence as success.

Overall, both parties were successful at filling many of their respective goals, with Perón’s electoral power allowing him to drive policy, and UKIP’s strong ability to influence political discourse driving British politics toward the Brexit vote. While Perón appears to have fulfilled more individual policy objectives, the success of Brexit cannot be understated in its lasting impact on British politics. Of all the above-mentioned goals, the achievement of Brexit looms larger than any other political victory achieved in either case.

#### **‘PERVASIVENESS’ SUCCESS**

In order to determine the level of pervasiveness of each movement, I hoped to examine the occurrences of ‘populist buzz words’ in two major newspapers: Argentina’s *Clarín* and the London *Times*. However, the number of editions of *Clarín* from the 1940s that were available was insufficient for a full analysis. Consequently, my discussion of the pervasiveness of Perón’s message is based in the conclusions drawn by historical experts who argue that Perón’s message was highly pervasive – largely due to the fact that he himself controlled the output of almost all news media in Argentina during his presidency. Thus, his message was extremely widespread but was disseminated in a constructed fashion rather than arising organically as a result of the growing success of the party. On the other hand, in order to determine the pervasiveness of UKIP’s message, I used basic search and find capabilities within the main Galegroup historical newspaper records for the *Times*. I searched for specific terms related to populism and UKIP across sections of the newspaper save for paid advertisements (reference Figure 4.3).

<b>Buzzwords for Populism: Great Britain</b>		
Populism	UKIP	Nigel Farage
UKIP + Farage	UKIP + Populism	
<b>Figure 4.3:</b> Words searched for pervasiveness analysis in Britain		

While both Argentine and British populist movements spanned many years, I focused my analysis for Argentina on Perón’s presidential years (1946-55), and for Britain on several groupings of three-year periods clustered around significant UKIP successes. The selection of three-year groupings helps reveal the importance of the middle year in UKIP’s pervasiveness lifecycle. The middle years examined include the following:

1. 1997 – Leadership within UKIP shifts thanks to the removal and subsequent reinstatement of Nigel Farage to party membership. Sked is ousted as party leader. The Referendum Party dissolves, strengthening UKIP.
2. 2004 – Large influx of Eastern European states into the European Union, doubling immigration into Great Britain between 2003-4).
3. 2010 – UKIP releases another party manifesto for the UK General Election. The party faces poor election results and the party leader, Lord Pearson of Rannoch resigned.
4. 2016 – Brexit Referendum

The results of my analysis are referenced in Figures 4.4a-c. Note that for the final three-year grouping for British populism, I based my analysis on a study completed by Moore and Ramsay in 2017 on media coverage of the Brexit Referendum as the Galegroup Database only holds records for the *Times* until 2012.

<b>UKIP – 1997 European Parliamentary Election</b>				
<b>Buzzword</b>	<b>Hit Count</b>			
	<b>Year</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>
Populism		21	21	21
UKIP		3	3	0
Farage		0	2	0
UKIP + Farage		0	0	0
UKIP + Populism		0	0	0
UKIP + EU		1	1	0
UKIP + Immigration		0	0	0
<b>TOTAL “POPULIST” HITS PER YEAR</b>		<b>25</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>21</b>

**Figure: 4.4a:** Occurrences of populist buzz words in the *Times*, a major newspaper of Britain

<b>UKIP – 2004 European Parliamentary Election</b>			
<b>Buzzword</b>	<b>Hit Count</b>		
<b>Year</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>	<b>2005</b>
Populism	24	34	40
UKIP	1	101	60
Farage	3	14	7
UKIP + Farage	0	11	4
UKIP + Populism	0	1	1
UKIP + EU	0	16	8
UKIP + Immigration	0	14	15
<b>TOTAL “POPULIST” HITS PER YEAR</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>191</b>	<b>135</b>

**Figure: 4.4b:** Occurrences of populist buzz words in the *Times*, a major newspaper of Britain

<b>UKIP – 2010</b>			
<b>Buzzword</b>	<b>Hit Count</b>		
<b>Year</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2011</b>
Populism	37	30	36
UKIP	80	62	27
Farage	21	31	10
UKIP + Farage	15	18	6
UKIP + Populism	0	0	0
UKIP + EU	23	7	7
UKIP + Immigration	5	11	3
<b>TOTAL “POPULIST” HITS PER YEAR</b>	<b>181</b>	<b>159</b>	<b>89</b>

