

Arch.  
*Class No.*..... 378.2  
*Book No.*..... Barnes

LIBRARY  
*OF*  
Washington and Lee University  
*LEXINGTON, VIRGINIA*

From  
3102  
Barnes

PRUSSIAN LIBERALISM  
IN THE  
MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY

AUG 2 1960

John Julian Barnes, Jr.

May, 1960



ARCH.  
378.2  
BARNES

PRUSSIAN LIBERALISM  
IN THE  
MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY

AUG 2 5 '60

John Julian Barnes, Jr.

May, 1960



## Table of Contents

Part I: Introduction to the Problem	1
Part II: A Review of "1848"	9
Part III: The Form and Theory of Liberalism	22
Part IV: The Structure of the Prussian State	28
Part V: Conclusion and Reflections	49

Footnotes  
Bibliography

## I

German liberalism in the mid-nineteenth century assumed various shades and meanings which are often nebulous and indefinite. However, there seems to be some pattern, some direction, even if it might be negative, which liberalism can be seen to have taken in the German states. The problems then, are these: What was the nature of liberalism in Germany? And more importantly, was it truly liberalism in the western European way of looking at things? And finally, what result can the impact and development of liberalism be said to have had on the German state? These questions have been raised to show the direction and purpose of this essay.

Much of the liberal thought in Germany had its roots in the French revolution and the Napoleonic wars. In 1789, the European world was rocked by a momentous event--the French Revolution. From this event came new ideas, concepts, and movements which were to affect Europe from then on. The culmination of the French Revolution was the Napoleonic Empire. Into Prussian and German territories poured these new ideas. Although the ideas of the French Revolution were not alien to Prussia before Napoleon, it was his victories at the battles of Jena and Auerstädt which forced the ancien regime in Prussia to come to terms with these concepts. Within seven years after being subjected to these ideas, Prussia was to have adopted French concepts and was to have turned the tide

against Napoleon at the battle of Leipzig. But, was it only the simple adoption of French techniques which allowed the Prussians to make this surprising recovery? No, I think it will be shown that the Prussians took the French techniques, then fitted and changed them according to their society. As, perhaps, in the period after World War I the western ideas of nationalism and democracy are perverted and then turned upon Western society, so were the ideals of the French Revolution perverted and turned upon the French. The Prussian bout with liberal ideas spread by the Revolution must be looked at as a successful response in the defeat of the French at Leipzig; but on a reappraisal the liberal reforms which looked so promising at the defeat of Napoleon must be seen as a failure. By 1819 with the threat of Napoleon gone, the desire for a constitution had definitely waned in court circles. The celebration of students at Wartburg commemorating Luther's burning of a papal bull convinced the king and the conservatives that subversive activity was present. Moreover, the Carlsbad decrees of Metternich led the Prussian monarch to similar moves. Consequently, Hardenberg and Humbolt, liberal ministers, were dismissed. The liberal movement was defeated.

The French Revolution is seen as the source for liberal ideas with which Prussia had to contend. What, then were the ideals of the French Revolution? What were some of the ideas of which Napoleon made the Prussians so acutely aware?

H. A. L. Fisher summarizes the work and thoughts of the men of the Revolution:

The working faith of the best men of the French Revolution was the legacy of the Eighteenth century philosophy, belief in scientific progress, in growing material comfort, in natural rights, in religious toleration, and the ultimate triumph of good sense throughout the world. It was a philosophy which took little heed of the various temperaments and idiosyncrasies of men or nations, regarding humanity as something homogeneous through place and time, capable of being nourished by the same food and rescued by the same conditions, believing that in politics as in physics, there was a mathematical art of discovery and scientific certainty of truth.<sup>1</sup>

However, there is one part of this analysis of the French Revolution which must be emphasized. The ideas of the Revolution were not a direct heritage from the philosophes of the eighteenth century. The philosophes believe in a static and unchanging society which was rationally based and ordered. This was the solution to the problems of the age.<sup>2</sup> However, the French Revolution "had at least one tenuous kind of unity, one determining and constant factor in its climate of opinion: change--change in manners, morals, institutions, business, art..."<sup>3</sup> It was a combination of these factors of natural rights and laws coupled with the idea of change which was the essence of the French Revolution.

The Napoleonic system was the tool for the spread of the ideas of the French Revolution and, of course, for the fostering of the ambitions of Napoleon. Herein is seen one of the reasons for the perversion of the ideals of the revolution. Napoleon's aspirations and the ideals of the revolutions are not necessarily similar. It may be important first to note how the Napoleonic system applied to Germany in its theory and

practice.

The ancient institution of the Holy Roman Empire had passed. Outmoded and archaic as it was, it served a useful function as protector of the weak against the strong and as a safeguard of traditional rights against the despotism of the princes.<sup>4</sup> Napoleon disregarded the desires of the people for "natural rights" and instead instituted a "federation of men and money." "The small people want to be protected against the big; the big want to govern according to their fancy; now as I only want a federation of men and money, and as it is the big people and not the small people who can give me the one and the other I leave the former in peace and the latter must get on as best they can."<sup>5</sup> This is a direct contradiction of Napoleon's promise to the Rhineland confederation: "Under our rule, the rights of man will be restored and all the obstacles to material progress raised by the selfishness of prince or noble, of priest or guild will crumble at a touch."<sup>6</sup> What is the importance of this obvious discrepancy between the ideals of the French Revolution and of the policies of Napoleon?\*

During the preceding period in German history, there was

---

\* Napoleon carried out many reforms, however. He provided the states with French type constitutions and legal codes; reduced the number of sovereign princes, simplified the political geography, secularized the ecclesiastical states, built up Baden, Bavaria, and Wurtenburg, and abolished the Holy Roman Empire. Moreover, although many of the reforms were destroyed when the old houses returned to rule, a good deal of the legal system seemed reasonable in comparison to the previous "hybrid" system, and was kept in many instances--kept to provide a stronger basis for autocratic rule.



a tendency in German politics toward dualism, i.e. the German people gravitated either toward Austria or Prussia. Would the German people now turn to Napoleonic France? Only long conciliation could work this out.<sup>7</sup> The men of Napoleon's bureaucracy saw the answer: "They saw their best work shattered before their ideals--the ideal of exploitation conquering the ideal of beneficence, the enthusiasm of the governed passing into acquiescence, and the acquiescence into concentrated hate."<sup>8</sup> The masses under the Napoleonic system were left out of its benefits; yet it was these people to whom the French Revolution appealed. They turned from France, who should have attracted them, and turned to Prussia for inspiration and leadership. The dichotomy between the theory and practice of the ideals of the revolution served to strengthen the Prussian revival.

There is another dichotomy which the revolution fostered and which served to destroy it. This was the discrepancy between the cosmopolitan ideas of the philosophes and the obvious nationalism which the revolution demonstrated in the levee en masse and the more organic relationships which were evident in the republic. The spread of cosmopolitanism by nationalistic means could only serve to spread nationalism with its still obvious dire results.

What can be said then about the reform movement in Prussia? Obviously it was a failure if one is to judge it as a movement toward liberalism. The constitutional crisis of 1819 repudiated the liberal reforms of Stein and Hardenberg,

innocuous as some of them were. But why was it a failure? The answer is a complex one with its roots back to the French Revolution and before. The constitutional crisis of 1819 cannot be understood without considering this. One factor which must be considered is that there was the obvious discrepancy between the ideals of the French Revolution and the practices as personified in the Napoleonic system. This discrepancy turned the Germans from the revolution and its ideals and only brought them into opposition to it. Another factor is the attempt by the French to create a general liberal European system based on the cosmopolitan ideas of the philosophes by nationalistic means. The levee en masse and the wars of the Revolution enhanced nationalism rather than internationalism. Another factor for the failure is that the historical traditions of Germany and its condition in time would not allow the imposition of liberal ideas without changing them to fit German experience. This is a pragmatic proof of the invalidity of the cosmopolitan ideas as represented in the Napoleonic system. The impact of new ideas upon the German state brought about not a revolution but an "enormity," as Toynbee would say. The liberal ideas reestablished the power in the hands of the defenders of the status quo. The status quo was strengthened by the new ideas of efficiency and rational government. The absolute government of Frederick the Great was replaced by a new government even stronger and more powerful.

What is the nature and the importance of the "enormity"

created by these factors? The failure of the liberal movement which reached its end in 1819 precluded the events during the rest of German history. This generalization is imprecise, but perhaps it can throw light on later aspects of German history. The years 1848, 1871, 1918, and 1945 are all dates which were determined largely by the misstep the German people made in 1819. The year 1819, not 1848, must be considered the turning point in German history, if there are turning points. The failure of the reform movement which had begun so hopefully in 1806 only to fail so ingloriously in 1819 must be considered as the derermining factor of Prussian and German history. The new status of power provided by the perverted ideas of reform was never successfully challenged. However, the failure of the reforms in 1819 must be seen as failures which were bound to occur given the existing situation in Prussia at the time of the French Revolution. The failure of the Prussian reform movement in 1819 seems to have set Germany and German liberalism on a path from which it did not stray. However, this failure did not eliminate a strong liberal tendency from German thought. It is found in the revolutions of 1848. Louis Namier and A. J. P. Taylor seem to have caught the real meaning of these revolutions. Namier calls it the "The Revolution of the Intellectuals." It was a brilliant and fragile movement with the romantic idealism of liberal humanitarianism. But here was its weakness:

States are not created or destroyed, and frontiers

redrawn or obliterated, by argument and majority votes; nations are freed, united, or broken by blood and iron, and not by a generous application of liberty and tomato sause... "The revolution of the intellectuals" exhausted itself without achieving concrete results: it left its imprint only in the realm of ideas.<sup>9</sup>

The revolutions were also complex events, but the conclusion was the same as in 1819--failure of the liberal movement. But as 1819 set the path for the failure of liberal ideas, 1848 sounded its death knell. Taylor notes, perhaps too strongly, but cogently, that:

1848 was the decisive year of Germany and so of European history: it recapitulated Germany's past and anticipated Germany's future. Echoes of the Holy Roman Empire merged into a prelude of the Nazi "New Order"; the doctrines of Rousseau and the doctrines of Marx, the shade of Luther and the shadow of Hitler, jostled each other in a bewildering succession. Never has there been a revolution so inspired by a limitless faith in the power of ideas; never has a revolution so discredited the power of ideas in its result. The success of the revolution discredited conservative ideas. After it, nothing remained but the idea of force, and this idea stood at the helm of German history from then on.<sup>10</sup>

The year 1848 was a decisive year in German history. But the events of 1848 were unavoidable. It could have occurred no other way. I doubt that there are any real turning points in history. There are only periods where factors long present meet in a casually connected way to bring about the inevitable results. Liberalism in some form survived, but it was in a much altered form. The task now is to examine liberalism and the lack of liberalism after it has been set on its way by the events of 1789, 1819, and 1848.

## II

The revolutions of 1848 and the reactions of 1848 must now be studied. If the humanitarian liberalism of Stein and Hardenberg was to receive its coup de grace in 1849 after its brief revival of 1848, it is necessary then to examine the direction this liberalism took in the decisive years of 1848 and more importantly, to discover what took its place. Revolutions may be diverse and heterogeneous, but Sir Louis Namier finds a certain unity in these movements in 1848:

...then the common denominator was ideological, and even literary, and there was a basic unity and cohesion in the intellectual world of the European continent, such as usually asserts itself in the peak periods of its spiritual development. 1848 came not as an aftermath of war and defeat (as so many revolutions in the following century), but was the outcome of thirty-three creative years of European peace carefully preserved on a consciously counter-revolutionary basis. The revolutions was born at least as much of hopes as of discontents.<sup>11</sup>

One of the most important facts to note about Germany is the fact that Germany as a nation was not yet a unified state. This problem of unification was to run through the entire movement, and once it is identified the revolution begins to have more meaning and significance. Undoubtedly, the German people were great in art, thought, and culture. They simply lacked national unity. A movement toward national unity was fostered in the wars of liberation in the preceding generation, and 1848 found the time ripe for an expression of this feeling.<sup>12</sup> Foremost in the revolutionary ideology was the demand by the middle classes for the government of the various states to be

remodeled according to the national principle. And it was the middle class intellectuals from urban centers who seemed to be the leaders of this movement. The basic conflict now can be seen as a struggle between the dynastic principle in the states and national sovereignty. The former was feudal in origin, deeply rooted, but irrational; the latter was rational and simple, but seemed to be impractical in reality. The fight resolved itself in a conflict between arbitrary rule and autocracy as against popular sovereignty and national self-government.<sup>13</sup> However, the supporters of this cogently reasoned principle of national sovereignty had to fight for their principle in the territories of states based on historical tradition and heritage.<sup>14</sup> The universal truth of the national principle found its battle ground in the relativistic and empirical truth of dynastic sovereignty.

