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Authenticity, Faith, and Love

I. Introduction:

“The term ‘religion’ I am using in its broadest sense, meaning thereby self-realization or knowledge of self”¹

Gandhi’s simple view of the word ‘religion’ reveals an important insight about its meaning: religion in its broadest sense means authenticity. To illuminate such conception, this thesis will argue that Kierkegaard’s analysis about faith is grounded on Heidegger’s investigation on authenticity. With this, I mean that *faith is a mode of authenticity*. Nonetheless, this thesis is *not* the marriage certificate of Kierkegaard’s theology and Heidegger’s ontology. The motto “Better well hung than ill wed”(PF 2)² shall always be kept in mind. This thesis plans to establish a basis for lucid dialogue between these two philosophers. A starting point for such basis has already been laid down by Gandhi. This thesis will appropriate it by developing Kierkegaard’s main philosophical and religious arguments and establishing its particular relation to Heidegger’s ontological investigations.

Before proposing a point of departure, we must first reveal the absolute dialectical tension between Heidegger’s ontology and Kierkegaard’s theology. Heidegger is interested in the *primordial ontologico-existential* question of Being (what is the meaning of Being?), whereas Kierkegaard is primarily concerned with the individual problem of

¹ GANDHI, Mohandas The story of my experiments with Truth p.31

² PF- KIERKEGAARD, Søren Philosophical Fragments

existence (what is the meaning of *human* existence?). For Heidegger the problem of existence cannot be understood without previous ontological clarity; thus, he notes: “In the nineteenth century, Søren Kierkegaard explicitly seized upon the problem of existence as a [personal] problem, and thought it through in a penetrating fashion. But the existential problematic was so alien to him that, as regards his ontology, he remained completely dominated by Hegel and by ancient philosophy as Hegel saw it”(BT 235)³. What does Heidegger mean by affirming that the existential problematic is *alien* to Kierkegaard? If he means that it does not concern faith, then Kierkegaard holds that faith always remains alien to such an existential problematic. However, Heidegger seems to suggest that it is foreign to Kierkegaard’s thinking, but this is not so. Kierkegaard’s theology is ontologically very responsive to the problem of existence. For Kierkegaard, this problem is that of the *relation* of the individual to his *own* self: “every man is a spiritual being, for whom the truth consists in nothing else than the self-activity of personal appropriation”(CUP 217)⁴. It is a problem about passion, commitment, and inwardness. Ontological understanding intensifies the problem but only goes so far. This absolute tension between the two authors is a bridge and a barrier. It is a barrier in so far as it maintains that Kierkegaard’s theology has no regard for ontology. This thesis will argue extensively against this view. It is a bridge, because Heidegger argues that the problem of existence is better understood within ontology, and Kierkegaard recognizes such understanding, but holds that this problem remains ultimately alien to *any* understanding. Thus, this tension is not an opposition but a relation between inwardness and ontology, and accordingly, between faith and authenticity.

³ BT - HEIDEGGER, Martin Being and Time, page numbers come from original version

⁴ CUP - KIERKEGAARD, Søren Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments

The dialectical tension between Heidegger and Kierkegaard is significant in studying the relation between philosophy and faith. For Heidegger, philosophy is “the science of [B]eing, the ontological science”(P 41)⁵, whereas “*theology is a positive science, and as such, therefore, is absolutely different from philosophy*”(P 41), theology is the science of faith. By science he understands: “the founding disclosure, for the sheer sake of disclosure, of a self-contained region of beings, or [B]eing”(P 41). Since theology has a specific disclosed being (faith) as its *positum*, it is a positive science. A science that discloses a specific type of entity he calls *ontic*. On the other hand, ontology “demands a fundamental shift of view: from beings to [B]eing”(P 41). We may wonder ontically *what* things are and develop specific sciences, or we may wonder ontologically *that* things are and address, as with Aristotle, *alatheia* (disclosure) itself. For Heidegger the relationship between theology and philosophy is that “*Philosophy is the possible, formally indicative ontological corrective of the ontic and, in particular, of the pre-Christian content of the basic theological concepts*”(P 53). This means philosophy may uncover the primary ontological foundations of the specific religious concepts, nevertheless, faith and other religious concepts extend beyond such philosophical basis. Faith founds and sustains itself in its own manner; nonetheless, the pre-religious ontic state that is modified by faith is ontologically grounded. Thus, even though the problem of existence has ontological foundations, it can be ontically modified so that it ceases to be solely ontological.

For Kierkegaard the relationship between faith and philosophy is more difficult to establish than for Heidegger. Kierkegaard wrote many of his philosophical works under pseudonyms using a witty and ironic tone. Several of these works deal with aesthetics and ethics rather than religion and faith. Nonetheless, the primary purpose of all his works is

⁵ P - HEIDEGGER, Martin Pathmarks p. 41

to propose the supremacy of the religious faith over the ethical and aesthetic lives. This supremacy is due to the intensity and sincerity of faith with respect to our *necessary* response to the problem of existence. Kierkegaard acknowledges *ontologically* that we must deliver our existence to our becoming self: “[The self as that] relation which relates itself to its own self (that is to say, a self) must either have constituted itself or have been constituted by another”(SD 18)⁶. However, he argues that *ontically* one requires infinite passion in deciding to be one self in confronting one’s whole existence. Faith as infinite passion absolutely constitutes this relation, whereas philosophy as mere intellectual speculation can never constitute this appropriation process: “Existence is not thoughtless, but in existence thought is an alien medium”(CUP 287). For Kierkegaard, reflection alone prevents any actual decision: “for the individual... no task is more difficult than to escape from the temptations of reflection, simply because... the result of one clever discovery may give the whole question a new turn, because at any moment reflection is capable of explaining everything quite differently and allowing one some way of escape; because at the last moment of reflective decision reflection is capable of changing everything”(PA 42)⁷. Hence, ontological understanding is important insofar it intensifies and clarifies the *foundations* of the problem of existence, but it is not a proper response. A passionate real deed is always necessary given the ontic nature of the problem.

Even though the two philosophers agree in the absolute difference between philosophy and faith, each thinker characterizes their relationship differently. Heidegger concludes that the ontological subject matter of philosophy is absolutely different from the ontic subject matter of any other science. Thus, philosophy is absolutely different

⁶ SD - KIERKEGAARD, Søren The sickness unto death

⁷ PA - KIERKEGAARD, Søren The present age

from faith, and in particular, Kierkegaard remains alien to ontology. Kierkegaard argues that the problem of existence is absolutely different from any other problem, in that by existing we *must* always act on it. Philosophy can recognize this issue, but it cannot *decide* on it, whereas faith has the necessary passion to entirely appropriate this problem. This dialectic tension relates Kierkegaard's analysis of faith to Heidegger's ontology. I will accentuate this tension as a relation while contending that theology is alien to ontology. Consequently, I will connect four main aspects of Kierkegaard's theology to its corresponding elements in Heidegger's ontology. The analysis of faith with respect to authenticity will be carried out in four chapters divided in two parallel movements: ontically from the vanity to faith, and ontologically from falling to authenticity:

1. **Vanity as a mode of falling**, on emptiness and presence.
2. **Despair as a mode of Anxiety**, on facing presence and absence.
3. **Faith as a mode of authenticity**, on care and Love.

The description of each chapter makes reference to the connection between some ontic aspect of Kierkegaard's theology with respect to its correspondent part in ontology. Thus, each section will ascertain this connection while explaining its role in the dialectal tension between both philosophers. Once the tension has been illuminated and the alienating barrier dispersed, the final chapter will put these pieces together and interpret faith as Love, which in turn will be a mode of authentic care.

II. Vanity as a mode of falling

The age of making distinctions is past. It has been vanquished by the system. In our day, whoever loves to make distinctions is regarded as an eccentric whose soul clings to something that has long since vanished. Be that as it may, yet Socrates still is what he was, the simple wise man, because of the peculiar distinction that he expressed both in words and in life, something that the eccentric Hanmann first reiterated with great admiration two thousand years later: "For Socrates was great in 'that he distinguished between what he understood and what he did not understand.'"⁸

Our age is one of indifference. We have destroyed every distinction to the point where everything feels the same. Why is this so? How is it that the best man is just as good as the worst? How is it that we all are waiting for something different? Why are we called to faith? Faith is a *mode* of authenticity based on the ontological possibility to modify our everyday indifferent self, so that we distinguish ourselves as *our* self. Accordingly, we must recognize this everyday self in order to understand how it hinders differentiation. For Heidegger, our self is proximally and for the most part 'they'-self, that is we are continually *falling* out of ourselves into the indefinite 'they' (das Man). For Kierkegaard, the common everyday individual identifies himself with the public, so that he gets continually lost in the public's vanity. This chapter will argue that the public is a mode of the 'they', and that vanity is an everyday mode of falling. Thus, it will support Kierkegaard's ontological awareness with respect to the problem of existence, and in particular, with respect to the inauthentic pre-religious state, which gets modified by religion. It will also clarify the dialectical tension between ontological self-understanding and the authentic decision to be oneself.

⁸ CA - KIERKEGAARD, Søren The Concept of Anxiety

To understand the 'who' of the everyday self we must interpret ontologically what human beings are. Heidegger calls the human being Dasein (Being-there). Dasein is that entity, which "in its very Being, that Being is an *issue* for it... this implies that Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship towards that Being - a relationship which itself is one of Being. And this means further that there is some way in which Dasein understands itself in its Being, and that to some degree it does so explicitly. It is peculiar to this entity that with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed to it... Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it *is* ontological"(BT 12). In other words, man is that entity that concerns itself with its own Being. Man consciously understands himself as Being to some extent. Thus, man discovers himself with and through his Being, which means man is unique in that he *is* ontological: he *is* in such a way that he understands Being. Furthermore, Dasein is *thrown* into the world. This means Dasein dwells in his own Being in the world. Dasein is always already in some state-of-mind with which he discloses the world, and he *is* in language with which he understands the world. Any legitimate analysis of the individual and religion must be grounded on Dasein as Being-in-the-world.