**Figure: 4.4c:** Occurrences of populist buzz words in the *Times*, a major newspaper of Britain

### *Analysis of Pervasiveness Success*

I analyze the pervasiveness of Perón’s populist message through qualitative scholarly discourse rather than through quantitative evaluation due to limitations of access to historical newspapers from the 1940s in Argentina. However, scholarship on the media during Perón’s period in power offers ample information from which to draw conclusions about the prevalence of populism. Prior to Perón’s assumption of power in 1946, the G.O.U., the representative group

of military leaders responsible for the coup of 1943, immediately imposed press censorship within hours of the revolution. They did so in order to prevent the spread of rumors that might disrupt the transition process for the new government (Blanksten 202). This imposition of censorship was strengthened by the creation of a Subsecretariat of Information, which, by 1946 was the direct link between the President and the press. One of the direct responsibilities of the Subsecretariat was to “supervise the conduct of the press and other media of information and opinion” (203). Not only did this direct control restrict all output of information contrary to the administration, it also, and most critically, forced the promulgation of the presidency’s message; all newspapers in Argentina were required by law to publish all official press releases coming from the *Casa Rosada*.

Violations of the various laws which both strengthened censorship and increased propaganda resulted in a dearth of both domestic and foreign newspapers within the nation. By 1951, around one hundred newspapers had been discontinued in Argentina since the start of Perón’s presidency in 1946 (205). In order to justify the censorship of the press, Perón emphasized the fact that Argentina did not have any paper production plants, and therefore had to import all of its paper. Given Perón’s push for economic independence, reducing imports of paper aligned with his economic goals and justified the rationing of newspaper distribution. However, it was clear both within Argentina and abroad that Perón’s censorship had passed the bounds of democratic legality (Blanksten 207; McGuire 69). One of the most visible examples of Perón’s suppression of the press is seen with the opposition newspaper, *La Prensa*, which for seven years wrote anti-Peronist editorials, constantly facing temporary closures until it was shut down officially in 1951. Perón’s administration was not solely responsible for the censorship attacks on *La Prensa*; Perón’s followers physically attacked the *La Prensa* building, starting

various fires, and state-linked unions for newspaper distribution refused to distribute *La Prensa*'s papers (Blanksten 212). However, while censorship of opposition was critical to Perón's portrayal of stability in his administration, more critical in the process of amassing voter support was the propaganda pushed out from his offices, particularly in the form of nationalist pride such as was seen in Perón's magazine, *Argentina* (Elena 209). With censorship of newspapers, magazines, radio, and theater, Perón created an atmosphere of positive information about himself and his regime; the breadth of outlets carrying Perón's message into the daily lives of Argentines ensured an unprecedented mass consumption of propaganda (211). As Blanksten notes, the media had become so manipulated that they "march[ed] on orders from the *Casa Rosada*, where dwell[ed] a firm determination to indoctrinate and educate the citizenry in the ways of its rulers" (219). Moreover, this blanketing of media channels with pro-Perón messaging actually worked; with only positive understandings of his populist nationalism hitting the ears of the country, Perón was able to win the 1951 election by over thirty percent of the vote. His victory, rooted in the widespread and genuine popular belief of the people that he would continue his fight for a united Argentina, reflected the intensity of the power that his electoral success granted him. Such power allowed him to influence and sway both policy and message to construct the image of a stable, idealized, opportunity-filled Argentina.

In contrast to Perón's manipulation and control of the media, UKIP had absolutely no control over the media's coverage of its rise to power. Consequently, any media coverage arose organically from the need to discuss and address consumer interest in populism and its chief political mouthpiece, UKIP. Based on the data collected above, it is clear that upticks in the national discussion surrounding Europe, immigration, and populism correlate with major moments of electoral significance for the party. The consistent spike in media coverage around

significant years is emphasized by the presence of an outlier in 2010. Unlike 1997 and 2004 which were marked by positive changes for the party, 2010 was a year of intra-party turmoil and poor electoral success. Consequently, rather than media coverage peaking in 2010, it dropped off, reflecting the reversed growth of the party. When UKIP was not making substantial party changes or directing policy discussion, the party and its populist message was absent from national political discourse. Despite the pockets of success experienced by UKIP over the two decades or so of its existence, the party's moment of victory both in terms of policy and national recognition occurred in 2016 with the Brexit Referendum.