It is this revolution in the realm of Frederick William IV with which we are most concerned. Frederick William was not adverse to all changes by any means. Prussian kings had fought a continuous battle against the provincialism and particularism of the Junkers and the bureaucracy for the Prussian state. But, on the whole, he was a man for whom the urge of the moment overrode his best natural impulses.<sup>15</sup> Basically he was a man of the past; embittered against revolutionary ideas by the French Revolution and Napoleon, he resisted the new Germany which was in the process of creation.<sup>16</sup> Valentin aptly describes him:

...he was a pedant, who liked to stress the importance of little things, because he had no sympathy with or understanding of, greatness... People of talent whose instinct drove them to do the right thing, irritated his monarchical sensibilities and aroused his obstinacy, against which it was practically impossible to do anything. Absolutism was in the very blood of this royal philistine.<sup>17</sup>

This picture of Frederick William can be seen throughout these two decisive years. His personality is always a factor in the events which were to take place.

The revolution which broke out in March of 1848 was sparked and dominated by the middle classes: "The significant factor of the middle class is its combination of ability with a certain amount of property and a certain degree of culture."<sup>18</sup> Even the lower classes wished only "to make their way" within a constitutional system (they comprised no proletariat and had little impact on the revolution). New types within the bourgeoisie were arising. One of these was a patrician class, quite often with titles and means. They were intellectually inclined and became moderately critical of the government and the desires of reform. Another group were the plutocrats who were the wholesale merchants and large manufacturers. Although they were few, they were energetic in their rise to power. Their main aim was to protect and increase their investments. To them, society had to be reoriented to the capitalistic point of view. It must be noted that it was these men who were to become quite conservative under Bismarck once their desire for a capitalistic system was obtained.<sup>19</sup> One of their chief aims was to be the unification

of Germany so that economics of capitalism could operate more efficiently. They realized the limitations which were inherent economically in states as small as Prussia and the even smaller German states. It was these two groups which were to take the lead throughout most of the revolution. They were never to become revolutionary: the communist and socialist movements with their revolutionary property ideas was to alienate these groups from all revolutionary ideas.<sup>20</sup>

The revolutions of March were inspired by the February revolution in Paris. This event was both fortunate and unfortunate for it both encouraged the revolutionaries by the example of success and deceived them by the intoxication of that same success.<sup>21</sup> It began in earnest in Baden, with stormy meetings also in Mannheim, Karlsruhe, and Heidelberg. In Baden, the revolutionaries drew up a program which was to have similar counterparts in most of the rest of the German states. They proclaimed the abolition of arbitrary law, equal rights for religious sects, trial by jury, the creation of a militia, progressive income tax, and ministerial reforms. In Offenburg, a unified program was made and mass demonstrations were held. And, of more importance, declarations from Heidelberg called for parliamentary government for all of Germany, and for the reconstruction of Germany along these lines. Although Prussia and Austria were unshaken at this time, they felt it was necessary to consult for common safety.<sup>22</sup> And well that they should, for everywhere the petty princes were granting



constitutions and appointing liberal ministers. The Frankfort Diet issued a document of great importance appealing to the national idea. It is recreated by Valentin:

This document appealed as the "legal organ of the national and political unity of Germany" to the German governments and people, exhorted them to work together harmoniously and loyally in the interests of upholding invulnerability abroad, and quiet and order, security and prosperity at home. The Diet promised "to care for Germany's security abroad as well as to further national interests at home." Germany "must be raised to the position which is hers of right among the nations of Europe."<sup>23</sup>

The revolution did not seem to be one of extremes--neither autocracy nor democracy were completely crushed or victorious.<sup>24</sup> It was only in Berlin that there was bloodshed, and it is to this scene that we turn our attention. By March 18, the revolution had reached Berlin itself. Large delegations came from the provinces and the city to present their demands to the king. It was to the Rhenish and municipal delegations that the king promised a liberal proclamation. Following this action, the king promised the abolition of censorship (however the newspapers were still restricted). He also called up a united Diet and promised a reorganization of the Federal Constitution. As success and promise followed success and promise, the protestants grew bolder; they demanded the naming of a new and more liberal cabinet. Troops called in to protect Berlin from demonstrators were greeted with demonstrations demanding their removal. However, the crowds milling about the royal palace were fired upon by these

troops and the revolution began in earnest. Up went the barricades, while civilian forces prepared to resist this instance of brute force against the free and democratic spirit.<sup>25</sup>

The barricades seemed to have gone up quickly, but, nonetheless, there did not seem to have been an international or even preconceived conspiracy against the state as some conservative critics have claimed.<sup>26</sup> Leaders of this street fighting were varied, but, although differing in aims and interests, they seemed to represent the intellectual leadership of Germany. One was Dr. Rutenberg who later became editor of the Staatszeitung. Another was Dr. Lowenberg who led the radical students. Dr. Woeniger organized the mass petition. Urban was the veterinarian who lead the actual street fighting. Levin Weiss was referred to as the "Philosopher." But unlike the French Revolution there were no real leaders. The king, adopting a paternalistic attitude, which might be called characteristic of him, viewed the fighting as a misunderstanding and a misfortune. Prittwitz's troops found it impossible to achieve a rapid victory. The only solution was to bombard the town, but the king thought that this was an atrocity and decided to recall the troops. Frederick William in his famous address, "To my dear Berliners," put the entire blame on strangers and foreigners. Negotiations with the insurrectionists provided for the gradual withdrawal of troops and the tearing down of the barricades.<sup>27</sup> Following this, the king granted the demand for arms and reform,

and reviewed the insurgents as they carried out their dead for burial. The revolution was successful and the rebels might well have agreed with Valentin's later statement on rebellions: "A revolution has always had that measure of historical justification which is given to it by the failure of governing powers."<sup>28</sup>

April was a time of optimism; the barricades and revolution had been justified as a means of effecting a political purpose. Berlin seemed to take the lead in effecting a free Germany. The people ruled in the diets, conscious of their own hard won power.<sup>29</sup> The pre-parliament had met at Heidelberg, composed of fifty-three liberals who decided to set a representative body for the whole of Germany to be elected by direct manhood suffrage. Although the body met without any violence or advocacy of social-revolutionary reforms, it did make a major declaration: "...that the decision on the future constitution of Germany should rest solely and entirely with the National Assembly to be elected by the people."<sup>30</sup> By implication, the princes were to be left out and the national principle was asserted. The groups which took the lead now were liberal, deriving their ideals from the French and English revolutions. International in scope, they were moulded by local influences.<sup>31</sup> April may be called the highwater mark of the revolution--sentiment for and confidence in the revolution seemed to be everywhere.

On May 18, the Frankfort National Assembly met for the

first time. It was the only parliament in German history which had been freely elected by the people. As might have been imagined, it was a middle class body, composed of many lawyers, professors, doctors, judges, officials and businessmen. The lower classes were not represented; only one representative could have been called a peasant.<sup>32</sup> But it met after the hours of action had passed and, being away from the true centers of decision, "this proud and courageous body suffered a truly German fate of having been strongest as an idea, and growing ever feebler as its work and being came nearer to realization."<sup>33</sup> The debates of this group were of a high order, but it was soon to be seen that high ideals and logic are not infallible.<sup>34</sup> It is perhaps to the credit of this body that it did nothing radical and promoted no terrorism. However, the parliament and the revolution were to prove something more important than the success or failure of this body. The people of Germany were to come to ask for something more than what this parliament was to give them:

They were the power, the future. These masses could be led, they could be welded into unity. They could be beaten down, starved out, by means of all the superior military-political, and economic potencies of which the Revolution had left the old powers in possession; but even the mightiest individual could not again destroy the entity of these masses as a social and political power.<sup>35</sup>

The parliamentary liberal and the barricade fighters of 1848 prepared the way for Bismarck's Real Politik and a new type of politics was to become important in Germany.

The Frankfort assembly had to concern itself with many

and varied problems of the German nation. One of these was the problem of minorities and more particularly, the problem of the Polish minorities of Eastern Prussia. The handling of this problem has led one historian to conclude that German liberalism was more verbal than real.<sup>36</sup> The idea of the national principle was turning into the more harsh imperialistic nationalism. There was now to be seen the fundamental contradiction in the German liberal movement: nationality was all right for the Germans but not for other people when it conflicted with the interests of Germany. One representative stated the position this way: "The right of peoples to segregate themselves according to nationality is a brand-new right recognized nowhere...In politics, only possession is decisive and recognized by the nations."<sup>37</sup> At first, the liberals espoused the Polish cause, but outbreaks in Poland and other Slavic states nurtured the ideal of Germanism. This brought about the above statement and others. German liberalism, as it was the ideology of the middle class, either claimed that the partition of Poland was the "mission" of Germany, or, more harshly, "the right of the stronger; the right of conquest, is Germany's right."<sup>38</sup> The seeds sown by Napoleon were brought out into the open by these expressions of nationalism and Real Politik.<sup>39</sup> And it was to have an effect upon later times and places: "Acid nationalisms based on language (on plenty of it and little in it) originate mainly with urban middle-class intellectuals; and this is why 1848 is of such

supreme importance in the growth of European nationalisms."<sup>40</sup>

The Frankfort assembly was to wear itself out on other problems besides the minority one. Although their aims were clear enough, the means to realize these aims were never clearly established. The assembly had two possible courses to follow. They could either take the power energetically to promote the constitution, or they could ally themselves with a large state. The fact is that they did neither well.<sup>41</sup>

Archduke John of Austria, who had been chosen to head a unified military force, was virtually powerless. The assembly was characterized by working with and against Prussia. This was evident on the matter of defense. A navy was to be built on Prussian lines and guidance; but defense forces were to be set up to counterbalance Prussian forces.<sup>42</sup> And when Prussia was forced to back down at the Malmo by the great powers over the Schleswig-Holstein affair, the assembly could neither decide to support or condemn Prussia. Finally, when the assembly offered Frederick William the crown of a united Germany, the king had little sympathy with this rather indecisive group and, following his absolutistic though unsure ideals, he turned down the offer. The fact was that this rationalistic and philosophical body completely underestimated the forces which were at work. The dynamics of dynastic particularism, the dynamics of power as expressed in foreign policy, and the dynamics of the social revolutionary and communistic idea could not be satisfied by this group.

Something more powerful and destructive was to take its place.<sup>43</sup>

Finally, however, the parliament did create an Imperial Constitution. It must be said to the credit of this institution that even in 1849 the document represented the best spirit and vigor of 1848. The first power of the government was to be in the hands of the Emperor, who was empowered to make treaties, war, peace, control movements of the army and navy, to supervise the highways and post. He was to have a civil list and responsible ministers and the right to dissolve the Reichstag, which was to be composed of a house of states and a house of people. Essentially, the Emperor was to be a unifying factor over and against the petty princes and the Reichstag. A third factor was the Imperial court of justice, which was to provide a unity of law and justice for the realm.<sup>44</sup> However, there were compromises which were to weaken this unitary constitution. Although the individual states had to give up envoys and consuls, they retained representative bodies which were to be chosen by themselves. Imperial law-giving was under certain restraints, and taxes could only be levied in case of need. In addition, the house of states was a conservative body which could act against decisions made by the representatives of the people who were elected by universal, direct, and secret ballot. Throughout, however, this document was to express the German democratic spirit.<sup>45</sup>

However conservative the work of the Frankfort parliament might have been, there were more conservative forces at work.

The counter-revolution in Austria was a signal for Prussia to do the same thing and to do it without any bloodshed. The fact of the matter was that the masses had lost interest in the Frankfort parliament, which had ceased to win concessions and rights for them.<sup>46</sup> On the other hand, the upper middle classes feared loss of influence and allied themselves with the dynastic and bureaucratic interests.<sup>47</sup> The final blow to the hopes of the parliament came when the king refused to accept the emperorship, despite moments of hesitation and confusion. After this, attention was now turned to the individual states and herein lay Germany's weakness: "Germany was once more poor in its richness, small in its greatness, yet great in pettiness, rich in wretchedness...Particularism was the true curse of Germany."<sup>48</sup> The revolution had failed; it only waited for Prussia to strike the blow.

The counter-revolutionary forces now reached their peak and forced conservative alterations in the constitution. The nobility was preserved, the death penalty retained, the right of franchise limited, free instruction of the needy denied, and the veto for the Imperial council restored. But even now, Prussia would not accept the constitution and, following Prussia's lead, Saxony refused the constitution. Prussian troops were sent to Dresden to support the conservative government there. Soon revolution broke out in Wurtemberg and Baden, where even the military joined the insurgents. But nothing could stop Prussia and the fortress of Rastalt was the last to hold out.<sup>49</sup> It was Prussia which destroyed German



patriotism which she herself had developed, so well in the preceding generation.<sup>50</sup> This Badensian Cradle Song expresses the bitterness which was directed at Prussia:

Sleep, my child, don't cry,  
The Prussian's going by.  
He killed your father at his door,  
He made your wretched mother poor.  
Keep very still, if you'd be wise,  
Or he'll find ways to shut your eyes.  
Sleep, my child, don't cry,  
The Prussian's going by.<sup>51</sup>

Force upon force was to be the prime mover in German politics from now on.