Heidegger explains: "Proximally and for the most part Dasein is fascinated with its world. Dasein is thus absorbed in the world"(BT 113). Hence, Dasein tends to understand himself in terms of the world. Dasein usually goes about his dealings and *circumspect* the world in its familiar *readiness-to-hand*. For example, when I use a pen, I do not immediately consider it an object, instead I write with it in its readiness-to-hand. Dasein primordially encounters things in the world as *ready-to-hand* equipment, which he uses in his familiarity with them. We encounter and circumspect things in our familiar interaction with the world. Based on this primordial interaction, we may regard things as

present-at-hand, i.e. *res extensa*. The world is also constituted by other people, so that Dasein *is-with* Others. Thus, Dasein's world is codetermined by Being-with-one-another, and because of his worldly absorption, he is constantly concerned with the relation he holds to the Others, his *distantiality* to them. In his constant concern-for distantiality, Dasein "stands in *subjection* to the Others [and he himself] is not; [his] Being has being taken away by the Others"(BT 127). Thus, man understands himself through Others, and he *is* not himself. Moreover, the Others are not definite men, instead they are an everyday 'they' [das Man] that is always there as an average, a "they" that neither person nor a group of people really is, but that everyone holds some average distantiality to. Therefore, the 'who' of everyday Dasein is the 'they'. The 'they' is the inauthentic mode of self that is always there for Dasein. It never ceases to exist, but our relation to it can be modified in authenticity.

In order to illustrate the public as a mode of the 'they', we must first investigate its driving force in what Heidegger calls 'levelling down': "the 'they' maintains itself... in the averageness of that which belongs to it... In this averageness with which it prescribes what can and may be ventured, it keeps watch over everything exceptional... This care of averageness reveals in turn an essential tendency of Dasein which we call the "levelling down" of all possibilities of Being"(BT 127). Accordingly, levelling down levels the possibilities of the individual to the average so that every distantiality gets reduced to a minimum. In this respect, Kierkegaard explains: "*ressentiment* not only defends itself against all existing forms of distinction but against that which is still to come. [In a reflective and passionless age,] the *ressentiment* which is *establishing itself* is the process of levelling... [This process] hinders and stifles all action; it levels. Levelling

is a silent, mathematical, and abstract occupation which shuns upheavals... the levelling process is the victory of abstraction over the individual”(PA 51-52). In a passionless age, resentment and envy due to public distinctions do not find a cathartic outlet. Thus, resentment strives to level such distinctions all together by making them look small and insignificant to everyone. Levelling destroys every prominent distinction by hindering and obscuring every action and upheaval, so that everything looks abstractly ordinary and common. Distantiality is the ontological basis of these distinctions, and resentment reveals our constant concern-for this distantiality. Hence, levelling is ontologically rooted on our average *distantiality* to the ‘they’. What we consider average depends on the specific characteristics of the era. In a passionless and reflective age, “levelling down” does not have the necessary passion to overcome any significant distinction. Without this passion, the ‘they’ that determines the leveling process is particularly obtuse and abstract. This ‘they’ is what Kierkegaard calls the public.

With respect to the ontology of the public, Heidegger explains: “Publicness proximally controls every way in which the world and Dasein get interpreted, and it is always right... because it is insensitive to every difference of level and of genuineness and thus never gets to the ‘heart of the matter’”(BT 127). Through publicness Dasein gets levelled down so that he interprets everything as ‘they’ do, he enjoys himself as ‘they’ do, and he essentially *is* as ‘they’ are. Publicness obscures and covers up *everything* as familiar, accessible and correct to *everyone*, so that Dasein in his everydayness can live *disburdened* from having to be answerable for his inauthentic “decisions”. Therefore, everyone is inauthentically the ‘they’, and no one is authentically himself, so that the “who” of everyday Dasein is really a “nobody” to whom everyone has submitted.

Similarly, Kierkegaard explains: "In order that everything should be reduced to the same level, it is first of all necessary to procure a phantom, its spirit, a monstrous abstraction, an all embracing something which is nothing, a mirage – and that phantom is *the public*"(PA 59). The public is neither a single individual nor a group of them, yet it embraces 'everyone' in their averageness. Since the public expresses an abstract and average consensus, "to adopt the same opinion as the public is a deceptive consolation... [Whilst] no majority has ever been so certain of being right and victorious as the public, [it] remains a phantom which forbids all personal contact"(PA 61). The individual can always share the inauthentic opinion of the public and feel secure. He is disburdened from choosing, because the public always decides for him in advance. However, since the public is an average shadow, such ^{an} individual never commits to any of his decisions. The public only understands actions abstractly: "what two people talking together... understand perfectly as a thought or observation, they cannot understand at all in the form of action"(PA 39). Thus, the public is also a "nobody" to whom the individual submits, so that the public is essentially an ontic non-passionate mode of the 'they'.

Everyday Dasein is disburdened of Being-himself. He is *dispersed* into the *they-self*, so that he is not his authentic self and must first *gather* himself. Similarly, the everyday individual does not have to be-himself. He is lost in the public, so that he "is reduced to a common denominator"(PA 67) and must first find himself. Consequently, everyday Dasein is *thrown* right into the publicness of the 'they', so that the 'they' and the public prescribe the usual ways he interprets the world. They prescribe the way we talk, see, and understand. For Heidegger, i) we talk idly, ii) we see out of curiosity, and iii) understand ambiguously. This constitutes Dasein's *falling* away from his authentic

self into the everyday world he is concerned with. For Kierkegaard, i) we are talkative, ii) we are formless and superficial, and iii) we remain ambiguous. These constitute what I will call *vanity*. I will argue that vanity and its characteristics are ontologically based on falling and its constituents.

i) In idle talk, “what is said-in-the-talk gets understood; but what the talk is about is understood only approximately and superficially. We have *the same thing* in view, because it is in *the same* averageness that we have a common understanding of what is said”(BT 168). In idle talk, we do not usually understand the entities which we talk about, we only understand what is said-in-the-talk as such. We are not so much interested in primordially appropriating the entities which we talk about, instead, we are content with groundless gossiping and passing the word along. “The groundlessness of idle talk is no obstacle to its becoming public; instead it encourages this. Idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without previously making the thing one’s own”(BT 169). Thus, idle talks enables the public to ‘understand’ *everything* without effort. This kind of understanding is that of average and undifferentiated intelligibility that closes things off, instead of disclosing them. Needless is to say (is not this idle talk?) that Dasein’s whole understanding is thus inauthentically uprooted.

For Kierkegaard, talkativeness “is the result of doing away with the vital distinction between talking and keeping silent. Only some one who knows how to remain silent can really talk – and act essentially”(PA 69). Keeping silent reflects the inward act of appropriation. When we do away with such inward understanding, we simply talk on without any genuine regard for the things we say. People absorbed in the public talk with an average and indefinite understanding. Hence, “People who are talkative certainly

chatter away about something and, indeed, their one wish is to have an excuse for more gossip, but the subject is non-existent from the ideal point of view”(PA 71). In other words, talkative people understand and enjoy what is said-in-the-talk, but they grasp the subject (what the talk is about) only proximally and superficially. Therefore, talkativeness is a mode idle talk. Furthermore, talkativeness “jabbbers on incessantly about everything and nothing”(PA 69) so that the individual feels he understands everything, but he never acquires the necessary inwardness for genuine understanding in silence, and he remains superficial and vain.

ii) Everyday Dasein is *curious* towards the world. *Curiosity* “expresses the tendency towards a peculiar way of letting the world be encountered by us in perception”(BT 170). Curiosity “concerns itself with seeing, not in order to understand what is seen... but *just* in order to see. It seeks novelty only in order to leap from it anew to another novelty”(BT 172). Thus, curious Dasein is simply amused *by* the world. In encountering the world, he simply wants *distraction*. Amusement is not yet enjoyment for there is no understanding. Distraction is not yet wonder for there is no sense of awe. Additionally, everyday Dasein does not want to calmly contemplate the world; in curiosity, he is always restless and in need of continuous excitement. Hence, “Curiosity is everywhere and nowhere”(BT 173). In curiosity Dasein never appropriates anything, and he remains *uprooted*. Curiosity believes it can encounter everything and idle talk believes it can understand everything. For curiosity and idle talk there is nothing closed off or obscure. Everything is quite easy to approach and understand. Thus, everyday Dasein feels quite genuine, secure, and lively. Nonetheless, he remains ungrounded. Consequently, for everyday Dasein the world is ambiguously familiar and uncanny at the same time.