The analysis of Britain's media coverage of the 2016 Referendum shows the catapulting of UKIP and populism to the forefront of political discussion, giving names such as Nigel Farage and UKIP "household" recognition. Moore and Ramsay (2017) calculate that nearly one fifth of all front page stories of national British newspapers during the official, ten-week Brexit campaign were related to the Referendum. The major topics of the articles written during the campaign were first related to the economy, followed by issues of immigration. However, immigration tripled in prominence over the course of the campaign, becoming a central point of controversy relating to 'British independence.' While the EU Referendum was a campaign that involved all political parties in Britain, UKIP's presence was at the forefront; significantly, Nigel Farage was directly quoted in over 2,000 articles – an extremely high number given that Prime Minister David Cameron's figure was only 5,700 (13). Populist rhetoric was also common in the discussion of the Referendum, with mentions of the "Establishment" against the "people" being mentioned in 547 articles and "elites" mentioned in 636 articles (14). In regard to the interest of various publications in publishing on the Referendum during the campaign, *The Guardian* wrote the most with 1,628 articles, and the *Times* publishing 1,102. All other major national



newspapers published between 850 and 1,628, highlighting the prevalence of the discussion across partisan news outlets (17). Overall, populism's message was being spread by all news outlets in Britain, with no newspaper able to exclude populism, UKIP, and the party's goal of leaving the European Union. Consequently, UKIP was highly successful in its message's pervasiveness throughout not only pockets of success between its founding and 2016, but also during the pinnacle of its political achievement with the Brexit vote.

Beyond any single three-year-grouping, there are a number of trends that can be drawn from them collectively. Most importantly, the number of hits for populist terms in Great Britain continually increased over the course of the two decades examined, highlighting the growing cumulative influence of populist ideology in Britain, as well as the growing recognition of the potential power – if not necessarily the political legitimacy – of UKIP as a substantial political contender in British politics. The critical moments examined, 1997, 2004, 2010, and 2010, also share significant drop-offs in discussion in the year following each of these significant moments. There is thus a clear lifecycle for the pervasiveness of UKIP's message. First, UKIP and populism shake up the news cycle as they approach key moments of decision related to Europe, immigration, or the existence of UKIP as a coherent party in the national conversation as they threaten to mobilize voters. Second, they achieve pinnacles of message pervasiveness (and elite funding) in key years of decision. Finally, they drop off the media's radar as the discussion shifts away from the issues of Europe and immigration. In this lifecycle sits a clue to the failure of UKIP to effectively translate pervasive attention into institutional political success in parliamentary elections: short-term policy success can actually degrade the party's place in the national conversation by exhausting it of its momentum, almost as though it were a 'pressure valve' allowing the periodic release of built-up populist tensions. UKIP, the mayfly of parties, is

thus born in the warm glow of national debates over topics touching populist nerves, but rapidly dies off when deprived of the heated disagreement of an election cycle.

## **CONCLUSION**

As seen in the analysis above, both the Peronist and UKIP movements gained significant popular support which allowed each to achieve policy change in favor of their populist ideology. Whether through coercion or natural discussion, the pervasiveness of both movements spiked across their respective periods of success. Perón's success is marked by his at least partial fulfillment of most of his goals, particularly in regard to the creation of economic independence, social justice, and popular sovereignty within Argentina. UKIP's success is largely defined in the party's victory seen in the UKIP referendum. These high levels of success in goal fulfillment and pervasiveness of message are ultimately what distinguishes these two movements as critical models of populism. Although both Peronism and UKIP's populism fade away, they do so for different reasons and with different consequences, as will be examined in chapter five.