## III

The defeat of liberalism at Rastalt was to set liberalism on a new course. The liberal movement which had its roots in the Enlightenment and the French Revolution was to abandon its humanistic idealism which characterized the period from Stein to the Frankfort parliament and to adopt the integral type of nationalism which was to find its greatest exponent in Bismarck. The task, therefore, is to examine liberalism as a concept before and after this period and to assess the reasons for its change of course and the significance of this change.

Basically the liberalism which was developed in Germany during and after the Napoleonic wars was in opposition to the liberalism and nationalism of Jacobinism. For the principles of revolution and reason were substitutes for the ideas of history and tradition. The idea of history as an evolutionary movement was propounded most naturally by philosophers of history, such as Hegel and Herdër, who were to take the lead in developing a "liberal" philosophy. Although much of the thought which was to come from this reaction against Jacobinism was conservative, there also arose from this movement a middle group of liberal nationalists.

This movement combined both nationalism and liberalism. Its exponents thought each nationality should have an independent state of its own. Divided nationalities should be joined into one state and Imperial states should be divided into their constituent nationalities. If every national state

should be free, likewise the citizens of these states must be free. Especially, they must have personal liberties, such as speech, press, worship, and association. Economic liberties were also important; there should be freedom of contract, profession, and trade. And most importantly there must be political freedom. They espoused the principle of representative democracy whereby assemblies would be chosen by equal, universal, and secret suffrage. But, it must be remembered, that these principles were advocated by the middle classes who had no burning fervor for "natural rights," but maintained them to be the evolutionary end of society. Liberal principles were to be promoted by the liberal institutions of free popular education, short term militia, popular journalism, and patriotic societies.<sup>52</sup>

One of the leading exponents of this type of liberalism in Germany was Karl Theodor Welcker. As a student he had been fired by the patriotism which had awakened Germany during Napoleon's victories. It is interesting to note that he was trained in history and jurisprudence. The key to his philosophy is his belief in the evolutionary history of mankind. Political development, he perceived, was like the individual's development from childhood to youth and manhood. Governments had proceeded from despotism, to theocracy, and were now to come to the legal state. It was accompanied by a changing method of social control from force and fear to faith and now to reason and liberty. Liberty, for him, meant a trust in the

ability of the individual to develop the greatest possible virtue and happiness. Within the legal state, men could realize themselves and their potentialities. The legal state was, therefore, a constitutional state in which the liberties were listed and guaranteed. The citizens of the state should take an active role in insuring the guarantees of individual liberties. However, he was definitely opposed to revolution as a means of realizing this state and this state was to be composed of not more than one nationality which must be in itself highly developed.

The "Declaration of the Fundamental Rights of the German People," which was issued from the Frankfort Parliament, was in part created by Welcker. Like the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, it espoused national popular sovereignty, personal liberties, and denunciation of nobility and class privileges. Yet it is a more restricted document emphasizing the German nation and omitting any reference to natural rights and the right of revolution. Liberalism was then to be peaceful and traditional.<sup>53</sup>

Having looked at Theodor Welcker as a theoretician, it might be well to look at Heinrich von Gagern, the leader of the Frankfort parliament. He too believed that each nation and every individual should exercise the right of self-determination, within the traditions of the historical past. His philosophy is noted by Hans Kohn:

The emphasis upon individual nationality and its

rights and the high evaluation of popular traditions and of the vernacular--the vision of a future peaceful world, in which each nationality would dwell in liberty in its own place, each awakened by the high message of humanity, each cultivating it own way, all, whether large or small, equal and competing peacefully for the common good of mankind--the faith of a harmonious synthesization of the rights of the individual with his loyalty to the national community and its duties to mankind: these were the new elements...<sup>54</sup>

Von Gagern led the parliament with ability and incorporated his ideas into the work of the parliament. But, finally, he was not able to combat the tide of more practical and more realistic nationalism and politics which were coming into Germany as a reaction to the revolutions of 1848.

Although Welcker was a professor, supporters were found in every walk of life. Politicians such as Gagern, Schmerling, and Lasker, industrialists such as Hansemann and Mevissen and economists such as Prince-Smith and Faucher endorsed these principles. Differing, as any large group will, they assumed in general that each nationality should be a separate political unit with an independent constitutional government ending despotism, aristocracy, and ecclesiastical influence. They believed that each state in serving its own interests would be serving the interests of humanity as a whole by national policies of free-trade, anti-militarism, anti-imperialism and international cooperation. They borrowed heavily from the romantic movement. They had sympathy for the underdog and the oppressed. And, in doing so, they revived interest in the past, in national heroes and legends. But peaceful as they

might have been, they lived in a less than pacific world. To promote their principles they encouraged people to fight for unity and freedom; but here was the cause of their failure. Once the sword had been taken up, it was difficult to lay down. Nationalism grew in strength while liberalism became weaker. The deed became more important than the idea and led to the more harsh type of liberalism which was to become prominent after the reactions of 1849.<sup>55</sup>

Without a doubt liberal nationalism lived on, but the new form of integral nationalism was to take its place as the most important movement in the last half of the nineteenth century. Charles Maurras was a Frenchman of this type and describes the movement in his own words as "the exclusive pursuit of national policies, the absolute maintenance of national integrity and the steady increase of national power-- for a nation declines when it loses its military might."<sup>56</sup> Therefore, it is seen to be a jingoistic and militant movement which has its heirs in the twentieth century. In general, it distrusts minorities, other nations, and internationalism, based on mutual respect and cooperation.<sup>57</sup>

However, most distressingly it came from liberal nationalism. How then was this humanitarian and liberal movement transformed into a militant and intolerant one? One factor is the fact that the liberal nationalists took up the sword to liberate oppressed nationalities, whether it was themselves or another. In the case of 1848, peaceful and

tolerant actions were seen to fail in the face of the forces of reaction. Bismarck was to prove pragmatically the value of force. Integral nationalism was nurtured as much on the failures of liberal nationalism as on its own successes. The value of the force of arms to maintain independence was established. Another factor was that once the liberals successfully achieved their independence, their heads were turned by that success. For example, the partial success which the revolutions of 1848 had created led the Frankfort assembly to deny the national principle to Poland. A third factor was the establishment of liberal institutions such as public education, free press and association. Schools, press and associations as they came more and more under the control of the national state were used to inculcate the ideals of nationalism to the masses. This movement appeals to the masses and operates with their blessing and approval for the glory of the fatherland. In doing so it becomes a religion. Although it is the child of liberalism, liberalism after 1848 was unable to combat its offspring.

## IV

After the revolutions of 1848 and the reactions of 1849 the Prussian state continued to be much the same as it was in the previous period--not quite the same to be sure, but the social structure had not been seriously changed or upset. In Prussia the social and political structure had assumed an aspect peculiar to that state. Indeed, it had similarities to both Russia and France, England and Austria; but, on the whole, it must be said that its social structure was distinctive and different. It is this structure which existed between 1848 and 1870 which must now be examined.

The first group which should be considered is the Junkers. Historically, they were the oldest group in Prussia--predating even the Hohenzollerns. As England had their country squires so did the east seven provinces of Prussia have their Junkers. They differed from the rest of the German nobility in that they had mixed at an early date with the Slavic peoples who were the original settlers and had been conquered by them. On account of their conquest, they rapidly assumed an attitude of command and domination over their subjects, who had been made serfs, compelling these peasants to work their lands for them and to perform other services which the squire deemed necessary. In local affairs, the Junkers rapidly assumed control through the power of the local diets and demanded to be hereditary military and political advisors to the prince. And through the lucrative grain trade which flowed through this part of north-central Europe, they gained the power of



the purse. Through this power they were able to extend their control over the diets and the peasants.<sup>58</sup>

Although they were eventually controlled by the Hohenzollerns, they became enthusiastic supporters of the crown and were thus able to retain much of their powers. The Great Elector granted them complete control over their local spheres. The Junker, who was to become the symbol of authority and obedience to the state, learned much of this loyalty to the fatherland from service in the army; these qualities he passed on to his subjects at home. On the whole, the Junkers were able to make an admirable compromise between feudalism and absolutism by gaining control over the local spheres and by service to the state as a whole in service in bureaucratic and court posts.<sup>59</sup>

In the nineteenth century the Junkers were challenged again, this time by the liberal industrial capitalism of the rising middle class and the materialistic profit motive. They became aggressive self-seekers, turning to the past and the romantic movement which fostered their existence, and putting up a stout resistance. Even when limited by Stein and Hardenberg's reforms, e.g. emancipation of serfs, citizen armies, equal citizenship, and the limiting of their administrative functions, their power was hardly impaired at the local level and they were actually able to bring more land under their control because of the land reforms. They continued their policy of service and alliance to the king, although they always remained separate from the royal influence.

Their ideal of a corporate state, God-ordained, which had been promoted by Lutheranism, was strengthened by the revolutions of 1848. Bismarck, who was also a Junker, brought them to new power with a policy of realism and nationalism. Bismarck's policies, which were to carry the Junkers further than they wished, converted the upper middle class to their ideals. Throughout this period the Junkers were able to continue in their tradition of control and service to state.<sup>60</sup>

What were the careers the Junkers might follow in the bureaucracy and administration of the Prussian state? As a generalization, it might be said that they held general offices rather than particular or technical offices for which they lacked training. In addition, they often held court offices which had great influence rather than those in the diplomatic service because of the wide range of interests demanded by these positions.<sup>61</sup> It may well be asserted that the participation of Junkers in the Prussian administration may have been a large factor in the supremacy of the conservatives in this period.<sup>62</sup> In the provinces, the office of Ober-Praesident was often held by a Junker and from this office a Junker often became a minister. In the governmental districts the Junkers exerted great influence as presidents over these districts and maintained a semi-autonomous authority. And in all of the lesser local divisions, the Junkers were able to hold offices of great importance and number in the ministries, especially interior, agriculture, and war, as well as court offices. Also they maintained considerable strength in the provincial

Arch.  
*Class No.*..... 378.2  
*Book No.*..... Barnes

LIBRARY  
*OF*  
Washington and Lee University  
*LEXINGTON, VIRGINIA*

From  
3102  
Barnes

PRUSSIAN LIBERALISM  
IN THE  
MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY

AUG 2 1960

John Julian Barnes, Jr.

May, 1960



Arch.  
378.2  
BARNES

PRUSSIAN LIBERALISM  
IN THE  
MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY

AUG 25 '60

John Julian Barnes, Jr.  
May, 1960



## Table of Contents

Part I: Introduction to the Problem	1
Part II: A Review of "1848"	9
Part III: The Form and Theory of Liberalism	22
Part IV: The Structure of the Prussian State	28
Part V: Conclusion and Reflections	49

Footnotes  
Bibliography

## I

German liberalism in the mid-nineteenth century assumed various shades and meanings which are often nebulous and indefinite. However, there seems to be some pattern, some direction, even if it might be negative, which liberalism can be seen to have taken in the German states. The problems then, are these: What was the nature of liberalism in Germany? And more importantly, was it truly liberalism in the western European way of looking at things? And finally, what result can the impact and development of liberalism be said to have had on the German state? These questions have been raised to show the direction and purpose of this essay.

Much of the liberal thought in Germany had its roots in the French revolution and the Napoleonic wars. In 1789, the European world was rocked by a momentous event--the French Revolution. From this event came new ideas, concepts, and movements which were to affect Europe from then on. The culmination of the French Revolution was the Napoleonic Empire. Into Prussian and German territories poured these new ideas. Although the ideas of the French Revolution were not alien to Prussia before Napoleon, it was his victories at the battles of Jena and Auerstädt which forced the ancien regime in Prussia to come to terms with these concepts. Within seven years after being subjected to these ideas, Prussia was to have adopted French concepts and was to have turned the tide

against Napoleon at the battle of Leipzig. But, was it only the simple adoption of French techniques which allowed the Prussians to make this surprising recovery? No, I think it will be shown that the Prussians took the French techniques, then fitted and changed them according to their society. As, perhaps, in the period after World War I the western ideas of nationalism and democracy are perverted and then turned upon Western society, so were the ideals of the French Revolution perverted and turned upon the French. The Prussian bout with liberal ideas spread by the Revolution must be looked at as a successful response in the defeat of the French at Leipzig; but on a reappraisal the liberal reforms which looked so promising at the defeat of Napoleon must be seen as a failure. By 1819 with the threat of Napoleon gone, the desire for a constitution had definitely waned in court circles. The celebration of students at Wartburg commemorating Luther's burning of a papal bull convinced the king and the conservatives that subversive activity was present. Moreover, the Carlsbad decrees of Metternich led the Prussian monarch to similar moves. Consequently, Hardenberg and Humbolt, liberal ministers, were dismissed. The liberal movement was defeated.