Formlessness “is the result of doing away with the vital distinction between form and content. Formlessness may... have a content that is true, but the truth it contains can never be essentially true” (PA 72). Formlessness is a way of disclosing the world so that one is not really interested in its content, but one is in love with its form. Nonetheless, because the content fills the form, a form without content is really a malleable nothing. In formlessness, “people find a paramount longing for and pleasure in ‘acting on principle’”(PA 73). A principle is a mere undeveloped formality without any content. Thus, “‘On principle’ a man can do anything, take part in anything and himself remain inhuman and indeterminate”(PA 74). A principle can be molded into anything, so that a man sees the world ‘on principle’ however he likes. Formlessness is founded on curiosity, because seeing a form without content is a way of seeing without understanding. Furthermore, formlessness is always superficial. Superficiality “is the result of doing away with the vital distinction between concealment and manifestation. It is the manifestation of emptiness, but where mere scope is concerned it wins, because it has the advantage of dazzling people with its brilliant shams”(PA 75). Superficiality does not understand concealment, for it everything is a show. The superficial individual distracts himself with little but becomes quickly bored, for the surface only offers so much. Nonetheless, the scope of superficiality is very varied, and thus, with little wit one can always find something that is dazzling. Superficiality is a mode of curiosity, because the superficial man seeks no more and no less than to satisfy his curiosity. The superficial man that acts ‘on principle’ always feels quite comfortable with himself, however, he is never so.

iii) When in our everyday dealings with one another, “we encounter the sort of thing, which is accessible to everyone, and about which anyone can say anything, it soon becomes impossible to decide what is disclosed in a genuine understanding, and what is not. This ambiguity extends [to every kind of dealing Dasein has in the world]” (BT 173). Because of idle talk and curiosity, everyday Dasein feels he has genuine understanding and access to *everything* in the world. Consequently, Dasein takes for granted that he genuinely understands himself, his potentialities, and his possibilities. Nonetheless, because everyday Dasein does not understand for himself, it remains ambiguous and indeterminate how genuine this understanding is. Thus, everyday Dasein is ambiguously himself. Furthermore, “everyone is acquainted with what is up for discussion and what occurs, and everyone discusses it; but everyone also knows already how to talk about what has to happen first – about what is not yet up for discussion but ‘really’ must be done”(BT 173). When everyone knows what occurs and what is to be done, in idle talk and curiosity, Dasein remains ambiguously interested: he knows too well what ‘they’ have to do, but he never commits to actually do it. Finally, when he is confronted with the actuality of the deed, he feels quite at ease with himself. After all, everyone could have done it too. “In the ambiguity of the way things have been publicly interpreted, talking about things ahead of the game and making surmises about them curiously, gets passed off as what is really happening, while talking action and carrying something through get stamped as something merely subsequent and unimportant”(BT 174). Ambiguous Dasein is thus completely lost in the “they”, confusing the world and himself with what ‘they’ say, see, surmise, and understand.

For Kierkegaard, ambiguity arises when “The distance separating a thing from its opposite in quality no longer regulates the inward relation of things [so that] opposites are unable to dispense with each other and unable to hold together”(PA 43). In talkativeness, this inward relation that is essentially constituted by our genuine understanding remains indefinite. In formlessness, opposites become mere formalities that no longer regulate anything. Thus, the individual sees and understands the world ambiguously and this inward relation becomes an exhausting tension, which “*leaves everything standing but cunningly empties it of significance... [and] makes the whole of life ambiguous: so that everything continues to exist factually whilst by a dialectical deceit, privatissime, it supplies a secret interpretation – that it does not exist*”(PA 42). This exhausting tension renders any relation the individual holds to himself and the world meaningless. Nonetheless, the individual remains quite comfortable with himself and the public, because “Every one knows a great deal, we all know which way we ought to go and all the different ways we can go, but nobody is willing to move. If at last some one were to overcome the reflection within him and happened to act, then immediately thousands of reflections would form an outward obstacle. Only a proposal to reconsider a plan is greeted with enthusiasm; action is met by indolence”(PA 77-78). The everyday man knows from public opinion what ‘they’ know and ‘they’ do, but at the same time he does not know what he *is*. The ambiguous individual is rooted on the ambiguous Dasein, because he has done away with any genuine understanding of the world and himself. He is lost in the publicness of the ‘they’. Thus, the levelled and passionless man can no longer differentiate himself from the abstract and meaningless public, and he succumbs to public vanity.

The basic kind of Being that Dasein has in idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity is that of *falling*. This term signifies that Dasein is in his everyday dealings with the world absorbed in it and lost in the publicness of the “they”. Dasein has “fallen away from itself as an authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and has fallen into the world”(BT 175). This means that he is completely fascinated by the world and the “they”, and that he has completely forgotten about the potentiality of Being himself. Hence, for the most part Dasein is not-Being-himself in falling. Idle talk discloses the world, Others, and Dasein himself in groundless understanding. Curiosity discloses everything without previous genuine understanding. Ambiguity hides nothing as if Dasein had already understood it. Thus, Dasein is uprooted. These phenomena prepare Dasein for the constant “possibility of losing itself in the “they” and of *falling* into groundlessness, this tells us that Dasein prepares for itself a constant temptation towards falling”(BT 177). Thus, falling is in itself *tempting*. Idle talk and ambiguity, having seen and understood ‘everything’, give the impression that Dasein understands genuinely, securely and fully every possibility of his own Being. Through publicness, it gets spread that there is no need of authentic understanding and of transparency. “The supposition of the ‘they’ that one is leading and sustaining a full and genuine ‘life’, brings Dasein a *tranquility*, for which everything is ‘in the best of order’ and all doors are open”(BT 177). Thus, falling is also *tranquilizing*, in such a manner that it does not stagnate but *aggravates* the falling. At bottom it still remains indefinite *what* is really to be understood and *how* it has to be understood. Hence, Dasein remains *alien* to his ownmost possibilities and falling is also *alienating*. This alienation forces Dasein into what he authentically is not, so that he becomes *entangled* in himself. This whole *movement* is called falling. Every Dasein falls in his

everyday dealings. Falling is not a kind of being from which Dasein must or can liberate himself: “authentic existence is not something which floats above falling everydayness... it is only a modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon”(BT 179). Falling should not be judged as detrimental in itself; it can only have such character by the specific way Dasein falls.

Vanity is the basic kind of Being that, I propose, the talkative, superficial, and ambiguous individual has. In vanity, the individual is essentially vain, because he is constituted by veiled *emptiness*. In talkativeness, the individual talks without inward regard for the subject; he talks indolently of an abstraction. This abstraction is merely the object of the talk that devoid of inward understanding remains *empty*: “[Abstract thinking] is thinking where there is no thinker. It ignores everything but thought, and in its own medium only thought *is*”(CUP 287 my italics). In formless superficiality, the individual only sees the form and the surface devoid of any content. A form without content is precisely what constitutes *emptiness*. In ambiguity, the relation between opposites is expressed as an exhausting tension that is almost meaningless. When the absolute relationship between opposites is transformed to a mere matter of degree; opposites lose all [?] *its* dialectic power and they become an awkward abstraction that expresses nothing and opposites become *empty*. Therefore, vanity as veiled emptiness is the basic kind of Being of the average everyday individual.

The vain individual is absorbed in the public. The public is an abstract “nobody” to which the individual submits for comfort. Thus, the individual is always already *tempted* in his vanity by the public. The public spreads the notion that there is no need for inward understanding of anything, because someone has understood it already, or

otherwise, it will be understood very soon. The individual in his vanity believes this notion, and he is *tranquilized*, because the world and his Being make now perfectly sense to him. Nonetheless, he is not authentically tranquilized, because in being superficial, he remains restless. Hence, tranquility does not sooth vanity, but *aggravates* it. Moreover, the vain individual is empty, because he has no inward understanding of himself and the world. Consequently, he remains *alien* to his ownmost possibilities and he becomes *entangled* in that which he is not. This whole movement is that of falling Dasein. Therefore, vanity is a mode of falling. In this case, vanity could be considered a detrimental mode of falling, because vanity drains all the passion from the individual.

Kierkegaard is ontologically aware of the everyday self of the average individual: the public. He knows the dangers of ontological reflection, which can be easily misunderstood as general objectifying abstractions. Thus, the absolute tension between ontological understanding of ourselves and the ontic decision to be ourselves is that between the universal and inwardness: "The reflection of inwardness is the subjective thinker's double-reflection. In thinking, he thinks the universal, but, as existing in its thinking, as acquiring this in his inwardness, he becomes more and more subjectively isolated"(CUP 56). Consequently, ontological reflection can be universal, but it must keep in mind the inward appropriation of this universal, which isolates the individual. By mere ontological reflection, we might vainly believe we are *being* authentic, but authenticity entails more than reflection. In vanity, we tend to oversimplify and think of Being as what is present here and now. This is an oversimplification for two reasons: it forgets that it is always already Dasein the one that understands Being, and it forgets the way Dasein *is-in-the-world*. Hence, vanity is inclined to regard Being as what is present-

at-hand, so that when something is not present, it *is* not. When confronted with his own vanity, the individual feels empty. This emptiness reveals his own absence. Even though he is present, he *is* not himself. If this absence is understood as a lack of presence, the individual usually tries to feel more present. This is normally called vanity. If this absence is confronted authentically, then the individual is repelled by the 'they', and he "is *thrown* back unto himself"(PA 61)⁹. This fundamentally changes his relation to the public and the 'they', so that he becomes anxious about authentically being himself. Anxiety is the first step towards authenticity and faith.

⁹ It is remarkable that Kierkegaard uses the term thrown

Despair as a mode of Anxiety

“All existence makes me anxious, from the smallest fly to the mysteries of the Incarnation; the whole thing is inexplicable to me, I myself most of all; to me all existence is infected, I myself most of all. My distress is enormous, boundless; no one knows it except God in heaven, and he will not console me; no one can console me except God in heaven, and he will not take compassion on me”¹⁰

It must be clear by now with what kind of wondrous creature we are dealing with, this mesmerizing they-self, which we all are, but no one really is. Thus, it does not surprise me that most of us will find this quote too gloomy and even distasteful, specially because twentieth century existentialism is completely out of fashion. “All existence makes me anxious...” Who would write this in a journal nowadays? Who would *mean* it? Why is this in a journal, and not in a newspaper, or a movie, or an advertisement? Alas, we like when things are made easier; thus, anxiety is merely another medical condition. The public has taken away all demands from the existing individual, but... he exists. Even when he is utterly distracted, applauding the politics of the day, he exists, and existence demands an awful lot of him: You! You be here and now! You be Dasein! “But I do not understand...” Oh, you poor creature that nourishes on understanding, get lost! And so we do. But the demand is always there as long as we care to exist. That anxiety sounds very distant nowadays is inevitable; we know better now and do not have time for it. Please bear with me.

In this chapter, I will argue that Kierkegaard’s concepts of despair and dread are modes of ontological anxiety. (I) First, I will illustrate Heidegger’s concept of anxiety.

¹⁰ KIERKEGAARD, Søren Journals and Papers p.5383

(II) Next, I will reveal Kierkegaard's concepts of dread and despair under the light of anxiety.