## Chapter 5: Concluding Analysis

Comparing populism in Argentina in the 1940s and in contemporary Great Britain, the two movements had many similarities in their growth due to the influence of the three drivers analyzed, but ultimately they had very different outcomes in their acquisition of institutional, and therefore lasting, power. While the ultimate success of Perón's populism was made possible through the power of the presidency, UKIP's influence on British politics was in the form of an ability to influence policy discussion rather than through holding institutional power in the British Parliament. If Perón had not been president, he would not have been able to enforce and control as many aspects of the state as he did, and consequently his ideology would not have infiltrated Argentine politics to create a "New Argentina." As president however, Perón constructed a strong system of nationalism through his populist rhetoric to fight against the failures of the status quo politicians of Argentina's past. On the other hand, UKIP did not hold direct power over policy, but in raising awareness of various impacts of British membership to the European Union, the party was able to tap into the needs and desires of different groups of people to successfully connect 'British independence' to the resolution of other policy problems touching the lives of ordinary Britons. Regardless of the differences in how Perón and UKIP exercised their growing influence as populist movements, the ultimate demise of both movements is a consequence of both losing one or more of the three drivers essential to the maintenance of populist movements.

Perón's eventual demise in the 1955 military *coup d'état* was not a result of his followers abandoning him, but from his own inability to continually leverage the three drivers of populism. With the death of Evita in 1952, funding from elites diminished as the Eva Perón Foundation began to perish with her. Additionally, Perón's ability to pander to voters was not an active part

of his presidency during the early 1950s as he had no election to win after 1951 and all those in power around him still approved of him and the general direction of his policies – in essence, he had to make no specific policy promises, and therefore made none. Furthermore, he had the power to depose any who publically opposed him, so internal threats were minimal. Finally, the manipulation of rhetoric began to wane as Perón consolidated more power in the presidency, creating a nearly entirely state-run nation that had bent the rules of democracy so far that there was little attempt to continue to hide this fact. Additionally, and most critically, Perón and his wife had helped so many working class citizens that he did not have to convince them of his goodness by the 1950s because he had already proven it. However, Perón's past success was not enough to continue pushing his party forward without the presence of the three drivers. Between the 1951 election and the 1955 military coup, Perón's ability and will to preserve the three drivers declined, as did his stability. Thus, Perón largely achieved his policy victories contributing to his high level of fulfillment success during the first half of his tenure while he still had control over the drivers, even though this control was forced and coercive. Thus, upon losing control of the drivers, Perón's ability to fulfill his goals decreased as public support decreased, and the prospect of an elite overthrow grew more feasible. By the end of 1951, Perón lost the support of his small percentage of middle class voters, who had represented a third of voters for Perón in 1946, due to fears of working class encroachment on their position (Schoultz 1429). By 1955, Perón essentially had only the support from the working class, and, knowing this, the military overthrew Perón without any obstacles or critical constituent groups in their way (Shoultz 1428). Consequently, Perón's dependence on his past meant his own personal demise, however, his ideology and party were pervasive enough that they survived in the hearts of Argentines despite the party being banned in the political arena for numerous years after the

coup. Thus, although Perón had lost control over the populist drivers and suffered a personal political loss, because his vision for a united Argentina had affected the lives of so many citizens so significantly, the coup was unable to defeat his populist ideology.

Similarly, UKIP's dissolution in the wake of Brexit is due largely to the fact that the party was no longer able to harness the drivers of populism that made it successful in the first place. First, elite backing was lost due to the fact that the party had, first, achieved its main goal of 'British independence' and therefore had fulfilled its *raison d'être*, and second, because the party lost its main leadership, and consequently wealthy donors did not want to follow inexperienced leadership that lacked a driving goal. This loss of leadership was directly in response to the Brexit victory, with Farage resigning just two weeks after the Brexit vote stating,

My aim in being in politics was to get Britain out of the European Union. That is why I now feel that I've done my bit – that I could not possibly achieve more – [...] So now I feel it's right that I should now stand aside" (Farage, July 4, 2016).

