

The Military Campaigns of the
Russian Civil War of 1917-1925.

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Preface

In a short work of this type the most difficult problem is just what to leave out, what to limit, and most of all how to arrange the few fragments that remain. During the Civil War the campaigns were so widespread and so little dependent upon one another I decided that it would probably be better to take them up geographically rather than chronologically.

The great problem of this work was to explain a war that was fought over and about economic issues without once mentioning such issues. For it is in the economic history of Russia from 1914 to 1925 that the actual key to the revolutions and the Civil War can be found. I recommend as the best work on this phase E. H. Carr's second volume. For the military history G. Stewart's The White Armies of Russia is excellent, but for a more complete view of the entire period W.H. Chamberlin's The Russian Revolution is certainly the outstanding job.

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J. Bowyer Bell, junior

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Part I

Russia, 1914-1925

The Russian people entered the War against Germany and Austria in 1914 filled with national devotion and an intense will to win. The civilian population supported the National Army under the command of Grand Duke Nicholas and provided for some of its needs through non-governmental organizations such as the Civil Red Cross. The Russian Army itself, despite its lack of military equipment, particularly artillery, ammunition, and hospital supplies, carried on an active and at times very successful campaign against the Germans and Austrians for three years. Thus there seemed to be no indication of revolution in 1914, nor of the possibility of one, despite the fact that every previous war in modern Russian history had brought about important changes in the internal affairs of the country. These changes had culminated in the institution of a representative legislative assembly after the last Russian War - the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. The conditions which made possible the Revolution of 1917 resulted from two major changes between the fall of 1914 and the beginning of 1917 - the collapse of the National Army and the incredible condition which the Tsar's government reached through corruption and mismanagement.

The losses of the Russian Army were astronomical; during the first ten months of the war they were stated to be 3,800,000 or well over 300,000 a month. This loss was due to the great Russian contribution

to the Allied War effort which included the Battle of Tannenberg that most certainly kept the Germans from breaking through on the Western Front. After the crushing losses suffered in this battle the Russians continued the war with amazing success, capturing large sections of Austrian Galicia and then, when forced to retreat, evading the efforts of the Germans to destroy their army. Again the cost to the Russians was tremendous and all resemblance between the National Army of 1914 was lost as raw recruits filled the ranks. Thus the Army began a slow retreat from Poland and Galicia, always managing to keep ahead of the German attempts to encircle and destroy their center.

Meanwhile, in the rear of the Army, reforms had begun in the National Government as soon as the war had started; the reactionary ministers had been dismissed by the Tsar on the advice of Rodzyanko, a conservative, and their powers given over to a commission and the Duma. Reform seemed to be progressing when the Tsar announced that he intended to take over the command of the Army in the field. This move was protested in vain by all of his ministers, for they feared that once the Tsar was in the field the command of the government would pass into the hands of the Tsarina. She was a neurotic and superstitious woman who had fallen under the influence of a shrewd but unsteady politician, the monk Rasputin. This fear soon proved justified and to all intents and purposes the government was soon in the hands of the Tsarina and her advisors: Rasputin, who was entirely discredited because of his unrestrained license and continuing public scandals; Sturmer, who by his stumbling actions nearly completely destroyed the administrative machinery; and finally Protopopov, who can at least be excused

for his tragic blundering in view of the fact that he was undoubtedly insane.

Thus by the fall of 1916 Russia was in a state of complete chaos despite the efforts of General Brusilov, who had continued with surprising success the German war and in particular had been able to undertake an offensive, Furihkevich, who had assassinated Rasputin, and the Tsar who had dismissed Sturmer. With the death of Rasputin the Tsarina no longer took an active part in the government and the Tsarist administration practically ceased to function. The Army was filled with defeatism and desired only to return home. The Russian people were for the most part sick of war and disgusted with the government - the time for revolution was at hand.

On March 8, 1917 crowds were demonstrating in Petrograd demanding food; these demonstrators were joined by 100,000 workngsien who were out on strike, and the demonstration soon turned into a riot. The Army was ordered to put down the riot by force if necessary and thus the crowd was fired upon. The Volynsk Regiment of the Guard, after taking a small part in this scene, returned the next day and came out on the side of the crowd. By mid-day most of the garrison of 170,000 men had joined the revolution and the Cabinet resigned soon afterward. Tsar Nicholas, who was later to be killed with all his family by a local Soviet, sent troops to quell the revolution; when they became stranded, he finally agreed to abdicate in favor of his brother, Grand Duke Michael. Michael, the next day, made his acceptance conditional

on the request of a Constituent Assembly - thus on March 16, 1917 the end of Romanov dynasty arrived. The revolution had not been the result of any group or party - it came from the people as a direct result of the utter bankruptcy of the Tsarist administration. The Revolution had arrived and it was now looking for a government to control it.

The Provisional Government formed under Prince George Lvov, former head of the Civil Red Cross, found itself ruling nothing - the police were abolished, the Army began to break up and return home, and all local authorities were swept away. Soviets, or local councils, of an extremely radical socialist nature began to spring up and share local and later national authority with the Provisional Government. These Soviets were the real key to the Russian situation and by fall of the year were in actual control of most of Russia. During the March Revolution the leaders of the Bolshevik party - the most radical of the many socialist parties - had not even been in Russia, but as soon as the Tsar's government fell they began arriving from their places of exile. Lenin came from Switzerland and Trotsky, who was not actually a Bolshevik until a month after his return, from America, and began plotting for an overthrow of the new democratic government. This then was the situation that faced the Provisional Government - a war with the Central Powers, internal chaos of the worst sort growing every day, and finally support from only an extremely small group of the middle-class within Russia.

The only man who appeared capable of holding together the Provisional Government was A. Kerensky, the Minister of War, a

democratic socialist and an outstanding orator. His efforts to continue the war, which was tremendously unpopular with the mass of the Russian people, and build a nucleus between the Bolshevik on the left and the reactionary monarchist on the right were actually successful for a few weeks in the summer of 1917. He managed to put down a Bolshevik revolution led by Lenin and temporarily revived the spirit of the Army. For a very short while it appeared as if the democratic revolution might succeed.

Then in August 1917 General Kornilov, the Commander - in - Chief of the Russian Army, attempted to form a more conservative government by marching on Petrograd and overthrowing Kerensky. The Provisional Government suddenly found itself unable to rally anyone to its support and it was only through the intervention of the Soviets that the Kornilov attempt was halted. It was now the Soviets, groups of soldiers, peasants, workers, and sailors, who had the ultimate power in Russia. It was with these Soviets that the Bolsheviks were able to overthrow the Kerensky government, for Lenin first controlled the Soviets and through them Russia. He demanded peace, bread, and land as well as all power to the Soviets - those things which the Russian people wanted most.

On the night of November 6 Bolshevik troops occupied the public buildings of Petrograd; the only opposition was the defense of the Winter Palace by the cadets of the Officer's Training School and a battalion of women soldiers. Within the next week most of Russia followed the example of Petrograd and the Kremlin in Moscow finally fell

on March 11. The Bolshevik party now controlled Russia and they immediately began eliminating all internal opposition; the anarchists on the left were arrested in December and on January 18, 1919 the Constituent Assembly, which had been elected by universal franchise to settle the new constitution of Russia, was dispersed. The Bolsheviks, or Communists, now began to put into effect their economic and political plans for Russia - the most important to the Allies was the signing of the treaty of March 3, 1918 at Brest-Litovsk with Germany ending the war and giving up vast areas of Russian territory. The Communists were now in power and knew that they were going to have to fight to stay there; Russia, which had just finished four years of war, was destined to be torn by both civil war and foreign invasion for the next five years.

Opposition to the new Soviet Government was both domestic and foreign. The Allies felt that this new government which had betrayed them by signing a separate peace was probably pro-German. The Allies certainly feared the constant talk of world revolution, but more acutely they were concerned about their investments in Russia. Thus, despite the efforts of Lockhart of the British Legation in Moscow and Robbins of the American Red Cross in Russia, the Allies decided on an anti-Soviet policy. Yet they could not or would not declare war on the Soviets. The result was that each country followed several apparently inconsistent policies and the collected Allies had no policy at all.

Allied troops landed in Murmansk in March 1918, in Archangel in May, in Siberia in August, and in 1919 in South Russia. These

Allied landings gave support to or created local anti-Soviet movements wherever they took place. Only at Archangel and Murmansk did the Allied troops take part in the fighting; in the remainder of the areas of the Civil War that local White Russian troops with Allied support in their rear managed to fight against the Red Army. The Central Powers also intervened in Russia during the period between the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and November 1918; their troops were in the Ukraina, Poland, and the Caucasus, and in some cases gave aid to local White Armies.

There were several movements against the Soviet Government during the Civil War; General Yudenich's attack from the Baltic against Petrograd; the campaigns of the south under Generals Kornilov, Denikin, and Wrangel; and finally within Siberia, where an outbreak of fighting between the westward moving Czech Legion and local Soviets led first to a democratic anti-Soviet government, later to a dictatorship under Admiral Kolchak, and finally to a series of buffer states and Japanese-supported puppet governments. Besides these domestic movements the Soviets fought a war with Poland in 1920 and crushed several anti-Soviet nationalistic movements in the Ukraina, Cossacks, Trans-Caucasian Republics, and the Central Asian provinces.

These campaigns were quite different from those of the War of 1914-1917, for there were seldom large armies or continuous fighting between large masses of men. In fact the battles of the Civil War were usually fought between armies that numbered around 50,000 as compared to the millions of the campaigns of Brusilov or Hindenburg. The campaigns

of the Civil War took place over huge areas of Russia and the battles were often won by a few thousand troops who were the only men that could be concentrated from the often fantastically thinly spread battle lines.

Along with the military campaigns there were continual outbreaks of terror against the civilian population by both the armies and governments of the Reds and Whites; in many cases these campaigns of terror were directed against particular economic and social classes. Besides the war and the terror Russia was in a state of industrial collapse as well as on the verge of starvation during the ten years between 1916 and 1925. Both sides were continually troubled by outbreaks of the peasants or the Green Revolts by the country-man against the city-man, Red or White, and the consequent destruction of the country's agricultural economy. Naturally, after years of neglect caused by the war with Germany, the transportation and communication systems of Russia were at best in terrible condition and usually non-existent.

In this state of anarchy, force seemed to be the only factor that could control support, but to the dismay of the Whites it soon became apparent that man could not rule by the sword alone. This was a war between fanatical minorities, fought over social and economic theories that few of its participants understood. The actual campaigns were independent of each other and often separated by vast distances yet each area of battle was a mirror of all the others.

NOTES FOR PART I

1. The material for this section was gathered from the following books:
E.H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923, Vols. I and II; W.H. Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution 1917-1921, Vol. II; M. Garrett and J. Godfrey, Europe Since 1815; B. Pares, Russia, Its Past and Present; A. Ransome, Russia in 1919; F. Chambers, G. Harris and C. Bayley, This Age of Conflict.

Part II

North Russia

On January 4, 1918 the Russian Soviet government recognized the independence of Finland; however, twenty-four days later the Red Army invaded Finland. In support of the White Finns under General Baron Mannerheim German troops under General von der Goltz landed at Hanko early in April.¹ Cooperating, these two forces cleared Finland of the Red Army and occupied Helsingfors on April 13. The Allies felt that the Germans were in Finland to exploit the natural resources of the country, to form a frontier buffer state (one of a possible chain along the eastern boundary of Russia), to form new divisions from Austrian and German prisoners in Russia, and to seize some of the 600,000 tons² of munitions and military equipment³ landed at Murmansk and Petchenga. Thus, on May 27, the Allied military attachés of Italy, France, England and the United States met at Moscow and unanimously agreed to intervene in Russia and the Supreme War Council at Versailles also decided in favor⁴ of intervention. The objects of the expedition to North Russia were, as defined by the British War Office, to form a military barrier inside of which the Russians could form to drive the Germans out, to reorganize the Russian Army, to bring in food supplies and in return receive raw materials from the Russians, to save the Czecho-Slovak troops that were spread out on the Siberian Railway and desired to be shipped to the Western Front in France, to prevent the Germans from exploiting the

resources of parts of Southeastern Russia, and finally to prevent the northern ports of European Russia from becoming bases for German submarines.

