

Clark
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AXIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

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Axiology or the general theory of value, although becoming a separate philosophic study only recently, has been a prime problem for as long as philosophy, as a field of inquiry, has existed. As soon as the term 'ought' is used in any inquiry there is sure to be a value judgment back of it. As soon as any decision is made between two divergent courses of action a value judgment is presupposed. Even the simple act of choosing a type of cigarette from a group of brands demands a value judgment. Therefore, we can see the problem concerning the nature of value and value judgments is basic to any understanding of man's experience and actions. The name valuation has a fairly short history, going back only to Karl Marx and his contemporaries. Marx had a conception of determination by relative value and philosophy appropriated this recognition and formulated the axiological problem from it. Yet this problem was at the center of Plato's work. It was the problem his teacher, Socrates, had to solve for his own satisfaction. During the reign of scholasticism it was answered by dogma and only after ethics reappeared that it differentiated itself from the wealth of theological knowledge that is contained in the Summa Theologia Kant had to deal with the problem in his two critiques of practical reason and judgment, but refused to take a firm stand on any real aspect of the problem because he assigned it a place in the noumenal world - it

thereupon became untouchable. But since Kant the problem has again come to the forefront. Mill dealt with a system of values in his form of hedonism and Nietzsche provided one of the greatest springs to a full inquiry in his 'trans-valuation of values'. The idea was picked up and first developed by Urban and Dewey with the work of Urban being the more complete of the two. His book Valuation Its Nature and Laws, still must be considered the starting point to any inquiry. Urban considers the converging work in economics and ethics as bringing the first realisation of valuation to the attention of the academic world and his book is an attempt to cover these two fields of research. Perry offers a more comprehensive study in his book General Theory of Value which appeared in 1924. The work since then has been mainly on particular aspects of the theory with only Bosanguet doing a complete job. In the journals of philosophy today, we see the basic problem of valuation occupying the most space. The problem is that of the objectivity and subjectivity of value experience, and forms the basis for any axiology.¹

§ 2

Axiology may be defined as follows: "The name given to that part of philosophy concerned with what is called the general theory of value."² The problems, concerning value, included within the general scope of axiology fall into four

main groups: 1) the nature of value or of the value experience; 2) the types of value; 3) the criterion of value; and 4) the metaphysical status of value or the general problem of value and reality. In these problems we can see that the theory of value or axiology implies three main steps - definition, epistemology, and metaphysic. It has been forcibly maintained that the true concern of philosophy is value and that the problems of philosophy are valuational problems.³ But this position will not be adopted in this paper. Rather the position taken will be that of a dualism between value as a subject for study on the one hand and phenomena as a subject for study on the other. Value is the concern of the philosophers and all men dealing in the humanistic 'sciences' (i.e. those sciences dealing with human beings and their thoughts and actions). Phenomena are the concern of philosophers (when questions of knowledge, being and reality et al) are involved and of the physical sciences as a whole. Therefore, value will chiefly be the concern of the economists, sociologists, psychologists and the like. The problem is central in their fields if they wish to acquire understanding of the reasons for human action. The position taken on the general theory of value should serve as a criteria for interpretation of purpose and action in the lives of human beings in society. Recently, in some of the leading philosophic journals, most of these humanistic sciences have

received value interpretation.⁴ The field is new and is just beginning to make its appearance as the chief of their problems. Any questions involving goals, purposes, desires, and most emotions presuppose a worth predicate. The forms man thinks in, in so far as he has self-consciousness, are largely value forms. The few instances of proposing a 'dismissal' of the axiological problem have held little weight.⁵ The outstanding example of this denial of axiology is logical positivism which adopted as a thesis that such a field as axiology is, in the very nature of the case, impossible; and that what are called value or normative sciences are really not a form of knowledge at all. They maintain that a logical analysis of language shows that so called value judgments are really not judgments at all; but merely expressions of feeling, and think a value judgment cannot, in the nature of the case, be constructed. I think that in the end this position leads to the final stage in scepticism and nihilism. It stultifies all discourse and makes a good point of our language meaningless. On these and other grounds⁶ I feel it necessary to reject this hypothesis as a presupposition and affirm the possibility of value as such. We may thank 'logical positivism' for making the question (as given) sharper and demanding a firm basis for discussion. In this way it has been very helpful to axiological study.

§ 3

The method in this paper will be to advance from relative concreteness to abstraction, from definition to metaphysic considering in turn the main views on each aspect of definition, epistemology and metaphysic. In some theories advanced a metaphysic never arises⁷ but these theories will not be the main concern of this paper. Some of the main questions that arise under the four main headings of nature, type, criterion, and metaphysic are: "What is its nature? Is it a quality or a relation? Is it objective or subjective? Is it a single property, or is it several properties, value being an ambiguous term? Is its presence in a 'thing' dependent on or reducible to the fact that the 'thing' is valued by someone? About the latter it also has various questions. Is it a mere feeling or desire? Or does it involve judgment and cognition? And if so, is this a cognition of a value already present independently of the act of valuing or of knowing?"⁸ Answers to these questions fall into three main categories or systems which can be recognized by the type of definition they give to value. 1) Ross's hypothesis that value is an indefinable predicate which is objective; 2) Parker's, Perry's, et al hypothesis that value depends upon desire or interest and 3) the Platonic theory that value is the expression of a transcendent 'ought' or idea held by Urban and Sorley. Therefore, the views which each of these positions take as

regards each phase of valuation - (definition, epistemology, and metaphysic) will be considered and the main objections to the position considered. It is impossible in a paper such as this to do justice to all theories so far advanced and for this reason I have omitted such men as Laird, Whitehead, Dewey and their followers. This is not because much of their work is not important for they all have many contributions to make to a general theory of value, but they are not as elemental as the others and on this basis I have omitted them.

II

§ 1

A) Of the three groups of theories that have been generally advanced, probably the most argument has occurred over those of the second group which maintain that value depends upon desire or interest. This theory is most ably presented by two men: Professor R. B. Perry in his comprehensive study General Theory of Value, and DeWitt H. Parker in a series of articles appearing in Ethics.⁹ Perry defines value as "any object of any interest".¹⁰ Interest in this case means neither curiosity or the power to arouse curiosity but, rather, as our feeling towards an object including desire and disposition. In other words an object becomes valuable or is invested with value when any interest, of whatever form, is taken in it. This relation can be expressed by a simple equation that Dr. Perry uses "x is valuable = interest is taken in x. Value is thus a specific relation into which things possessing any ontological status whatsoever, whether real or imaginary, may enter with interested subjects."¹¹ The classification of values depends; then, upon the type of interest that is taken in them. He rejects any qualification of the object of interest or any qualification of the interest for, he maintains, with any object - interest has the character of value and, therefore, he equates the two. He gives an apt summary of his argument by stating "A certain

positive plausibility is given to this hypothesis by the fact that, in order to create values where they did not exist, it seems to be sufficient to introduce an interest factor. The silence of the desert is without value, until some wanderer finds it lonely and terrifying There is no entity that can be named that does not, in the very naming of it, take on a certain value through the fact that it is selected by the cognitive purpose of some interested mind."¹² As this is the keystone of Perry's whole axiology I think that justice may be done to this view by a closer examination of the central hypothesis. DeWitt Parker, a follower of Perry's, maintains that the fundamental mistake of Professor Perry is "the identification of value with the object of interest."¹³ Professor Parker maintains that in Perry's definition the object of interest becomes the value, a situation which Parker calls false. Parker offers the suggestion that it is not the object of an interest but the satisfaction of the interest in the subject which constitutes the value. "Values are always experiences, activities; they are not the object towards which these activities may be directed."¹⁴ Parker wants to restore the relational quality of Perry's definition and transpose it to read "value is any interest in any object."¹⁵ Here we have the main stress upon the interest in the form of satisfaction of that interest and not upon the object as being capable of arousing this interest.

This Perry rejects¹⁶ in principle for he maintains that in order to assign value to objects of unfulfilled desire, to unrealized ideals, and to perfection there must be a forward or transgradient reference as to anticipated satisfaction through the object in question. "This forward reference is characteristic of all responses to an object. The response itself is an event in time, and predicates the continued existence of the object to the moment of its intersection with the completion of the event."¹⁷ The difference here is in the analysis of interest. It is unintelligible that interests could exist which have no objects Perry contends. Perry realizes, however, that the quarrel here may be one of verbal statement and is inclined to accept an amended definition that would state that value instead of being 'any object of any interest' could be 'any interest of any object' which is Parker's definition. I think that Parker's definition and criticism is well taken, for Perry's 'interest in object' falls under Dr. Ross's criticism that values so defined would be only extrinsic. For in Perry, by placing the value in the object is merely giving that object the ability to arouse a state of satisfaction in the subject. Therefore, Perry's value would be merely instrumental to the higher value of satisfaction. This intrinsic value belongs only to states of mind, it cannot be possessed by physical things. Therefore, we now have the identification of intrinsic value

with the satisfaction of interest. Parker contends that the primary argument for this identity is the fact that when one does an analysis of experience which possesses intrinsic value one always will find satisfaction present, and nothing else that could be identified as being its value.¹⁸ Under this definition the transgradient reference for value would be a state of satisfaction anticipated in the future and the meaning of the term interest would be this transgradient reference. In summation: value is the state of satisfaction which arises from interest fulfillment. Thus Parker has rejected the substantive relational definitions of value. Thus Parker reduces value to a subjective state of mind.