In addition to losing elite backing and core leadership, the party was unable to mobilize further electoral support by pandering to voters – as noted in chapter four, the same voters that had supported UKIP's signature issue were willing to trust the established parties to address the consequences of that decision moving forward (Ball, *Guardian*). Indeed, with the referendum out of the way, nothing that UKIP could realistically promise its voters was enough to differentiate the party from the more reliable and powerful mainstream Conservative and Labour parties, both of whom stood prepared to accept the general notion of Brexit as the will of the people. Third, and in relation to the inability of UKIP to pander, was UKIP's lost ability to manipulate rhetoric to reflect both party and voter desires because the party's biggest goal was achieved, and voters no longer were on board with the more extremist views of UKIP. Consequently, the party's inability to fulfill all of its goals was largely due to an inconsistent and un-sustained leveraging

of the populist drivers. Thus, the trend seen across UKIP's life was that it would achieve momentary success, but immediately afterward it would lose momentum and diminish in its influence to direct national conversation. Therefore, moderate UKIP voters shifted back, particularly post-Brexit, into the mold of establishment politics, leaving UKIP devoid of voter support.

While this paper analyzes how Perón and UKIP leveraged drivers of populism to achieve varying levels of goal fulfillment and pervasiveness in recognition across their respective nations, there were a few weaknesses in my analysis. First, there are other drivers of populism other than the three analyzed here. Some of these other drivers potentially include macroeconomic failures, exclusionist discourse stemming directly from parties in power, and the rise of echo-chamber politics in bi-partisan political arenas. However, none of these drivers can be directly applied as causing continued growth of Perón's populism or that of UKIP. Additionally, another weakness in my analysis is in regard to the measures of success. As stated previously in chapter four, the fulfillment success for Perón was based not on specific policy goals, but rather broad political objectives. This broadness resulted in a highly subjective analysis of success. For the fulfillment measure of UKIP, again, it must be noted that some of the policy goals achieved cannot be linked directly to UKIP's influence, but rather UKIP's "piggy-backing" on Conservative or Labour policy successes. In regard to the pervasiveness measure, Perón's fulfillment was almost as high as it could be, but this was due to his state-control over the media and subsequent publication of Peronist propaganda. For UKIP, pervasiveness of message did display a clear bell curve around important years for the party's structure and growth, however, the results were based solely on the London *Times*, and results may have varied among more extreme-partisan publications.

Given the weaknesses detailed above, areas for future research within the scope of this paper include deeper analysis of specific party goals for Perón, and the potential continuation of these goals in the subsequent administrations that followed his 1955 ousting. Additionally, a comparison of Perón's populism in his first two terms as president compared to his third term (1973-1974) would offer insight to the durability of his original goals and the possibility of their ultimate fulfillment. On the UKIP case, further analysis of various other publications could offer insight as to the messaging that highly-liberal papers were publishing versus highly-conservative papers. An analysis of Brexit voter leanings compared to the prevalence of readership of particular publications could show how media may have influenced the election, although from my current analysis it is clear that the party's success drove the media reaction, not vice versa. However, these are just a few examples of potential future research, and with an ideology as broad as populism, many other future paths are available for exploration.

In sum, both of the examined cases of populism sought to gain influence and power, however for different purposes. Perón sought to gain representation for the underrepresented working class in Argentina, and UKIP sought to bring the underrepresented idea of 'British independence' to the fore of national discussion, pairing it along the way with an economic message targeting a working class that felt abandoned after Labour's 1990s reforms. Despite the ultimate unraveling of both populist movements, their existence in each of their respective nations resulted in the resolution of the root issue that creates populism: missing representation in the existing political environment. Consequently, one asks what the long-term role of populist movements is within established democracies. Given that populism seeks to add representation or give voice to a previously unconsidered idea, once that is achieved, is it possible for a populist movement to sustain itself? I argue that although the three drivers can continue giving strength to

a specific movement, ultimately it is the strength of the populist ideology itself that will determine how lasting its presence is in politics. In other words, while a populist party may fail or fall out of power, if its fundamental message of bettering some aspect of representation is continually necessary to the functioning of a fully-representative democracy, then there is a chance that the same populist ideology may rise again one day. In the case of Argentina, this is seen with continued waves of remnant *Peronista* ideology still affecting policy decisions in the last few decades because giving voice to working-class voters is still prominent and necessary. On the other hand, in UKIP's case, the party's single-issue stance may result in the party's specific vein of populism fading out of British politics altogether. Thus, so long as democracies function to encourage the shifting of leadership and ideological leanings from election to election, there is the opportunity for previously strong sentiments of populism to resurface as they have in Argentina, or for new gaps in representation to form and then be filled by new populist movements. Therefore, populism is both a continual opportunity and/or threat to every democratic nation, for as long as there are unrepresented groups or ideas, there exists the possibility of a populist movement to rise and fill in the gap.