On March 5, 1918 one hundred and fifty British Marines landed in Murmansk without opposition from the 1500 Red sailors stationed there; three days before an agreement preparing for this landing had been signed between the regional Soviet and English and French representatives. This force was steadily increased until by July there were over 10,000 troops - English, French, Canadian, American, Italian, and Serbian - which after June were under the command of British Major-General Poole. These troops moved down the Murmansk to Petrograd Railroad, reaching Kem on July 8, where the first armed clash between the Allies and the Russians occurred in the disarming of their members of the Kem Soviet, and finally halted at Sorokskaya. At the same time General Maynard, who had arrived on June 4, cleared Karelia of the Finnish White Guard and captured Petchenga and on September 11, Ukhtinskaya. During this time the Allies had been co-operating with the Murmansk Soviet who were, on June 8, 1919, told by the Soviet Government in Moscow to ask the Allies to leave. This Murmansk Soviet was expelled by the Moscow Government when it refused to offer resistance to the Allies when ordered to do so on June 30; thus, from the first week of July all co-operation between the Allies and the Russian Red Army (which had reached a high point under Maynard against the White Finns) ended. For the remainder of the campaign in Northern Russia the Murmansk venture was mainly the patrolling and protection of the railroad between Kem and Murmansk, although the Allies did reach as far south as Medvejya

Gora on Lake Onega on May 21, 1919.

During the months of June and July the British Secret Service at Petrograd had been preparing for the landing at Archangel through members of Russian White organizations. On July 25, 1918 the Allied Ambassadors left Vologda (where they had moved from Petrograd in fear of the Germans) for Archangel. ¹³ On August 1 a party of 550 French, British, and American Marines attacked Archangel. Resistance on both the mainland and Modyugski Island was weak and, following an anti-communist uprising on August 2, the Communist retreated up the Dvina River to Kotlas and down the railroad to Vologda taking with them the supplies the Allies had intended to protect. General Poole's command was quickly increased to about 9,500 men. The military object of this force was to move down the Vologda Railroad and form a junction with the Czech division under General Gaida that were forming an eastern front on the Trans-Siberian Railroad. The British War Intelligence, however, soon informed Poole that Gaida had been back more than 500 miles to Samara and could not advance until spring, if then. ¹⁴

The Allies had sponsored a government for North Russia under a former member of the Russian Constituent Assembly, N.V. Chaikovsky, in an effort to make the intervention seem not only permanent, but also of Russian origin. Chaikovsky was a socialist and his government was certainly to the left of most of the White Russians in Archangel. This government's relations with the Allies and with the officer groups under the influence of Commander Chaplin, a Russian formerly in the

service of British Intelligence, became increasingly strained throughout the summer. Finally a group of officers under Chaplin with the approval of General Poole, who desired a more conservative government, on the night of September 6 kidnapped President Chaiskovsky and declared the government overthrown. When the Allied Ambassadors heard of this they protested and mainly thanks to Francis, the American Ambassador, the government was reinstated by September 9, 1918.

General Poole was replaced on October 14 for his part in the coup d'etat and for his military policy of continual offense which had spread the expedition into six separate and far-flung columns. He was replaced by Major-General Sir William Edmund Ironside who commanded over 18,000 troops and was opposed by 17,900 Red Army troops with about 4,800 troops in reserve. When Ironside arrived he found the following military situation: one column had moved down the Onega River valley toward Turchasova; another column was fighting a series of battles on the Archangel-Vologda Railroad; a third column had forked off from the Dvina River in a drive toward Kosish; two other columns were moving south in the Dvina River Valley; the sixth column had occupied Pinega on the Pinega River north of Archangel, where they remained until March 1919 when the city was left in the hands of a Russian-Allied Legion. General Ironside immediately halted Poole's offensive war and ordered the expedition to dig in for the winter.

The Red Army began to launch a series of winter attacks in an effort to drive the Allies back to the Archangel area. To do this the Russians had 18,300 men and over seventy pieces of artillery; to offset

this numerical advantage Ironside was reinforced in February from
¹⁹
 Murmansk. On March 24 the Red offensive attempted to split the Onega
 River group off from the rest of the expedition as well as cut off the
 far advanced post on the Vologda Railroad. The Allies managed to stop
 the attack at Bolshie Ozerki with over 2000 casualties inflicted upon
 the Red Army. From the 19 of September when the Americans captured
 Seltzo on the Dvina River until the final disengaging blow by the
 British on August 10, 1919 the area from Toulgas to Seltzo was under a
²⁰
 series of unsuccessful Red Army attacks. On the Vaga River front the
 Allied city of Ust-Padensk was attacked by the Sixth Red Army - number-
 ing 45,700 - and captured on January 19. The Sixth Red Army also capt-
 ured Shenkursk on the 25th and it was only because the Red Army was
 unable to mass its superior strength because of the terrain and heavy
 snows that this Allied force finally was able to escape and by spring
²¹
 cross the Vaga and Dvina to safety.

Throughout the campaign the Allies, and the British in
 particular, tried to raise a White Russian Army from the local pop-
 ulace. General Ironside recruited a force known as the Dyer Regiment
 and later as the Slavo-British Allied Legion which numbered about 2000.
 This unit fought successfully until July 7, 1919 when the Third Company
 of the First Battery rebelled during the offensive on the Northern Dvina.
²²
 The commander of the scattered Russian elements was General Eugene
 Miller, a former staff-officer in the Imperial Army, who, when
 Chaikovsky left Archangel in January 1919 to devote himself to anti-
 Bolshevik agitation in Paris, gradually concentrated authority in his
 hands. On April 30 he acknowledged the superior authority of Admiral

Kolchak, commander of the White Armies in Siberia, who then delegated to him both military and civilian administration in the Northern Territory. Finally in August Miller took over from General Marushevsky the operative command of the Russian Army in the Northern Territory. Except for some officers and volunteer peasant partisans from Shenkursk and Kholmogorsk the morale of the Russian troops was extremely low and their military value unreliable.

During May and June of 1919 General Maynard again pushed south along the Murmansk Railroad, capturing Kyapeselga on July 6; however, his forces were weakened by withdrawals and the advance was halted. General Ironside received experienced and well equipped reinforcements during June and July which raised his total force to 37,000 men, of whom 13,000 were British. With these troops Ironside intended to advance to Kotlas where he would be able to make contact with General Kolchak's right wing from the direction of Yarensk. Kolchak, however, retreated instead of advanced, resistance became increasingly heavy, the Dvina dried up immobilizing the Allied naval flotilla, and two mutinies broke out among White Russian troops. This ended the attempt by Maynard and Ironside for a summer offensive.

After November 11, 1918 pressure to withdraw the Allied forces increased; Senator Lodge, before the United States Senate, had demanded the return of American troops in public as early as February 1919. On March 4 the British War Cabinet appealed to the Allied representatives at Paris to evacuate the North Russian contingents as soon as possible; thus it was decided to remove the troops as soon as Archangel became

ice-free in May. The Americans and French were withdrawn from the line and the last of this group left on June 28, 1919. On August 11, Lord Rawlinson, the new commander-in-chief of the entire expeditionary force, arrived in Archangel to carry out the evacuation. Murmansk was to be evacuated last because it could be used as a base to threaten Petrograd if the Red Army followed General Ironside too closely. Sea communications could also be kept open with England, because it was ice-free longer than Archangel.²⁵

Although General Sadleir-Jackson had attacked Seltoz in a successful disengaging blow on August 10, 1919, capturing 2000 prisoners and eighteen guns, the Red Army recovered so quickly that it was decided to delay the evacuation until September 10 and try another offensive. This attack began on August 29 on both the Seletskoe and the Vologda-Railroad front with the assistance of the White Russians under General Miller. On September 27 the bulk of the Allied troops left Archangel, while the remainder of the British left on October 12,²⁶ 1919. General Miller had on August 4 wired General Kolchak that he could only expect to hold out one month after the British left, but on August 12 he decided to remain. On the Murmansk front a limited offensive was carried out by Russian-Allied forces under General Skobeltsin on three fronts: the Nurmis River, the Shunga Peninsula, and a column towards Koikori. The attack was a partial success and by September 20, 1919 the conduct of all operations was taken over by the Russians. On October 4 all British troops were north of Kandalakshi and by the 12th²⁷ the last Allied troops left Murmansk.

During the evacuation the Allies had removed only 6500 White Russians. The remainder stayed with General Miller, who continued the campaign with limited success by capturing Onega; his 25,000 ill-trained troops however could not long stand against the Red Army, which finally moved against Archangel in February. On the 19th of that month Miller fled on an icebreaker when he realized the inability of his troops to obey his order to retreat to Murmansk and make a stand. Archangel fell on February 20, 1919 and on the 21st there was a Soviet uprising which captured Murmansk. The last White troops in North Russia surrendered on February 27, 1919 in the Karelian town of Soroka.

The cost of the Allied intervention was high both for the Allies and the Red Army - as for the White Russians it was a total and complete tragedy. The Soviet government claimed the cost of the Civil War in the provinces and ports Archangel and Murmansk to be 220,620,000 pre-war gold roubles. The cost to the British was over 18,000,000 pounds sterling and 100,000,000 dollars to the Americans. The British forces' total casualties were 196 officers and 877 other ranks; the Americans casualties were 2,485.

During this intervention the regime in North Russia reflected all the defects, failings and mistakes of the other White movements. "Making allowance for lesser differences in time and place, one is struck by the amazing fidelity with which the Government in Archangel followed the course which history seemed to have marked out for all the White regimes. Even such little details as the sharp antagonism between the front and the rear and the reckless, desperate drinking are as

characteristic of Archangel as of Omsk, Ekaterinodar, and Rostov."

32

Thus in Archangel we find the pattern for the White movements throughout the entire Civil War.

Arch.
378.2
Bell

NOTES FOR PART II

1. G. Stewart, The White Armies of Russia, p. 86.
2. Ibid., pp. 83, 85, 86.
3. John Cudahy, Archangel: The American War With Russia, p. 24.
4. Ibid., p. 27.
5. Ibid., pp. 26, 31-2.
6. W.H. Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution 1917-1921 (Vol. II), p. 398.
7. W.P. Coates and C.Z. Coates, Armed Intervention in Russia, 1919-22, p. 82.
8. Ibid., p. 82. The agreement stated that the Allies would assist in the defense of Russian territory against the German-Finnish invasion; assist in the feeding of the population of the Murman province; and gave assurances of no annexation aims or intention to interfere in domestic affairs of Russia. Trotsky, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Government, ordered that the local soviets co-operate with the Allies and the agreement.
9. Ibid., p. 86.
10. Stewart, op. cit., pp. 89-91.
11. Ibid., p. 87.
12. Ibid., p. 90.
13. Ibid., p. 91.
14. Cudahy, op. cit., pp. 47, 53-55.
15. Strakhovsky, Intervention at Archangel, pp. 29-57.
16. Stewart, op. cit., pp. 186-7. These troops consisted of 6,220 British, 1,686 French, 5,100 Americans, 25 Italians, 5,300 White Russians plus 12,000 other Russians loosely co-ordinated with the Allied effort.