The most cogent criticism brought against this theory has been the "circular" refutation of Professor Urban¹⁹ - which may be summarized as follows: to define the good as the object or the satisfaction of desire is circular, because it assumes that desire or satisfaction is itself good, that fulfillment of desire is better than non-fulfillment; and this assumption is unwarranted, for do we not distinguish between good and bad desires; is not, in fact, the non-fulfillment of certain desires better than their fulfillment?²⁰ In other words the basis of Urban's argument is that the "interest" theories argue from the 'is' to the 'ought'. If value is merely the satisfaction of desire then all values would be on an equal footing. Such values as good, justice, beauty, etc.

would not, under this system, really be values at all for they themselves would become mere satisfaction of feeling. Parker adds weight to this argument when he affirms Professor Urban's suspicions.

"We cannot, I should say, ask of any satisfaction whether it is intrinsically good; for satisfaction is the intrinsically good; to do so would be as meaningless as to ask whether a man is a man or an elephant an elephant. It is likewise meaningless to ask whether fulfillment of desire is better than non-fulfillment when we are thinking of intrinsic good - just as meaningless as to ask whether good is better than bad; for fulfillment of desire is the intrinsically good and non-fulfillment is the intrinsically evil." 21

In his own words Professor Parker has confessed to the hedonistic fallacy, that of ignoring a qualitative aspect in value which demands a hierarchical comparison. The state of satisfaction that comes from eating a good meal and fulfilling the bodily value of subsistence would, I think, have to be recognized as somewhat less than the value of the 'beautiful vision' which also produces a state of satisfaction of a different sort. These states of satisfaction must be viewed in a hierarchy with reference to some ultimate value. It may be argued that this criticism might apply to ethical values but have no application as to associational

or recreational values. The answer to this position is that all values must be, in the end, interpreted in light of prime values or final values which are of their very essence ethical. But this position I do not wish to argue at this point but defer it for later consideration.

I believe this main criticism of the Perry-Parker interest theories makes them, at least, highly dubious. Yet there are some main concepts that can be appropriated from the theory without accepting it as a whole. The concept of states of satisfaction as being a part of every affective value situation I think is indisputable. If a value exists for an individual actualization of the conative valuational dispositions will produce in most cases a corresponding state of satisfaction as an attribute in that actualization. (Perhaps the ultimate state of satisfaction would come in a mystical vision and would be achievement of pure value as such). Also the concepts of instrumental or extrinsic value as opposed to intrinsic value has been introduced. This dualism of values demands a greater study which will be covered in the consideration of Professor Urban's theory. The third benefit we can appropriate from the 'interest' theories is the problem of value relation of subject to object. The interest theory should not be regarded as wholly wrong, as some are wont to do, but merely as incomplete.

B) The next general theory of axiology that is to be

considered is the deontological theory of morals which received its best expression in W. D. Ross's The Right and the Good and his Foundations of Ethics. This is the first group of value theories which maintains generally that value is an objective indefinable predicate. It is interesting to note that all analysis of this theory has been either very short or non-existent. Parker twice passes it over with the phrase "which I do not choose to discuss at this time."²² Professor Urban merely gives it short notice.²³ This is the position that must be taken, however, for the issues that it raises are only of secondary importance to epistemological valuation. The main questions it raises are whether right and duty are separable from the good or value and whether the theory of good in deontology is subjective or objective, for the good or value must have some place in ethics. In respect to the first issue both Ross and Urban maintain that, as far as their intuitive meaning is concerned, the right and the good are unique, or, better, sui generis and that neither is resolvable into the other; and at the same time assert that, as attributes of actions and things, they can be understood only as standing in organic relations the one to the other. Ross maintains, rightly I think, that all duty presupposes a recognition of intrinsic goods and vice versa. The relationship between ends (intrinsic values) and duties is of an equivalent nature. I think this can be shown by the inability

of thinking of one apart from the other. The main question in Ross is of primacy - which is to be considered as prior? The value would have to be first for duty seems to be derived from recognized values although it arises when they arise. Professor Urban maintains that the value as characterized by its 'oughtness-to-be' arises prior to the duty which is characterized by its 'oughtness-to-do'.²⁴ This relation is probably, as Ross maintains, *a priori* but this is only one aspect of it. A further aspect would arise when we consider shades of value and duty, a subject that Ross touches only lightly. But, again, these questions do not really concern us at this point. Ross did not give a clear definition of value, and his theory exists mainly in the form of an ethic, so with apologies I will omit it from the present discussion.

C) The third group of theories - the Platonic valuation of Urban and Sorley - are deserving of a more detailed and complete exposition. To this end the rest of this paper will be devoted. The justification for this overbalance in consideration is that these theories above all others seem to be most complete in explaining the character and place of value in human experience.

Urban, in his definition of value, attempts to answer the fundamental question in axiology. This question is of the nature of all determination of value; in other words of a definition which includes all forms of value. It is in the

light of a comprehensive definition of value that he criticizes other definitions that have been offered. In his book Fundamentals of Ethics²⁵ he divides value definition into three levels according to their completeness of definition. The first definition is of the Perry-Parker nature. It is the type which is most generally accepted uncritically. This is the idea "that value is that which satisfies human desire. All things that satisfy human desire have value, or are good."²⁶ Value would be the determination or quality of an object which involves any sort of appreciation or interest. In other words value is the feeling. Urban does not reject this concept, as has already been seen, but maintains that it is inadequate for expressing all forms of value. Back of this feeling or desire which are psychological tendencies lie biological tendencies or instincts broadly presupposed by the desire or feeling. Examples of this fact are numerous, some of the most obvious being the desire for food produced by the body demanding sustenance; or thirst produced by the bodily need for water. Most basic desires and feelings presuppose these biologic tendencies, therefore, these 'interest' or psychological theories of value become biological theories in the broader sense of the term. It can be seen that these biologic tendencies lead to the survival of the individual. They are directed to the preservation of bodily well-being and life. Herein arises the second broad

definition of value which includes the first. Value is now defined in terms of survival and enhancement of life, and the biological tendencies are graded according to some value-for-life. Value becomes "anything that furthers or conserves life" and value may be defined as "a phenomenon appearing in a psychological form."²⁷ It is at this point that the philosophic definition of value arises. This second definition is fine for the animal world but is inadequate for the human in his human capacity. By assuming that there is value in the continuance of life we are assuming that life itself has value and ought to be continued. I think it will be generally agreed that man has in his value structure values which in no way affect his status as a biological being and serve not for the enhancement of life but the enhancement of another side of his nature which may be called the spiritual attribute of man. Furthermore, if values get their significance from their teleological relationship to the enhancement of life, then surely life must get its significance from "absolute" values which it embodies; otherwise life and its relative values lose all their genuine meaning. "Life (human) is not necessarily a good in itself, but gets its value rather from that which living realizes"²⁸ (ultimate value). From an ultimate point of view, a knowledge of value is presupposed in any concept of a valuable life. Therefore, we must find a third definition of value which includes the other two.

To this end we have two possible choices. Either value is to be conceived of as a "logically primitive concept, and, therefore, indefinable (which is Ross's position) or as a function of the coherent organization of life or experience as a whole."²⁹ The first has been examined above and found to be in some aspects inadequate, so we are lead to accept some form of the latter. Urban defines value generally as "that alone is ultimately and intrinsically valuable that leads to the development of selves, or to self-realization."³⁰ In this definition it can be seen that axiology becomes an extension of ethics for the methods of self-realization are the study of ethics. Therefore, axiology becomes the basis for ethics and must deal with ultimates. It will also be recognized that Urban's definition includes only intrinsic values. This too is legitimate for all extrinsic or instrumental values, derive their value character from the higher or intrinsic values. By definition, instrumental values are a function of intrinsic values and exist only so far as they exhibit relationship to the intrinsic values. It has long been recognized by those who deal primarily with values; such as poets, religious-philosophers, et al; that there are three truely ultimate values. These are: 1) the intellectual value of Truth; 2) the aesthetic value of Beauty, and; 3) the moral value of Goodness (Plato's Justice). These values seem to be the ineffable realities

of self-realization. It is only through the understanding of their ontological status, and the functions of their use in value judgments that they can be finally understood or realized. This leads directly to our next problem of the consciousness of value.

§ 2

The problems which need to be considered under this section are largely of an epistemological character. What is the nature of the consciousness of value? What is the nature of the value-judgment? These and other questions are basic to axiological structure. Involved in the consciousness of value is the value-judgment itself. Therefore, this section will particularly be concerned with an examination of worth or value feelings.