The French Revolution is seen as the source for liberal ideas with which Prussia had to contend. What, then were the ideals of the French Revolution? What were some of the ideas of which Napoleon made the Prussians so acutely aware?

H. A. L. Fisher summarizes the work and thoughts of the men of the Revolution:



The working faith of the best men of the French Revolution was the legacy of the Eighteenth century philosophy, belief in scientific progress, in growing material comfort, in natural rights, in religious toleration, and the ultimate triumph of good sense throughout the world. It was a philosophy which took little heed of the various temperaments and idiosyncrasies of men or nations, regarding humanity as something homogeneous through place and time, capable of being nourished by the same food and rescued by the same conditions, believing that in politics as in physics, there was a mathematical art of discovery and scientific certainty of truth.<sup>1</sup>

However, there is one part of this analysis of the French Revolution which must be emphasized. The ideas of the Revolution were not a direct heritage from the philosophes of the eighteenth century. The philosophes believe in a static and unchanging society which was rationally based and ordered. This was the solution to the problems of the age.<sup>2</sup> However, the French Revolution "had at least one tenuous kind of unity, one determining and constant factor in its climate of opinion: change--change in manners, morals, institutions, business, art..."<sup>3</sup> It was a combination of these factors of natural rights and laws coupled with the idea of change which was the essence of the French Revolution.

The Napoleonic system was the tool for the spread of the ideas of the French Revolution and, of course, for the fostering of the ambitions of Napoleon. Herein is seen one of the reasons for the perversion of the ideals of the revolution. Napoleon's aspirations and the ideals of the revolutions are not necessarily similar. It may be important first to note how the Napoleonic system applied to Germany in its theory and

practice.

The ancient institution of the Holy Roman Empire had passed. Outmoded and archaic as it was, it served a useful function as protector of the weak against the strong and as a safeguard of traditional rights against the despotism of the princes.<sup>4</sup> Napoleon disregarded the desires of the people for "natural rights" and instead instituted a "federation of men and money." "The small people want to be protected against the big; the big want to govern according to their fancy; now as I only want a federation of men and money, and as it is the big people and not the small people who can give me the one and the other I leave the former in peace and the latter must get on as best they can."<sup>5</sup> This is a direct contradiction of Napoleon's promise to the Rhineland confederation: "Under our rule, the rights of man will be restored and all the obstacles to material progress raised by the selfishness of prince or noble, of priest or guild will crumble at a touch."<sup>6</sup> What is the importance of this obvious discrepancy between the ideals of the French Revolution and of the policies of Napoleon?\*

During the preceding period in German history, there was

---

\* Napoleon carried out many reforms, however. He provided the states with French type constitutions and legal codes; reduced the number of sovereign princes, simplified the political geography, secularized the ecclesiastical states, built up Baden, Bavaria, and Wurtemberg, and abolished the Holy Roman Empire. Moreover, although many of the reforms were destroyed when the old houses returned to rule, a good deal of the legal system seemed reasonable in comparison to the previous "hybrid" system, and was kept in many instances--kept to provide a stronger basis for autocratic rule.

a tendency in German politics toward dualism, i.e. the German people gravitated either toward Austria or Prussia. Would the German people now turn to Napoleonic France? Only long conciliation could work this out.<sup>7</sup> The men of Napoleon's bureaucracy saw the answer: "They saw their best work shattered before their ideals--the ideal of exploitation conquering the ideal of beneficence, the enthusiasm of the governed passing into acquiescence, and the acquiescence into concentrated hate."<sup>8</sup> The masses under the Napoleonic system were left out of its benefits; yet it was these people to whom the French Revolution appealed. They turned from France, who should have attracted them, and turned to Prussia for inspiration and leadership. The dichotomy between the theory and practice of the ideals of the revolution served to strengthen the Prussian revival.

There is another dichotomy which the revolution fostered and which served to destroy it. This was the discrepancy between the cosmopolitan ideas of the philosophes and the obvious nationalism which the revolution demonstrated in the levee en masse and the more organic relationships which were evident in the republic. The spread of cosmopolitanism by nationalistic means could only serve to spread nationalism with its still obvious dire results.

What can be said then about the reform movement in Prussia? Obviously it was a failure if one is to judge it as a movement toward liberalism. The constitutional crisis of 1819 repudiated the liberal reforms of Stein and Hardenberg,

innocuous as some of them were. But why was it a failure? The answer is a complex one with its roots back to the French Revolution and before. The constitutional crisis of 1819 cannot be understood without considering this. One factor which must be considered is that there was the obvious discrepancy between the ideals of the French Revolution and the practices as personified in the Napoleonic system. This discrepancy turned the Germans from the revolution and its ideals and only brought them into opposition to it. Another factor is the attempt by the French to create a general liberal European system based on the cosmopolitan ideas of the philosophes by nationalistic means. The levee en masse and the wars of the Revolution enhanced nationalism rather than internationalism. Another factor for the failure is that the historical traditions of Germany and its condition in time would not allow the imposition of liberal ideas without changing them to fit German experience. This is a pragmatic proof of the invalidity of the cosmopolitan ideas as represented in the Napoleonic system. The impact of new ideas upon the German state brought about not a revolution but an "enormity," as Toynbee would say. The liberal ideas reestablished the power in the hands of the defenders of the status quo. The status quo was strengthened by the new ideas of efficiency and rational government. The absolute government of Frederick the Great was replaced by a new government even stronger and more powerful.

What is the nature and the importance of the "enormity"

created by these factors? The failure of the liberal movement which reached its end in 1819 precluded the events during the rest of German history. This generalization is imprecise, but perhaps it can throw light on later aspects of German history. The years 1848, 1871, 1918, and 1945 are all dates which were determined largely by the misstep the German people made in 1819. The year 1819, not 1848, must be considered the turning point in German history, if there are turning points. The failure of the reform movement which had begun so hopefully in 1806 only to fail so ingloriously in 1819 must be considered as the derermining factor of Prussian and German history. The new status of power provided by the perverted ideas of reform was never successfully challenged. However, the failure of the reforms in 1819 must be seen as failures which were bound to occur given the existing situation in Prussia at the time of the French Revolution. The failure of the Prussian reform movement in 1819 seems to have set Germany and German liberalism on a path from which it did not stray. However, this failure did not eliminate a strong liberal tendency from German thought. It is found in the revolutions of 1848. Louis Namier and A. J. P. Taylor seem to have caught the real meaning of these revolutions. Namier calls it the "The Revolution of the Intellectuals." It was a brilliant and fragile movement with the romantic idealism of liberal humanitarianism. But here was its weakness:

States are not created or destroyed, and frontiers

redrawn or obliterated, by argument and majority votes; nations are freed, united, or broken by blood and iron, and not by a generous application of liberty and tomato sause... "The revolution of the intellectuals" exhausted itself without achieving concrete results: it left its imprint only in the realm of ideas.<sup>9</sup>

The revolutions were also complex events, but the conclusion was the same as in 1819--failure of the liberal movement. But as 1819 set the path for the failure of liberal ideas, 1848 sounded its death knell. Taylor notes, perhaps too strongly, but cogently, that:

1848 was the decisive year of Germany and so of European history: it recapitulated Germany's past and anticipated Germany's future. Echoes of the Holy Roman Empire merged into a prelude of the Nazi "New Order"; the doctrines of Rousseau and the doctrines of Marx, the shade of Luther and the shadow of Hitler, jostled each other in a bewildering succession. Never has there been a revolution so inspired by a limitless faith in the power of ideas; never has a revolution so discredited the power of ideas in its result. The success of the revolution discredited conservative ideas. After it, nothing remained but the idea of force, and this idea stood at the helm of German history from then on.<sup>10</sup>

The year 1848 was a decisive year in German history. But the events of 1848 were unavoidable. It could have occurred no other way. I doubt that there are any real turning points in history. There are only periods where factors long present meet in a casually connected way to bring about the inevitable results. Liberalism in some form survived, but it was in a much altered form. The task now is to examine liberalism and the lack of liberalism after it has been set on its way by the events of 1789, 1819, and 1848.

## II

The revolutions of 1848 and the reactions of 1848 must now be studied. If the humanitarian liberalism of Stein and Hardenberg was to receive its coup de grace in 1849 after its brief revival of 1848, it is necessary then to examine the direction this liberalism took in the decisive years of 1848 and more importantly, to discover what took its place. Revolutions may be diverse and heterogeneous, but Sir Louis Namier finds a certain unity in these movements in 1848:

...then the common denominator was ideological, and even literary, and there was a basic unity and cohesion in the intellectual world of the European continent, such as usually asserts itself in the peak periods of its spiritual development. 1848 came not as an aftermath of war and defeat (as so many revolutions in the following century), but was the outcome of thirty-three creative years of European peace carefully preserved on a consciously counter-revolutionary basis. The revolutions was born at least as much of hopes as of discontents.<sup>11</sup>

One of the most important facts to note about Germany is the fact that Germany as a nation was not yet a unified state. This problem of unification was to run through the entire movement, and once it is identified the revolution begins to have more meaning and significance. Undoubtedly, the German people were great in art, thought, and culture. They simply lacked national unity. A movement toward national unity was fostered in the wars of liberation in the preceding generation, and 1848 found the time ripe for an expression of this feeling.<sup>12</sup> Foremost in the revolutionary ideology was the demand by the middle classes for the government of the various states to be

remodeled according to the national principle. And it was the middle class intellectuals from urban centers who seemed to be the leaders of this movement. The basic conflict now can be seen as a struggle between the dynastic principle in the states and national sovereignty. The former was feudal in origin, deeply rooted, but irrational; the latter was rational and simple, but seemed to be impractical in reality. The fight resolved itself in a conflict between arbitrary rule and autocracy as against popular sovereignty and national self-government.<sup>13</sup> However, the supporters of this cogently reasoned principle of national sovereignty had to fight for their principle in the territories of states based on historical tradition and heritage.<sup>14</sup> The universal truth of the national principle found its battle ground in the relativistic and empirical truth of dynastic sovereignty.

It is this revolution in the realm of Frederick William IV with which we are most concerned. Frederick William was not adverse to all changes by any means. Prussian kings had fought a continuous battle against the provincialism and particularism of the Junkers and the bureaucracy for the Prussian state. But, on the whole, he was a man for whom the urge of the moment overrode his best natural impulses.<sup>15</sup> Basically he was a man of the past; embittered against revolutionary ideas by the French Revolution and Napoleon, he resisted the new Germany which was in the process of creation.<sup>16</sup> Valentin aptly describes him:



...he was a pedant, who liked to stress the importance of little things, because he had no sympathy with or understanding of, greatness... People of talent whose instinct drove them to do the right thing, irritated his monarchical sensibilities and aroused his obstinacy, against which it was practically impossible to do anything. Absolutism was in the very blood of this royal philistine.<sup>17</sup>

This picture of Frederick William can be seen throughout these two decisive years. His personality is always a factor in the events which were to take place.