17. Cudahy, op. cit., pp. 105, 197.
18. Coates and Coates, op. cit., p. 161. According to a report dated January 2, 1919 from Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to the Secretary of the War Cabinet, the Allies now had 6,293 British, 1,686 French, 5,203 American, and 2,715 effective Russians.
19. Stewart, op. cit., pp. 190-1. This reinforcement consisted of one battalion of infantry and a half-strength machine-gun company.
20. Cudahy, op. cit., p. 208. During the battles of November 10-13 Trotsky commanded the Red Army. Touglas was captured for one day - April 25.
21. Ibid., pp. 153, 164, 173-190, 268-9.
22. W. Churchill, The Aftermath (World Crisis 1918-1928), p. 240. The author states there were in Russia between 25,000 and 30,000 local troops.
23. Chamberlin, op. cit., p. 401.
24. Stewart, op. cit., pp. 193-7.
25. Ibid., pp. 195, 200.
26. Cudahy, op. cit., pp. 209-210.
27. Stewart, op. cit., pp. 203-4.
28. Chamberlin, op. cit., pp. 404-405.
29. Coates and Coates, op. cit., p. 381.
30. Cudahy, op. cit., p. 211.
31. Ibid., p. 211.
32. Chamberlin, op. cit., p. 405.

Part III
1
The Baltic

In April 1917 Kerensky had given the former Baltic province of Estonia the right to form a legislative body and to use all Estonian troops as a home defense force. After November 1917, Anvelt, Estonian Red leader, carried out a reign of terror until February when the Germanophile elements (the Balto-Saxons as opposed to the older Estonian stock) asked for German aid. The German high command moved into Estonia, occupying Reval on the 25th of the month. The day before the Estonians had set up a provisional government, which was naturally not recognized by the Germans. On March 3, 1918 the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed giving the Baltic provinces their independence from Russia and placing them under the control of Germany until order was restored.² During the remainder of the year the Estonians were hampered by Red outbreaks and on July 1 the Germans offered to help put these down. The Estonians, fearing German influence, refused.

During the month of September 1918 the Russian Northern Corps was formed at Pskov - these troops, after a battle with the Reds near the town of Walk, withdrew into Estonia in two parts. The first of these joined the Estonian Army and the second formed a separate unit under a Baltic noble, Prince Lieven.

On November 11, 1918 the Germans signed the Armistice, which required by Article 12 that Germany was to maintain order in Russian territory under her occupation;³ however, most of the German Army left

and the Estonian National Council was still confronted with the question of internal as well as external Bolshevism. This council again refused aid from the Germans, although their army, commanded by General Laidnor, consisted of only 600 Baltic volunteers under Colonel Weiss and 3000 Finnish volunteers under General Wetzer.

On December 24, 1918 the All-Russian Soviet Executive Committee recognized the independence of the "Soviet Republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania." At the same time the Red Army began an offensive to help the local Soviets in those countries. By January 2, 1919 a Red Army of 12,000 captured Riga and all of Latvia except a little territory around Libau. Although the Baltic Volunteer Corps of Latvia numbered only 700 men under Major Alfred Fletcher, a German Staff Officer, plus a Lettish brigade under Colonel Ballod, the Allies still protested the use of the First Guard Reserve Division from East Prussia and a group of German troops under Major Bischoof. The command of this varied group was given to General Count von der Goltz and was known as the White Army of Latvia. This Army gradually cleared the Reds from Windau, Miau, and Libau; Riga was finally taken on May 22, 1919.

Meanwhile the White Army of Estonia was aided by the presence of General Rodzianko, who commanded the Russian Corps of some 5000. During the early months of 1919 the Reds were attempting to subdue Estonia. Trotsky on February 15, 1919 announced that the Estonian Army would soon be destroyed; however, this Army, now numbering 40,000 men, defeated the Reds and even cleared a portion of Latvian territory by the end

of February. While in Latvian territory the Estonian Army fought a sharp engagement at Wenden-Ronneberg with the Germans under von der Goltz, who had disbanded the Latvian Government at Libau, and forced him to give up his plans for an Estonian invasion and retire from Latvia.

During the spring of 1919 both the Reds and Whites built up their forces in anticipation of a summer campaign. On May 13, 1919 the Northern Corps under General Rodzianko launched an offensive eastward in an effort to capture Yamburg and Odov. At the end of three weeks the Corps had increased to 25,000 men and Yamburg was taken as well as a large number of Red prisoners. In the north the fortress of Krasnaya Gorka was taken and in the south the Reds retreated along the railroad towards Luga after giving up Pskov. The White Army had occupied territory embracing more than 2000 square kilometers with a population of 500,000 - this territory extended along the eastern and southeastern borders of Estonia to the depth of 60 versts and included Yamburg, Odov, and Pskov.

In an attempt to develop a civil organization by restoration of local self-government (particularly town and village municipalities), a chief of Civil Government, Alexandrov, was appointed and the territory under him was divided into a northern and southern province with two former members of the Duma, Count Benningsen and Krudner-Struve, appointed as governors. During this period there were two main problems facing the White Russians: the acquisition of supplies, both military

and civilian and in particular food; secondly, the relations between the Estonian government and the Russian Northern Corps. On May 19 Colonel Krusenstein, chief of staff of the Russian Northern Corps, appealed to the United States through the American Relief Administration. Various American investigators reported the near-famine conditions and on June 11 a conference to consider the entire situation was held in Reval, attended by General Gough, head of the Allied Military Mission to the Baltic, American Relief Administration officials, and high officers of the Estonian and White Russian Armies. An agreement was signed concerning both civilian and military supplies; since the military authorities possessed the only organization capable of the transporting of supplies, it was decided to turn over to the Supply Committee of the Russian Northern Corps the food for both the army and the civilian population. The British had pledged that the first load of military supplies (which was to consist of complete equipment for 10,000 men plus rifles, cartridges, tanks, and planes) would arrive at Reval on June 27. The first load of food arrived on June 15th on the S.S. Lake Charlottesville - 2400 tons of flour and 147 tons of bacon. With the removal of starvation conditions the tensions between Estonia and the White Russians eased. The Estonians had feared a return to the old Tsarist boundaries while the Whites had wanted more active aid from the Estonian Army.

The Russian Northern Corps planned to begin its offensive against Red Russia on July 1. They had been assured by the Allied Military Mission to the Baltic States under General Gough of the British Army, with Colonel Marsh as his chief of staff - both men had arrived in Reval on May 6, 1919 - that all the military supplies necessary for

a drive towards Petrograd would have arrived. The Corps was re-formed into the Northwestern Army which, under General Laidor of Estonia, contained four divisions and about 26,000 men. This Northwestern Army was turned over to General Rodzianko and on June 15, 1919 General Nicholas Yudenich was appointed Commander-in-chief of all Russian armed military and naval forces in the Baltic area by the White Russian Government of Omsk, which was then generally recognized as the supreme as the supreme government of Russia.

When the supplies promised by the British did not appear on June 27 the Reds decided the moment had come for a drive against the White forces and began a general offensive early in July, which by the middle of the month reached the outskirts of Pskov. At this time, in answer to a plea from Yudenich, the Paris headquarters of the Allied Military Missions replied that 50,000 gallons of gasoline for the use of sixty motor trucks would be in Reval by September 1, 1919. Estonia, in self-protection, sent troops supported by two armored trains and together with the Northwestern Army managed to stabilize the southern front. The Reds continued to advance in the north, taking Yamburg on August 3rd, the day after the long overdue British supplies arrived. The Red advance was halted when the Lug River bridge was destroyed in the evacuation of Yamburg.

On August 1, 1919 Soviet Russia announced that peace would soon be made with Estonia. Estonia at this time feared the White Russians would refuse to recognize their independence and thus the

possibility of a separate peace was hoped for. In an effort to prevent this Brigadier General F.G. Marsh held a meeting on August 10 with several Russian political leaders and demanded that they form a government or the Allies would withdraw all support. After forty minutes the ultimatum was accepted and a declaration recognizing Estonia was signed. On August 12 the Estonian Government agreed to co-operate with General Yudenich in his drive on Petrograd.⁶

By September 1, 1919 the Northwestern Army had a strength of 18,500 men, six tanks, fifty-three artillery pieces and four armored trains. The Red Seventh Army, which was to oppose the Northwestern Army, had a strength of 25,500 troops and sixty guns.⁷ Yudenich decided to begin his long awaited drive on Petrograd in hopes that its capture would stun the Soviet government and rouse the people in the interior of Russia to revolt. After several minor engagements the White Army broke the Red lines at Bulata on October 1 and Yamburg, less than 100 miles from Petrograd, was taken by a surprise attack on October 11.⁸ Yudenich planned to isolate Petrograd by cutting the three main southward railway lines; however, the commander of the Third Infantry Division disregarded his orders to capture the Tosno station and reinforcements were brought to Petrograd from Moscow.⁹ Yudenich, however, continued to advance and on the 11th began the final push towards Petrograd; finally on the 16th the city of Gatchina, less than twenty miles from Petrograd, fell.¹⁰

Lenin suggested the abandoning of Petrograd rather than

weakening of other Red Army forces on the Southern and Siberian fronts
of the Civil War. ¹¹ Trotsky, however, insisted that the city could be saved and arrived there on October 16, 1919. He planned not only a defense around the city, but within the city as well - this was to take the form of groups of armed workers in street to street fighting. On October 20 the Reds were pushed back to the Pulkovo heights where they held until the evening of the 23rd when they pushed the Whites from the nearer suburbs of Pertograd - Pavlovsk and Tsarskoe Syelo. Yudenich did not possess enough troops to sustain a long struggle and, realizing that defeat meant the collapse of his whole movement, he continued to hold out at Gatchina during the last days of October. The Fifteenth Red Army in the south occupied Luga and began directly to threaten his line of retreat. Yudenich evacuated Gatchina on November 3, Odov on November 7, and Yamburg on the 11th. ¹²

As the army retreated it became demoralized, desertions were numerous, many of the wounded were left behind, and spotted typhus broke out among the straggling regiments. As the White Army crossed into Estonia they were disarmed and interned, although the Supreme Allied Council asked Estonia to cease disarming Yudenich's troops and permit the reorganization of the army on Estonian soil. With the withdrawal of Estonian support the Northwestern Government disappeared and the Northwestern Army, which had been reduced to 12,000 soldiers, was finally disbanded in Estonia. The official end of the Petrograd drive and this phase of the Civil War came on February 2, 1920 when Estonia signed a treaty of peace with Soviet Russia.

The reasons for the failure of the Northwestern Army are many: the lack of a unified command and particularly friction between Yudenich and Rodzianko; the inabilities of Yudenich, both strategic and personal; the growing strength of the Red Army and the high morale of the Soviet troops under Trotsky; the difficulty in cooperating with Estonia; the devastated state of the country which made an adequate service of supply difficult; mud, snow, and frost which added to the troops' difficulties; finally, typhus, which killed over 14,000 White soldiers. The Red Army on the other hand had the advantages of excellent military leadership and a personal saviour - Trotsky - as well as a devotion to an ideal plus all the military advantages of a friendly city. General von der Goltz says of the campaign, "in the most unscrupulous and stupid manner, the English egged on Yudenich to undertake an offensive against Petrograd, single-handed and totally unprepared, with the result that most of the so-called Northern Army was massacred."

14

NOTES FOR PART III

1. G. Stewart, The White Armies of Russia. The majority of the material in Part III came from Mr. Stewart's Chapter on the Baltic. Unless stated otherwise in the notes one is to assume that this was the source for Part III.
2. Vernadsky, The Russian Revolution, 1917-1931, p. 73.
3. M. Sayers and A. Kahn, The Great Conspiracy, p. 88.
4. S.L. Bane and R.H. Lutz, Organization of American Relief in Europe 1918-1919, p. 357. Herbert Hoover, director of American Relief, estimated that the Baltic States should get 15,240,000 dollars in food supplies.
5. M. Sayers and A. Kahn, op. cit., p. 87.
6. W.P. Coates and C.Z. Coates, Armed Intervention in Russia, 1918-1922, pp. 183-4.
7. Ibid., pp. 181, 189-190. The Northwestern Army was supported by the British Fleet in the Baltic; on October 27, 1919 the British had sixty-five ships in the Baltic. During the Yudenich campaign the British destroyed the following Red Navy ships: two battleships, one cruiser, three destroyers, and eight other vessels.
8. Ibid., p. 377.
9. Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution 1917-1921 (Vol. II), pp. 271-2.
10. Coates and Coates, op. cit., p. 377.
11. J. Maynard, Russia in Flux, p. 244.
12. Chamberlin, op. cit., pp. 272-3.
13. Coates and Coates, op. cit., pp. 195-6.
14. Chamberlin, op. cit., pp. 273-4.