A) The basic nature of all value-judgments can be formulated by an equation where 'x' the object (physical or non-physical) is said to have the ability of arousing 'y' the worth predicate in the subject. By the worth predicate is meant such terms as good, bad, beautiful, ugly, true, and false. For the unreflective worth or value consciousness these predicates exist in the 'objects' as tertiary qualities and one just as real in the object as the primary and secondary qualities which are parts of the physical objects of cognition. The best example of this unreflective consciousness of the value in an object occurs, probably, in judgments involving the aesthetic

value of beauty. When we say that such and such a picture is beautiful are we not maintaining that the picture has a quality which we entitle beauty existing in the picture itself? Yet it is generally admitted that this tertiary quality is in part subjectively determined in a way that the other qualities are not. "The judgment of value has accordingly been described as a mere assertion of the meaning of the object for the subject, or as an appreciation. When I say that the object's good or beautiful or noble, I assert a direct relation of the object to my feeling and will, a harmony between the object and my subjective disposition which is relatively independent of my judgment of existence of the object or judgment of the truth of the idea I have of the object. Existence is perceived; truth is thought; value is felt. But while the worth predicates are in the first place felt and not cognised, while they are at the third removed from pure objectivity, nevertheless, there is presupposed in every appreciation, in every judgment of value, a reference to reality and truth. The reference comes to the surface as soon as I ask such questions as these: is the object really useful or good? is it truly noble or beautiful? The feeling of value (consciousness of value) includes the feeling of reality. Appreciative meanings presuppose reality meanings."³¹

Here Urban draws an important distinction between the ways of knowing. There is a basic difference between the

existence, as perceived, of the primary and secondary qualities in an object and the existence the observer imputes to the tertiary quality. Although the worth predicate is applied to objects in the same way as the secondary predicates, such as black and soft; there is a basic difference in their character, at least a prima facie difference in the way in which the worth predicate or value belongs to an object from the inherence in the object of the qualities which are held to make up its nature. One basic difference in the primary and secondary qualities that sets them apart from the tertiary quality is that the former may only be imputed to material objects while the latter can be imputed to both objects and to non-physical events such as thoughts. Furthermore, the tertiary qualities, being one step farther removed from the nature of the object than either the primary qualities, which are said to be truly existing in the object itself, and the secondary qualities which are, perhaps, merely mental effects caused by some modification of the primary qualities, at any rate, in some sense due to the mind of the subject;³² then the tertiary qualities would be even more subjective. This would eventually lead to a completely subjective explanation of value which, from the previous discussion, will not do. Therefore, in the predication of value to an object there is a difference in kind from that of quantitative or qualitative predication.

B This leads directly into a further discussion of, perhaps,

one of the chief problems in value theory. If value is not a perceptible quality of objects, in the sense that primary and secondary qualities are perceptible, then what is the relation of the object to the subject that produces an imputed value in the object for the subject; or, in other words, gives the subject a consciousness of value in the object? This relation is not the same as the perceptual experience by which existence is imputed to an object but is a relation involving feeling or appreciation by which value is recognized in the object - if a relation at all. But first there needs to be an understanding of the way value, as a 'felt' quality, exists in the consciousness. Objects are valued in two ways, actually and ideally. This duality in value consciousness exhibits itself in situations of conflict between values. An action may be sanctioned in immediate appreciation, although from an objective, moral point of view, it must be condemned. The first value is instrumental for it can be judged in terms of the higher intrinsic values. In order for the object to have final value it must lead to the fulfillment of the intrinsic value. But, in this case, there also exists two attitudes toward the object. One is the presumption of real value in the object that would lead to the fulfillment of desires etc; the second which involves the value-judgment is the ideal value where worth is attributed to the object because it deserves to be valued irrespective of the fact

that any person or persons actually do value it. "In both cases the real and the ideal values are equally functions of the relation of the object to the subject. The difference lies in the attitude of the subject, in the different presuppositions of the feeling in the two cases."³³ The basic presupposition in the value judgment is the presupposition of reality. In every judgment of value there must exist a presupposition of reality of the value for the judgment to arise. These presuppositions manifest themselves in two ways: the presupposition of the actual value in the object, and the presupposition of the reality of ideal value in light of which the object is judged. Therefore, worth judgments express not attributes of objects apart from the subject, even when the value is described as actual, but rather functions of the relation of subject to object. The transition from actual to ideal value occurs when the attribution of value to the object ceases to be determined by the immediate or immanent reference and becomes a function of a transgradient reference to higher values; the judgment decides whether the object deserves to be valued in light of these higher values. This second case also expresses a relation, but one of a different nature than the relative which exists in the judgment of actual value. The relation becomes projected out of the immanent situation into the future. The attitude of the subject depends upon a transgradient reference

and the continuation of value is judged. This judgment of continuation of value always depends upon a higher intrinsic value for the verification, for it is only as far as an object deserves to be valued that it will be valued at some future date. The ideal value of an object is relatively stable while the actual value of an object changes as the situation of the subject changes. The actual value depends upon dispositions of the subject, which are fluctuatory; while the ideal value depends upon a relatively permanent disposition of the subject in which he wills that the object be valued and judges that the object deserves to be valued. This volitional aspect is a product of the 'wills' determination by intrinsic values. Therefore, this relation between object and subject which arouses the consciousness of value for the subject is a result of the "funded meaning"³⁴ of the object for the subject. Or, to describe the relation better, it consists of the "affective - volitional meanings"³⁵ of the object for the subject and it is asserted that the object has the power to arouse value experience.

The attitude of the subject of this relation may be one of three: 1) simple appreciation of the affective - volitional meaning of the object for the self which is immediate and transitory. These are 'condition' worths which are determined by feelings of the individual which presuppose merely presumptions, judgments, or assumptions of existence or

non-existence of objects immediately or remotely desirable. They are called condition worths for the feelings which are aroused (by the object), when abstracted from the object and viewed retrospectively, refer not to the idea of the self, but to the affective condition of the organism. These arouse the primary consciousness of value in an object from which comes the primitive or first definition of value (see above P.16). This simple appreciation may be called also the primary value-consciousness. The act of value-judgment involved in simple appreciation is usually presumption of value-reality.

The second type of value-consciousness may be called individual worths. These values are subjective in that they are directly relative to the person holding them. For an object to arouse individual value-consciousness meaning there must exist a judgment involving a transredient reference to ideal personality. This ideal personality must remain a basic presupposition in all judgments of individual - worth meanings. This ideal personality is the self as idealized by the present self. It is a purpose for the present self to become the idealized self. This idealized self is a subjective value held in its unique form only by the individual. Each individual visualizes or projects his idealized self in a form different than all other individuals. Each situation that arises is judged or given worth predicate proportional to the

instrumentality it carries toward the realization of the ideal self. This ideal self is at the same time both intrinsic and instrumental. The relation here is triangular between the object and subject for it is a relation between both the present self and the ideal self, the value of the object being the change which it will produce in moving toward the ideal self from the immediate self. The funded meaning of the object is the degree to which it will lead to the realization of the ideal self. The judgment which produces this consciousness is always or almost always of instrumental worth in the object. This judgment is on a different and higher level than the value-consciousness of simple-appreciation for through this value-consciousness of the ideal personality or individual worth all values of simple appreciation can be evaluated. "Through reference to the ideal of the person, and through contrast with condition worths, the disposition becomes the object of feelings qualitatively different from the feelings of simple appreciation. But not only is this qualitatively new meaning acquired. The feelings of value, with these acquired presuppositions, have greater transgredient and immanental reference, greater depth and breadth in the personality. They represent, therefore, an absolute increase in the degree of value or affective - volitional meaning. In general, personal worths have preference over condition worths. The demand to realize personal worths, as represented in feelings of 'personal'

obligation is more intense than the (interest) obligation attached to objects of (simple-appreciation)."³⁶ They are more demanding because they carry a greater capacity for continuous valuation. An example of the preference that an individual worth would take over the value of simple appreciation is in a simple choice between two varieties of food. If the individual includes in his idealized self bodily well-being then he would have a criterion of choice between two varieties of food that would produce the same value of simple-appreciation, that of relieving hunger. One variety of food would have more value for him for it would lead to bodily well-being where the other wouldn't.

The third type of value-consciousness is the impersonal attitude, in which the subject of the judgment is identified with an impersonal over-individual subject and the value of the object is determined by explicit reference to the over-individual demand."³⁷ This is a consciousness in which values are seen to exist apart from the subject. Objects of over-individual value are those, the value of which is recognized by the subject. An object is imputed with over-individual value or transcendent value is so far as it participates in that value. The consciousness of these values arises in an entirely different way than does the preceding two. The relation from which value is imputed is one of participation not one of direct cause and affect relation. Transcendent

values differ in their appreciation for they are not appreciated because they produce another value (viz satisfaction) in the individual, but are appreciated for themselves as independently existing realities. Whereas, in the case of conditional worths they gain value only by their instrumental character in producing a state of satisfaction which is intrinsic; and in individual worths, by their instrumental character, in producing the idealized personality which, when achieved, produces a deeper state of satisfaction, they are not instrumental but intrinsic and the satisfaction derived in the individual is through participation in them. A complete state of satisfaction can not be achieved as in, say simple appreciation, unless the participation is complete. Judgments of objects in respect to these values are dependent upon the degree to which the value is visualized or cognised. In most individuals such judgments will vary in a marked degree in proportion to the knowledge one has of the imputed value. These judgments are always relative for they are of the degree of participation. Therefore, to be proper, they should be adverbial to imply their own relativity to the judging subject. These values are higher or more inclusive than the other two for they are the determinate of the other two. The consciousness of objects of simple appreciation can be evaluated as to their participation in these transcendent values as can the value-consciousness of objects of personal worth. In fact the idealized


personality is evaluated as to its participation in the transcendent values.