The revolution which broke out in March of 1848 was sparked and dominated by the middle classes: "The significant factor of the middle class is its combination of ability with a certain amount of property and a certain degree of culture."<sup>18</sup> Even the lower classes wished only "to make their way" within a constitutional system (they comprised no proletariat and had little impact on the revolution). New types within the bourgeoisie were arising. One of these was a patrician class, quite often with titles and means. They were intellectually inclined and became moderately critical of the government and the desires of reform. Another group were the plutocrats who were the wholesale merchants and large manufacturers. Although they were few, they were energetic in their rise to power. Their main aim was to protect and increase their investments. To them, society had to be reoriented to the capitalistic point of view. It must be noted that it was these men who were to become quite conservative under Bismarck once their desire for a capitalistic system was obtained.<sup>19</sup> One of their chief aims was to be the unification

of Germany so that economics of capitalism could operate more efficiently. They realized the limitations which were inherent economically in states as small as Prussia and the even smaller German states. It was these two groups which were to take the lead throughout most of the revolution. They were never to become revolutionary: the communist and socialist movements with their revolutionary property ideas was to alienate these groups from all revolutionary ideas.<sup>20</sup>

The revolutions of March were inspired by the February revolution in Paris. This event was both fortunate and unfortunate for it both encouraged the revolutionaries by the example of success and deceived them by the intoxication of that same success.<sup>21</sup> It began in earnest in Baden, with stormy meetings also in Mannheim, Karlsruhe, and Heidelberg. In Baden, the revolutionaries drew up a program which was to have similar counterparts in most of the rest of the German states. They proclaimed the abolition of arbitrary law, equal rights for religious sects, trial by jury, the creation of a militia, progressive income tax, and ministerial reforms. In Offenburg, a unified program was made and mass demonstrations were held. And, of more importance, declarations from Heidelberg called for parliamentary government for all of Germany, and for the reconstruction of Germany along these lines. Although Prussia and Austria were unshaken at this time, they felt it was necessary to consult for common safety.<sup>22</sup> And well that they should, for everywhere the petty princes were granting

constitutions and appointing liberal ministers. The Frankfort Diet issued a document of great importance appealing to the national idea. It is recreated by Valentin:

This document appealed as the "legal organ of the national and political unity of Germany" to the German governments and people, exhorted them to work together harmoniously and loyally in the interests of upholding invulnerability abroad, and quiet and order, security and prosperity at home. The Diet promised "to care for Germany's security abroad as well as to further national interests at home." Germany "must be raised to the position which is hers of right among the nations of Europe."<sup>23</sup>

The revolution did not seem to be one of extremes--neither autocracy nor democracy were completely crushed or victorious.<sup>24</sup> It was only in Berlin that there was bloodshed, and it is to this scene that we turn our attention. By March 18, the revolution had reached Berlin itself. Large delegations came from the provinces and the city to present their demands to the king. It was to the Rhenish and municipal delegations that the king promised a liberal proclamation. Following this action, the king promised the abolition of censorship (however the newspapers were still restricted). He also called up a united Diet and promised a reorganization of the Federal Constitution. As success and promise followed success and promise, the protestants grew bolder; they demanded the naming of a new and more liberal cabinet. Troops called in to protect Berlin from demonstrators were greeted with demonstrations demanding their removal. However, the crowds milling about the royal palace were fired upon by these

troops and the revolution began in earnest. Up went the barricades, while civilian forces prepared to resist this instance of brute force against the free and democratic spirit.<sup>25</sup>

The barricades seemed to have gone up quickly, but, nonetheless, there did not seem to have been an international or even preconceived conspiracy against the state as some conservative critics have claimed.<sup>26</sup> Leaders of this street fighting were varied, but, although differing in aims and interests, they seemed to represent the intellectual leadership of Germany. One was Dr. Rutenberg who later became editor of the *Staatszeitung*. Another was Dr. Lowenberg who led the radical students. Dr. Woeniger organized the mass petition. Urban was the veterinarian who lead the actual street fighting. Levin Weiss was referred to as the "Philosopher." But unlike the French Revolution there were no real leaders. The king, adopting a paternalistic attitude, which might be called characteristic of him, viewed the fighting as a misunderstanding and a misfortune. Prittwitz's troops found it impossible to achieve a rapid victory. The only solution was to bombard the town, but the king thought that this was an atrocity and decided to recall the troops. Frederick William in his famous address, "To my dear Berliners," put the entire blame on strangers and foreigners. Negotiations with the insurrectionists provided for the gradual withdrawal of troops and the tearing down of the barricades.<sup>27</sup> Following this, the king granted the demand for arms and reform,

and reviewed the insurgents as they carried out their dead for burial. The revolution was successful and the rebels might well have agreed with Valentin's later statement on rebellions: "A revolution has always had that measure of historical justification which is given to it by the failure of governing powers."<sup>28</sup>

April was a time of optimism; the barricades and revolution had been justified as a means of effecting a political purpose. Berlin seemed to take the lead in effecting a free Germany. The people ruled in the diets, conscious of their own hard won power.<sup>29</sup> The pre-parliament had met at Heidelberg, composed of fifty-three liberals who decided to set a representative body for the whole of Germany to be elected by direct manhood suffrage. Although the body met without any violence or advocacy of social-revolutionary reforms, it did make a major declaration: "...that the decision on the future constitution of Germany should rest solely and entirely with the National Assembly to be elected by the people."<sup>30</sup> By implication, the princes were to be left out and the national principle was asserted. The groups which took the lead now were liberal, deriving their ideals from the French and English revolutions. International in scope, they were moulded by local influences.<sup>31</sup> April may be called the highwater mark of the revolution--sentiment for and confidence in the revolution seemed to be everywhere.

On May 18, the Frankfort National Assembly met for the

first time. It was the only parliament in German history which had been freely elected by the people. As might have been imagined, it was a middle class body, composed of many lawyers, professors, doctors, judges, officials and businessmen. The lower classes were not represented; only one representative could have been called a peasant.<sup>32</sup> But it met after the hours of action had passed and, being away from the true centers of decision, "this proud and courageous body suffered a truly German fate of having been strongest as an idea, and growing ever feebler as its work and being came nearer to realization."<sup>33</sup> The debates of this group were of a high order, but it was soon to be seen that high ideals and logic are not infallible.<sup>34</sup> It is perhaps to the credit of this body that it did nothing radical and promoted no terrorism. However, the parliament and the revolution were to prove something more important than the success or failure of this body. The people of Germany were to come to ask for something more than what this parliament was to give them:

They were the power, the future. These masses could be led, they could be welded into unity. They could be beaten down, starved out, by means of all the superior military-political, and economic potencies of which the Revolution had left the old powers in possession; but even the mightiest individual could not again destroy the entity of these masses as a social and political power.<sup>35</sup>

The parliamentary liberal and the barricade fighters of 1848 prepared the way for Bismarck's Real Politik and a new type of politics was to become important in Germany.

The Frankfort assembly had to concern itself with many

and varied problems of the German nation. One of these was the problem of minorities and more particularly, the problem of the Polish minorities of Eastern Prussia. The handling of this problem has led one historian to conclude that German liberalism was more verbal than real.<sup>36</sup> The idea of the national principle was turning into the more harsh imperialistic nationalism. There was now to be seen the fundamental contradiction in the German liberal movement: nationality was all right for the Germans but not for other people when it conflicted with the interests of Germany. One representative stated the position this way: "The right of peoples to segregate themselves according to nationality is a brand-new right recognized nowhere...In politics, only possession is decisive and recognized by the nations."<sup>37</sup> At first, the liberals espoused the Polish cause, but outbreaks in Poland and other Slavic states nurtured the ideal of Germanism. This brought about the above statement and others. German liberalism, as it was the ideology of the middle class, either claimed that the partition of Poland was the "mission" of Germany, or, more harshly, "the right of the stronger; the right of conquest, is Germany's right."<sup>38</sup> The seeds sown by Napoleon were brought out into the open by these expressions of nationalism and Real Politik.<sup>39</sup> And it was to have an effect upon later times and places: "Acid nationalisms based on language (on plenty of it and little in it) originate mainly with urban middle-class intellectuals; and this is why 1848 is of such

supreme importance in the growth of European nationalisms."<sup>40</sup>

The Frankfort assembly was to wear itself out on other problems besides the minority one. Although their aims were clear enough, the means to realize these aims were never clearly established. The assembly had two possible courses to follow. They could either take the power energetically to promote the constitution, or they could ally themselves with a large state. The fact is that they did neither well.<sup>41</sup>

Archduke John of Austria, who had been chosen to head a unified military force, was virtually powerless. The assembly was characterized by working with and against Prussia. This was evident on the matter of defense. A navy was to be built on Prussian lines and guidance; but defense forces were to be set up to counterbalance Prussian forces.<sup>42</sup> And when Prussia was forced to back down at the Malmo by the great powers over the Schleswig-Holstein affair, the assembly could neither decide to support or condemn Prussia. Finally, when the assembly offered Frederick William the crown of a united Germany, the king had little sympathy with this rather indecisive group and, following his absolutistic though unsure ideals, he turned down the offer. The fact was that this rationalistic and philosophical body completely underestimated the forces which were at work. The dynamics of dynastic particularism, the dynamics of power as expressed in foreign policy, and the dynamics of the social revolutionary and communistic idea could not be satisfied by this group.



Something more powerful and destructive was to take its place.<sup>43</sup>

Finally, however, the parliament did create an Imperial Constitution. It must be said to the credit of this institution that even in 1849 the document represented the best spirit and vigor of 1848. The first power of the government was to be in the hands of the Emperor, who was empowered to make treaties, war, peace, control movements of the army and navy, to supervise the highways and post. He was to have a civil list and responsible ministers and the right to dissolve the Reichstag, which was to be composed of a house of states and a house of people. Essentially, the Emperor was to be a unifying factor over and against the petty princes and the Reichstag. A third factor was the Imperial court of justice, which was to provide a unity of law and justice for the realm.<sup>44</sup> However, there were compromises which were to weaken this unitary constitution. Although the individual states had to give up envoys and consuls, they retained representative bodies which were to be chosen by themselves. Imperial law-giving was under certain restraints, and taxes could only be levied in case of need. In addition, the house of states was a conservative body which could act against decisions made by the representatives of the people who were elected by universal, direct, and secret ballot. Throughout, however, this document was to express the German democratic spirit.<sup>45</sup>

However conservative the work of the Frankfort parliament might have been, there were more conservative forces at work.

The counter-revolution in Austria was a signal for Prussia to do the same thing and to do it without any bloodshed. The fact of the matter was that the masses had lost interest in the Frankfort parliament, which had ceased to win concessions and rights for them.<sup>46</sup> On the other hand, the upper middle classes feared loss of influence and allied themselves with the dynastic and bureaucratic interests.<sup>47</sup> The final blow to the hopes of the parliament came when the king refused to accept the emperorship, despite moments of hesitation and confusion. After this, attention was now turned to the individual states and herein lay Germany's weakness: "Germany was once more poor in its richness, small in its greatness, yet great in pettiness, rich in wretchedness...Particularism was the true curse of Germany."<sup>48</sup> The revolution had failed; it only waited for Prussia to strike the blow.

The counter-revolutionary forces now reached their peak and forced conservative alterations in the constitution. The nobility was preserved, the death penalty retained, the right of franchise limited, free instruction of the needy denied, and the veto for the Imperial council restored. But even now, Prussia would not accept the constitution and, following Prussia's lead, Saxony refused the constitution. Prussian troops were sent to Dresden to support the conservative government there. Soon revolution broke out in Wurtemberg and Baden, where even the military joined the insurgents. But nothing could stop Prussia and the fortress of Rastalt was the last to hold out.<sup>49</sup> It was Prussia which destroyed German

patriotism which she herself had developed, so well in the preceding generation.<sup>50</sup> This Badensian Cradle Song expresses the bitterness which was directed at Prussia:

Sleep, my child, don't cry,  
The Prussian's going by.  
He killed your father at his door,  
He made your wretched mother poor.  
Keep very still, if you'd be wise,  
Or he'll find ways to shut your eyes.  
Sleep, my child, don't cry,  
The Prussian's going by.<sup>51</sup>

Force upon force was to be the prime mover in German politics from now on.

## III

The defeat of liberalism at Rastalt was to set liberalism on a new course. The liberal movement which had its roots in the Enlightenment and the French Revolution was to abandon its humanistic idealism which characterized the period from Stein to the Frankfort parliament and to adopt the integral type of nationalism which was to find its greatest exponent in Bismarck. The task, therefore, is to examine liberalism as a concept before and after this period and to assess the reasons for its change of course and the significance of this change.

Basically the liberalism which was developed in Germany during and after the Napoleonic wars was in opposition to the liberalism and nationalism of Jacobinism. For the principles of revolution and reason were substitutes for the ideas of history and tradition. The idea of history as an evolutionary movement was propounded most naturally by philosophers of history, such as Hegel and Herdër, who were to take the lead in developing a "liberal" philosophy. Although much of the thought which was to come from this reaction against Jacobinism was conservative, there also arose from this movement a middle group of liberal nationalists.

This movement combined both nationalism and liberalism. Its exponents thought each nationality should have an independent state of its own. Divided nationalities should be joined into one state and Imperial states should be divided into their constituent nationalities. If every national state

should be free, likewise the citizens of these states must be free. Especially, they must have personal liberties, such as speech, press, worship, and association. Economic liberties were also important; there should be freedom of contract, profession, and trade. And most importantly there must be political freedom. They espoused the principle of representative democracy whereby assemblies would be chosen by equal, universal, and secret suffrage. But, it must be remembered, that these principles were advocated by the middle classes who had no burning fervor for "natural rights," but maintained them to be the evolutionary end of society. Liberal principles were to be promoted by the liberal institutions of free popular education, short term militia, popular journalism, and patriotic societies.<sup>52</sup>

One of the leading exponents of this type of liberalism in Germany was Karl Theodor Welcker. As a student he had been fired by the patriotism which had awakened Germany during Napoleon's victories. It is interesting to note that he was trained in history and jurisprudence. The key to his philosophy is his belief in the evolutionary history of mankind. Political development, he perceived, was like the individual's development from childhood to youth and manhood. Governments had proceeded from despotism, to theocracy, and were now to come to the legal state. It was accompanied by a changing method of social control from force and fear to faith and now to reason and liberty. Liberty, for him, meant a trust in the

ability of the individual to develop the greatest possible virtue and happiness. Within the legal state, men could realize themselves and their potentialities. The legal state was, therefore, a constitutional state in which the liberties were listed and guaranteed. The citizens of the state should take an active role in insuring the guarantees of individual liberties. However, he was definitely opposed to revolution as a means of realizing this state and this state was to be composed of not more than one nationality which must be in itself highly developed.