Part IV

South Russia

After the November Revolution in Pterograd there was only local fighting and a rather long skirmish in Moscow by way of resttance to the Soviet government. As yet there was no organized anti-Soviet force; however, in South Russia a large number of officers began to collect at Novocherkassk, the capital of the Don. This group formed the Volunteer Army under General Alexeyev after permission had been given by Kaledin, Ataman of the Don Cossacks.¹ At the same time a smaller anti-Soviet organization composed largely of officers was being formed on the Rumanian front.²

Kaledin was re-elected Ataman in June 1919 thanks to his policy of opposition to the Soviet Government; he chose as his chief-of-staff General Krasnov. Kaledin with two loyal divisions proclaimed the independence of Don and attacked the troops of the newly formed Donetz Socalist Republic, which was organized on November 16, 1917. While Kaledin continued his campaign the Volunteer Army began to grow; on December 8, 1917 it contained only 500 men, yet two days later it helped to crush a Red rising in Rostov. On January 7, 1919 the army was reorganized and Kornilov took command of all military action while General Alexeyev assumed responsibility for all questions of a political or financial character.³ The White Army at this stage was in very poor condition - menaced by typhus, by huge groups of Red soldiers that were returning from the German front, and by an unstable local population. Its financial problems were partially solved, however, with

a gift of 5,000,000 rubles from the Moscow Right Center Party.⁴

In answer to rising anti-Soviet groups, the Red Army was formed by decree of the Council of People's Commissars on February 3, 1918. The Volunteer Army decided at this point to move from Novochoerkassk to Rostov while Kaledin guarded the Don toward the North. On February 11, 1918, however, Kaledin, hopeless of the future of his cause, shot himself.⁵ Thus the Volunteer Army on the 21st of the month evacuated Rostov (which the Red Army took on the 25th) to go to Ekaterinodar. At this time the Army numbered 3500 men, eight guns and only 600 shells.⁶

On March 9, 1918 the Army entered Kuban territory, but the Kuban Cossacks from whom support had been expected remained passive. Then the report was received that Ekaterinodar had been occupied by the Reds and the Kuban government had withdrawn to the hills. Alexeyev wanted to proceed directly to Ekaterinodar, but General Kornilov, because of the conditions of the troops, advised a period of rest in the foothills of the Caucasus before attacking the city. On March 20, 1918 the White Army crossed the Kuban and six days later, after heavy fighting, reached a refuge in several small mountain villages, where on March 27 they were joined by Kuban soldiers under General Erdeli.⁷

From March 29 until April 6 the Volunteer Army advanced on Ekaterinodar and on April 8, 1918 the storming of the city began. The Red Army had over 17,000 men and thirty guns while General Kornilov had 3000 men, plus 4000 others armed mainly with swords, and eight three-inch

guns. The siege was broken off on April 13 when General Kornilov was
8
killed. Yet this campaign had cost the Red Army heavily - they lost
9
about 15,000 men and the White Army about 1500.

On the 16th the Army, now under the command of General
Denikin, withdrew to near-by Medvedinskaya where the army first heard
of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. The Volunteer Army regrouped and was
reinforced on May 17, 1918 by Colonel Drozdovsky and 2000 men from the
10
Rumanian front.

On May 16, 1918 General Krasnov was elected Ataman of the Don
Cossacks to serve as successor to Kaledin. He received large amounts of
supplies from the German command. The Germans also equipped a third
anti-Soviet force in South Russia - the Astrakhan Volunteer Army. This
latter group received planes for four escadrilles and money for 7000
troops. The Astrakhan Army, a thorough-going monarchist organization,
remained as a partisan group until January 1919 when it joined Denkin's
11
Army.

Still a fourth area in South Russia was being torn by internal
strife - the Ukraina. After the March Revolution of 1917 the Ukraina
had demanded autonomy. On March 23 the Ukrainian Central Rada, a
nationalistic group under Hrushevsky, had proclaimed the Ukraina autonomous
12
Kerensky recognized this on June 16. On November 21, 1917 the Rada had

proclaimed the Ukraina autonomous - Kerensky recognized this on June
¹²
16. On November 21, 1917 the Rada had declared the Ukraina a sovereign
republic and by January 28, 1918 it was recognized by Germany, France,
and England. In the new government Petlura was named Minister of War
and on February 28, 1918 his troops with German aid expelled the troops
of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, founded on December 17, 1917, from
Kiev, which was taken on February 8. On March 9, 1918 the Soviets
promised the Germans to respect Ukrainian territory. The Germans, on
April 28, forced out the Ukrainian Rada for failing to supply enough
¹³
grain for the German Army. A new Hetman was put in as a German
puppet, Paul Skoropadsky. This government was backed by the Conser-
vative elements and in particular the Society of Agriculture, which was
made up of the rightist land owners. Throughout the summer of 1918
German influence in the Ukraina declined with their losses on the
Western front. After the armistice of 1918 Hetman Skoropadsky's govern-
ment collapsed and a new Rada under Vynnychenko made up of various
¹⁴
socialist parties was formed. Petlura again was included in the new
government. The Allies, uncertain as to the Ukrainian aims, ordered
the Germans not to turn over their weapons to the Petlura troops;
however, the German Army could not maintain control. The Rada
continued to gain power under Petlura until on December 19 the Republic
was re-established. During the fall of 1919 another Ukrainian Rada,
the Ukrainian National Rada, composed of those Ukrainians under the
control of Austria-Hungary, was established at Lvov under Petrushevych.
The troops of this Rada were mainly concerned with fighting the Poles.

On August 15, 1919 Ekaterinodar was taken by the Volunteer
Army and there continued through the fall the building up of the

strength of the Army. In the Don area there was a meeting of the Krug, the local Cossack government, and Krasnov was re-elected because of his German support. On October 8 Alexeyev died and General Denikin
¹⁵
 assumed complete command. During the fall there were two campaigns: the first towards Tsaritsin under Krasnov, lasted through the summer and fall; the second, under White General Wrangel, took place in October and November and cleared the lower areas of the Northern Caucasus of all Red units. At this point the Volunteer Army had increased to 35,000 men and 80 guns; later in the fall it was joined by
¹⁶
 5000 Terek Cossacks.

Wrangel again attacked the Reds, during the last week of December of 1918, and completely disorganized the Red Taman Army; yet on January 2, 1919 the Red 11th Army counterattacked. Wrangel halted the Red advance, began a sweeping counter-offensive, and by the 24th of the month the 11th Red Army had ceased to exist as a fighting force. By February the entire North Caucasian Red Army had been destroyed and the Whites had captured 50,000 prisoners and a considerable amount of
¹⁷
 military supplies. This campaign cost both sides heavily - the Reds lost the Caucasus area, which gave Denikin a secure and untroubled rear, and a Red Army of over 100,000 men, while the Whites lost heavily in men and in particular some of their most distinguished leaders - Markov,
¹⁸
 Kornilov, and Drozdovsky.

Throughout the winter of 1918-1919 the Ukraina was also the scene of fighting. Although the Western Ukrainians controlled most of Galicia they were confronted with the increasing size of the Polish

Army. In the spring a division under Polish General Joseph Haller, which was supplied by the French, was used despite Allied protest and the Western Ukrainian Army retired eastward. The Allied Mission's efforts to stop the fighting proved useless since the French desired a strong Poland and backed their offensive. On January 22 the Ukrainian National Government had been formed when the Western and Eastern Republics voted to unite, but since the Allies, and in particular France, thought these movements German-inspired they refused to recognize them.

The Allies at this time began active military intervention within South Russia. As early as December 1917 an Anglo-French Convention had been signed at Paris dividing South Russia into two zones of influence. The French zone consisted of Bessarabia, the Ukraina, and the Crimea; the British zone consisted of the Cossack Territories, the Caucasus, Armenia, Georgia, and Kurdistan. This agreement was approved by the English War Cabinet on November 13, 1919. Thus on December 18, 1918 a force of 6000 French, 2000 Greeks, and 4000 Polish Legionaries landed at Odessa. The greatest strength this force reached was two French and two Greek divisions plus a small number of Rumanians - altogether the foreign troops in the Odessa region at the high point of the occupation amounted to about 45,000. Conditions both within the French Forces (particularly the Navy which mutinied against continuing the intervention) were unfavorable for intervention. Although the Allies did insist on trying to push out their line from Odessa, they were mainly content with the occupation of the city. On March 10 Grigoriev, an irregular Soviet partisan, drove the French and Greeks from Kherson and on the 14th a German garrison was also defeated by

Grigoriev. On April 2, 1919 an order from Paris was received for a general evacuation and on April 6 the last French ship sailed from Odessa as Grigoriev took over the city. The French also evacuated at the end of April a small force that they had landed within the Crimea. This marked the end of the French military intervention and during the remainder of the Civil War in South Russia the French limited their direct military aid to naval support.

21

British intervention followed two separate paths (which in many cases conflicted): to support General Denikin and secondly to aid the new republics which had sprung up - Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. The latter policy was followed because of the rich oil deposits in these small Caucasian countries. On August 14, 1918 a small British force under General Dunsterville occupied Baku after the local Red regime had been ousted by the population; however, on September 14 the Turks occupied this area. The British returned after the armistice in November and it was not until July 1920 that the last British foothold in the Caucasus was evacuated.

British aid to Denikin was considerable and consisted of both men who were to train and fight with the White Army, and military supplies. A few of the items sent to Denikin were a complete 200-bed hospital; 1500 complete nurses' costumes, enough soldiers' clothing to equip the British Army twice, and large amounts of tanks, guns, etc. British support of Denikin continued throughout the remainder of the campaign, although, a great deal of it was either wasted or never reached the front because of corruption and the poor transportation system.

23

On December 12, 1918 Petlura had entered Kiev, but by spring he had been driven out by less than 2000 Reds. With the failure in the south of the Odessa intervention and the weakness of the Ukrainian Army, which the Allies still mistrusted, the French desired a strong Polish buffer state against the Reds. Thus the Poles under General Haller were allowed to recover the entire province of Galicia from the Western Ukrainian Army. This latter group of 75,000 men joined Petlura and during the summer of 1919 this combined force defeated the army of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and entered Kiev, which Petlura had evacuated on February 4, on August 30, 1919.²⁴

Meanwhile, during the winter of 1918-1919 in the Don Cossack area of South Russia, the army of 76,500 men under Ataman Krasnov was being driven back by Red forces numbering 100,000 infantry and 17,000 cavalry. By February the Reds had continued to push forward and were threatening both Novocherkassk, the Cossack capital, and Rostov, the largest city of the province. General Krasnov resigned in February and was succeeded by General Bogaevsk who began to work in close harmony with the White Army. General Denikin consequently now became the sole leader of the South White Russian movement.²⁵

Denikin, having made a clean sweep of the North Caucasus, now sent a corps of highly picked veterans under General Mai-Maevsky to aid General Bogaevsk. These troops with the use of the railways of the Donetz basin stopped the Red Army offensive. This defense was greatly aided by a large-scale Cossack insurrection behind the Red Army, which

grew into an army of 30,000. As a result, the Red Army was held to a stalemate in the Don and Donetz Basin; however, it was at this time that the Red Army was reoccupying the Ukraina from which they were driven later in the year by the Ukrainian Army and a Denikin offensive. It was during this occupation of the Ukraina that Grigoriev, the Ataman who had forced the French from Odessa, revolted and with his 16,000 troops and sixty cannon attempted to overthrow the Soviet power in the Ukraina. By the end of May the Soviet Red Army had reduced him to the status of a leader of a small partisan band,

During the last days of May and June General Denikin's Army broke the long deadlock on the Southern Front. The White Cossack cavalry broke through the Red defense in the Donetz Basin, badly smashing the Thirteenth and Eighth Red Armies. At the same time the Ninth Red Army, which had been embarrassed by the Cossack uprising in its rear, was hurled back north and east of Rostov. Finally General Wrangel routed the Tenth Red Army forcing it to retreat towards Tsaritsin.