The rest of this paper will be devoted to the mode of being of the transcendent values, the methods of knowledge of them etc. - for they seem to be the means of ultimate determination of all other value.

C) From the preceding discussion, consciousness of value can be seen to be the process of making evaluation or value-judgments. The value-judgment determines the affective-volitional meaning, expressed in the relation of the object for the subject. The object is judged to have value if it arouses one of three attitudes in the subject. These are:

- 1) simple-appreciation which is a triangular relation of the object to the subject whereby the object is judged to be capable of producing a state of satisfied in the subject in an immediate sense;
- 2) individual worth which is a triangular relation which is projected to an idealized personality presupposed by the individual whereby the object is judged as an aid in realizing the ideal personality; and
- 3) over-individual or transcendent value which is a triangular relation whereby the object is judged to participate in a transcendent value to a certain degree.


①



a single time experience


Purely relational

② Y^n (with z)



Part relational
Part participatory

③



Participatory

The value is not a quality of an object nor is it directly perceived but is felt or recognized. The value of an object is a part of the object but not structurally. It is the ability of the object to produce, or the degree that an object exhibits a manifestation of a transcendent value. The degree of participation determines the capacity of the object to fulfill the lower values.

§ 3

A problem that can no longer be avoided is the question of objectivity or subjectivity of the transcendent value. The general view that has been implied is that certain values are largely subjective while the transcendent value is objective. Here a Platonic position is taken and the conception of the transcendent value follows a general Platonic ~~scheme~~. There are two choices possible, either the transcendent value is objective or else it has no reality apart from the mind of the subject who affirms them. This is the idealism and realism battle or more historically the

nominalism-realism battle. Yet in trying to establish the independent reality of the transcendent value we do not have the same perceptual coerciveness that the realist can depend upon to substantiate his view. A naturalistic point of view is untenable for the objectivity of value. This has been shown previously by the rejection of tertiary qualities. This rejection has made explicit the point that values, if they exist independently, have a different mode of existence than does the perceptual object. Therefore, the term of existence is not appropriate to the realm of value. Existence shall rather be used to denote, as in Kant, 'absolute position' in the perceptual experience. As has been seen, values are not part of the nexus of perceptual experience. They do not exist. But we can say that objects have being. When we speak of a value as having being we do not mean that it exists as a particular apple exists but moreover we mean that it has the same type of reality as blueness or triangularity. We say of a value such as Goodness that it is and has being but does not exist. This is a basic difference that causes a great deal of confusion if it goes recognized. Plato was vulnerable to great criticism when he had to assert, by nature of his language, that the 'ideas' had existence and were because they were permanent, eternal; but he could not use this same term for the world of perceptual experience for they exhibited flux and decay; therefore, they were not.

To us this would mean that they had no being. This was not Plato's meaning. In modern terminology, we can avoid this confusion by asserting that the objects of perceptual experience exist and have being, and that the universals have being but do not exist. Existence belongs to individuals only; but being may be ascribed to a group of objects of thought indefinitely. This group of objects to which we attribute being we say has objective reality. Therefore, a better formulation of the problem would be: Do values have being or are they merely subjective generalizations which are un-real. As has been stated above all value-judgments presuppose value-reality, therefore, it is this presupposition that is being examined. It may be by means of conative or affective experience that we arrive at judgment of value, just as sensual experience leads to the judgments of sense-perception. But in neither case does the origin constitute the meaning of the judgment. In both cases there is a reference to something beyond the mental state of the subject - to a value which he appreciates or to an object which he apprehends. There is a view that the value predicated judgment not only arises out of, but can be reduced to, the mode of valuation;³⁸ it consists in the relation which some content presented to a subject has to that subject's sensibility, thus producing a state of satisfaction. This view would, accordingly, explain value as a relation to the subject.

But this view is founded upon a confusion between the process by means of which we become aware of value (the value-consciousness and the judgments) and the value itself. Probably in the end value nominalism cannot be refuted absolutely for we are not dealing with existant objects which carry sense coerciveness. But we have to attribute objectivity to values if value-judgments are to have any meaning at all. To say that an action is good, or that an object is beautiful has no meaning unless there is a criterion which is apart from the judging subject. But the prime argument for asserting the objectivity of values or the mind-independent character of values is in principle the same as that for the independence of sense-data. The distinction between the sensation blue and the datum blue is no more and no less significant than the distinction between the feeling of value and the value datum of which we become aware through the value-consciousness. The significance of values just as the significance of knowledge depends upon the acknowledgment of their objective status, and it is this, in the last analysis, which is determinative. The argument in this case has to be dialectical in the same manner that the argument for objectivity of sense objects in the physical sciences is dialectical. In the end, as asserted before, value nominalism cannot be refuted but the reasons for adopting a realistic attitude seems persuasive, in that only through affirmation of the objective

reality of values can any value be felt or seen to be. Therefore, for the purposes of the present discussion it will be assumed that transcendent values have being and are by their nature objective realities.

§ 4

As has been suggested before all values can generally be classified into two distinct groups: intrinsic and instrumental. An intrinsic value is one which can be valued for its own sake. That is, it depends upon no higher value for its meaning. An instrumental or extrinsic value is a means to an intrinsic value. It is inseparable from the intrinsic value from which it derives its meaning or 'funded' character. Furthermore, we saw that there are three levels of value-consciousness, to which correspond the three types of value: The values of simple-appreciation; the individual values, or the values of personal worth; and lastly the transcendent values. Also the principle was stated that lower values may be evaluated in terms of higher values. Everett constructed a table of values³⁹ which has become standard. Thus all values are classified into eight basic types.

- I Bodily Values
- II Economic Values
- III Values of Recreation
- IV Values of Association
- V Character Values

VI Aesthetic Values

VII Intellectual Values

VIII Religious Values

This table is not perfect but serves merely as a preliminary grouping which is useful for a starting point to further examination. Primarily, all the values contained in this table are clearly recognizable. The classification that is here presented is not indicative of any hierarchy of values but only a comprehensive classification. These eight groups can be further divided into three others: Organic, Social, and Spiritual, and the last two included under Hyper-Organic.

ORGANIC Bodily
Economic
Recreation

HYPER-
ORGANIC Social Character
Association
Spiritual Aesthetic
Intellectual
Religious

These are natural groupings, for the first group achieves value in the satisfaction of bodily wants; the second arise only with the self in society and the third arise only insofar as the self is projected beyond the other two groups. We

can see that each of these values fulfills a primary definition of value as presented by Urban - they all lead to the realization of some aspect of the self. Of this whole list only one classification can be recognized as entirely instrumental - these are the economic values. All economic values exist for the fulfillment of one of the other classes. Food exists for the bodily value, money is acquired so that the other values may receive more attention. By the character of its complete instrumentality the Economic value takes the place of lowest in our value hierarchy. The next two are Bodily and Recreation, Bodily being lower than Recreational because it is instrumental to the Recreational Value. The others fall in line with the spiritual values and the Character Value coming at the top of the list. The Character Value is the peculiar value to personal worth but this takes its meaning from the spiritual values. It is in dealing with these spiritual values that we run into difficulties and the table becomes not quite perfect. For the spiritual values form the basic predicates of valuation. These are Truth, Goodness, and Beauty. And may be called, in order the Logical Value, the Ethical Value, and the Aesthetic Value. These three values are not clearly and directly recognized but constitute the class of transcendent values. They are the determinates of all other values lower on the scale. Take for example the personal worth-happiness.

This can be included under the Character Value group for it is a value of personal worth. All the lower values are instrumental to it. Yet it is not instrumental to the three ultimate values but derives ideal value as far as it participates in them. These three prime values are independent, they require no relational connections to give them validity. They are the Platonic archetypes - eternal, immutable but part of the nature of reality. Yet these three prime values, although irreducible to each other do not have being apart from each other, they are co-ordinated closely and judgment of one involves the other two. This co-ordination has been recognized by some of the poets, the classic example being Keats' declaration that "beauty is truth, and truth beauty." Yet, although Keats recognized that these values were co-ordinated, in his mind they were carried a step further and became reducible to each other. This is a confusion of values. Beauty is beauty - not truth, although they invariably appear together. The very nature of Keats' confusion suggests that a closer examination of each of the prime values is required.

A) Truth has most often of the three prime values been denied being by many thinkers. It has been maintained by one school of thinkers that truth is simply a concise expression for working efficiency; that it is capable of analysis into certain other values, and that all so-called intellectual values have their real value in relation to some other function than

intellectual apprehension. On this view truth would not be a prime value. One aspect of the personality that this view overlooks is the independent interest in knowing which characterises the maturity of the human mind. The attainment of intelligence can be distinguished from goodness or beauty mainly by its personification in the individual attitude. The person, in so far as he recognizes truth in a system of propositions believes or asserts it of them. This attitude is basically different from the attitude of approval that comes from the judgment of goodness, or of admiration from that of beauty. But it must be remembered that no proposition is perfectly true save truth itself. No knowledge is gained of truth through true propositions but the belief consists mainly of appreciation for their participation in absolute or perfect truth. "It is knowledge of truth or truth as known, that has value. Man as a thinking being finds value in the truth which he seeks; it may even become the chief aim of his life, and he cherishes it on its own account - not as something alien to himself, but as completing or perfecting his own intellectual nature."⁴⁰ Knowledge of truth comes only through the participation of the individual in it. But this is an epistemological question and will be considered in the following section.