I) For Heidegger, anxiety is a very revealing state of mind, because in it, Dasein confronts his self as himself. This confrontation normally repels him, but it can also be the first step towards becoming authentic. To become authentic, Dasein must be first transparent to himself. He needs a state of mind that reveals his being and his world as they are. Dasein is thrown into the world, i.e. he is his "possibilities, and is them in such a way that it understands itself in these possibilities and in terms of them, projecting itself upon them"(BT 181). His self, however, is normally they-self, so that he understands himself only in terms of their possibilities. In anxiety, Dasein confronts his possibilities as his own. Thus, anxiety is a state of mind that reveals his thrownness in the world while bringing up the *possibility* of authenticity.

In the present age, we tend to confuse possibility with actuality, so that one goes to war simply because of the possibility of aggression, one becomes a hero by saying: "I could have done that", and one becomes a philosopher by working out a System of what ifs. Nonetheless, the possibility of authenticity is as far from being authenticity as the possibility of faith is from being faith. Unfortunately, here understanding confounds everything. One's understanding of authenticity as a possibility reveals a *task* to be undertaken. Reflection clearly plays a role in this task, but imagination and passion are also decisive. Through idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity, Dasein tends to think, imagine, and even feel as they do. Anxiety can put an end to such falling by revealing Dasein's own possibilities, which up to that point remain empty. Alas, in anxiety one feels very much so, and one is tempted to flee back into the they. Hence, "Dasein's absorption in

the “they” and its absorption in the ‘world’ of its concern, make manifest something like a fleeing of Dasein in the face of itself - of itself as an authentic potentiality-for Being-it-Self’(BT 184). Therefore, Dasein is proximally and for the most part anxious in confronting himself, and thus, he flees into the they.

In anxiety, our Being-there (Da-sein) gets revealed. We are that on the face of which we flee. “*That in the face of which ones has anxiety is Being-in-the world as such*”(BT186). When one asks an anxious soul: ‘why are you anxious?’, one generally hears: ‘Oh, it is nothing!’ Even when anxiety is triggered by some extraordinary and lamentable event, with a bit of meditation one comes to realize one is not anxious in the face of this or that in particular. Otherwise, one runs the risk of being a rather tragicomic character that is anxious because of a broken TV. In such cases, the loss of something or someone reveals an indefinite oppression, in which “the world has the character of completely lacking significance”(BT186). Thus, nothing is relevant at all. One is not anxious in the face of some ready-to-hand or present-at-hand entity in the world. Furthermore, “That in the face of which one has anxiety is characterized by the fact that what threatens is *nowhere*”(BT186). When we are anxious, we might think that by changing environment *everything* will change. In some respects this is true; one usually distracts oneself by going on some exotic vacation. However, by fleeing one is always already anxious. If the oppression is truly indefinite, then it cannot be left behind somewhere else. It is constantly everywhere and nowhere waiting to come up! “The obstinacy of the ‘nothing and nowhere within-the-world’ means as a phenomenon that *the world as such is that in the face of which one has anxiety...* the world in its worldhood is all that still obtrudes itself”(BT187). The insignificance of the world makes anxiety more

unbearable and crushing. The world is felt ever more present and empty at the same time! Hence, one hears that the worst feeling of failure is in the face of success, and the worst feeling of loneliness is in the midst of beloved friends.

How revealing is the emptiness man feels in anxiety! This “nothing” one confronts in anxiety is *everything*. “Ontologically... the world belongs essentially to Dasein’s Being as Being-in-the-world. So if the “nothing”- that is the world as such - exhibits itself as that in the face of which one has anxiety, this means that *Being-in-the-world itself is that in the face of which anxiety is anxious*”(BT187). For a long time philosophy has divorced the soul from the world. Nonetheless, the world *is part of* Dasein as Being-in-the-world. Thus, all anxiety in the face of something in the world is ultimately anxiety in the face of Being-in-the-world itself. Furthermore, “Being-anxious discloses, primordially and directly, the world as world”(BT187). That the world is disclosed as world does not signify it gets interpreted, understood, and systemized. It means Dasein confronts the world primordially as what it is, that is as an essential part of his Being-in-the-world. This paradoxical transparency is normally unbearable for Dasein. A toast to those beautiful nymphs that protect us against such fate!

Anxiety is all too revealing like the eyes of an oracle. Luckily, it also speaks in riddles. Hence, there is a further subtle distinction to be made: “Anxiety is not only anxiety in the face of something, but, as a state-of-mind it is also *anxiety about* something. That which anxiety is profoundly anxious about is not a *definite* kind of Being for Dasein or a *definite* possibility for it... That which anxiety is anxious about is Being-in-the-world itself”(BT 187). The threat of anxiety is invisible. That something *definite* happens is what one hopes in anxiety, but the world is bare and without significance.

Even if one fears the worst, one anxiously hopes for it: Oh, the worst would be something! It would be at least significant... Nonetheless, even the worst remains a removed possibility in an invisible world. All that remains is Being-in-the-world itself with all its null possibilities, and that is precisely what one is deeply anxious about.

Being-anxious about Being-in-the-world is seen as an eccentricity reserved to those with too much time to spare. This is not completely false, because to make an individual out of oneself is an art, and as such, one requires time and effort. "Anxiety individualizes Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world, which as something that understands, projects itself essentially upon possibilities. Therefore, with that which it is anxious about, anxiety discloses Dasein as *Being-possible*, and indeed as the only kind of thing which it can be of its own accord as something individualized in individualization"(BT 187-188). Anxiety individualizes Dasein for his ownmost *Being-possible*. In a world in which "individuality" is the norm, it is curious that we need to be individualized. Individuality® nowadays is mass produced, so that to become an individual one requires very little. Personality can always be ordered online with a credit card. Luckily, our pusillanimous possibilities in the they are endless and fantastic. Our Being-possible gets reduced to a possible-being that has nothing to do with our ownmost possibilities. The problem is not that we dream, the problem is that we dream as everyone else does. A true dream is prophetic. Anxiety is the mirror that reveals our false self imagining vain possibilities: it shows nothingness. Nevertheless, this void is full of individual possibilities. Alas, one is required to choose, to take a quantum leap from nothingness to Being. A terrifying and impossible leap into the abyss, which Gandalf the

grey takes in the Mines of Moria in order to be reborn as Gandalf the White! This is a poetic task of courage, a task for an individual, a task for inwardness, and a task of faith!

We are still learning about tasks, responsibilities, and duties. In fact, we know very little about these, and confound them easily. Freedom itself, which many believe is the mother of every right, is a duty. "Anxiety makes manifest in Dasein its *Being towards* its ownmost potentiality-for-Being – that is, its *Being-free* for the freedom of choosing itself and taking hold of itself. Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its *Being free for* (*propensio in...*) the authenticity of its Being, and for its authenticity as a possibility which it always is"(BT 188). *Man is free for the freedom of choosing himself*; and indeed, this is a rare gift. Needless is to say, we are also free for the "freedom" of *not* choosing ourselves; and this is also a strange kind of freedom. The leap is to choose oneself *and* take hold of oneself authentically. Thus, we are free for the authenticity of our Being. To such Being we are delivered by existence. This is its tyrannical demand!

A demand upon freedom?! Is not this an outrage, an insolence, a temptation that calls upon defiance and rebellion?! We would rather be slaves to all that is good and evil on earth than to follow such an uncanny command! Hence we fall. "In anxiety one feels 'uncanny'. Here the peculiar indefiniteness of that which Dasein finds itself alongside in anxiety, comes proximally to the expression: the "nothing and nowhere". But here "uncanniness" also means 'not-being-at-home'"(BT 188). We are used to feeling securely at home; we are born in one, we grow up in one, and we seek one throughout most of our lives. At home, we are masters, we have rights, we are familiar, we are secure, we are satisfied, we watch TV, we sleep... and not merely at night. Who would think home could be a dangerous place? Yet home is for the most part not one's home but

their home. Who would think our private property is a public space? Yet we lock its doors with their key, and our Being-in becomes an average everyday *Being-familiar with*. In such case, the worst that can happen is an eviction notice: your home is not yours, it is theirs. YOU, find a new dwelling... now! "But my stuff is inside...May I at least...?" NO! Anxiety's demand is cold and cruel: "as Dasein falls, anxiety brings it back from its absorption in the 'world'. Everyday familiarity collapses. Dasein has been individualized, but individualized, as Being-in-the-world. Being-in enters into the existential mode of the 'not-at-home'"(BT 189). No wonder we flee in the face of debtors, specially if we owe them so much!

When one falls into the they, one borrows their robes which are very beautiful shiny, and pleasant clothes to vain creatures! Nonetheless, in front of one's own existence one is completely naked, just as that ridicul^{ous} emperor in his new garments. It is not by chance that Adam and Eve find themselves naked after they eat from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, and wear *fig leaves* so that God does not see them naked. This primordial and uncanny nakedness, which we would do anything to hide, is exactly what anxiety reveals: "When in falling we flee *into* the "at-home" of publicness, we flee *in the face* of the "not-at-home"; that is, we flee in the face of the uncanniness which lies in Dasein – in Dasein as thrown Being-in-the-world, which has been delivered to itself in its Being. This uncanniness pursues Dasein constantly, and is a threat to its everyday lostness in the "they", though not explicitly"(BT 189). Cruel is the destiny that delivers ourselves to ourselves without giving any reason. Why? We ask ourselves, but the silence is unbearable and the emptiness is impossible, so we flee into our most noisy public distractions: religion, poetry, philosophy, science, technology, etc. Ambiguity, curiosity,

and idle talk set the stage for this circus. We *choose* to be deaf in face of such silence. Nevertheless, at the heart of all this noise is a deep silence breathing behind our ears. Hence, "That kind of Being-in-the-world which is tranquilized and familiar is a mode of Dasein's uncanniness, not the reverse. *From an existential-ontological point of view, the "not-at-home" must be conceived as the more primordial phenomenon*"(BT 189). That we all come naked to the world, we all know, but that we remain naked our whole lives is something we immediately forget. Providentially, anxiety individualizes, stops our falling, and makes manifest that authenticity and inauthenticity are possibilities of our Being. Anxiety is like the precocious kid that in front of the stupid crowd laughs at the vain emperor and screams: "Behold, the emperor is naked!".