There were several reasons for the success of Denikin's Army which now made him the main menace to the Soviet Government. The numerical relation of his forces had changed to the disadvantage of the Reds; the new British tanks were a moral advantage, and finally there were also several mutinies or uprisings of considerable proportion in the Red rear. Grigoriev's mutiny absorbed all the forces of the Ukrainian Red Army during May, and Vsevolodov, commander of the Soviet Ninth Army, passed over to the Whites.

Throughout June the White Armies continued to advance despite the desperate attempts of Trotsky to rally the workers of the threatened areas as he had done at Petrograd. On June 25, 1919 Kharkov was captured and on the 30th Tsaritsin was taken by Wrangel. By the 1st of July Denikin controlled the Don Territory and a large part of Eastern Ukraina as well as the Donetz Basin. In the south Kuban troops had captured Ekaterinoslav on the Lower Dnisper.³⁰

Denikin decided on July 3 for an extensive plan of advance which became known as the Moscow Order. The drive towards Moscow was to proceed in three directions: Wrangel was to advance up the Volga; General Sidorn was to advance northward from the Don Territory; and Mai-Maevsky, who commanded the Volunteer Army - this name now included only a special part of Denikin's forces as the entire Army had been renamed "The Armed Forces of South Russia" - was to move north from Kharkov on the main railroad to Moscow.³¹

Throughout the summer of 1919 the White armies continued to move north.³² The eastward flank at Tsaritsin held steady under Wrangel and the Caucasian Army. On the Western front the Whites captured Odessa by means of a combined land-sea attack and on July 31 Peltava was also captured. On August 31 Petlurist troops, who had entered the city the day before, were forced out of Kiev. Thus in August Trotsky decided on a two-pronged counter-offensive; at this time the Reds outnumbered the Whites 171,600 to 151,900. One attack under the command of General Belivachev was toward Kharkov and made only local gains; the second

under General Shorin towards Tsaritsin was stopped without reaching any of its objectives.³³ One of the main reasons for the failure of the Red August offensive was a sweeping cavalry raid in the rear of the Soviet line carried out by Don Cossack General Mamontov and about 8000 men.³⁴

Throughout the fall of 1919 the White Army again began their advance; on September 20 the Whites captured Kursk and on October 6 Voronezh fell. Finally on October 12 Chernigov on the northern frontier of the Ukraina was captured.³⁵ Then on the 13th Orel on the direct road to Moscow, which was but 250 miles to the north, fell to the Whites; however, conditions in the rear of the White Army continued to grow worse, making the capture of Moscow absolutely necessary.

The main problems of the White administration were civilian unrest due to the conservative land policy and the military dictatorship,³⁶ a steadily increasing amount of Jewish pogroms, and peasant insurrections. Nationalistic unrest began in the Ukraina where large areas fell into the hands of partisan bands. Finally a large scale rebellion sprang up in the Daghestan area. All of these disturbances diverted troops from the front, which was very thinly held in a long arc from the Volga to the Rumanian frontier. So although Denikin held extensive territory with nominal control of regions with population of 42,000,000 he could not, outside of the Cossack Territory, count on the active support of any of the population except a small middle-class and a few intellectuals. Denikin was either actively opposed or recieved at best passive resistance from the Ukraina, the Transcaucasian Republics, the Kuban Cossacks, large sections of the poorer peasants, and most of the

workers, who were more apt to be Mensheviki in South Russia. Thus it was an absolute political necessity for Denikin to capture Moscow in the autumn of 1919 since his system of military dictatorship over unfriendly groups could not stand the shock of a serious reverse.

At the beginning of October the Reds had on the Southern Front 186,000 troops and 1000 guns to face 112,600 Whites with 542 guns. Denikin, on the other hand, gives the figures as Reds 140,000 to 160,000 while the Whites had 98,000 men. The Reds decided that this was to be the time for a counter-attack and massed 12,000 troops in a shock battalion to the west of Orel. On October 20 the Reds attacked and captured Orel, where for several days a series of battles raged about the city, but the Whites were finally forced to fall back to Kursk. Meanwhile, a Red cavalry corps under Budenny, a former sergeant of the Tsar's army, had beaten the best White cavalry under Mamontov and captured Voronezh. This marked the turning point in the battle for South Russia. The Reds captured Kastornaya on November 15 and Kursk on the 17th. In an effort to stop the Red advance General Wrangel was brought from the Tsaritsin front and given command of the Volunteer Army. By the middle of December, however, the White retreat had become a rout. Thus the third conquest of the Ukraina took place with little resistance - Kharkov fell on December 12 and Kiev on December 16. At this point the Denikin Army began breaking up into disorganized groups throughout the Ukraina. General Wrangel seemed to desire to retreat into the Crimea with his part of the army. Denikin, however, ordered him to join with the Don Cossack Army and together they fell back to Rostov.

The Red advance was finally halted after a three-day battle outside of Rostov and Novocherkassk on January 6-8, 1920; although Rostov itself was evacuated, Red attempts to cross the Don were thrown back. At this time, with the aid of the Kuban Cossacks, Denikin might have been able to not only hold on to the territory which he occupied, but to start a counter-offensive since his forces, 50,000, and the Red Army were almost equal. The Kuban Cossacks, however, were slow to respond and there were only 8500 of them in the White Army. The Reds began moving their forces to the east for a large-scale flanking movement and in so doing weakened their forces in the Rostov area to the extent that the city was retaken on February 20. It was then that a large-scale cavalry battle was fought between General Budenny and General Pavlov, who commanded Denikin's best cavalry corps. The Soviet Tenth Army and Budenny completely routed Pavlov on February 25. Rostov fell the same day and Sataisk on March 2 and Tikhoretskaya on the 9th. The White Army and the Don Cossacks were now in full retreat in an attempt to reach the sea at Novorossisk before they could be cut off. Denikin began to evacuate his troops to the Crimea which was still under White rule. On March 15 Ekaterinodar was evacuated and on the 26th Novorossisk also was evacuated. In the general mood of panic only the British remained calm and carried many of the Russians, civilians as well as part of the army off on their warships. The Kuban Army, which had broken with Denikin, retreated down the coast to the Black Sea where they were trapped between the unfriendly Georgians and the advancing Reds and forced to Surrender.

When Denikin arrived in the Crimea he had only 40,000 troops under his command, yet only the Don Cossacks lacked arms. Denikin felt that his troops no longer respected him after his rout and resigned. General Baron Wrangel was appointed Commander-in-Chief and Denikin left for Constantinople. Before retiring Denikin had received a note from Admiral de Robeck of the British High Command in Constantinople asking the Whites to arrange an amnesty for their troops in the Crimea or the British Government would withdraw its support. On Wrangel's appointment and after receiving a note from him the British government decided to temporarily continue their support of the Crimean White Army.

NOTES FOR PART IV

1. A.I. Denikin, The White Army, pp. 22-27.
2. G. Stewart, The White Armies of Russia, pp. 25-28.
3. Denikin, op. cit., p. 30.
4. Stewart, op. cit., pp. 28-33.
5. Denikin, op. cit., p. 44.
6. Ibid., p. 48. General Denikin gives the number of combatants at 4000 and 1000 others for a total of 5000.
7. Stewart, op. cit., pp. 39-40.
8. Denikin, op. cit., p. 90.
9. Ibid., p. 93.
10. Stewart, op. cit., p. 54.
11. Ibid., p. 53.
12. J. S. Reshetar, The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917-1920, p. 65.
13. Stewart, op. cit., pp. 46-53.
14. C. A. Manning, Twentieth-Century Ukraine, p. 53.
15. Denikin, op. cit., p. 189.
16. Stewart, op. cit., pp. 64-69.
17. W.H. Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution 1917-1921 (Vol. II) p. 146.
Some of the military supplies captured included 150 cannons and 350 machine-guns.
18. Ibid., pp. 147-8. Denikin, op. cit., p. 210.
19. Manning, op. cit., pp. 59-61..
20. Chamberlin, op. cit., pp. 153-154.
21. Ibid., pp. 164-167.

22. Ibid., pp. 167-170.
23. Hodgson, With Denikin's Armies, pp. 141-142, 180-181. The author in particular mentions the activities of English airmen in South Russia.
24. Manning, op. cit., pp. 61-65.
25. Chamberlin, op. cit., p. 209.
26. Ibid., pp. 210-219.
27. Denikin, op. cit., p. 270. Denikin states that at this time the Armed Forces of South Russia was 50,500 against between 95,000 to 105,000 under the command of General Gittis.
28. Chamberlin, op. cit., p. 242.
29. Ibid., pp. 243-244.
30. Ibid., pp. 247-248.
31. Denikin, op. cit., pp. 276-277.
32. Chamberlin, op. cit., p. 249.
33. Ibid., p. 246.
34. Ibid., p. 248.
35. Ibid., p. 249.
36. E. Heifetz, The Slaughter of the Jews in the Ukraine in 1919, *passim*. The author blames the majority of the Jewish deaths on the White Army or upon partisan groups. This author sets the grand total of Jewish deaths at 30,500; although, he feels that actually there may have been as many as 120,000. In note 8 on page 240 of Chamberlin, op. cit., he states that Gusev-Orenburgsky, in his Book about Jewish Pogroms in Ukraina in 1919, p. 14., puts the total number of deaths as no fewer than 100,000. Certainly the scope of the Jewish pogroms suggest the chaotic conditions to the rear of Denikin.
37. Chamberlin, op. cit., pp. 249-266.
38. Ibid., pp. 277-282.

38. Ibid., pp. 277-282.
39. Denikin, op. cit., pp. 345-347.
40. Chamberlin, op. cit., 282-289.
41. Denikin, op. cit., pp. 356-360.
42. Ibid., p. 361.
43. Ibid., pp. 361-364.

Part V

Poland

Throughout the winter and spring of 1918 and 1919 hope for peace with Poland, whose independence had been recognized by the Kerensky government on March 30, 1917,¹ had been growing within Soviet circles. Several invitations had been given to the Poles and it was thought that Marshal Pilsudski, dictator of Poland, realizing Poland's grave economic and political situation, would agree to a treaty. Pilsudski, however, decided to attack Russia partially out of fear of a united Russia and partially in hopes of dividing Russia by the formation of a chain of new states: Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to the north with the Ukraina, Don Cossacks, Kuban Cossacks, and the Trans-Caucasian republics in the south. Therefore, on April 25, 1920, the Poles launched a sudden attack on the city of Zhitomir in the Western² Ukraina.

The Poles had an ally in this attack upon Soviet Russia, General Petlura and what was left of the Ukrainian Army, which had suffered at the hands of both Denikin's White Army and the Soviet Red Army. During the advance of the White Army's of Denikin the Ukrainian Army had been pushed towards the Rumanian border and had been even further restricted during the Red advance in the fall and winter of 1919-1920. The Western Ukrainian government under Doctor Petrushevych, rather than retreat into Poland - whom they felt was a far worse enemy than Soviet Russia - withdrew from the United Ukrainian government and crossed into Rumania and later went into exile in Vienna.³ Petlura,

however, felt that Polish aid was the last hope for a Ukrainian nation and on April 24, 1920 signed with Pilsudski a military alliance which probably renounced Eastern Galicia to the Poles.