The "Declaration of the Fundamental Rights of the German People," which was issued from the Frankfort Parliament, was in part created by Welcker. Like the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, it espoused national popular sovereignty, personal liberties, and denunciation of nobility and class privileges. Yet it is a more restricted document emphasizing the German nation and omitting any reference to natural rights and the right of revolution. Liberalism was then to be peaceful and traditional.<sup>53</sup>

Having looked at Theodor Welcker as a theoretician, it might be well to look at Heinrich von Gagern, the leader of the Frankfort parliament. He too believed that each nation and every individual should exercise the right of self-determination, within the traditions of the historical past. His philosophy is noted by Hans Kohn:

The emphasis upon individual nationality and its

rights and the high evaluation of popular traditions and of the vernacular--the vision of a future peaceful world, in which each nationality would dwell in liberty in its own place, each awakened by the high message of humanity, each cultivating it own way, all, whether large or small, equal and competing peacefully for the common good of mankind--the faith of a harmonious synthesization of the rights of the individual with his loyalty to the national community and its duties to mankind: these were the new elements...<sup>54</sup>

Von Gagern led the parliament with ability and incorporated his ideas into the work of the parliament. But, finally, he was not able to combat the tide of more practical and more realistic nationalism and politics which were coming into Germany as a reaction to the revolutions of 1848.

Although Welcker was a professor, supporters were found in every walk of life. Politicians such as Gagern, Schmerling, and Lasker, industrialists such as Hansemann and Mevissen and economists such as Prince-Smith and Faucher endorsed these principles. Differing, as any large group will, they assumed in general that each nationality should be a separate political unit with an independent constitutional government ending despotism, aristocracy, and ecclesiastical influence. They believed that each state in serving its own interests would be serving the interests of humanity as a whole by national policies of free-trade, anti-militarism, anti-imperialism and international cooperation. They borrowed heavily from the romantic movement. They had sympathy for the underdog and the oppressed. And, in doing so, they revived interest in the past, in national heroes and legends. But peaceful as they

might have been, they lived in a less than pacific world. To promote their principles they encouraged people to fight for unity and freedom; but here was the cause of their failure. Once the sword had been taken up, it was difficult to lay down. Nationalism grew in strength while liberalism became weaker. The deed became more important than the idea and led to the more harsh type of liberalism which was to become prominent after the reactions of 1849.<sup>55</sup>

Without a doubt liberal nationalism lived on, but the new form of integral nationalism was to take its place as the most important movement in the last half of the nineteenth century. Charles Maurras was a Frenchman of this type and describes the movement in his own words as "the exclusive pursuit of national policies, the absolute maintenance of national integrity and the steady increase of national power-- for a nation declines when it loses its military might."<sup>56</sup> Therefore, it is seen to be a jingoistic and militant movement which has its heirs in the twentieth century. In general, it distrusts minorities, other nations, and internationalism, based on mutual respect and cooperation.<sup>57</sup>

However, most distressingly it came from liberal nationalism. How then was this humanitarian and liberal movement transformed into a militant and intolerant one? One factor is the fact that the liberal nationalists took up the sword to liberate oppressed nationalities, whether it was themselves or another. In the case of 1848, peaceful and



tolerant actions were seen to fail in the face of the forces of reaction. Bismarck was to prove pragmatically the value of force. Integral nationalism was nurtured as much on the failures of liberal nationalism as on its own successes. The value of the force of arms to maintain independence was established. Another factor was that once the liberals successfully achieved their independence, their heads were turned by that success. For example, the partial success which the revolutions of 1848 had created led the Frankfort assembly to deny the national principle to Poland. A third factor was the establishment of liberal institutions such as public education, free press and association. Schools, press and associations as they came more and more under the control of the national state were used to inculcate the ideals of nationalism to the masses. This movement appeals to the masses and operates with their blessing and approval for the glory of the fatherland. In doing so it becomes a religion. Although it is the child of liberalism, liberalism after 1848 was unable to combat its offspring.

## IV

After the revolutions of 1848 and the reactions of 1849 the Prussian state continued to be much the same as it was in the previous period--not quite the same to be sure, but the social structure had not been seriously changed or upset. In Prussia the social and political structure had assumed an aspect peculiar to that state. Indeed, it had similarities to both Russia and France, England and Austria; but, on the whole, it must be said that its social structure was distinctive and different. It is this structure which existed between 1848 and 1870 which must now be examined.

The first group which should be considered is the Junkers. Historically, they were the oldest group in Prussia--predating even the Hohenzollerns. As England had their country squires so did the east seven provinces of Prussia have their Junkers. They differed from the rest of the German nobility in that they had mixed at an early date with the Slavic peoples who were the original settlers and had been conquered by them. On account of their conquest, they rapidly assumed an attitude of command and domination over their subjects, who had been made serfs, compelling these peasants to work their lands for them and to perform other services which the squire deemed necessary. In local affairs, the Junkers rapidly assumed control through the power of the local diets and demanded to be hereditary military and political advisors to the prince. And through the lucrative grain trade which flowed through this part of north-central Europe, they gained the power of

the purse. Through this power they were able to extend their control over the diets and the peasants.<sup>58</sup>

Although they were eventually controlled by the Hohenzollerns, they became enthusiastic supporters of the crown and were thus able to retain much of their powers. The Great Elector granted them complete control over their local spheres. The Junker, who was to become the symbol of authority and obedience to the state, learned much of this loyalty to the fatherland from service in the army; these qualities he passed on to his subjects at home. On the whole, the Junkers were able to make an admirable compromise between feudalism and absolutism by gaining control over the local spheres and by service to the state as a whole in service in bureaucratic and court posts.<sup>59</sup>

In the nineteenth century the Junkers were challenged again, this time by the liberal industrial capitalism of the rising middle class and the materialistic profit motive. They became aggressive self-seekers, turning to the past and the romantic movement which fostered their existence, and putting up a stout resistance. Even when limited by Stein and Hardenberg's reforms, e.g. emancipation of serfs, citizen armies, equal citizenship, and the limiting of their administrative functions, their power was hardly impaired at the local level and they were actually able to bring more land under their control because of the land reforms. They continued their policy of service and alliance to the king, although they always remained separate from the royal influence.

Their ideal of a corporate state, God-ordained, which had been promoted by Lutheranism, was strengthened by the revolutions of 1848. Bismarck, who was also a Junker, brought them to new power with a policy of realism and nationalism. Bismarck's policies, which were to carry the Junkers further than they wished, converted the upper middle class to their ideals. Throughout this period the Junkers were able to continue in their tradition of control and service to state.<sup>60</sup>

What were the careers the Junkers might follow in the bureaucracy and administration of the Prussian state? As a generalization, it might be said that they held general offices rather than particular or technical offices for which they lacked training. In addition, they often held court offices which had great influence rather than those in the diplomatic service because of the wide range of interests demanded by these positions.<sup>61</sup> It may well be asserted that the participation of Junkers in the Prussian administration may have been a large factor in the supremacy of the conservatives in this period.<sup>62</sup> In the provinces, the office of Ober-Praesident was often held by a Junker and from this office a Junker often became a minister. In the governmental districts the Junkers exerted great influence as presidents over these districts and maintained a semi-autonomous authority. And in all of the lesser local divisions, the Junkers were able to hold offices of great importance and number in the ministries, especially interior, agriculture, and war, as well as court offices. Also they maintained considerable strength in the provincial

diets. Their close alliance to the crown strengthened both their position and the position of conservatism.<sup>63</sup>

The next part of Prussian society to consider is the king. In 1858 Prince William succeeded Frederick William IV, who had become deranged. The new king had been a military man, and, as a younger son not in direct line to the crown, he had not been trained for this position. He had inherited the Hohenzollern tendencies to modest talents and steadiness of character. As the kings before him, he believed in the divine right of kings, but he wanted to stay within the limits of the constitution by keeping within the historical traditions of absolutism. It could hardly be said that he had much conception of practical politics or of the new industrialism, for he thought of society as it had been in the ancien regime.<sup>64</sup>

Shortly after William became king, he appointed right wing liberals as ministers. However, this was not to be thought of as a move to liberalism. Rather, the king wanted to put through certain military reforms of which he was most fond. The liberals themselves were unaware of the king's real autocratic beliefs. And as early as 1859 the king was questioning his previous policy. Pinned down to the actual reforms which he wanted, his desire for military reforms (which the liberals opposed), his reform of the election districts and local governments, and his reform of the land tax (which was to be used for military purposes) was hardly enough for the liberals who in addition wanted reform of the conservative upper house, action against reactionary officials, less apathy toward

unification and for the whole of Germany. But the liberals had little chance; once the king had put through his land tax, his differences with the conservatives, who had still retained influence at court, were wiped out.<sup>65</sup>

Although, indeed, the social system of Prussia had not been much altered, there were certain forces which were at work to shake up the then present existing social order. One of these was the great increase in population and the corresponding rise of cities. The towns were drawing from the countryside and industry from the handicrafts. There was, consequently, a rapid increase in the middle class and the expansion of industry and the turnover of goods. Even land after the Stein reforms became mobile property and a subject for capitalistic enterprise:<sup>66</sup> "The pursuit of Mammon had overcome the stronghold of Junker moral purity."<sup>67</sup> Social mobility and the breakdown of the caste state were leading the population to liberalism, which they hoped would guarantee them the benefits which the new society of materialism and capitalism seemed to grant them in this expanding society. No longer were the universities the leaders in this movement; rather, they clung to their old ways. Liberalism seemed to be materialistic rather than idealistic.<sup>68</sup> The problem for the Prussian caste system was whether it could allow economic and social freedom without losing absolutism.<sup>69</sup>

The constitution of 1850 in Article 4 states: "All Prussians are equal before the law. Caste privileges are

invalid."<sup>70</sup> As well might be imagined, there was a distinct difference between theory and practice in the application of this article and by 1856 this clause was under heavy attack by the conservatives. The caste system was still held in Prussia despite this constitution, and despite social mobility. In actuality, the conservatives tried to limit the power of this statement by interpretation in order to preserve the old estates-state whereby each person was legally and socially restricted to the rights and responsibilities of his own estate.<sup>71</sup> On the other hand, the liberals believed strongly in the article. Liberty for the individual person, equality before the law, protection against aristocratic preference and arbitrary power were interpreted by them as the real meaning of the article.<sup>72</sup>

The ideals of privilege and caste were well entrenched in Prussian society, but it did not seem to appear that social origin or environment seemed to have been decisive in the beliefs of individual Prussians. Nobles like Freiherr von Vincke might condemn the conservatives, as might the church. This is seen most readily when one considers that even after the conservative regime of Manteuffel-Wesphalen had been replaced by liberals, there was no difference in the social origin of the administration. Even in the selection of liberal officials the caste standard seemed to have been predominant. The upper house remained Junker, (fifty percent of them were hereditary and the rest were elected by the highest

paying taxpayers) wrecking all of the reform bills. Only the Landtag represented the people to any degree. The local assemblies or Kreistage were controlled by the nobles as before and the few burghers who were allowed to sit remained conservative. These assemblies were able to control the finances of circles and were enormously powerful, despite the fact that the towns were considerably larger and paid more taxes than the few nobles who were allowed to sit in these assemblies.<sup>73</sup>

The means and methods of the Police state enabled the conservative factions in the state to maintain the caste system. For the Prussians the term "Police State" meant the all inclusive authority of the centralized bureaucracy. In reality, a citizen had no recourse to justice as against the bureaucracy unless he could show that an administrator or department had violated a contractual obligation. In the final analysis, the police had all authority in private and personal affairs. All complaints were handled in a system of red tape, often by the department against which they were addressed. Even the local assemblies found that their actions had to be approved by some administrative officer and the towns found that they could conduct nothing on their own, even the introduction of street lighting without the approval of the Landrat.<sup>74</sup> The liberals, although desirous of local reforms and more self-government, distrusted the ability of the towns and the peasants for self-government, and consequently failed to arouse the support of these groups in their fight with the conservative forces.<sup>75</sup>



The right of a free press had been provided for by the constitution. However, it was not long before the conservatives put through a press law provided for by an escape law in the constitution. Also the right to societies and assemblies was subject to temporary restrictions under law. The restrictions provided for the necessity of obtaining a permit for meetings and for the providing of details such as membership lists. Moreover, the police could be present at any meetings. Political associations were particularly watched. Protests against this sort of action were directed to the state's attorney who would then decide which cases would be brought to court.<sup>76</sup>