B) More closely connected are the prime values Goodness and Beauty. The differences between them can be seen in the type

of appreciation which they exhibit in the value-consciousness. Our appreciation of beauty in an object differs, not to a great extent, but nonetheless differs from our appreciation of a good deed. The former is admiration and the latter - approval. Many times these two attitudes are combined in one judgment. When we say that a picture is good many times we are not merely expressing an admiration for the artist but also our approval of it and its author. In such times as are now used - "beautiful soul" etc. we see a term of aesthetic admiration used to express high moral approbation. But even here there seems to be a combination of the two modes of appreciation rather than identity. The soul is beautiful because of its harmony with the ethical ideal and both modes of appreciation are appropriate. The difference between the two judgments can be clearly seen if they are considered in opposition. Take a statement such as "the fine art of stealing" here we have a sense of admiration for the degree and perfection to which the thief has carried his peculiar skill, yet it does not meet with our approbation. Therefore, it exhibits beauty to some degree but its goodness is on a very low level. Perfect goodness and perfect beauty do not exist in the world of sense experience. As has been said before (P.30) they do not exist - they have a type of reality that existence does not have. Yet consciousness of these forms can arise through recognition in existing

objects. This occurs by a process of abstraction.⁴¹

C) These ultimate values are the only complete intrinsic values for they are the only permanent ones. They are the three universally existing values which do not change. All other values, save the economic value, (and even this acquires intrinsic value in the hands of a miser) are in part intrinsic and in part extrinsic. The hierarchy of values can be arranged according to the inclusiveness of the value. Values which are higher on the scale will include the lower values as instrumental to them. Another means of classification would be on the criteria of means and ends. All instrumental values are a means to the extrinsic value which is the end. All purely intrinsic values are ideal and nowhere show actuality. Values of simple appreciation are lowest on the scale for they are the means to states of satisfaction in the individual and also are means to the next higher level of valuation. This next level is not existent the same way that the values of simple appreciation are existent but are essences. Each individual has an ideal which is his realized self and this is the prime meaning of value for the individual. Personal worths are the usual determining factor of action for the individual. Yet these personal worths are lower on the scale than the transcendent values for the ideal personality is determined to a large extent by the three transcendents. Valuation can then be thought of in Platonic-Aristotelian terms. The values

themselves have the characteristics of the Platonic ideas. The lower values are arranged on an ascending scale in so far as they exhibit or participate in the eternal ideas. The transcendent values are the only true catholic - non-exclusive. By catholic is meant values in which all men may participate and who's enjoyment by one man does not limit or interfere with their equal enjoyment by others. As can readily be seen the values of simple-appreciation are exclusive, for their enjoyment by one means the subsequent loss for all others. There are four values which deserve the term catholic, these are: Happiness - the personal with archetype and the three transcendentals. In all of these every man can be a participant without making the value exclusive for himself.

There have been two methods of comparative valuation, that of a scale and that of a system. A scale depends upon empirical and quantitative analysis. To build a scale of values one must start on the assumption that each valuable object has a definite ~~quant~~ quantity of something which is always the same in kind and can be measured by the quantity of it which they contain. A scale which is built upon this hypothesis, although fine in theory, will not work practically for it depends upon knowledge of the limits of the scale. To construct a scale we would first have to know the uppermost limit and be able to construct from this knowledge a value


calculus. Furthermore, the values would be measured as to quantity, not quality which is their real attribute. And lastly a scale depends upon an identifiable, existent attribute in objects which can be measured. This fallacy of ascribing a quality to an object called value has been examined and discarded. The difficulties of such a scale make it practically impossible to construct.

The question may be asked: does not the criteria of participation give a quantitative distinction between values, and, therefore, could they not be arranged according to their participation in the higher values? My answer to this would be that if the relative participation of values in the higher value could be found then they could be arranged on a scale, but again this depends upon a complete knowledge of the values which are participated in,- in reality a lasting mystical experience. Who would construct such a scale would be a very difficult problem to deal with.


Sorley gives a clue to the comparison of values when he states: "If we are to compare values at all, it appears to me that we must give up the idea of a scale for that of a system." "The clue," says Sorley, "will to be sought in the idea of a system to which the values belong. Now the subject of values - that is, the conscious person - when he tries to rationalize his life, does attempt also to systematize his values: partly deliberately, partly unconsciously,

he gradually forms a dominating conception which determines his conduct and his view of what is of greatest worth."⁴² It may be added to this that in this very system, constructed by the individual, that determines his idealized personality. The central focus or dominant value of one man's life may be different from that of another. Each pursues his own "happiness" according to his special capabilities. Yet behind the difference in achievement there remains an identity of principle. "All men, in their various ways, may be guided by the same principle, each seeking to make his life perfect by the highest performance in his power."⁴³ This principle Plato called justice, Aristotle-happiness the label matters little, what is important is that it must be a principle of self-realization and it demands a philosophy of the spirit or a complete identification of value with reality. Thus insistence upon self-realization recalls the primary definition of value arrived at in Section II, § 1 C - That alone is ultimately and intrinsically valuable that leads to the development of selves, or to self-realization.

A preliminary system of values may be constructed on the lines of the preceding argument. This system is not to be construed as any sense final or definitive but merely as a possible way of looking at value in a system. This system may be divided into two levels - personal / impersonal as below.



The lines in this diagram do not represent direct relations but only show some sort of connection. Below the line there is relational connections as to means and ends, but this exists merely on the lowest level. Another means of classification could be on the criterion of catholicity.



No system is apt to be right unless there is a complete idea of spirit and reality behind it. It is to this main problem that I now turn.

III

§ 1

The material for this section is taken mainly from The Imprisoned Splendor by Raynor Johnson; Moral Values and the Idea of God by W. R. Sorley; Beyond Idealism and Realism by W. M. Urban; The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy by J. H. Muirhead; and Appearance and Reality by F. H. Bradley. This test is not exclusive (i.e., it does not mean that other works could not be used, but these are the clearest formulation of the rather inexact problem of Values and Reality). The method of this section will be to consider value in terms of reality and as an expression of reality and then to determine the general methods of knowledge that lead to this 'reality'. Reality here will be taken to mean that which is not imaginary or illusory. It is nearly equivalent to 'existence' as previously defined above with two main differences. "In the first place, it marks its object off from the imaginary, although the imaginary always has existence as a mental fact. In the second place, reality and real are used not only of the existing things to which, through our perceptive and intellectual process, a measure of independence has been ascribed; but also of those factors in the conditions and behaviors of existing things to which we do not assign existence by themselves, although without them the things could not be as they are."⁴⁴ Thus reality would

include the 'laws' of science, mathematical relations for both of these things constitute part of the nature of the universe. Values, it will be argued, are of reality because they also are in a different way constituents of the nature of the universe. The main evidence for the belief in the nature of reality must either be supplied by the mystics or by realization in our own minds. 'Reality' as Reality cannot be perceived directly. This led Kant to deny any knowledge of the world of Reality in the noumenal. Kant was most probably right if he meant that we can have no knowledge of Reality in the same way that we have knowledge of the sense-data for it is knowledge that comes through perception and carries as its mode 'existence'. But Reality includes both existence and non-existence, its judgment is of being and this judgment does not occur in the same way as our judgments of perception. The quarrel between idealism and realism does not arise on the value level for the concept of objectivity of value held by both idealist and realist show a transcendence above this controversy. The idealist and realist argument is concerned primarily with existence and thereby is concerned only with the world of perceptual experience. For purposes of abbreviation we may assume that whatever the nature of existence is, it has being and, therefore, is included in Reality. With this assumption we already include in Reality all of the existent physical world including

the objects, laws which govern them, and the mathematics which seem to order it. This transcendence of Reality above the quarrel (as outlined by Urban in Beyond Idealism and Realism) a certain freedom of action that would not be possessed in epistemological forms of thought. Urban gives a good starting point for this discussion in his Chapter - 'The Philosophy of Spirit',⁴⁵ - "Idealism has always been the humanistic philosophy per excellence. It has constantly maintained a value realism, but it has always maintained that the objective reality of values is bound up with a spiritualistic metaphysic, and that they lose their significance if the rational basis for such a metaphysic is denied. Naturalistic humanism, on the other hand, denies this contention. It maintains that the human significance of values is wholly independent of the cosmic background and that, indeed, so it is maintained by some, to give them cosmic significance is to destroy their human significance. It may be described as an attempt to synthesize a humanistic idealism with a scientific naturalism - an attempt which, is one of the outstanding characteristic of present day philosophy."⁴⁶ Here we have two main positions as to the locus of value in reality.

§ 2

Naturalistic humanism has as its main assumption: the world of reality is the world of existence only, nothing is to be included in reality that does not exist as an objective

entity of experience in the world of objects. "It not only denies the cosmic significance of values, but often goes so far as to assert that such a notion is in some fashion mimical to human values themselves."⁴⁷ For this position any humanization of the cosmos means the moral annulment of man.