There was little effective resistance to the dual advance of the Polish-Ukrainian offensive⁵ and on May 6 Kiev was captured. The Poles on May 14 turned back a Red Army counterattack under Tukhachevsky, the twenty-seven year old commander of the Soviet Western Front. Finally on June 5 Budenny's famous Cavalry Army of 17,000 men, after a 600 mile march from Elizavetgrad, broke the Polish front near Slovira, southwest of Kiev. On June 12 the Poles evacuated Kiev and were soon being driven back from their original line of attack. In the north from July 4 to 7 the Polish First Army was defeated in a series of battles and began to retreat, forcing the Polish Fourth Army back with it. The Reds captured Minsk on July 11 and Vilna on the 14th; with the capture of the latter the small anti-Polish Lithuanian Army intervened on the side of the Reds. The Poles had now been driven back to the Bug and Narew Rivers, the last natural boundaries which covered the approach to Warsaw from the east and northeast. On August 1 Brest-Litovsk was captured and the line of the Bug taken; at the same time the Red Cavalry Corps in the north cut off communication between Warsaw and the port of Danzig.⁶

The July victories of the Red Army presented the question to the Soviet Government of whether the Polish War was defensive or aggressive in its revolutionary sense. Lenin decided to choose the latter, partially because of the tendency to underestimate Polish capacity for resistance and partially because of the atmosphere in Moscow during the summer of 1919 where world revolutionary sentiment was overestimated.

Communist governments in Hungary and Bavaria were probably greatly responsible for this optimism. Therefore the Reds tended to ignore really Polish peace proposals and when they finally, on August 10, presented their peace terms it was obvious that the Soviet government of Russia was demanding a Soviet government in Poland. The Soviets had made strong efforts to make this a class war and had tried to win the confidence of the population. Certainly in the main the conduct of the Red Army was good with the exception of some of the Cossack troops. The Reds failed to gain the support of the Polish population, however, probably because of the long antagonism between Poland and Russia and partially because of the rise of Polish nationalism.

Pilsudski, working closely with his advisor the French General Weygand, decided not only to hold Warsaw, but to organize a counter-attack against the Red Army. Thus Pilsudski organized a shock force of five divisions fifty miles to the southwest of Warsaw; he hoped to strike the flank and rear of the Red troops that were moving on Warsaw from the north and east. This maneuver was made far simpler by the grouping of the Red troops which had left a gap defended by only 6600 men to the south of Warsaw between the Third, Fourth, and Fifteenth and Sixteenth Red Armies to the north of Warsaw and the Twelfth Red Army to the South. This gap was caused by the slowness of Egorov, commander of the Southwestern Front and Budenny, commander of the Cavalry Army, to break off action in the south and move northward for the drive on Warsaw. Thus with these Army groups to the south General Tukhachevsky in his

operations against Warsaw had only 60,000 men against Pilsudski's 90,000. The Red Army reached Radimin, which is less than 15 miles from Warsaw, and were attacking the suburbs of the Polish capital by August 13.⁸

Then on the 16th Pilsudski ordered his counter-attack through the gap held by the Mozir Group between the Soviet Twelfth Army and the Soviet Sixteenth Army. By the 17th the left wing of the latter Red Army had been smashed and 10,000 prisoners had been taken by the Polish Army. The Poles continued to advance rapidly and by August 19 had re-captured Brest-Litovsk and on the 23rd captured Bialystok and defeated a counter-attack by Budenny on August 27 at Zamoste. Throughout September and October the Poles continued to advance slowly, and the Reds, once their hopes of a Soviet Poland were gone, were not particularly interested in defending this area.⁹

Meanwhile Petlura in the northwestern corner of the Ukraina continued to carry on spasmodic warfare against the Soviets, but this Ukrainian group was no longer an effective fighting force. The entire Petlura Government collapsed upon the opening of the negotiations between Poland and Soviet Russia, where the Ukrainian Soviet Republic was present instead of the Petlura Government. The Ukrainian Army of 30,000 men was finally exiled to Poland and given the protection of the Pilsudski Government. So ended the battle for Ukrainian nationalism.¹⁰

Finally on October 12, 1920 the Treaty of Riga was signed, giving the Soviets about 60,000 square kilometers inhabited by 4,500,000

people which they had not controlled when the campaign opened in the
11
Spring. The reasons for the failure of the Red Army before Warsaw
were both strategic and political. At this time there were more than
5,000,000 men in the Red Army, yet at the most decisive operation of
the entire war there were only 60,000 men on the front. This campaign
also showed the folly of trying to force communism on an unwilling
12
country by using the Red Army outside of the Russian frontier.

NOTES FOR PART V

1. J.T. Shotwell and M.M. Laserson, Poland and Russia, 1919-1945, p. 17.
2. W.H. Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution 1917-1921 (Volume II), pp. 297-300.
3. J.S. Reshetar, The Ukrairdian Revolution, 1917-1920, p. 290.
4. Ibid., pp. 295-298.
5. A. Barmine, One Who Survived, passim.
6. Chamberlin, op. cit., pp. 304-311.
7. Ibid., pp. 306-310.
8. Ibid., pp. 310-312.
9. Ibid., pp. 313-314.
10. Reshetar, op. cit., pp. 312-313.
11. W.P. Coates and C.Z. Coates, Armed Intervention in Russia, 1918-22, p. 380.
12. Chamberlin, op. cit., pp. 312-316.

Part VI

The Crimea

During the spring and early summer of 1920 General Wrangel tried desperately to rebuild the White Armies within the Crimea. Although the British had threatened to withdraw their support, they hesitated for months during which the White Army received new supplies. At first Wrangel feared that he could do nothing but prepare to evacuate the area, but since the Reds launched no new attacks he continued to build up. The outbreak of the Polish-Russian War was of tremendous significance to Wrangel for from then until the fall of 1920 only second-rate troops were used on his front. Although the British military representative, General Percy, warned Wrangel that there would be no change in British policy because of the Polish War, the French General Mangin suggested that Wrangel co-ordinate his activities with those of the Poles and Ukrainians.¹

On May 8, 1920 the French promised Wrangel provisions and military supplies as well as protection of the Crimean coast and to evacuate the White Army if this became necessary. Great Britain on the other hand had notified Wrangel on June 3 that if he took the offensive the British Government would withdraw all of its support. Wrangel felt, however, that he must begin an offensive: first because the Crimea was a poor base of operations and could not even feed its own population, much less all the refugees, and secondly because too long a period of inactivity might lead to disintegration of the army. The Whites also felt that a successful offensive would aid in convincing the French

and British governments that the Wrangel movement should be regarded as a serious factor in Russian affairs.²

Wrangel's offensive began on June 6, 1920 when the Volunteer Army broke through the Isthmus of Perekop. This attack was under the command of Wrangel at the same time a second group under General Slashev spread out from a landing on the coast of the Sea of Azov and captured Melitopol. Within two weeks Wrangel had taken the capital of Northern Tauride Province as well as occupying the entire Northern Tauride. This doubled the area of territory in Wrangel's control, but owing to the size of his army he had to discontinue his advance.

Wrangel now decided to suspend operations in the Ukraina for the remainder of the summer and concentrated all his forces against the Don Cossack area. Wrangel signed an agreement with the remaining Cossack Atamans concerning the disposition of the Cossack territories and appointed the Kuban Cossack General Ulagai as commander of the main expeditionary force that was to land within the Cossack territories. On August 13, 1920 the first landing took place at Primorsko-Akhatarskaya on the Kuban coast of the Sea of Azov with about 7000 infantry. By August 18 Ulagai had moved over 15 miles inland from the coast and had occupied Timoshevskaya, about 35 miles north of the capital, Ekaterinodar. There was a possibility that if Ekaterinodar was captured Ulagai could have formed a union with a group of Whites called "The Army of the Regeneration of Russia" under a General Fostikov which was holding out in the Caucasian foothills south of the Kuban River. The Reds, who had 30,000 men despite the demands of the Polish front, attacked Ulagai's base at Ahktirsko-Primorskaya and forced him

to move south to Achuev, where the entire expedition was evacuated on September 7, 1920. There were two minor attempts to land on the Cossack area, one under a General Cherepov, near Novorossisk, and another attempted a landing opposite the city of Kerch on the Taman peninsula.³

General Wrangel now proposed to cross the Dnieper River and to push into the Western Ukraina in hopes of establishing contact with the Polish Armies advancing during the fall after the Battle of Warsaw. His forces made large gains to the east and north of the front in preparation for his prospective drive to the west. At one point this secondary advance came very close to Ekaterinoslav. Through the early part of October the Dnieper drive was successful, but on the 13th the main body of troops under General Dratzenko were driven back over the Dnieper with heavy losses. On the 24th news reached the White Army that Poland had signed a peace treaty with the Soviet Government, which meant that the Reds could now turn their entire army against the Crimean front.⁴

Wrangel decided to make his stand in the North Tauride rather than at the Isthmus of Perekop because a siege within the Crimea would soon expose the Army and the populace to hunger and withdrawal of aid from France, now Wrangel's only support. At this time the Whites had only 25,000 troops to face a Red Army of about 137,000. Besides the numerical advantage the Reds had far better morale, for the spirit of the White Army had declined within the last few months of the war. On

October 28, 1920 the Red Army attacked and Wrangel managed to hold out on the North Tauride Front for several days: his forces were finally smashed back into the Crimea. Here Wrangel began the dual plans for a defense of the Isthmus of Perekop and for the evacuation of all his troops as well as the civilian population.⁵

Perekop had three lines of defense: the direct defenses of Perekop, a second heavily fortified line known as the Turkish Wall and finally the Ushun line of defense at the southern end of the peninsula which utilized several small lakes. On November 7, 1920 the Reds attacked the first line of defense, which held out until that night, when the Whites retreated to the Turkish Wall; this in turn had to be abandoned on the night of November 8 owing to the failure of White Army counter-attacks and a fear that a Red force on a small peninsula on their flank might cut them off from the rear. The Ushun position was held for two days without definite result; then on the 11th both sides moved into positions which threatened to outflank the other. The issue was finally decided, however, when the Thirteenth Division of the Red Army landed on the northern coast and began to move into the Crimean plain threatening the White rear and their headquarters at Dzhankoi.⁶

During the first week of November Wrangel had made plans for the impending evacuation and throughout the month the evacuation was carried off very smoothly at several ports. All White Russian shipping as well as French warships and transports assisted in the evacuation, during which 145,693 people were removed from the Crimea. The majority of these troops and civilian refugees were taken to Constantinople.⁷

Wrangel and his small White Army could certainly never have defeated the Red Army of 5,000,000 men, but he did keep large numbers of Red Troops in the Ukraina and Kuban which greatly aided the Poles in their defense of Warsaw. ⁸ Along with the gradual defeat of the last White troops in South Russia the three Trans-Caucasian republics also fell to the Soviet Government. Azerbaijan on April 28, 1920 was taken over by the Red Army, Armenia fell during December 1920, and finally Georgia in February 1921. This was the end of all White movements in South Russia and a complete victory in the south for the Red Army - particularly in almost regaining the frontiers of the old Russian Empire. ⁹

NOTES FOR PART VI

1. W.H. Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution 1917-1921, Volume II,
pp. 318-320.
2. Ibid., pp. 320-322.
3. Ibid., pp. 322-327.
4. W.P. Coates and C.Z. Coates, Armed Intervention in Russia, 1918-1922,
p. 380.
5. Chamberlin, op. cit., pp. 328-329.
6. Ibid., pp. 330-332.
7. J.S. White, The Siberian Intervention, p. 408. There is supposed to
have been an agreement between France and Japan (published by the
Far Eastern Republic during the Washington Conference of 1921)
proposing to transport the forces of General Wrangel to the Far
East for another attack against Soviet Russia.
8. Chamberlin, op. cit., pp. 332-333.
9. Ibid., pp. 414-415.