II) The public is of the opinion that: 'On principle, ignorance is bliss'. Thus, we dream about going back to our childhood when we were harmless and uncorrupted, playing every day without any worry. Better yet, we attempt to perpetuate our ignorance as long as possible. Even better yet, we want to forget! We hide the ugly and the beautiful, we ignore misery and ecstasy, we suspend mortality and transcendence. How exhausting! So many deep impressions get willfully ignored. We want to forget passion. Next, we drink from the sweet milk of Reason, but we avoid its paradoxes and mysteries. Through thinking we want to put an end to thinking. We want to forget thinking. Finally, we conform, we assent, we agree, we react, we follow, we repeat, we vote, we work. With all this we want to kill our imagination and forget our will. In sum, finality is what we want: Apocalypse, Armageddon, Ragnarok, Final Judgement, a telos. We want to forget existence, or at the very least ignore it. We want to be innocent again. We will nothingness.

Why do Adam and Eve in their *innocence* eat from the Tree of *Knowledge*? What is the relation between innocence and knowledge? After all, they do not eat from the tree of passion, imagination, or reason. What is their innocence? "Innocence is ignorance. In his innocence man is not determined as spirit but is [psychically] determined in immediate unity with his natural condition. Spirit is dreaming in man"(CD 37). In innocence, we are our 'natural' selves. We are always already one with our selves. Nonetheless, we have an empty consciousness. We simply are. We dream. "In this state there is peace and repose; but there is something different, which is not dissension and strife, for there is nothing to strive with. What is it then? Nothing. But what effect does nothing produce? It begets dread. This is the profound secret of innocence, that at the same time it is dread. Dreamingly the spirit projects its own reality, but this reality is nothing, [and this innocence always sees this nothing outside itself]"(CD 38). In innocence, we are dreaming spirit that knows nothing, needs nothing, and wills nothing. Yet it remains spirit-in-a-world, and as such it projects its own possibilities into its null reality. It sees itself in terms of these empty possibilities. Thus, nothing gets hold of our spirit and begets dread.

We do not know innocence, we men of knowledge. We only speak of it as one talks about hallucinations. Innocence is long gone, but empty dread is its trail. We also know nothing about nothingness, we men of passion and imagination. We speak of it in riddles and only by contrast. Nonetheless, innocence and nothingness are the fundamental constituents of our unholy spirit. "The reality of the spirit constantly shows itself in a form which entices its possibility, but it is away as soon as one grasps after it, and it is a nothing which is able only to alarm. More it cannot do so long as it only shows

itself”(CD 38). The spirit naturally calls for its own possibilities. In innocence, these possibilities are always already empty; they merely *show* themselves, they are mirages in the middle of paradise. This call of nothingness in the midst of possibility causes dread. “[D]read is freedom’s reality as possibility for possibility”(CD 38). As spirit we are always already free for our own possibilities, our own freedom. We are free for the possibility of our own freedom; we are free for the possibility of our own free self. Hence, in the mere possibility of a self lives dread.

Dread is a dream and a nightmare. It is possibility and necessity. It is everything and nothing. Dread is a gift from God and the devil. “Dread is [spiritually] a *sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy*”(CD 38). Dread is thus determined, because it is always already indeterminate. Dread alarms and captivates. It is an alarming mystery. As an innocent possibility it is tempting; as a dreadful necessity it is worrying. Think of the way one feels in certain deep dreams: one is there, and yet one is not oneself. One wants to keep dreaming, but one is afraid of what could happen. It is dreadful and mesmerizing. This is the root of the dialectics of the spirit as synthesis of soul and body. In this uncanny synthesis lives dread.

The spirit is the synthesis of soul and body. As a relation it unites them immanently and separates them eternally. “What then is man’s relation to this ambiguous power? How is spirit related to itself and to its situation? It is related as dread... [Man] cannot flee from dread for he loves it; really he does not love it, for he flees from it”(CD 40). If man is soul and body, then his spirit is primordially related to itself as dread. Spirit as the mysterious possibility for Being is loved in dread. Spirit as the alarming necessity of Being is feared in dread. In innocence, the spirit is ignorant, and his possibilities are

null. In this sense, the spirit *is empty*. This is dread's ambiguous innocent state. Now that dread has been interpreted psychologically, we can reinterpret dread in the light of ontological anxiety.

Dasein is Being-in-the-world. In this sense, Dasein's self is a "synthesis" of the world and his Being. Furthermore, Dasein's Being is an issue to himself; Dasein's self cares about itself. Hence, Dasein is always already anxious about and in the face of Being-in-the-world. Dasein normally understands himself in terms of his world, but in anxiety, the world means nothing. Similarly, man's spirit is a synthesis of soul and body that is related to itself. In innocence, man feels dread in the face of ignorance for he knows nothing about his own possibilities in the world. Nonetheless, *the world is co-primordial to his own Being*, so that man's Being is ignorant and his world is null. When dread faces man with a void world, it faces his spirit with his null Being-in-the-world. Furthermore, man dreads dread itself. Dread is what man is most anxious about, but dread reveals his spirit in his possibilities; thus, man feels dread about his spirit, which also is his Being-in-the-world. Therefore, man dreads his innocence. In other words, man is anxious in the face of and about his dreadful spirit, which in all its ambiguity is not yet a self.

In innocence, one is not yet an individual self, but dread absurdly calls for one's *own* possibilities. Thus, dread individualizes. In dread, man is asked to be something he does not know how to be, an individual; this possibility can be reinterpreted ontologically as authenticity. To be something one is not can be qualified as a dreaming state. Nonetheless, one is also awake and there is no higher state *beyond* our dreaming spirit. To be awake in a dreaming world is a strange. To be free for being awake in a dreaming

world is even stranger. This ambiguity is better articulated poetically: Adam and Eve live in Paradise, a dreaming world, in which they are innocent. They are free to choose anything, but they cannot choose for they know nothing yet. In this dreadful state, the serpent gives them “something” to choose: ‘you can be as God wants you to be (as you always already are), or else... you can be *like* God himself’. They do not know they are always already in His image; they do not know they *are* His repetition. As creators in dread, they are tempted to re-create themselves. The serpent deceives Adam and Eve, because it presents them with a choice, which they cannot understand in their innocence and about which they cannot truly decide. Nonetheless, they are free to choose this. This inspires dread as a form of innocent anxiety. ‘To be like God’ means nothing to them, yet it is tempting. Hence, in their ignorance they choose such knowledge. They choose to be what they are not, and they fall. That the fall is an illusion as much as real is part of their dream. Afterwards, they believe they are beyond their innocent dream. Ignorance is lost, and now they have knowledge: “They can be however *they* want”. This is true in so far as God gives them freedom to do so, but this is false in so far as they want to be what they are not. After the fall, dread ceases to be innocent anxiety; now, they flee from their nakedness, they flee from God, and they are thrown into an uncanny world. In despair, they flee and leave innocence behind in golden ashes.

Dread is a mode of innocent anxiety. When innocence is lost, we fall into the world, and dread turns into despair. In innocence, the self is not yet a self, it dreams in tense calmness. In despair, the self becomes a disrelationship to itself, a discord between body and soul that infects the relationship that unites them. “The disrelationship of despair is not a simple disrelationship but a disrelationship in a relation which relates

itself to its own self and is constituted by another, so that the disrelationship in that self-relation reflects itself infinitely in the relation to the Power which constituted it”(SD 19). Man is always already constituted by some Power: Nature, the World, God, etc. This Power constitutes man in such a way that he can relate to himself. Man is free to relate to himself as himself, as the Power constitutes him, or in discord to the self and such Power. In the latter case, the self is a disrelationship and it despairs at not willing to be itself. Hence, when Adam and Eve will to be *like* God, they deny their authentic relation to God, and they despair. After they eat from the tree of knowledge, they discover their own ignorance, and despairing over their new condition, they ask defiantly: What? Why? How? From far away only *their* own echo answers.

In primordial despair, most of our questions are aimed at the world, because we fall into an uncanny world that demands familiarity and homeliness. Despair leaves a profound impression on the self by disclosing the despairing self. Thus, we flee from our desperate self and do not want to recognize ourselves afterwards. We become *unconscious* of our own despair. The self slowly acquires new meaning through our familiarity with the world. This meaning is a vain byproduct that is merely tranquilizing and soothing. Thus, the self loses contact with itself, and at the bottom despair remains a sickness to the self. *Conscience* of despair and of falling is the first step towards *facing* ourselves. At the shallowest level, we despair over the earthly: ‘Alas, my shirt has a wrinkle and my day is ruined! (or) My face has wrinkled and my life is ruined! I blame you, monstrous Fortuna! Please, smile at me again’. Thus, we live completely outside ourselves falling into the they. If we mockingly ask ourselves: ‘Why do I despair over such small nuisance?’ After some reflection, we might answer: ‘I am weak and I despair

over my shameful weakness! *Mea culpa!* Maybe if I were stronger (sighs)'. Thus, one acquires a new conscience about despair and oneself. The self is weak, because it is sustained by the fantasies of the public. We do not despair over something in the world; despair is our own fault. Nonetheless, we are still half asleep, that is, we are weak. At the bottom, there is an infinite abyss...