This is a perennial idea as old as philosophy itself. It is the common assertion that to postulate a transcendent reality is to degrade mankind. Another common assertion of this position is: "If values are transcendent and grounded in ~~ultimate being~~ are they not unreachable and, therefore, it is futile to attempt any realization in the self?" Yet when we examine the lives of those that held transcendent values we find in a number of cases a greater self-realization than those who set supposedly attainable goals. In the pragmatic argument is not valid in this case.

The theoretical grounds for such an assertion are no more compelling than the practical. The naturalist demands a non-human universe, he maintains that to assert the cosmic significance of value is to humanize the cosmos. The difficulty in this position is that values, even though they are human, are objective - they have being in reality. Therefore, values are more than human or are transcendent and are part of reality. The naturalist demands that man stay out of reality yet he has no more basis for this prejudice than the

mere love of a well ordered mechanical cosmos which can be identified in perceptual experience. The 'joker' here is that many physicists are now asserting that the cosmos of perceptual experience is not the ideal cosmos of mechanical causation. This is a form imposed upon the world of sense-experience by the mind. As soon as one realizes that the laws of thought are the laws of things in sense-experience, and that the forms and relations that constitute mechanical causation are not an element in sense-experience then there exists no more reason for expecting mechanical causation as the nature of reality than transcendent values. The most sensible view would seem to be to accept all levels of human experience as indicative of different aspects of total reality. The assumption that casual and axiological determinates are the only possibilities and that a third immanent, free teleology, which involves no determinations is impossible is overly restrictive of reality.


Such a free teleology "far from meaning the moral annulment of men, seems to be a necessary presupposition of the human. The essence of human purpose is the actualization of the ends, and of the values they presuppose. But surely, unless these values, when actualized and enhanced, were also conserved human teleology would have no ultimate significance."⁴⁸ Unless values have a significance as being in reality, the actualization of values by man as a moral being, has no meaning.

It is possible to conceive of the world of naturalism theoretically only if we omit the human being from this world, but as soon as we allow him to re-enter a larger perspective of reality opens up, a perspective which includes ideal values. Bradley enforces this idea of deriving our ideas of reality from man's total experience when he states "We have seen that in reality there can be no mere physical Nature. The world of physical science is not something independent, but is a mere element in one total experience."⁴⁹ Other criticisms can be leveled at the position of the naturalistic humanist but I believe all in all that the preceding are grounds enough to adopt the idea that this position is unsatisfactory in its explanation of Reality. The idealistic insistence upon the priority and privileged character of values in the understanding and interpretation of the human seems to be more satisfactory. But this carries with it the implication that a completely idealistic interpretation of reality will be accepted. I don't believe that this can be done for, in the main, the idealists, while being the superior in their treatment of the axiological side of reality are somewhat wanting in the natural side - therefore, Reality must be a combination of idealism and realism into an absolute.

§ 3

All of the men in the works cited above (III Sec. § 1) are lead to the same general conclusion: Reality must be

a unity of philosophical or human experience. Bradley postulates "the Absolute", Urban the "philosophia perennis" and Sorley "Reality". All, I think are advancing in the same direction - toward a unity that would serve as the ground or teleological 'cause' for all human experience. Sorley states "If we would reach a true view of the connection of value with reality, we must bear these points in mind. The validity of ideas of value differs from the validity of physical principles. This difference, however, is not a difference in degree of validity. It is a difference in the reference of the respective classes of principle: values are valid for persons; physical principles are valid of material things; and this difference is the ground of the different parts of validity possessed by each."⁵⁰ Sorley then divides Reality into three divisions: "1) existents, among which we distinguish persons from what may be called simply things; 2) relation between existing things, of which the 'laws of nature' may be taken as an example; and 3) values".⁵¹ These divisions of reality would correspond to the levels of experience that Johnson shows in his diagram.⁵²



This diagram of Johnson's is used to illustrate the levels of the mind. To Sorley reality exists on every level of the mind and is in part sensed by every level. Sorley doesn't mean, however, that Reality is conscious at every level of the experience but merely that once Reality has been recognized it can be seen on every level of experience.

The first division of reality is a classification of the objects of knowledge (Belief to Plato). The reality of this division is not reality of the same type as perceptual reality. This reality is of the structure that holds perceptual reality together. To assume this reality Sorley gives five propositions to support it. These in substance conform to the arguments present by Urban for the reality of the perceptual object.⁵³

"1) "Existence is given in the fact or act of knowledge."

(This would include Kant's criterion of coerciveness).

2) "In knowledge the subject is aware of an object which is other than itself - at least than itself as the subject knowing."

3) "The object of knowledge is not an isolated something." (This is the criteria of coherence. This coherence or system Sorley calls the 'objective continuum'.)

4) The fourth is a reinforcement of the third. "As the things which we distinguish in the 'objective

continuum', and with which we have dealings practical and cognitive, are not isolated or "distinct existence" but portions of a connected whole, so the relations which we look upon as connecting are things with another have equally an objective basis." (This proposition of objective order has been severely attacked by the idealists and is, at best on shaky grounds).

- 5) The fifth proposition concerns introspection or self-knowledge. There is a problem here because the other forms of knowledge consisted in a subject to object relation and assumed that all knowledge was relational. So Sorley is forced to state the proposition as follows: "knowledge of self is distinguished from knowledge of any other object in as much as it involves explicit consciousness as an object of that self whose activity is the condition of knowledge of every kind; and this consciousness of self is implicit in all our other consciousness." There is a very interesting problem here that will be covered more fully in the section concerning knowledge of reality or of the 'absolute'.

This first division of reality falls under the criticism that it is not true reality but mere 'appearance'. But as this idealist-realist controversy is not really pertinent to the

present inquiry it can be omitted without too much loss. For the purposes of the present inquiry the position is taken that the objects of sense-experience are existent and have a form of being and thereby are part of reality. Of these existents there are three 1) Selves, which possess or accrue a material embodiment, an inner life. 2) Similar unities on an inferior level. (Such as dogs and cats) 3) Material objects which we class as existent, but the constituents of which are without the individuality that characterize persons and even quasi-persons. But which have not independent reality apart from their whole environment. They are a part of reality as far as they inhere in the structure of the physical world. The reality possessed on this level is the reality of the formless material which is formed by the second division of reality to which we now turn.⁵⁴

The second division of reality - the sphere of relation - is on a different level than that of the 'existents'. Relations are abstract and universal, not concrete and individual like the members of the existent groups. In Plato these relations received a status of reality which was higher than that of the existents. This is the world of the mathematical objects which is characterized by the corresponding state of mind-thinking. In thought, relations join existents to give the content of awareness intelligibility. To Kant these relations were regarded as super added by the subject of knowledge

to a pre-existing formless material. The universal such as man, planet, or the like, has no separate existence apart from the individual is the Aristotelian - Sorley point of view, while the Platonic point of view is that these relations are independently existing. The problem has greater significance for the present inquiry than the question of the reality of existents. The answer that is given to this question will in a large part determine the reality that is given to values. This problem here is of the ontological status of the rational entities. These are always relations for the reason. Therefore, the universal is a relation between many objects held in common, a mathematical principle is relation of ideal properties - (the equations, axioms are all expressed in terms of relations), a scientific principle is a relation which applies between similar existents. The general view which Sorley adopts is that these relations are only as they exist between existent objects. "When we discuss the reality of relations, what we are thinking of is not the reality of the general formula, but the reality of the relation as it is in this and other particular cases."⁵⁵ This is the driving force of empirical philosophy. For it takes the position that 'horse I see but horseness I do not'. The relations have the same character as the universals. So the question becomes do universals have real being apart from the particular manifestations of them? Universals being predicates such as

redness, roundness, etc. One of the best discussions of this problem occurs in B. B. More's Platonism and the general argument presented here will follow the same lines.

§ 4

Plato separates his universals or ideas into two main categories - those which constitute a class of things in nature and correspond to the genus or species of natural science such as men or cats; or in the other case, it is of a class of manufactured objects such as tables and shoes. But is this idea an entity apart from the individual objects, of which it is the pre-existent cause; and if so, how and where does it exist? Where do we draw the line between what are universals and what are not? These and other difficulties exist when a pre-existed universal is posited. Yet the nature of the universal is such that it requires independent existence. When we speak of men as men or better as carrying the quality of manness are we not in truth positing a perfect generalization. What is the cause of this generalization? In defending the universals we must consider their generic character. Universals are, in the first place, generalizations characterizing a class of objects. Now it can be seen that in these classes almost all of the objects differ in almost every way. As soon as we try to isolate certain characteristics of members of that class we run into the problem of perfection. (perfect

realization). When we abstract a characteristic we imbue it with perfection and it can be seen that no participant in the class carries this perfection. Therefore, the 'object-universal' is a perfect object of which there are no manifestations. Without this universal object there is no basis either for classification or for any principle of purpose or teleology. All comparisons break down without the pre-existing perfect individual (which has no existence) and the world becomes only a world of individuals. No one individual can be compared with any other. The difficulties in such a view are endless, for without these comparisons there can be no predicates or universal nouns. Language becomes useless or at the best primitive where each object is given a different name and no similarity is seen between objects. Therefore, for merely practical purposes universals have to be accepted as independent realities - not merely as generalizations that have no independent reality. Even in such a view there are insoluble difficulties as testified by the debates of the medieval scholastic philosophers. The question seems in the end to be insoluble. In a general way independent universals have to be accepted as independent or a basis for science and language and upon this merely pragmatic character they will be accepted here as independent. We have to accept with Plato the reality of universals or pre-existent entities without attempting to explain the nature

of their being. But does this problem also arise in our third divisions of reality - the world of values?