Part VII

Siberia

From November 17, 1917 until the spring of 1918 the local Soviets that had been formed throughout Siberia controlled most of Central and Western Siberia. Except for the Chinese movement of troops into the China Eastern Railway Zone and an unsuccessful attack at Aigun on the Amur river by local Whites with the aid of Japanese and Chinese troops, the local Soviets also controlled all of Eastern Siberia without opposition during this period. The White forces in Siberia consisted of officers' organizations and an Allied-supported White Government under a General Horvath at Harbin. Thus an active anti-Red force was not to be found until the spring, when an outbreak of fighting occurred between the Czech Legion, moving east on the Trans-Siberian Railroad, and a local Red Soviet.

The Czech Legion was made up of citizens of a state which existed only in the minds of their nationalist leaders. From September 10 to 18, 1914, these leaders had met in Petrograd and organized a committee; this group was the directing force of the movement until June 1915 when Masaryk and Benes set up a central headquarters in Paris. Masaryk established diplomatic relations with the Czech groups in Russia. Meanwhile in Russia many Czechs who lived in Russia as well as Czechs who had been conscripted into the Austro-Hungarian Army and had been captured or had deserted were formed into all-Czech brigades. By the autumn of 1917 these were organized into an independent corps containing over 30,000 men.

During the revolutions, both March and November, the Czech Legion tried to remain neutral; although some of its troops did join Kornilov's movement, this neutrality was still respected by the Soviet Government. Then on January 25, 1918 an agreement between Masaryk and the French Government declaring that the Russian Czech Army was part of the autonomous Czechoslovak Army in France. This was done because Masaryk felt that, since Russia was apparently out of the war, the best use of the Czech Legion could be made on the Western Front. Here they would be able to prove that Czechoslovakia had a right to independence. The plan put into effect was to move the troops across Russia on the Trans-Siberian Railroad to Vladivostok and then to France. On March 26, 1918 an agreement was signed between the Czechs and the Soviet government which proposed the terms on which the Czechs would move through Russia.

Tension between the local Soviets and the Czechs increased as they moved eastward - there is little doubt that both parties evaded the agreement of March 26. Then the Supreme War Council issued an order suggesting that all troops west of Omsk use Archangel as a port of embarkation; however, the Czechs, fearing that this plan was a Soviet trick, decided to continue to the east. Thus when there was an outbreak of fighting at the Cheliabinsk station on May 14 the results were quick and widespread. Trotsky on May 25 ordered all the local Soviets to disarm all Czechs and to halt their trains. The Soviets were far too weak, however, and in almost all cases the fighting was won by the Czechs. One town after another fell to them: Penza on the 28th, Tomsk on the 31st, Omsk on June 7 and Samara on the 8th. Aid in these skirmishes

was given by the 6000 anti-Red troops within Siberia; these troops were useless alone, but, with the support of the Czechs, were in many places able to defeat the local Reds. The Czechs were divided into six parts of which about 20,000 of the most westward of them did most of the early fighting.⁷ These forces, after securing the towns of western and central Siberia, moved eastward to form a junction with the Czechs⁸ moving west from Vladivostok.

It was at this point that the Allied forces saw their opportunity to intervene in Siberian affairs.⁹ The French first ordered the Czechs to remain where they were on June 20. Then in July 1918 the most westward of the Czechs declared themselves the vanguard of a new Eastern Front. The Czechs continued to solidify their control of Siberia: Ufa was taken on July 4 and by the end of August the last of the Soviet towns in eastern Siberia were taken.¹⁰

Since November of 1917 the question of intervention in Siberia had been proposed by the Allied powers; however, except for a landing by the Japanese on April 6, 1918, there had been no serious attempt. The Czech capture of the Trans-Siberian Railroad and most of Siberia made the venture not only feasible, but necessary for the protection of the Czechs as well as a block to possible Soviet expansion (at this time the Allies were still under the assumption that the Soviet Government was pro-German.) Each of the separate powers apparently had different reasons for sending its troops to Siberia. In fact it was not until after the Czechs had actually formed a front on the Volga, July 1918, that America was willing to lend its support. Until that time England and France, who were too afraid of public opinion to attempt

Siberian intervention without American support, had prevented a Japanese occupation for both political and moral reasons. The Japanese had purely nationalistic-economic motives in mind and hoped to control Eastern Siberia through their occupation of this area.¹¹ The French and British were primarily interested in weakening the Soviet Government and in protecting their economic investments in the Siberian area. The Americans were there to attempt to keep the balance of power in the Pacific area by equalizing the influence of the Japanese.¹² All the powers claimed to be not only rescuing the Czechs, preventing the German and Austrian prisoners from being returned, but also re-establishing the Eastern Front against the Central Powers.¹³

On August 3, 1918 the landing at Vladivostok by British and Japanese troops took place without incident. The American troops followed on August 15 and 16.¹⁴ Except for the Japanese the majority of Allied aid was passive or consisted mainly of supplying the White Armies. One of the major contributions to the White cause was the Inter-Allied Railway Committee, which was formed on January 9, 1919. This group, which was active until 1922, attempted to improve the conditions on the Siberian Railroads, which were becoming increasingly chaotic by 1919. The Allies guarded different sections (there was often friction between the troops in these sections) and contributed both funds and technical assistance. Although the railroad never ran smoothly the Commission managed to keep it in operation without serious losses until the fall of Kolchak in January 1920.¹⁵

With the fall of the local Soviets and the dominance of the Allies and Czechs, there was temporarily a vacuum in both local and all-Siberian governments. Two separate groups arose in an effort to fill this need: The West Siberian Commissariat and the Government of the Committee of Members of the Constituent Assembly in Samara. The West Siberian Commissariat announced its existence on June 1, after the Czech victories, and was socialistic in nature. This government stood for an autonomous Siberia and a meeting of an All-Russian Constituent Assembly. The Government began slowly shifting to the right and on July 4 the Siberian Government located at Omsk proclaimed itself sole authority in Siberia. Meanwhile the Government in Samara remained under the influence of Socialist Revolutionary leaders, who had been members of the Constituent Assembly that had been closed by the Soviet Government.

This Constituent Assembly Government formed a small army and began increasing the size of its territory: Ufa was captured on July 4, Volsk on the 21st and on August 6 Kazan was taken. This advance by the Samara government, along with the activities of the Czechs, set up a front running from Perm, in the Northern Urals, to Orenburg. There were about 65,000 Reds against 50,000 Czechs and anti-Reds. By August the Reds had established the front and the advance of the Samara troops was halted.

On September 8 the local White governments, under pressure from the Czechs, who were anxious to have an official White government and Army to relieve them at the front, met at Ufa. There were representatives from the Constituent Assembly regime at Samara, the Siberian

Government at Omsk, and a government from Ekaterinburg, which was pro-Omsk rather than socialist in character. The government formed by these groups was to be a Directory of five persons who were to be responsible to the Constituent Assembly. The men of this Directory were a compromise between the right and left. The new government, which represented the hopes of the liberals, was extremely weak, lacking administrative apparatus, funds, or a party newspaper. Located as it was in Omsk, which was filled with rightist officers, the real power in Siberia gradually shifted to the right and soon the Government became a mere shadow of authority.

Throughout the fall the Czechs became increasingly passive in their support of the White cause; therefore, the Red Army was able to advance with increasing ease. On September 10, during the formation of the Directory, Kazan fell to the Red 5th Army; this was in reality the end of the power of any democratic government in Siberia. The Red Army continued to advance through the next three months, capturing Samara on October 8, 1918. Only around Ekaterinburg were the Whites able to hold their ground as the Reds took Ufa and Sterlitamak during the last days of November and cleared the Volga area of White forces.

It was now obvious to most observers that the Directory, which had taken up residence at Omsk on October 9, 1918, was to be short-lived. Within a few weeks the town was filled with plots, most of them resulting from the bitterness of the officer-class and monarchists

towards the socialist within the government. Not only the reactionary elements among the Russians opposed the government, but also all the Allied Missions, particularly General Knox, head of the British mission. Only the Czechs supported the Directory. Finally on the night of November 17, 1918 the long expected coup took place. The two most radical socialists were arrested and the remainder of the ministers met the next day to decide on some sort of government. The majority (only one man opposed the measure) proposed a dictatorship. ²¹ The man this group chose was Admiral Kolchak, a former polar-navigator and a man with satisfactory conservative beliefs. He had arrived in Siberia with the aid of the British and had become War Minister in the Directory Government, although his only formal army experience had been the building of fortifications during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Kolchak thus became the Supreme Ruler and Commander-in-Chief of all the land and naval forces of Russia. Apparently the coup had been arranged by members of the Cadet party and several reactionary Cossack Army units; they appeared to have had the tacit approval of the French and certainly ²² the British Military Mission. The coup was opposed only by the Czechs, who owing to their peculiar position could not take an active part. There were also statements of protest from various democratic and socialistic organizations. By the end of 1918 there was no longer any effective resistance to Kolchak's government. Horvath, a local White leader, the Orenburg local government, a local Ural Government, and Dutiv, a free Ataman, all offered their support; only the Japanese supported Semenov and Kalmykov did not immediately give up their ²³ claims to authority.

Admiral Kolchak, who was certainly honest and reasonably capable, made several mistakes during the early days of his rule that almost predicted his end. He mercilessly crushed several minor revolts; he allowed his secret police and partisan bands to commit the worst sort of excesses with the local populace; he appointed poorly qualified men to his staff (which finally reached the incredible size of 6000 men); mainly, however, he failed to win the confidence of the people of Siberia. On the front during the latter part of December the northern wing of the White Army captured Perm, but in the south the Red Army continued to advance occupying Orenburg and approaching the passes of the Ural Mountains, where the front became stabilized until Spring. ²⁴

Kolchak decided to make his main thrust in the north in the dual hope of reaching Moscow, possibly before Denikin, and joining the Allied forces in North Russia. Therefore in March the White advance began for Kolchak, despite his methods, had been quite successful in raising an army, which at one time numbered 800,000 although not anywhere near this number were ever on the front. Probably at this time 40,000 Whites opposed the Red Fifth Army of only 11,000. On March 13, 1919 Ufa was taken and by April the towns of Kazan and Samara were threatened by the Whites. ²⁵ The White Army, however, was not being supplied properly owing to the chaos on the Siberian Railroad and the obvious graft of the Kolchak government. Thus when the Red Army counter-attacked, the White front crumbled quickly and throughout May continued its retreat. On June 9 the Red Army captured Ufa, the starting point of the offensive, and on July 1 Perm was retaken. ²⁶

At this point a difference of opinion arose in Soviet circles as to how to pursue the course of the war. Trotsky proposed holding the line of the Belaya and moving against Denikin, while Lenin wanted Kolchak crushed first so that the Red Army could move against the Southern Front. Kolchak, seeing the signs of decline of his army, replaced several of its leaders, in particular Czech General Gaida, and placed in command General Diederichs. Despite Diederichs' advice, Lebedev, his Chief-of-Staff, chose to halt the new Soviet attack, for Lenin's policy had prevailed, by a complicated maneuver at Cheliavinsk. The resulting battle took place during the last days of July and the first week in August - the results were final and ended in a rout for the White Army which lost over 15,000 prisoners. By this time the total Kolchak Army numbered only 50,000 and was in a general retreat towards Omsk. Only once did the White Army again attack and that was a half-hearted counter-attack before the Tobol River. By mid-October the Red Army was advancing towards Omsk with almost no opposition, which they entered on November 14. The Reds took at the capture of Omsk eleven generals, 1000 other officers, and 39,000 soldiers as well as immense amounts of military supplies. This victory by the Reds can be considered the end of the Kolchak government.