Underneath all despair there is defiance. Defiance is "despair of willing despairingly to be oneself"(SD 107). In defiance, man detaches "the self from every relation to the Power which posited it, or [detaches] it from the conception that there is such Power in existence"(SD 109). Thus, man defiantly denies his own foundations or even the idea of such foundations. For Nietzsche, we deny the earthly. For Freud, we castrate ourselves. For Kierkegaard, we forget God, and are left with *nothing* but a self in despair; a self that uproots itself from the infinite Power that created it, and wills to be something else in its abstract possibilities of Being. "By the aid of this infinite [abstract possibility] the self despairingly wills to dispose of itself or to create itself, to make itself the self it wills to be, distinguishing in the concrete self what it will and what it will not accept"(SD 109). Alas, this is the source of our despairing misery! We "choose" what we are without paying attention to what we really are. Hence, our self becomes a fantastic construction, a Quixotic figure. We rush through life like mad men, re-creating ourselves constantly without any authentic basis, only to find out by the end that we were and will be always already in despair. Based on our freewill, we loose ourselves in abstract possibilities, whose fulfillment is for the most part completely inconsequential. If one becomes conscious of this process, and nonetheless, one still asserts one's despairing self by inauthentically refashioning it, then one lives in defiance.

In defiance, man wills to be an abstract self different from himself; nevertheless, man is not abstract, he is in a world with definite conditions and possibilities. "The man's concrete self, or his concretion, has in fact necessity and limitations, it is this perfectly definite thing, with these faculties, dispositions, etc."(SD 109). 'Nosce te ipsum' reads the Delphic inscription, but who pays heed to such counsel nowadays? One's own dispositions, virtues, vices, environment, and necessities remain for the most part alien to oneself. When life demands a self, we hastily choose a fashionable they-self with their faculties and dispositions. We dress ourselves in their suit, and we look rather comic. We usually do this unconsciously. Hence, we believe we are passive agents that despair from time to time. As we acquire awareness of our selves in despair, we come to realize we play an active role in despair. We will to be a self that is always already in despair, and this is defiance. Consequently, we will to be in discord with ourselves, and this is despair. Therefore, all despair is at its bottom defiance.

We can understand defiance and despair ontologically by examining the concept of anxiety. In defiance, man wills to be his despairing self, that is he despairs about and in face of his despairing self. Moreover, despair is a disrelationship in one's self-relation. Ontologically this is possible because anxiety reveals Dasein's anxious Being-in-the-world, so that he *is* most anxious *about* his inauthentic self. This inauthentic self is the self-disrelationship of despair. Thus, one defiantly despair about one's disagreeing self. When defiance reveals one's despairing self, it also discloses one's possibilities in the world. This, world is not the null reality of dread. In despair, we firmly believe we can refashion ourselves. Thus, we must choose among our possibilities. By choosing an

inauthentic possibility, we perpetuate defiance. We are defiant in face of the self and the Power that posits it. We are defiant in face of and about Being-in-the-world.

In defiance, we do not necessarily fall into the they-self. Nonetheless, we fall out of ourselves into a groundless self. Defiant Dasein does not simply *flee* in face of himself, instead, he reaffirms his despairing self by recreating it. He flees from his despairing self into his despairing self that flees. This is the vicious circle of anxious repetition, in which man does away with the Power that posits him, and is left with nothing. In this sense, man despairs over nothing. This nothing is not the same nothing of dread. Here, man believes his is left with something, namely his despairing self, but this is an illusion. His self is not his and he feels uncanny. Ironically, this empty homelessness also reveals the possibility of one's own transparent inwardness. The uncanniness of despair individualizes by presenting the possibility of one's own authentic dwelling, in which "[the self] by relating itself to its own self and by willing to be itself, the self is grounded transparently in the Power which constituted it"(SD 216). Since the state-of mind of despair reveals to Dasein his Being-in-the-world, defiant despair is ontologically rooted on anxiety.

Defiance and anxiety in their gloominess come with the promise of leaving all despair behind. Despair reveals the possibility of transparency in face of the Power that posits the self. Anxiety reveals the possibility of authentic Being-in-the-world. These possibilities are intimately related in their ontological structure. Nonetheless, ontologically there is nothing that can assure us that these possibilities are actually possible. In fact, ontically there is much evidence against Dasein's being able to overcome his anxiety and despair. Primordially, we are always already inauthentically

falling in to the they. We are always already anxious about Being-in-the-world. We discover our selves imprisoned in our bodies, necessities, instincts, limitations, and obscurities. Our own obscurity calls for transparency. Nonetheless, we cannot become transparent to ourselves by denying what we are. In doing so, we destroy the basis for any real inwardness. Instead, we must find transparency within our own obscurity. Up to what degree given our pressing limitations, we have the courage, wisdom, and strength to do so, only God knows.

Faith as a mode of authentic Love:

So far this thesis has remained at the margins of theology, looking at it from afar like a distant palace. In doing so, it has amply demonstrated Kierkegaard's ontico-ontological awareness with respect to the problem of existence. More importantly, we have revealed the ontological foundations upon which religion can build its kingdom. Religion comes from the Latin verb *religare*, which literally means to bind again. The obvious connotation is to be reunited with the divine, which means for most religions *to unite ourselves with God again*. A careful analysis of this formula reveals many theological subtleties and difficulties. The main difficulty is that we are in general rather powerless with respect to this union. We do not understand it, we are ignorant about God, and we cannot do or say much about it. Of course, there are many holy texts, churches, sects, interpretations, and mystics that claim to understand *religion*. Nonetheless, all this does is add to the general confusion of the average individual. Hence, I want to suspend this common interpretation, and consider religion through Gandhi's glasses: religion as *reunion with ourselves*.

In the previous two chapters, we have discovered the two main difficulties that religion must face: the average everyday individual is mostly not himself, he barely has a self of his own, and under the influence of the publicity of the they, he leads a life of unconscious anxiety. In anxiety, he is despairingly defiant about being his null self. He wills to be his inauthentic self and flees in face of his own emptiness. For Heidegger, Dasein can only go beyond this vicious reunion through anticipatory resoluteness. For Kierkegaard, the individual must have faith. (I) Initially, this chapter will explain Heidegger's ontological concepts of anticipatory resoluteness of Dasein as care. (II)

Next, it will argue that faith is a mode of anticipatory resoluteness. (III) Finally, it will consider Love as a mode of authentic care and its implications with respect to faith, the public, and despair.

I) Anxiety is the oracle that reveals authenticity as one of Dasein's possibilities; it reveals Dasein's possibility of *Being-himself* as himself. "[The] Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world). This Being fills in the signification of the term "*care*" [Sorge], which is used in a purely ontological-existential manner"(BT 192). Dasein is that Being that *cares* about Being. In anxiety, he cares about his potentiality-for-Being, and as such, he always already compares himself with a possibility of himself. This means Dasein is in every case 'beyond himself' as *Being-ahead-of-himself*. This is one mark of Dasein's existence, and Heidegger calls it his *existentiality*. Furthermore, anxiety discloses the abandonment of existential Dasein to himself as thrown-in-the-world. In this abandonment, Dasein must care about his Being-already-in. Thus, Dasein is *Being-ahead-of-himself-Being-already-in-the-world*. Dasein's existentiality is codetermined by his Being-already-in, which Heidegger calls his *facticity*. Finally, falling is grounded on the uncanniness of anxiety, so that Dasein for the most part flees to *Being-alongside* the world of his concern (Besorgen). Therefore, care articulates Dasein's elemental structural totality as: Being-ahead-of-himself-Being-already-in-the-world as Being-alongside entities encountered within-the-world.

In order to become authentic, we must first grasp our fleeing and whimsical structural totality as care. Nonetheless, "[as] long as Dasein is, there is in every case something still outstanding, which Dasein can be and will be. But to that which is thus outstanding, the

'end' itself belongs. The 'end' of Being-in-the-world is death. This end, which belongs to the potentiality-for-Being – that is to say, to existence - limits and determines in every case whatever totality is possible for Dasein”(BT 233-234). As long as Dasein exists, he is potentiality-for-Being, which means he is *not-yet* something. His uttermost not-yet is death. Thus, human existence is marked with death from the beginning. Death must not be understood as an event. Instead, death marks the end of Dasein's possibilities as the possibility of the impossibility of existence. Death itself is our *ownmost* possibility. Hence, as long as we exist we are *Being-towards-death*. “As soon as man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die”(BT 245). Dasein's Being-towards-death is grounded on his facticity, existence, and falling. Dasein's existence is always already thrown towards its end. Anxiety is the state of mind that faces Dasein with such dreadful facticity. Average everyday Dasein flees in face of his own existence, and covers up his ownmost Being-towards-death by falling. In order to become authentic, man must first uncover his own death by *anticipating* it.

How can we anticipate our own death? How can we dispel the obscurity and horror that surrounds our everyday understanding of dying? How are we to understand death ontologically? “[*Death*], as the end of Dasein, is Dasein's ownmost possibility – *non-relational, certain, and as such indefinite, not to be outstripped. Death is, as Dasein's end, in the Being of this entity towards its end*”(BT 259). Anticipation must grasp death authentically as Dasein's *ownmost* possibility, which is never *their* possibility. Hence, anticipation reveals that we can pull ourselves away from the “they”, and in turn, this reveals our everyday lostness in they-self. Death is *non-relational*, because Dasein must take it over *alone*. Death belongs always already to an *individual* Dasein. Hence,

anticipation must bring Dasein face to face with himself as himself. Death is *not to be out-stripped*, because it is always pending; it is our uttermost possibility as long as we exist. Thus, anticipation must free Dasein *for* his own death. It must liberate him from the idea that death is an accident. It must free Dasein for his ownmost Being-towards-death, which determines his finite possibilities and his totality. This means anticipation liberates Dasein as authentic care. Furthermore, since death is *certain*, Dasein must become certain of his own death as that possibility which is non-relational and not to be outstripped. To be certain of death means to uncover death as death. In anticipation, Dasein must uncover death as a possibility which is always already there, and that as such remains *indefinite*. Consequently, death is *there* a constant threat to Dasein (Being-*there*). “*But the state-of-mind which can hold open the utter and constant threat to itself arising from Dasein’s ownmost individualized Being, is anxiety*. In this state-of-mind, Dasein finds itself face to face with the “nothing” of the possible impossibility of its existence”(BT 266). Thus, in anticipation Dasein becomes most anxious about his Being as care. Being-towards-death is essentially anxiety, so that anticipation opens up Dasein as care in his facticity, existence, and falling. In sum, “*anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings is face to face with the possibility of being itself... in an impassioned **freedom towards death** – a freedom which has been released from the Illusions of the “they”, and which is factual, certain of itself, and anxious*” (BT 266).