§ 5

Sorley says of values that they are similar to relations, as relations are found in rebus, so the former are always manifested in personis. Yet the value as manifested in personis is only a small part of the value about which we speak, even of the value which we seek to realize. Therefore, this value, as manifested, cannot yet be said to be real. Sorley takes the position "that persons cannot be understood by what they have achieved at any given moment: that their nature is to be realizers of value".⁵⁶ Sorley takes a position as to the reality of values as follows. To say that values belong to the nature of reality, two things are implied. In the first place, "the statement implies an objectivity which is independent of the achievements of persons in informing their lives with these values, and is even independent of their recognizing their validity. Their reality is an imperative reality".⁵⁷ This implies that their reality does not depend upon their acceptance by individuals they are not subjective but have another higher source. In some way they must belong to the system or order of the universe. The second implication this position is "Reality, whatever other manifestations it may have, is manifested in persons;"⁵⁸ objective value determines the lives of men, they seek their

fulfillment. "Value is objective, but the kind of being it possesses is conceived as something apart from the existing universe. Values characterize personal life as completed or perfected; they are factors in the fulfillment of purpose, and purpose is an essential trait of personality. It is possible that they never obtain complete realization in time. But, even so, they will express the limit towards which the nature of persons points and press. In this way they belong to the same total of reality as an existing system."⁵⁹ This position of Sorley's presumes a general Platonic conception of values as independent perfect realities. It demands that they be the highest type reality. Yet Sorley takes one issue with Plato. He demands that the values be directly connected with persons; that they be brought into existence by persons.

In criticizing Sorley's view we can also include another view which maintains that beautiful things and good actions exist but an idea of an absolute unchangeable transcendent an idea as eternally real apart from the particular manifestation is a manifold absurdity. We can ask this more radical critic to name anything which at one point appears beautiful which at another point may appear ugly, or any good action which may not appear bad under other circumstances. Is not the position that these good actions and beautiful objects are merely relative to the condition of the viewer. If one concerns himself merely with the world of particular he cannot

help but see this flux in valuation for, as has been suggested before, the judgment of participation of particulars in the transcendent values depends upon the knowledge one has of the transcendent values (i.e. one's own participation in them). This point can be shown by St. Paul's judgment of himself as 'the chiefest of sinners'. This he could only do through a greater realization of the value of goodness and would not correspond to our judgments of him in the least. Therefore, our particular value-judgments are mere opinion and do not constitute knowledge in the true or Platonic sense of the world. To the believer in value flux we have two answers: First of all, judgments of value in objects are completely meaningless without a criterion upon which to base them. One cannot even assert that they are good or bad for him unless he has a criterion of comparison.

Now either this criterion is a product of the self or it is pre-existent, eternal and independent of the individual. If we take the development of a criterion a step farther we see that the personal criterion must arise somewhere. It is not through judgments of object-worth for this would make these judgments prior to the criterion which is an absurdity. Therefore, this criterion must arise through a recognition of pre-existent immutable realities. The proof of their being must be pragmatic in character for without them no sound basis for morality can be discovered. "They are, in fact, the very

realities of our spiritual life, in comparison with which all the solid-seeming phenomena of earth are things evanescent and unreal."⁶⁰ The ideas, however, are not the precise dictates of morality. They are formulated as imaginative projections of the mind working on the facts given through recognition of their true nature. In the end our belief in the ideas must come through a faith commitment coerced by the strength of the value demand.

§ 6

In the preceding discussion the levels of reality, as posited by Sorley have been in a different form affirmed. Yet such a 'piece-meal' view of reality will not suffice. There must be a connection between the various levels of reality in order to give it the character of Reality with the capital 'R'. Although we can have only glimpsing knowledge of this reality we can say a few things about it. First of all it must cover all levels of human experience. They must be explicable in terms of it. It must be at least as perfect as the entities it absorbs, therefore, it must be imbued with perfect unity. It must be different from the world of perception but underlying that world. Plato named this reality the "Good", and in any reference to its nature he lapsed into mythological explanations. This is probably the only way that it can be conceived. More says of Plato's vision "The ideal world, created or, it may be, obversely grasped by the


imagination, is thus at once an illusion and a reality, with this difference, that when we deal with philosophy as a mere dead corpus of speculation these ideas fade away into an illusory make-believe, whereas such is the constitution of our spiritual nature that the more we take philosophy as a principle of life the more vivid and real do they become".⁶¹

Plato envisaged the 'Good' as an active principle containing all else. It is the reduction of the irreducible in the 'Good'. Beauty, truth and Goodness become one. It is indefinable because to do so one would have to use the language derived mainly from sense-experience which is inappropriate. It is seen by the "inward searching eye of the soul." An applicable principle of expression of this ultimate value for Reality as such is the ultimate value, a value from which all else is derived is in the sense of Brahman-Atman used in the Bagavad-Gita "Being absolutely present, Brahman is within all creatures and objects. The Godhead is present in man, in the mouse, in stone, in the flash of lightning. Thus considered, Brahman is called the Atman - a term of convenience merely, which does not imply the slightest difference. The Atm and Brahma are one."⁶² It is useless to talk more of Reality for in the end the only thing we can say about it is that it is by definition and all else is because of it. The soul is endowed with the Reality yet the Reality is not a product of the soul but is transcendent to it. The next

problem is how can knowledge of the Real be obtained.

§ 7

If value is part of reality and independent from the world of sense-experience how do we gain knowledge of it as in fact we do? This is the chief practical problem that exists in any Platonic value system and for an answer Johnson and Pluto himself serve as the best expositors. The main distinction will be one of knowledge from opinion. Knowledge is of the permanent, the real while opinion is of the changing, the particular. Kant, when dealing with the phenomenal world made the proposition that whatever we may know of a physical object we can not know the thing - in - itself which is part of reality. Therefore, for this knowledge of Reality sense-perception is not sufficient, it must come through some other aspect of man's self. Recalling Johnson's diagram of the self of man three levels of mind activity can be seen:



These levels are not hard and fast but shade into one another. Corresponding to each level there is an element of man's experience peculiarly suited to deal with it. X - is

"lower mind" and has the aspect of opinion. Y - is 'reason' corresponding to Plato's - 'thinking' - Z. In the 'Buddhic' or as More aptly calls it - imagination. The knowledge we have of the external world (Belief) is a function of X and Y. The knowledge we have of the world of values and of Reality as a whole is a function of Y and Z. In the knowledge we have of existent objects the X faculty collects raw sense-data which is ordered and given relation by the Y faculty. The function of the reason is, therefore, the relational functions. All of our knowledge of the external world, as far as it is at all intelligible is knowledge of relations which join raw data. But in the case of knowledge of Reality, if we accept the Hindu notion that it is known through the Atman is not relational but participatory. The 'Buddhic' level of the self fulfills a function which is impossible to reason working alone. The 'buddhic' does not depend on relations for the content of its awareness but "apprehends Truth directly."⁶³ Here the distinction between 'belief' and true 'knowledge' becomes clear in both Johnson and Plato. As Johnson states it, "Belief is all that can be acquired from all outward sources and testimonies; knowledge must well up from within. The extent of knowledge which a man may have of Reality of of the world of transcendent values is only limited by the degree that he himself participates in them in his own Atman. Complete knowledge is complete absorption

and this has commonly been called the 'beatific vision' or mystical experience. To ask if, in the 'beatific vision' there is any chance of error is an inappropriate question for on this level of the consciousness error exists only because of incomplete participation. To say that there is error in the 'beatific vision' is senseless for it is complete participation.

If this is true, the question arises as to the difference in value judgments. A problem which has been covered in detail previously and does not need further elaboration at this point. It would be well to add, however, that it is the reason which makes the judgment and, therefore, distorts the nature of value in action by expressing it in relational terms where the appropriate language would be that of participation. The meaning this has for value and theory is the assertion that all our judgments of value must be in some sense false and contingent for they depend on incomplete realization of the values themselves.

§ 8

In this section the problem has been the nature of value and reality. The general conclusion is that transcendental values are part of reality and must be apprehended by a quality of man's experience which is above reason. The subject is by no means closed for the views presented in this section are merely one way of looking at reality and the place

of value in it. One of the chief sticking points for any axiology in a metaphysic of value for in its foundation Reality must be defined and understood. I believe that I have suggested, in some part, the difficulty of such a pursuit. Of all the sections of axiology this is the most incomplete and at the same time the most necessary.

Conclusions

In the introduction I stated that the general method to be followed was to study in order the four main problems of axiology: The nature of value, the criterion of value, the types of value and the metaphysics of value. These problems have been taken up and tentative conclusions arrived at. The second problem was not considered separately except for the consciousness of value and the value-judgment because it depends mostly upon the answers that are given to the last question.