The old institution of mercantilism and the guild system continued to frustrate professions and handicrafts through the establishment of economic counselors and other government licensing agencies. In all, it was often a conflict between autocratic mercantilism and the rising capitalistic industrialism. Businessmen were adamant in their contention that new industry could not expand under this type of system, which retained the paternalism of the old regime. They believed that the government should only handle for business those essential services which it alone could handle. Railroad construction, the coal and iron industry, and the private banks were hamstrung by the numerous regulations which even included a usury law. It is to the credit of German industrialists and financiers as well as to general conditions that there was economic expansion despite the many restrictions.<sup>77</sup>

Militarism had and would play a great part in Prussian society. To the king, the army must not be economized on and must, in addition, give weight to the political situation. His propensity toward military matters led to the appointment of von Roon as minister of war and, eventually, to the appointment of Bismarck as minister president. In 1859, when the Italian war forced the mobilization of the army, reform seemed necessary. Consequently, reform was pressed in the Landtag. The conservatives and the king pointed out that the population had increased while the army had not. The program included an increase of recruits from 40,000 to 63,000 and the reorganization of the Landwehr. The king had decided to stand or fall on this issue of efficiency in the army. Von Roon typifies the conservative position on the army issue:<sup>78</sup> "The armed force does not deliberate, it executes."<sup>79</sup> The goal of this position was, of course, to preserve the caste system under a constitutional cover. On the other hand, the liberals disliked the army program, objecting both to the loss of the labor force and the increase in taxes which it would entail.<sup>80</sup> It was on this issue that the liberals and conservatives were to fight most bitterly during this period after 1848:

The liberals believed that a country was strong in defence if it was economically prosperous. They feared that the military reforms would wreck the economy and expose the country in time of war to extreme danger. They believed in the intelligent loyalty of each citizen to the country and his willingness and ability to fight in a crisis... The king and his military entourage emphasized the

necessity of drill and more drill for the inculcation of social and political obedience, not to say docility... Two different views of life were here opposed to each other, that of the growing industrial, liberal society and that of the Old Regime.<sup>81</sup>

The fight centered around this military controversy was basically a fight over the larger issue of the caste spirit and that caste spirit which was formed by the army. The liberals denounced the holding of all the high posts by the nobility. A duel between Manteuffel and the liberal critic Twesten, who tried to avoid the fight, showed that the military thought themselves unapproachable. The liberals favored two years of military service and the strengthening of the Landwehr as a counter to the regular army. Basically they wanted to maintain the system which had defeated Napoleon and was identified with the popular reforms of that day.<sup>82</sup> When the king presented his budget, the liberals claimed that he was hiding the true cost of the military reforms in different categories of the budget, which was probably true.<sup>83</sup> As a result, the liberals refused to approve the budget. Doing this, they put themselves in unalterable opposition to the king. The king immediately retorted that the liberal deputies were not patriotic and he asserted his divine right of kingship.<sup>84</sup>

The problem of unification was to stir the Prussian state greatly in this period and to involve all factions in the controversy. As the idea of unification occupied the interests

of the liberals at Frankfort so did the concept now. The liberals wanted a program "of remaking Prussian and German culture on the pattern of freedom and compelled the indifferent, lukewarm, theoretically interested and hostile elements to respond in one way or another."<sup>85</sup>

The king theoretically approved of it but thought that he would not live to see it. In fact, he did little on his own initiative outside of continuing the Prussian policy of absorbing small states, one of which was Kurhess, which separated East and West Prussia. And, under no circumstances was unification to proceed except under the hegemony of Prussia. It was for this reason that he opposed the inclusion of Austria in any new German nation.<sup>86</sup>

The liberals took a view which may be seen as characteristic of them. They thought that more room was needed for activity than the present sphere allotted to them (especially for economic reasons). Small states, which included Prussia, had to support armies too costly for their size and to maintain these armies, in turn, it was necessary to have an autocratic form of government. These small states were only able to maintain their independence solely through the balance of power. Consequently their contention was that the greater resources of Germany would render absolutism useless on military grounds, and the liberal principles of social freedom and human dignity would prevail over caste and privilege. Independence and security would equal honor and self-respect.<sup>87</sup>

Anderson remarks: "The ideals of liberty were employed to justify a people in asserting the right of self-determination within the limits of his own nation."<sup>88</sup>

The issue which was most often raised and often seemingly the most influential was the one of economic expansion. The continuing mercantilistic and absolutistic policies of the Old Regime made it impossible for great industrial advancement even in a state as large as Prussia. A corollary to unification was free trade. The liberals had so little confidence in the princes to accomplish this that they formed the "National Verein," which became the headquarters for the liberal point of view. This organization published a weekly journal, and, being an organization widespread through Germany, it was able to influence the small states. They thought that the unification could proceed peacefully without foreign intervention and war. However, most of the members of this organization wanted to exclude Austria on the ground that she was too large and had too many Slavic subjects. The goal, of course, was a free democratic state run under the principles of laissez-faire, with Prussia taking the lead.<sup>89</sup>

The conservatives were not to remain inactive in the issue of unification; they set up the Prussian Union in opposition to the liberal organization.<sup>90</sup> The first principle of their program set the tone for the organization: "Unity of our German fatherland, not in the manner of the Italian kingdom by blood and fire but in the unity of its princes and

peoples and in the firm preservation of authority and law. No repudiation of our Prussian fatherland and its glorious history; no perishing in the filth of a German republic; no robbery of the crown and nationality swindle."<sup>91</sup> The conservatives were not vitally interested in unification, but rather in maintaining the status quo. The Prussian Union was to combat the liberal organization rather than to initiate action itself. The conservatives were still fearful of nationalism since it had been associated with Napoleon and revolution.<sup>92</sup>

Bismarck took a broader view, however; he realized the necessity for unification as a prerequisite for making Prussia an international power. Realizing quite clearly that the German Confederation would be unable to do it, he knew that the initiative lay with Prussia. Therefore, Bismarck adopted the liberal objective of unification with liberal support, but he conducted it under conservative control. Like the liberals, he wanted a German national parliament to represent the people, realizing the general desire for it. However, the parliament would be under conservative control and would train the people politically. Once again, Bismarck's means were different from the liberals. The liberals thought unification would be internal and peaceful, but Bismarck thought to conduct it by diplomacy and war, as means more important than popular support. Politics under Bismarck became more important than the economics of unification.<sup>93</sup>

The constitution of 1850 stood behind the caste system, the conflicts over military, and the unification problem. The constitution was an ambiguous document, a compromise with the revolutions of 1848. It looked either to the past or to the future, depending on one's political loyalties. At first, the king had tried to resolve his basic loyalty to his house and the upholding of the constitution. To him the constitution meant the guarantee of his hegemony with the parliament and the people acquiescing. The king had lost confidence in the Landtag when the liberal deputies of that body had opposed him. He consequently condemned liberal ideas in the development of the constitution, largely at the urgings of Von Roon and Bismarck.<sup>94</sup>

Within the constitutional framework, the conservatives led by Von Roon worked for the dismissal of the liberal ministers. Von Roon claimed that the constitution had been given by the king and that he could expand the document to provide certain legal restraints against liberal ideas. He went to work on the king, claiming that the liberals desired reforms merely to keep their own positions, not because the country wanted them. He asserted that the army, not the Landtag, represented the best interests of the state. Essentially, his position was that of "constitutional law as interpreted by the military."<sup>95</sup> Von Roon little understood the ideas of political parties and the new ideologies, but he did convince the king to accept Bismarck. After his first hesitation, the king welcomed Bismarck on account of the latter's attack on the

liberals in the Landtag. Bismarck understood better the workings of the constitution. He knew that divine right was no longer possible but that assemblies could be modified and controlled to support the executive.<sup>96</sup>

Bismarck soon took the field against the liberals in the Landtag, provoking a constitutional crisis whereby the power of the conservatives when led by a man like Bismarck was proven and the inherent weaknesses of the liberals were revealed. The conflict, as was mentioned before, was over the budget and the military reforms. He quickly curbed the press and dispersed liberal officials and judges to less liberal districts of the state. He violated both the spirit and letter of the constitution to achieve victory. The lower house retaliated by refusing to pass the budget. Although there might have been a compromise on the measure by the granting of parliamentary responsibility in exchange for the military budget, the liberals were not unified on the nature of parliamentary responsibility and the king and Bismarck were little inclined to grant it. Bismarck simply implemented his budget by the "gap measure" or Article 99 of the constitution which stated that the "state must live."<sup>97</sup> The lines were well drawn now and would not be resolved until the elections of 1862 and 1863.

As sides were taken for the coming constitutional battle, the political parties were to organize themselves further to provide the bases for the struggle. Although political



parties had developed earlier as the result for the need for political organization after the creation of representative bodies, they had not become the standard means for expression until this period. Political experience had never been extensive among the Prussians. Political parties were developing to take the place of caste and class. The parties were bound to create more social equality, for the candidates often had to seek the support of people "below" them socially.<sup>98</sup>

The conservatives could never reconcile themselves to this position and allied themselves with the king and the power at court. The conservatives were differentiated sharply from all other parties; they cooperated only on the local level, if at all, with the liberals. When the king appointed the liberal ministers, they lost much of their power. Not used to having to fend for their political lives, they worked only to reverse the opinion of the king through their power at court, which was still great. Having declined from 181 deputies in the Landtag in 1855 to 10 in 1862, a group of conservatives formed a committee to develop an organization to promote conservative power. The committee urged campaigning in all districts and an alliance with the Prussian Handworkers Congress, which had as its aim the retention of guild rights in opposition to the new ideas of freedom of occupation. These two groups formed the Prussian Volksverein to combat the liberal organizations. Actually the conservatives and the handworkers had little in common and the latter found themselves overwhelmed.

The organization, which was strong in itself, grew to a membership of 50,000 in 534 locals by 1865. But it was generally ineffective due to inadequate press representation. The conservatives aimed their greatest efforts at the rural populace rather than the towns. Their procedure was to control their dependents and to watch over the polls to see that these dependents voted the way that they were instructed.<sup>99</sup> One noble, von Kleist-Retzow, expressed their viewpoint when he said, "We demand of our people that they select us; then we must take care of them."<sup>100</sup> The conservatives lacking popular appeal were forced to adopt extreme measures, e.g. cultivation of anti-semitism and the claim that the liberals advocated revolution and the partition of Prussia among France, Russia, and the Jews. In the end the conservatives were forced to follow Bismarck wherever he might take them.<sup>101</sup>

The liberal parties were characterized by a lack of clarity and individuality. They did not think of parties as partisan groups but thought of them as introducing a new way of life to Prussia. The Progressive Liberals tried to unite to promote formal party responsibility; however, parties continued to be run much like local social clubs.<sup>102</sup> The Constitutionalist were the oldest group of liberals, often aristocratic, who wanted to lead the king gently along to constitutional government. It was generally composed of prominent men who disliked popular and party action. Many liberals became disenchanted with this group and formed the German Progressive Party, whose aim it was to bring all

liberals together into a cohesive whole. This left wing group became more important as the government became more reactionary. Although the aristocrats continued to provide leaders for this movement, industrialists, insurance directors, and bankers, as well as professors and lawyers became the real leaders. The bourgeoisie became increasingly important as Prussia's economy picked up. Government officials were often liberal deputies and remained liberal despite official pressure, as were judges who were often quite close to the peasants and workers. In all, the dominant group was from trade and industry. The liberals were able to organize a number of groups despite restrictions. Economic interests such as mining, iron and steel organizations, the Congress of German Economists, and the Prussian and German commercial associations were particularly strong. These groups provided the means of entering into political affairs.<sup>103</sup> The Lassallean socialist organization, General Association of German Workers, was not strong, but was to have an effect at a later time. Their main program was the unification of Germany to provide for greater economic freedom.<sup>104</sup> The Progressives attempted to organize the elections by setting up a central election committee to provide worthy candidates for different sections and by setting up local committees for local elections. But the organization in each area depended upon the enthusiasm of the individual members and leaders.<sup>105</sup>

The composition of the liberal parties leadership is

interesting. The business percentage was large, about 20%, but when administrative figures, judicial figures, and lawyers are included in one group they amount to over one-third. By this time the number of professors, doctors, and army officers had declined. The impression which they leave is one of a prosperous elite composed of businessmen, middle class bureaucrats, and large landholders. There were hardly any factory workers and laborers. They were also relatively well-educated. At least two-thirds had attended a university and about one-third had received higher degrees. While England and France had developed a strong liberal middle class, the liberal initiative in Prussia lay with the bureaucrats and officials. Yet it was these officials who were never to become overly liberal. They were always fearful of reprisals and more importantly they represented that group interested in the interpretation and preservation of the existing laws. Obedience and discipline, a sort of esprit de corps, characterized them. Lenore O'Boyle contends, cogently, I think, that this occupational influence can at least offer a partial explanation of the weakness of German liberalism. The question is, "Were they committed to existing values?" Most of the liberal leadership had little to gain by a shaking up of society. Truly, they did not like an inferior social position, but they were in the ruling group now. The Zollverein had given at least some satisfaction to the industrialists and businessmen. The desire for social equality and more political power did not seem to be sufficient for aggressive liberal resistance.<sup>106</sup>

The election system in which the conflict was to take place was satisfactory to all groups; it had returned, on varying occasions, both liberal and conservative majorities to the Landtag. The Lower Höuse of 350 deputies was elected by all males of 24 years of age. The citizens voted for electors who represented 250 people and voted in one of three classes according to direct state taxes which the members of that class paid; each class had one-third of the electors. The ideal of inequality which is apparent in this system underlay the entire social structure. One glaring inequality was the provision for the open ballot. The secret ballot had been repeatedly defeated, but even the liberals were not strong for this reform, accepting social inequality as a fact. Because of this and the three class system of voting they failed to get all the voters out.<sup>107</sup>

The elections of 1862 and 1863 returned strong liberal majorities to the lower house. However, Bismarck was unimpressed by these victories and continued his program by extra-legal means. He sums up his attitude on the situation: "We live not under the regime of general suffrage but under the rule of the king and the laws."<sup>108</sup> With sweeping successes in the field of international politics and war, he was able to gain the sympathy of some liberals. By 1867, the National Liberals were formed out of the Progressive Party and gave support to Bismarck.