Anticipation of death is authentic Being-towards-death as a possibility. How do we *attest* an authentic possibility to Dasein, if Dasein is for the most part listening to the ambiguous idle-talk of the they-self failing to hear himself? How can we arouse Dasein from this stupor? “Conscience [is that which] gives us something to understand; it

discloses”(BT 269). Conscience gives a *call* that appeals to Dasein’s self, in order to attest his authentic possibilities in his potentiality-for-Being. This call appeals to the they-self, but the “they” gets *passed over* and collapses, so that only the self remains. Hence, the call does not speak the language of idle talk, instead it summons by saying ‘nothing’. “*Conscience discourses solely and constantly in the mode of keeping silent*”(BT 273). In what other way can conscience disclose Dasein to himself? If it were to say *something* definite it would distract Dasein to *what* is being said. By remaining indefinite, the call directs Dasein to his uncanny self and makes him ready to hear himself. Thus, Dasein asks: Where does the call come from? Since his own conscience calls him involuntarily forth, he responds: “The call comes *from* me and yet *from beyond me and over me*” (BT 274). This answer is perplexing if we consider worldly Dasein as an entity that is simply present-at-hand. If, however, we remember that Dasein exists in the depths of uncanny anxiety, then we can interpret that the “caller is Dasein in his uncanniness: primordial, thrown Being-in-the-world as the “not-at-home”(BT 276). Hence, this call is alien to the they-self, and by remaining silent, it calls the self to his reticent potentiality-for-Being as care. Therefore, “*Conscience manifests itself as the call of care: that caller is Dasein, which, in its thrownness (in its Being-already-in), is anxious about his potentiality-for-Being*”(BT 277). Conscience is Dasein’s primary *disclosedness* of Being-in-the-world as care, so that conscious care (love) is the starting point of Dasein’s authenticity.

How does reticent conscience appeal to the self? The call of conscience reveals that Dasein is constituted by a “*not*” in his facticity (thrownness), existence (projection), and falling, so that Dasein is always already ontologically ‘Guilty!’: “[In] the idea of ‘Guilty!’ there lies the character of the “not”... Hence we define the formally existential idea of the

'Guilty!' as "Being-the-basis for a Being which has been defined by a 'not' – that is to say, as '*Being-the-basis of a nullity*'"(BT 283). In thrownness, Dasein is thrown into his there, but *not* of its own accord. In existence, Dasein projects himself into his possibilities, but he is only free to stand in one possibility or another but *not* all of them. In falling, Dasein is himself but *not* as himself. Therefore, the "Self, which as such has to lay the basis for itself, can *never* get that basis into its power; and yet, as existing, it must take over Being-a-basis"(BT 285). Dasein has been delivered *to* himself *as* his basis, but *not through* himself. This is the demand upon existence: *Dasein must be the thrown basis of his own Being while not Being-himself his own pre-ontological basis*. This demand torments care, and it constitutes its *nullity* in thrownness, existence, and falling. *Nullity* is the basis of our inauthentic guilt. Ironically, we must first be willing to understand our primordial Being-guilty in order to modify our guilt. Thus, Socratic ignorance is a higher wisdom that constitutes our readiness to hear the call of conscience! "*Understanding the appeal means wanting to have a conscience*"(BT 288). In defiance, we *choose* our own conscience, even though this is impossible, while in *resoluteness*, we *choose* having-a-conscience as Being-free for our ownmost Being-guilty.

Wanting to have a conscience is the basis for the attestation of authenticity. When Dasein chooses to have a conscience, he is ready for the call that discloses his ownmost uncanniness as an individual. The state-of-mind that corresponds to such understanding is anxiety. Thus, "Wanting-to-have a conscience becomes a readiness for anxiety"(BT 342). Furthermore, Dasein's readiness for the call entails *reticence*. By keeping silent, when he has something to say, he is willing to listen the discourse of conscience. In doing so, he does away with the ambiguous idle-talk of the they, and becomes free for choosing

himself. "This distinctive and authentic disclosedness, which is attested in Dasein itself by its conscience – *this reticent self-projection upon one's ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety* – we call 'resoluteness'" (BT 297). Resolution is disclosive projection of Dasein's factual possibilities in time. Resolution makes Dasein see his authentic *Situation* fully articulated by care. In resoluteness, Dasein is both in the truth as disclosive Being and the untruth as covering they-self. Thus, he appropriates authentically his own nullity. Resoluteness bring Dasein to his "there" so that he can authentically become Dasein (Being-there). Hence, resoluteness constitutes authentic care, and as such, it attest Dasein authentic possibilities.

What is the relation between resoluteness and anticipation? When resolute Dasein discloses his own potentiality for Being 'right to its end', he discover his Being-towards-death and anticipates it. Hence, resoluteness is authentic only as anticipatory resoluteness. Death is the possibility of the impossibility of existence, and as such it is the utter nullity of Dasein. Hence, anticipation makes manifest Dasein's *whole* Being-guilty. Anticipatory resoluteness attests death authentically in Dasein's existence. In turn, existence becomes our *ownmost, non-relational, not to be out-stripped, certain, and indefinite* potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. In giving himself his *ownmost individual* Situation, which *cannot be out-stripped* by the they-self, Dasein becomes both *certain* in his authentic possibilities, and *indefinite* in his manifold potentialities. Only when Dasein is thus disclosed, he is transparent to himself in authentic care.

II) The previous exposition shed some light in the concept of anticipatory resoluteness as authenticity. After this wordy ontological interpretation, it is easy to see why Kierkegaard held that philosophical understanding remains for the most part alien to

the problem of existence. Authenticity is *what* this problem demands, and Heidegger's hermeneutics are in this respect very illuminating; however, are we any clearer on *how* to carry out this project after the previous elucidation? We have a better picture of authenticity now, but at the same time, we have not moved a bit and do not know in what direction to move. As Plato, Heidegger points out how lost we are, explains why we are lost, tells us what it is to be out of our lostness, and leaves us staring at the shadows on the walls of our caves. Guilt, anticipation, care, death, resoluteness, the situation; we only "understand" these ontological concepts from afar. They barely speak to our spirit, and make seem authenticity like a fantastic dream. This is no criticism to Heidegger, on the contrary, the disclosure of this primordial *aporia* might be one of his primary aims. On the other hand, even though Kierkegaard admires Socrates immensely, his 'philosophy' wants to go beyond the Socratic method and also aims at being *uplifting*. This being said, we can better appreciate the impossible poetic movement from vain defiance to faith.

Despair is the sickness unto death, "this agonizing contradiction, this sickness in the self, everlasting to die, to die and yet not to die, to die the death. For dying means that it is all over, but dying the death means to live to experience the death"(SD 25). In despair, we anticipate death as the impossible cure for this sickness. In defiance, we will this sickness, and anticipate death inauthentically as its uttermost bitter end. We are not yet resolute about our situation, because we still want to be our despairing inauthentic selves. "By relating itself to its own self and willing to be itself, the self is grounded transparently in the Power which constituted it"(SD 216). If the Power is God, then this is the formula for *faith*. With faith our anticipation of death is radically modified. Since we are grounded in God, death is no longer the end of the self; instead death becomes part of

the self. Hence, we truly become free toward death and our Being-towards-death is *modified* as Being-towards-God. If faith is a mode of authenticity, then Being-towards-God must be our ownmost, non-relational, not to be outstripped, certain, and as such indefinite potentiality-for-Being-a-whole.

Faith is “an objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation-process of the most passionate inwardness”(CUP 182). The objective uncertainty is God as paradoxical Truth, that is God as the basis of Being. Our most passionate inwardness marks our subjective God-relation, our Being-towards-God. This God-relation is essentially also our Self-relation, since one is related to oneself only when grounded transparently in God. If this is so, then God is the ground for faith, and all we do is appropriate this Truth with our innermost passion. Yet we “must make the leap [ourselves], for God’s love is not second-hand gift”(PA 82). Hence, the public and its Christendom can do nothing for our *ownmost* Being-towards-God. We are always already individuals in the face of God, and our relation to Him is absolutely *non-relational* with respect to others. Furthermore, if God is the ground of the self, we cannot avoid having a God-relation; thus, our Being-towards-God *cannot be outstripped*. Finally, our holding fast to God implies our *certainty* with respect to an *indefinite* objective uncertainty. Therefore, our Being-towards-God in faith has the structure of an authentic potentiality-for-Being. All that rests is to see how faith can be attested as anticipatory resoluteness.

Kierkegaard’s most important assertion is that we are devoid of the *condition* for Being-authentic, that is we are always already in a state of Error in face of God as the Teacher of the Truth¹¹. This state of Error constitutes our primordial dread, which is our Being-guilty and our ownmost nullity in the face of Him. God is the occasion for man to

¹¹ This premise takes the form of the decisive Significance of the Moment in Philosophical Fragments p. 16

become *conscious* of his own Error: "what the Teacher can give [the learner] occasion to remember is, that he is in a state of Error"(FP 17). This occasion is ontologically rooted in the call of conscience. This becoming conscious constitutes our initial anxious step towards resoluteness. So far, this can also be accomplished in conscious defiance. In order to become fully resolute and choose having-a-conscience in the face of God, we must transparently appropriate our whole null Self in the Truth. "Now if the learner is to acquire the Truth, the Teacher must bring it to him; and not only so, but he must also give him the condition necessary for understanding it"(FP 17). This condition is faith as authenticity of the self. The Truth is God as the Paradox that makes the essentially inauthentic and null individual authentic. Thus, God attests our Being-toward-God as an authentic potentiality-for-Being. In this way, faith is a mode of authentic anticipatory resoluteness.