Kolchak himself retreated along the Trans-Siberian Railroad and then on January 4 abdicated in favor of General Denikin and made Semenov, a Japanese supported partisan, commander of all White Russian forces east of Lake Baikal. On January 15 the Czech forces with whom Kolchak had been moving east handed him over to the local government in Irkutsk, which had revolted against him on December 24. Apparently

he was the price for free transit on the railroad; although, of course, the Czechs were not actually responsible for the Admiral. Yet when they withdrew their protection they were criticized by many White Russians. As a matter of fact not even Kolchak's own staff would attempt to protect him. He was questioned by the local government and on February 7 was shot.³⁰

With the collapse of the Kolchak forces in the fall of 1919 the Allied Missions decided to withdraw; only the Japanese wanted to remain. The Allies had in June 1919 received an answer to a group of questions concerning Kolchak's future governmental plans, after which they agreed to continue support, but decided to withhold recognition.³¹ After the defeats of the summer of 1919 it became obvious that the Kolchak regime was collapsing and the Allies must reconsider their Far Eastern policy. The British hoped for local buffer states in Eastern Siberia, although they began to withdraw troops on November 1; the Japanese continued to dominate this area. By this time the United States was anxious to withdraw all its troops and Graves received orders to do so on December 29, 1919. This decision by the United States Government resulted in the general Allied determination to end the intervention. Even Japan on February 27, 1920 announced plans for evacuation.³² In effect the Allies admitted that their attempt to aid the White Armies had been a failure for now in Eastern Siberia only 20,000 of Kolchak's Army was left. The last Americans left Siberia on April 1 and inter-Allied intervention was at an end. The Japanese on March 31, 1920 announced their intention of remaining in Siberia and, taking advantage of an anti-Japanese incident on April 4 and 5, re-established military control in the Maritime Province.³³

In the absence of the Omsk dictatorship four governments sprang up to govern Eastern Siberia. The first was the Semyenov Government at Chita, which was supported by the Japanese. The second was a government opposed to Semyenov, which eventually in October 1920 defeated him - the Verkhne-Udinsk Government. This latter group later became a buffer state between Russia and Japan and controlled most of Eastern Siberia. After Kolchak's resignation a local group took over control of Vladivostok under A. Medvedev. Finally a pro-Soviet government was formed by several bands at Khabarovsk.

During the spring of 1920 the regime at Verkhne-Udinsk became known as the Far Eastern Republic; the western boundary of this government was the Soviet-controlled territory around the Selenga River and Lake Baikal, the eastern boundary was restricted by the Japanese occupation of the Maritime province. This government, under a Siberian liberal named Krasnoshchekov, was a non-communist buffer state between the part of Siberia under the Soviet Government and the Japanese occupation zone. The government hoped to become permanent and sought recognition from the major powers and demanded the removal of Japanese troops. This government defeated an attack by another White government led by Merkulov and supported by the Japanese. The battle lasted during January and February of 1921 and was decided in favor of the Far Eastern Republic on February 12. The Republic's troops forced the Whites back to the area of the Maritime Province occupied by Japan. Thus the military situation remained stabilized until that fall, when, on November 14, 1922, Japanese troops evacuated the Maritime Province and the Far Eastern Republic was then absorbed immediately by the Russian Soviet Republic.

All that remained of the Japanese occupation was their control of North Sakhalin Island, which was finally returned to the Soviet government on January 20, 1925.³⁸ This was the last official step of both Allied intervention and the White movements against the Soviet Government. Between 1921 and 1925 active resistance to the Soviets in Siberia was restricted to partisan movements. General Semyenov had been driven from Chita in October 1920, when Japanese support was withdrawn,³⁹ by forces of the Far Eastern Republic. His last action against the Soviets was an unsuccessful raid from Manchuria. The Red Army had on August 4, 1922 incorporated Bokhara, an old province in Central Asia, into the Soviet Union after a year of desultory fighting. Early in 1920 the Khanate of Khiva, another Central Asian province, had been turned into a People's Republic and from this base all of south-central Russian Asia was soon brought under Soviet rule - the last being Bokhara.⁴⁰ Another White leader in Asia was Baron Ungern-Sternberg who managed to control Outer Mongolia for several months. He started his campaign during the fall of 1920 and by February 2, 1921 he had captured Urga. He was opposed in Mongolia by a Provisional Mongol People's Government who invited the Red Army to aid them. By July 1921 Ungern-Sternberg's forces were defeated; he was captured and shot on September 15, 1921.⁴¹ Thus the end came to all these last White attempts against Soviet forces, and with the death of Ungern-Sternberg, the end of White Armies, and with the return of North Sakhalin, the end of intervention. Russia was again "Great, United, Undivided," but not exactly in the way hoped for by Denikin, Kolchak, and Yudenich.

NOTES FOR PART VII

1. J. S. White, The Siberian Intervention, pp. 80-81.
2. H. Baerlein, The March of the Seventy Thousand, pp. 23.
3. Ibid., pp. 40-41.
4. W. H. Chamberlin, The Russian Revolution, 1917-1923 (Volume II), p. 3.
5. W.P. Coates and C.Z. Coates, Armed Intervention in Russia, 1918-1922, p. 106.
6. White, op. cit., p. 246.
7. White, op. cit., pp. 252-253. These troops were divided on May 25 as follows: 8000 under Cecek near Penza, at Cheliabinsk 8000 under General Voitsekhovsky, in Central Siberia 4500 under General Gaida, at Vladivostok between 12,000 and 14,000 under General Dietrichs.
8. Chamberlin, op. cit., pp. 2-7.
9. White, op. cit., p. 249.
10. Chamberlin, op. cit., p. 8.
11. White, op. cit., pp. 194-195.
12. W. Graves, American Siberian Adventure 1918-1920, pp. 4-8. The American War Department orders to Graves in the form of an Aide Memoire dated July 17, 1918, written by the Department of State, determined his policy in Siberia. It said that the only legitimate object for which American troops could be employed was to guard military stores which may be subsequently needed by Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in organization of their own self-defense.
13. Chamberlin, op. cit., pp. 159-160.
14. Coates and Coates, op. cit., p. 207. Allied troops continued to increase in Siberia and on March 26, 1919 M. Pinchon, Minister of Foreign Affairs in France gave the following totals:

14.	Czechs	- 55,000	British	- 1,600
	Poles	- 12,000	French	- 760
	Serbs	- 4,000	Japanese	- 28,000
	Rumanians	- 4,000	Americans	- 7,500
	Italians	- 2,000	Canadians	- 4,000

These totals are probably accurate except for the Japanese total since it is known that the Japanese had nearly 70,000 troops in Siberia at one time.

15. White, op. cit., pp. 124-160.
16. Chamberlin, op. cit., pp. 12-15.
17. Ibid., pp. 15-16.
18. Ibid., pp. 18-23. White, op. cit., pp. 110-111.
19. Chamberlin, op. cit., p. 120.
20. E. Varneck and H.H. Fisher, The Testimony of Kolchak and Other Siberian Materials, p. 168.
21. Chamberlin, op. cit., pp. 177-178.
22. Varneck and Fisher, op. cit., pp. 170, 186-187.
23. Ibid., pp. 186-187.
24. Chamberlin, op. cit., pp. 185-188.
25. Ibid., p. 189.
26. Coates and Coates, op. cit., p. 220.
27. Ibid., p. 229. Some of the supplies captured by the Red Army included 2000 machine guns, 30,000 uniforms, 75 locomotives, 3300 loaded railroad cars, and 4,000, 000 rounds of ammunition. Much of this material had been supplied by the British; in fact, at one time General Knox, senior British officer in Siberia, received a telegram from the Red Army thanking him for the huge amounts of equipment that had been captured and were being used by the Red Army.
28. Chamberlin, op. cit., pp. 190-200.

29. Coates and Coates, op. cit., p. 236.
30. Varneck and Fisher, op. cit., pp. 215-216.
31. W.S. Churchill, The Aftermath (World Crisis 1918-1928), p. 247.

The author states that the total amount carried or supplied through British vessels in the year 1919 amounted to nearly 100,000 tons of arms, ammunition, equipment and clothing.

32. White, op. cit., p. 259.
33. Ibid., p. 360.
34. Ibid., pp. 121-123.
35. Ibid., p. 389. The Japanese supplied this movement with 500,000 yen, 12,000 rifles, 6 pieces of artillery, 50 machine guns, and 350,000 cartridges.
36. Ibid., pp. 389-391.
37. Ibid., pp. 367-371.
38. Ibid., p. 411.
39. Ibid., pp. 365-366.
40. Chamberlin, op. cit., pp. 423-425.
41. White, op. cit., pp. 378-381.

Part VIII

Conclusion

With the return of North Sakhalin to Soviet Russia in 1925 the last official act of the Civil War had taken place and except for Poland and the Baltic States the boundaries of Tsarist Russia had been reached. This had been a war of classes and theories and, as far as the military campaigns were concerned, the fighting had been over for three years; yet the real battles of the war were seldom those of the Army. The application, or lack of it, of the socialistic theories of Marx by V.I. Lenin, who was the driving force of the Revolution, was what finally won the war for the Soviets. Certainly the weakness of the Whites both strategically and from a leak of a constant over-all political policy other than being anti-Bolshevik had contributed greatly to the ultimate Soviet victory.

With the collapse of military opposition from the White Armies the Soviets were left with the domestic problems of Russia, a country devastated by a decade of war, terror and famine. Lenin called a halt to the theories of militant communism and began a period of compromise in order to rebuild Russia. At Genoa in 1922 Soviet Russia approached the capitalist countries for loans and gradually concluded a series of trade treaties with their late enemies. Within the boundaries of Russia some attempt had to be made to create order out of chaos. It was not until the collectivization of the peasant and the beginning of the first five year plan during the late twenties that the Soviets began a communist attempt at rebuilding Russia. Until that time there was a period

of compromise with capitalism. Thus the Reds who had won the Civil War under the banner of World Revolution and theoretical communism found themselves faced with the possibility of having to give up their theory or else the one foot-hold left to Socialism would collapse. For this was the result of the Civil War for the Soviet Government - socialism in one country rather than world socialism.

The result of the war for those men who had fought in the White Armies was lasting exile. The conservative churchmen migrated to the new Yugoslavia, the scholars to Czechoslovakia, and the politicians to Germany and France. Those who were luckiest found a home in the New World. The fate of those Whites who drifted into Manchuria and China was poverty and degeneration. Today all over the world each major city has its White Russian colony - for instance at one time many of the taxi-cab drivers in Paris were Russians. At least these men and women escaped the fate of most of their class, for in Soviet Russia the rich, the intellectuals, and any politically suspect groups were wiped out by wholesale lots. The Tsar and his family were murdered in a cellar in Ekaterinburg in 1918 and by 1922 the vast majority of the men who had formerly held positions of importance, monarchist or socialist, were imprisoned, exiled, or shot. For those in opposition to the new Socialist State the best they could expect was to live out their lives in some not unfriendly part of the world.

Certainly Allied intervention within Russia had been a dismal failure; no Allied supported White movement had lasted and only the Polish War had even been partially successful. Yet the Allies

could claim that by occupying the Soviets within Russia during the hectic post-war days they prevented a spread of communism to the receptive areas of Eastern and Central Europe. This indeed was all that they could claim - that the frontier of Bolshevism was further to the east than it might have been. This was the reward the Allies received for the immense amounts of money and the lives they had spent during their anti-Soviet campaigns.

Throughout the chaos of war and the turmoil of life in Russia during the Civil War the visionaries of the party had kept their goals clear and based their plans on their ultimate victory. Now that this military victory had arrived the Soviets began the task of rebuilding Russia. Lenin had lived only long enough to see the almost believable vision of world socialism; now lesser men were going to have to create socialism in one country. Within ten years the Civil War was going to become the source of myths and the battle-ground of the saints of economic determinism. For this was the birth through fire of the new Russian state and after just missing a miscarriage the young state grew crookedly as well as quickly into a Russian Empire that would have pleased the Tsars.

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