After the defeat of Austria at Sadowa, Bismarck was able

to unite the North German states under Prussia in the North German Confederation. The king of Prussia held the presidency of the federal government and was represented by his chancellor, Bismarck, responsible only to the king. The Bundesrat, or federal council, was made up of delegates from the various states. Prussia with its seventeen votes was able to control this council, since a two-thirds vote was necessary for a constitutional change. The lower house, or Reichstag, was equal to the Bundesrat in legislative powers. It was composed of members selected by universal suffrage. Prussia was dominant and liberal responsible government was defeated.<sup>109</sup>

## V

Bismarck had indeed been behind the defeat of the liberals. However it is doubtful that liberalism in Germany had ever been truly strong. Nonetheless, Bismarck as a person overshadows this period of constitutional struggle. The Minister-President was a conservative with a new outlook as to means to accomplish the conservative ends: he was a perfect example of the dichotomy of the French Revolution--repulsed by its ends, intrigued by its means. He had little sympathy or feeling for the reforms and ideals of Stein. He was a romantic idealist, prone to duels and fights. In the 1830's, the decline of liberalism caused Bismarck to turn from idealism to orthodoxy and from liberalism to conservatism. The Christian ethic of serving the state and preserving the natural order of things appealed to him. As minister-president he was, of course, against most liberal ideals, which he suspected came from the French and American revolutions. To him political parties led to chaos and only the historically tried ideas and traditions were acceptable. On the other hand, he realized that absolute monarchy had been outgrown. Accordingly, he wanted a parliament which could watch king and bureaucracy but which could also defeat both liberal and democratic movements. Under Bismarck the national principle with Prussia as the leader became the dominant element.<sup>110</sup> A statement of Bismarck's concerning liberal and national ideas is worth noting: "The duty of the statesman is to conserve a

state, independent of popular forces."<sup>111</sup> So this romantic idealist with conservative sympathies turned Prussia from a state who solved its problems internally to one who solved its problems externally. What was to follow was Sadowa, Sedans, the treaty of Versailles, and, most assuredly, the defeat of the liberals.

Conservatism in Prussia was retained and liberalism defeated. What caused this defeat? What were the weaknesses of liberalism which doomed it in Bismarck's empire? To me the most important factor was that the dichotomy between the ideals and the deeds of the French Revolution proved true. Preaching liberal ideals, the French Revolution instituted the terror. Preaching the brotherhood of man, the French Revolution established the Napoleonic Empire. These inconsistencies have been pointed out before and I think they are still justified. Liberalism was only utilized for a brief time in Prussia under Stein and Hardenberg to defeat Napoleon and became, thereby, national and nationalistic. And nationalism was more of a problem in Germany which was not united. Combined with the feeling which the French Revolution instituted, this desire for a unified nation proved too much for liberalism. Louis Snyder analyzes the limitations of Prussian liberalism in 1848:

The Liberals (in 1848) combined to overthrow the shackles of the Metternichian order. On the surface, it seemed that the streams of rationalism were converging at last in Germany. But the main stream of revolt was directed not with but against



the ideas of the French Revolution. All the catch-words of liberalism, democracy, and constitutionalism were utilized freely, but the overall pattern was distinctly national and not liberal. The men of 1848 were not radicals in the modern sense of the term. In most cases, their spirit of emancipatory liberalism was tempered by vestiges of authoritarianism. What they desired most of all was a combination of unity and liberty within the framework of a new democratic monarchy.<sup>112</sup>

The question of Poles and Slavs in the Empire took up much of the time of the Frankfort Parliament and showed the nationalistic tendencies of this liberalism. Bismarck won the reluctant admiration of the liberals, especially the National Liberals, by the pragmatic justification of his policy of "blood and iron." Force, only present in Prussian society, was justified as a way of action. An empire created by force had to be maintained by force. In the last analysis, Bismarck appears as a latter day Frederick the Great.

But what of this obvious defeat of liberalism? Is the world worse off because Germany never could realize liberal ideals? Some would, of course, trace this defeat of liberalism to Hitler and Nazism and, perhaps, with good reason. Now, of course, the broader question is whether or not the movement of history has any meaning. The answer can be either Yes or No, depending upon your outlook. It might be well to remember the words of Crane Brinton at this time to see if the defeat of liberalism does not, after all, have some real meaning:

If you judge the course of history by standards ultimately beyond history, as the full Christian must, you may then at least say, not that medieval

men were happier than we are, but that they were better than we are, for they knew, they believed, what millions of us cannot bring ourselves to know and believe, that there is something beyond history. Within history, men seem always essentially the same in their differences, and Talleyrand quite irrefutable: Plus ça change, plus c'est la meme chose.<sup>113</sup>

## Footnotes

- <sup>1</sup>Herbert A. L. Fisher, Studies in Napoleonic Statesmanship: Germany, (Oxford, 1903), 374.
- <sup>2</sup>Geoffrey Brunn, Europe and the French Imperium, (New York and London, 1938), 3.
- <sup>3</sup>Crane Brinton, A Decade of Revolution, (New York and London, 1934), 248.
- <sup>4</sup>Fisher, 163.
- <sup>5</sup>Fisher, 165.
- <sup>6</sup>Fisher, 376-377
- <sup>7</sup>Fisher, 382.
- <sup>8</sup>Fisher, 376.
- <sup>9</sup>Louis Namier, 1848: The Revolution of the Intellectuals, (Oxford, 1944), 31.
- <sup>10</sup>A. J. P. Taylor, "1848: The Year of German Liberalism," 1848: A Turning Point, ed., Melvin Kranzberg, (Boston, 1959), 24.
- <sup>11</sup>Namier, 4.
- <sup>12</sup>Viet Valentin, 1848: Chapters of German History, (London, 1940) 137.
- <sup>13</sup>Namier, 24.
- <sup>14</sup>Namier, 29.
- <sup>15</sup>Valentin, 35.
- <sup>16</sup>Valentin, 31.
- <sup>17</sup>Valentin, 30-31.
- <sup>18</sup>Valentin, 152.
- <sup>19</sup>Valentin, 152-156.
- <sup>20</sup>Valentin, 150.
- <sup>21</sup>Valentin, 176.

- 22Valentin, 176-180.
- 23Valentin, 181.
- 24Valentin, 192.
- 25Valentin, 193-199.
- 26Valentin, 201.
- 27Valentin, 204-210.
- 28Valentin, 185.
- 29Valentin, 216-218.
- 30Valentin, 221.
- 31Valentin, 222.
- 32Valentin, 271.
- 33Valentin, 265.
- 34Valentin, 255.
- 35Valentin, 259.
- 36Roy Pascal, "The Frankfort Parliament, 1848, and the Drang Nach Osten" The Journal of Modern History, XVIII, 2 (June, 1946), 108.
- 37Pascal, 114.
- 38Pascal, 116-119.
- 39Pascal, 121.
- 40Namier, 101.
- 41Valentin, 275.
- 42Valentin, 309.
- 43Valentin, 305-306.
- 44Valentin, 271-272.
- 45Valentin, 372-373.
- 46Valentin, 339-340.
- 47Valentin, 377.

- 48Valentin, 378.
- 49Valentin, 395-417.
- 50Valentin, 420.
- 51Valentin, 420.
- 52Carlton J. H. Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism, (New York, 1931), 135-137.
- 53Hayes, 147-151.
- 54Louis L. Snyder, German Nationalism, (Harrisburg, Pa., 1952), 106.
- 55Hayes, 158-163.
- 56Hayes, 165.
- 57Hayes, 166-167.
- 58Lysbeth Walker Muncy, The Junker, (Providence, R.I., 1944), 3-10.
- 59Muncy, 13-19.
- 60Muncy, 23-32.
- 61Muncy, 43-47
- 62Muncy, 159.
- 63Muncy, 160-219.
- 64Eugene N. Anderson, The Social and Political Conflict in Prussia, 1858-1864, (Lincoln, Neb., 1954), 3-7.
- 65Anderson, 7-10.
- 66Anderson, 11-12.
- 67Anderson, 15.
- 68Anderson, 16.
- 69Anderson, 15-17.
- 70Anderson, 18.
- 71Anderson, 19.
- 72Anderson, 20.
- 73Anderson, 21-31.
- 74Anderson, 47-58.

- 75 Anderson, 61-62.  
76 Anderson, 64-66.  
77 Anderson, 68-83.  
78 Anderson, 84-85.  
79 Anderson, 87.  
80 Anderson, 87-88.  
81 Anderson, 89.  
82 Anderson, 94-99  
83 Anderson, 102.  
84 Anderson, 102-103.  
85 Anderson, 119.  
86 Anderson, 119-122.  
87 Anderson, 123-124.  
88 Anderson, 124.  
89 Anderson, 125-131.  
90 Anderson, 131.  
91 Anderson, 132-133.  
92 Anderson, 134-136.  
93 Anderson, 136-175.  
94 Anderson, 176-181.  
95 Anderson, 183-189.  
96 Anderson, 190-199.  
97 Anderson, 201-237.  
98 Anderson, 243-244.  
99 Anderson, 352-367.  
100 Anderson, 374.  
101 Anderson, 377-379.  
102 Anderson, 249-254.

- 103Anderson, 278-305.
- 104Sinclair W. Armstrong, "Social Democrats and the Unification of Germany, 1863-1871," The Journal of Modern History, XII, 4 (December, 1940), 485-490.
- 105Anderson, 317-348.
- 106Lenore O'Broyle, "Liberal Political Leadership in Germany, 1867-1884," The Journal of Modern History, XXVIII, 4 (December, 1956), 340-353.
- 107Anderson, 255-277.
- 108Anderson, 431.
- 109Encyclopedia of World History, ed., William L. Langer, (Boston, 1948), 686.
- 110Hajo Holborn, "Bismarck's Real Politik," Journal of History of Ideas, XXI, 1 (January-March, 1960), 84-92.
- 111Holborn, 96.
- 112Snyder, 104.
- 113Crane Brinton, A History of Western Morals, (New York, 1959), 267.

## Bibliography

### I. Books

- Anderson, Eugene N., The Social and Political Conflict in Prussia, 1858-1864, (Lincoln, Neb., 1954).
- Brinton, Crane, A Decade of Revolution, (New York and London, 1934).
- Brinton, Crane, A History of Western Morals, (New York, 1959).
- Brunn, Geoffrey, Europe and the French Imperium, (New York and London, 1934).
- Encyclopedia of World History, ed., William L. Langer, (Boston, 1948).
- Fisher, Herbert A. L., Studies in Napoleonic Statesmanship: Germany, (Oxford, 1903).
- Hayes, Carlton J. H., The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism, (New York, 1931).
- Muncy, Lysbeth Walker, The Junker, (Providence, R. I., 1944).
- Namier, Louis, 1848: The Revolution of the Intellectuals, (Oxford, 1944).
- Snyder, Louis L., German Nationalism, (Harrisburg, Pa., 1952).
- Taylor, A. J. P., "1848: The Year of German Liberalism," 1848: A Turning Point? ed. Melvin Kranzberg, (Boston, 1959).
- Valentin, Viet, 1848: Chapters of German History, (London, 1940).

### II. Periodicals

- Armstrong, Sinclair W., "Social Democrats and the Unification of Germany, 1863-1871," The Journal of Modern History, XII, 4 (December, 1940).
- Holborn, Hajo, "Bismarck's Real Politik," Journal of History of Ideas, XXI, 1 (January-March, 1960).
- O'Broyle, Lenore, "Liberal Political Leadership in Germany, 1867-1884," The Journal of Modern History, XXVIII, 4 (December, 1956).
- Pascal, Roy, "The Frankfort Parliament, 1848, and the Drang Nach Osten," The Journal of Modern History, XVIII, 2 (June, 1946).