III) Since faith is a mode of anticipatory resoluteness, and resolute Dasein is transparent to himself as authentic care, we must reinterpret the relation between faith and care. Dasein is that Being to which Being gets revealed in his own Being. In anticipatory resoluteness, Dasein *cares authentically* about his own Being, which gets revealed and attested in his ownmost Being-there. In faith, man wills to be himself grounded transparently in God as positing Power. In this case, God reveals and attests faith. When God posits man, He wills man to be. According to St. Augustine, this means God *loves* man. Thus, Love can be interpreted as authentic will to be, so that in faith, man loves himself as God loves him. Thus, Love essentially constitutes our genuine Being-a-whole-towards-God, and as such a mode of authentic care. Now, we must briefly re-

interpret our relation to the public and despair in order to reveal the appropriateness of this new analysis.

Transparent self-Love is not the vain fanaticism of the public. Vanity is essentially inauthentic self-love. In vanity, man loves himself as they-do. The public in its ambiguity is not capable of loving anyone; at most, it can be only a fanatic of public figures. Consequently, everyday man loves himself in accordance to public affection, and ones achievements are judged by the curious idle talk of public opinion. Nonetheless, the fanaticism of the public is deceitful. It only loves moved by a vain desire towards leveling down. When the public admires, it makes sure to level down any genuine qualities of the individual while exaggerating his most inauthentic characteristics. This is precisely the self-love of a degraded public religion. When they lays their hands on religion, they attempt to reunite man with God by leveling God down. Thus, it creates its own metaphysics and morality in accordance to the public needs and flaws. It basically projects its own publicity onto its own God figure. Needless is to say, that this publicity carries with it the most inauthentic desires and vices of the public. Thus, man becomes fanatic and justifies his inauthentic actions on religion. Nietzsche is one of the harshest critics against this all-too human religiosity. Kierkegaard's uplifting poetics and criticisms attempt to summon our authentic love from the ^{stagnant?} rotten waters of fanaticism. In doing so, he reveals a self that in despair does not love itself.

Defiance means not to love oneself authentically. When we despair, we dread being loved; we feel most unworthy of authentic love. We despair over a love that is not there, and in this sense, we despair over nothing. This lack of love constitutes our primordial Being-Guilty, that feels abandoned to an uncanny and love-less world. Our

will to nihilism springs precisely from this loveless state. The tendencies to suppress our authentic passions that express a transparent self-Love destroy the possibility of authenticity. It is important to notice that these passions are not the public passions of aggression and lust, which tend to reduce love to basic instincts. Instead, these instincts arise due to the lack of love and the nihilism^{is?} impulses of the public. In defiance, there is an undertone of public resentment, which thinks that no one is entitled to authentic love. Hence, the public levels down love to sex and violence, and its own resentment is reflected in its ambivalent feeling towards these impulses. The thrust of these urges comes from Dasein's own tendency to fall in^{to} the familiarity of the they. In doing so, they cover up Dasein's authentic love, and present him the familiar and tranquilizing picture of man as an irresponsible animal.

To overcome the resentful belittlement of man, we require genuine faith. In faith, man loves himself as God loves man. Even so, man cannot love as God does. Consequently, the paradox of faith is that God makes man love as He does. Faith is essentially the Love of God given to man. To receive it, man must be willing to have a conscience that reveals his own authentic merits and limitations. Here, the task of philosophy is to clear the ground for this authentic revelation, while the task of religion is to uplift the human spirit with lyrical poems about faith and Love.

Bibliography:

- HEIDEGGER, Martin Being and Time Harper San Francisco, San Francisco – 1962

This book, first published in 1927, is considered Heidegger's most important book as it deals with the basic ontology, hermeneutics, and phenomenology that will permeate his thinking through out all his later philosophical works. In this book, Heidegger investigates the question of Being qua Being. To do so, he rejects all previous metaphysical understanding, and starts off with Dasein (man) as Being-in-the-world. This means Dasein *is* always already in the world, and as such, we must consider every question with this pre-ontological basis in mind. Heidegger explains how the Cartesian ontology of Being as presence is insufficient in many aspects, and he reinterprets concepts such as truth, meaning, state of mind, understanding, interpretation, language, and Reality. Furthermore, he recreates Dasein's falling, levelling, 'they', care, Guilt, anxiety, solicitude, and authenticity. Hence, this book is essential to this thesis as it provides the ontological roots to all these concepts. Kierkegaard's own understanding about the individual, sin, subjectivity, religion, and faith will be revealed as being ontologically aware and grounded on pre-Christian Dasein.

- HEIDEGGER, Martin Pathmarks Cambridge University Press, Cambridge – 1998

This book contains the 1927 lecture *Phenomenology and Theology*. This lecture explains the absolute difference between theology and philosophy as ontology. It gives a definition of theology as the positive science of faith, and it relates such definition to philosophy as the science of Being. It considers the role of philosophy with respect to theology and faith, and concludes that philosophy is an

ontological corrective of the pre-Christian basis of Christian concepts, such as guilt. This lecture plays an important role in the introduction of this by revealing the tension between ontology and theology. This book also contains a letter written in 1964 concerning “The Problem of a Nonobjectifying Thinking and Speaking in Today’s Theology”. This letter, which is polemical against the supremacy of objectivity, will play an significant role in the third chapter of this thesis with respect to Kierkegaard’s subjectivity. Finally, this book also has the 1930 essay *On the essence of Truth*. The last chapter of this thesis will probably make reference to this essay, as it deals with the relation between Truth as uncovering and philosophy.

- KIERKEGAARD, Søren Philosophical Fragments Princeton University Press, New Jersey – 1985

This book was written under the pseudonym of Johannes Climacus in 1844, and it compares the concepts of Truth for Socrates and Christianity. It begins by presenting the problem of knowing the Truth, and proposes two alternatives: the ethical immanent remembering of truth and the religious absolute paradoxical Truth. Thus, it is primarily an ethico-religious text that deals intensively with the idea of God as the Teacher and Paradox, Faith, and the individual as disciple. Kierkegaard’s sharp religious awareness in this text is particularly important for my thesis, as it indirectly addresses many criticisms against religious morality and metaphysics. This text will be used in the third chapter with respect to Guilt and sin, and in the last chapter with respect to faith and God.

- KIERKEGAARD, Søren The present age Harper Torchbooks, New York – 1962

In this book published in 1846, Kierkegaard (under no pseudonym) presents a polemical analysis of the passionless but over-reflective present age. He criticizes reflection and abstract thinking, because they have done away with the most important dialectical distinctions, and due to lack of passion everyone and everything have been reduced to an ambiguous nothing. He explains how the present age has reduced the individual to its minimum expression, so that man becomes superfluous. He laments over the loss of authority and inwardness, and calls for an inward reappropriation of the individual in faith. He considers the everyday implications of these phenomena, such as levelling, the public, superficiality, ambiguity, and other everyday features of the individual. Given that Heidegger reveals these same features in everyday Dasein, this book particularly pertains the first chapter of this thesis, which relates falling into the 'they' with Kierkegaard's public.

- KIERKEGAARD, Søren Concluding Unscientific Postscript Princeton University Press, New Jersey – 1941

This book published under the pseudonym of the witty and ironic Johannes Climacus in 1846 is the postscript to Philosophical Fragments (1844). It presents a philosophical analysis of Truth and its relation to Christianity, subjectivity, objectivity, and dialectics. In this book, Climacus is mainly polemical against Hegel's system and its objective point of view. He criticizes the lifeless and absentmindedness of abstract thinking, and argues for the importance of subjectivity, and in particular of subjective truth. He explains the absolute

difference between speculative philosophy and the ethico-religious, and emphasizes the superior intensity of the religious over the ethical. This is Kierkegaard's most ontological and complicated philosophical text. It reveals his ontological awareness with respect to truth, the individual, religiousness, and existence. Hence, it will play an especially important role in the third chapter of this thesis, which considers Being-in-the-world and subjectivity.

- KIERKEGAARD, Søren The Sickness unto Death Princeton University Press, New Jersey – 1951

Kierkegaard wrote this book in 1849 under the pseudonym of Anti-Climacus, a gesture that many have interpreted as purposely giving away his authorship. This is mainly a religious text that analyzes extensively the concept of despair and its relation to the human spirit. He explains how despair is the sickness unto death that every human spirit faces by being the synthesis of the temporal with the eternal. Despair is the human tragedy that elevates the human spirit over other beings. This work presents the implications of human existence in despair. This text will be mainly used in the second chapter, which relates anxiety with despair.

- KIERKEGAARD, Søren The essential Kierkegaard Princeton University Press, New Jersey – 2000

This book is a survey of fragments from many of Kierkegaard's most important texts. It will be mainly used as indirect reference to some of Kierkegaard texts such as his Journals, Repetition, Works of Love, Johannes Climacus, The Concept of Irony, and The Concept of Anxiety.

- RICŒUR, Paul and MACINTYRE, Alasdair The religious significance of atheism
Columbia University Press, New York – 1969

This book, first published in 1969, has two essays, one of which is Ricœur's *Religion, Atheism, and Faith*. This essay deals with the importance of atheism with respect to faith and religion. It argues that Nietzsche's and Freud's atheism uncovers two interrelated conflicts in religion: accusation and protection. Accusation arises from the transgressed religious obligation to a moral God. Protection is God's punishment to any transgression, which is aimed to protect the community of believers. Ricœur argues that atheism clears the ground for a new faith without these all-too human problems. He concludes by emphasizing the role of love in faith. In the last chapter of this thesis, this essay will play an important role in revealing love as care. His atheistic criticism will also be very considered in the third chapter on subjectivity.