**Appendix A: Timeline of Pertinent Argentine Political History**

**1814-1874:** Argentine Civil War

**1835 - 1852:** Rosas was governor of Argentina but ruled as dictator

**1868 - 1874:** Sarmiento was President of Argentina

**1912:** Full adult male suffrage

**1916 - 1922:** Hipólito Yrigoyen was President

**1928 – 1930:** Hipólito Yrigoyen held second term before being ousted by a military *coup d'état*

**1929:** Outbreak of the Great Depression

**1930 - 1940:** Infamous Decade; series of military and civilian rulers

**1930 - 1960:** Mass migration from the 'internal' to Buenos Aires during Industrialization

**1939:** Outbreak of World War II (Argentina neutral until 1945)

**1941-1946:** State of Siege imposed on Argentina

**1943 - 1946:** Military rule of Argentina by three successive brigadier generals

**1943:** Juan Domingo Perón elected as Secretary of Labor and Welfare

**1945:** President Farrell's military kidnap Perón; later released and bid for presidency declared

**1946:** Perón won Presidency; establishment of *Peronista* Party

**1947:** Universal Suffrage

**1949:** Passage of reformed social Constitution

**1952:** Perón elected to second term; Eva Perón passes away

**1955:** Perón ousted by a military *coup d'état*

**Appendix B: Perón's 20 Truths of Social Justice (1950)**  
Source: Guido (2006)

1. True democracy is one where the government does what the people want and defends only one interest: the people.
2. Peronism is popular in its essence. All political circles are anti-popular and for this reason are not Peronist.
3. The Peronist works for the Movement. Whoever in its name serves a circle or a caudillo is one only in name.
4. For Peronism there exists only one class of men: workers.
5. In the new Argentina work is a right that creates human dignity and is a duty, for it is right that everyone produce at least what he consumes.
6. For a good Peronist there can be nothing better than another Peronist.
7. No Peronist should feel himself to be more than he is, or less than he should be. When a Peronist begins to feel himself to be more than he is he begins to convert himself into an oligarch.
8. In political action the scale of values of every Peronist is the following: first the Fatherland, then the Movement, and then Men.
9. For us politics are not an end, rather only a means for the good of the Fatherland, which is the happiness of its children and national greatness.
10. The two arms of Peronism are Social Justice and Social Assistance. With them we embrace the people in Justice and Love.
11. Peronism wants national unity and not struggle. It wants heroes and not martyrs.
12. In the new Argentina children are the only privileged ones.
13. A government without a doctrine is a body without a soul. For this reason Peronism has its own political, economic, and social doctrine, which is Justicialism.
14. Justicialism is a new philosophy of life that is simple, practical, popular, profoundly Christian, and profoundly popular.
15. As a political doctrine Justicialism realizes the equilibrium between the rights of the individual and those of the community.
16. As economic doctrine Justicialism realizes the social economy, placing capital at the service of the economy and the latter at the service of social well-being.
17. As a social doctrine Justicialism realizes social justice, which gives every person their right to a social function.
18. We want a socially just, economically free, and politically sovereign Argentina.
19. We constitute a centralized government, an organized state, and a free people.
20. The best we have on this earth is the People.

**Appendix C: British Party Funding in 2015**  
Source: Business Insider (2-2016).

**Figure C.1:** Major donors to UKIP in 2015

<b>Donor</b>	<b>Amount</b>
Stuart Wheeler	£100,000
British Government	£89,869
Ko Barclay	£80,000
Arron Banks	£34,232

**Figure C.2:** Total funds received by major British political parties in 2015

<b>Party</b>	<b>Funds Gathered (2015)</b>	<b>Private Funds within Total</b>
UKIP	£3.3M	£196,282
Conservatives	£5.4M	£5.1M
Labour	£4.1M	£2.5M

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