The Nature of value is its definition and of the three definitions presented all were at least in part rejected because they were too narrow and didn't give a full enough account of experience. The 'interest' theory of Parker and Perry was rejected mainly on the grounds that it didn't explain value but only interest itself, secondly that it committed the hedonistic fallacy as shown by many men. It is true that 'interest' value exists on the lowest level of man's consciousness but it is merely extrinsic and has no basis for existence. Parker's state of satisfaction as a criterion was accepted in part but rejected as a **general** view for it merely shows the consequences of value acquirement and not its basis or nature. A state of satisfaction probably does exist with the achievement of every value but this doesn't mean that the value itself is the state of

satisfaction. But following Urban's analysis we can derive a more inclusive definition of value by examining the pre-suppositions of the Perry-Parker interest theories. Desire (interest) can be reduced to means of enhancing the life process. But this enhancement can't be intrinsic value for there has to be a value to life. Therefore, value rests ultimately in the way a man orders his life. This brings us to the general conclusion that value is that which leads to the development of selves, or to self-realization. This does not mean, however, that all value is extrinsic, far from it, for there must be ultimate values for man to aim at which are unreachable except in the "beatific vision" or value becomes in the end meaningless. One problem that wasn't discussed was the further definition that value is what "ought-to-be". (Urban's further view) True value as transcendent is what ought-to-be but this criterion for value makes it more of a projected characteristic. If this 'ought-to-be' is a projection of the imagination which is working upon facts given through the 'buddhic' then as a definition it is tenable. However, the phrasing is bad because it leads to the mis-conception that values are subjective images of the mind, a position that is pragmatically unsound if value-judgments are to be anything more than mere 'puffs of wind uttered by men with no 'real' basis whatsoever.

Consciousness of value was the next general problem

discussed. Here value judgments were divided into three main categories corresponding to our consciousness of them. First our simple appreciation, much like the interest theory's idea of all value. It is immediate and coercive to the individual. It consists in no extra effort for its realization or state of satisfaction; therefore, in the non-transcending mind this would seem to be the only value. Yet the second class of value-judgments - those of personal worth seem to be, once recognized - every bit as coercive as the first. The values of simple appreciation are evaluated on the basis of a projected 'ideal personality' that man conceives to be his summum bonum. This transgredient reference is man's closest value in that it is his purpose. All of his actions can be evaluated in the light of their instrumentality towards the ideal personality. Examples in cultures and societies can be seen of this summum bonum. To the Greeks it was areté to the Romans virtú, to the Buddhist (Mahayana) Bodhisatt~~traship~~traship. Therefore, this value is the compelling, in the long view, value is man's life. Everytime he denies it and follows the path of least resistance he suffers in his conscience, when he works toward it he has satisfaction. Yet this purpose must not be confused with the interest theory for the eventual state of satisfaction is many times unreachd. There is a third and higher criterion of evaluation, however. This criterion, the transcendent values or Ideas are the

basis for man's evaluation of his present self and of his ideal personality. They are the objective, real, eternal, et al values which man can only recognize, never directly experience in the world. Man gains realization of these values by participation in them. The relational type of experience and consciousness does not exist in knowledge of the transcendent values. There is only knowledge, usually arising in 'flashes' of recognition on the buddhic level of the consciousness. Man's value-judgments as far as they concern the transcendent values is relative to the participation man has gained in the transcendent values. This is the cause of the apparent relativity of value-judgments and the reason they are many times called merely 'matters of taste'.

Values may be divided into two main classes - intrinsic and extrinsic. The only ultimately intrinsic values are the transcendent values - they are not instrumental to anything else. These transcendent values are three in number and have commonly been called Truth, Beauty, and Goodness. They determine the judgments we have of their manifestations in so far as we participate in them. The greater the participation the more valid the judgment. These values are separate yet they almost always are co-ordinated - appearing together in value-judgments. This is not necessary, however, a thing which is beautiful is not necessarily good. The problem of their opposites evil, ugliness, and falsity was not discussed.

Some are want to include them as values but on the grounds of participation we can explain them by the degree of participation in the transcendent values. The lower the realization of the value the less good or beautiful etc. it is. The opposites become an absence of value not another value which they participate in. This would lead, in the end, to the Socratic thesis that is parallel in the Vedantic system of Hindu philosophy - the 'paradoxical identification of the good with knowledge'. In the man evil is the result of ignorance and incomplete participation.

Values must somehow be a part of an all-inclusive Reality. Here no individual exists and here all values shade into one deriving their differentiation from being aspects of Reality. Our view of Reality is incomplete and has to be for this writer for one knows nothing about its true nature. The nature of reality must be found by complete participation in it. Perhaps a modified Brahman-Atman concept is right. However, it may be the height of value knowledge would be in the 'beautific vision' when the individual becomes one with Reality and Knows its entirety not merely some aspect of it.

§ 2

Nothing has heretofore been said concerning the uses and extention of the value sciences as part of man's knowledge. I think it will be fairly obvious that for any science that concerns man such as history, sociology, and economics value

study is a necessity. Understanding, in the humanistic sciences must be built on some value theory. One part of man's nature may not be abstracted from the whole to serve as a basis for inquiry. The whole of a man must be accepted if any part of him is to be examined. Therefore, the chief job of these sciences would be a philosophy of man upon which they can base their researches. This philosophy of man's nature could serve as the basic presupposition from which they could derive their hypothesis and carry on their researches.

On the side of the physical sciences the problem is not as pressing. However, I would like to quote one authority to show that they can't be completely unconcerned. "Now it may well be that science, despite its rejection of final causes, reveals the presence and functioning of values in the fundamental categories it selects and the way it applies them. If so, then an adequate scientific metaphysic will not be able to manage without teleology in some form, and it becomes a question of first-rate importance what that form is to be. Surely a comparative study of different stages in the growth of scientific thinking will throw light on this question and suggest hypotheses that could be entertained with more confidence than any reached by a structural study of contemporary scientific procedure alone."⁶⁴ The problem of the co-ordination of man's knowledge is an old one and since the time of St. Thomas it has not been attempted in its entirety. Yet

if some semblance of co-ordination is to come about it must come through reciprocity between the specific fields.

This gives us a hint to the future of axiology. Most questions in this study have been merely the most important ones. Much detail has been omitted not without the corresponding incompleteness that is bound to arise. There still has to be a work in the field that is comprehensive in its scope. So far axiologists have been most concerned either with refuting each other or examining small problems. The main questions lack adequate answers. However, there is hope, this is a young study and with maturity it ought to achieve the scope which is necessary for its intelligability as a legitimate enquiry.

FOOTNOTES

1. The value aspects of Plato and Spinoza have been well covered by John Laird in his book The Idea of Value.
2. Wilbur Marshall Urban, Twentieth Century Philosophy. P.54.
3. Such ideas have been reinforced by Wilbur Marshall Urban in his book Beyond Idealism and Realism.
4. There have been many interpretations of the various 'human' sciences in terms of value. As an example Marx's labor theory of value et al.
5. The most forceful argument is by James Ward Smith, "Should general theory of value be abandoned" in Ethics, Vol. LVII, No. 4; July, 1947; PP 274-288.
6. Urban's Language and Reality gives a fuller exposition of value structure in language.
7. John Dewey and his followers base their value theories on a non-metaphysical basis.
8. Urban, Dictionary of Philosophy. P. 330.
9. See bibliography.
10. Ralph Barton Perry, General Theory of Value. P. 116.
11. Ibid., P. 116.
12. Ibid., P. 116.
13. DeWitt Parker, "Value as any object of any interest" in The International Journal of Ethics, Vol. XL, No. 4; July, 1930; P. 465.
14. Ibid., P. 466.
15. Ibid., P. 466.
16. R. B. Perry, "Value as election and satisfaction" in International Journal of Ethics, Vol. XLI, No. 4; July, 1931; PP 936f.
17. Ibid., P. 437.
18. Parker, "Metaphysics and value" in International Journal of Ethics, Vol. XLIV; No. 3; April, 1939; P. 295.
19. Urban, Beyond Idealism and Realism. P. 301.

20. Urban, Intelligable World. P. 136ff.
21. Parker, "Metaphysics of value". P. 305.
22. Parker uses this phrase in "Metaphysics of value" many times also in "Value and existence" in International Journal of Ethics, Vol. XLVIII, No. 4; July, 1938.
23. Urban, Beyond Idealism and Realism. P. 207.
24. Ibid., P. 208.
25. Urban, Fundamentals of Ethics. P. 16ff.
26. Ibid., P. 16.
27. Ibid., P. 17.
28. Ibid., P. 18.
29. Urban, article on "The Theory of Value" in The Encyclopedia Britanica, 18 ed. Vol. 22, P. 961.
30. Urban, Fundamentals of Ethics. P. 18.
31. Urban, Valuation. P. 21-22.
32. A full discussion of the idealism realism argument can be found in Dorthy Emmet's fine book The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking, Chap. II.
33. Urban, Valuation. P. 23.
34. Ibid., P. 25.
35. Ibid., P. 26.
36. Ibid., PP 264-70, also Chap. VIII.
37. Ibid., P. 28.
38. This is the general view adopted by Urban in his later works.
39. Everett, Moral Values, Chap. VII.
40. William R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God. P. 31.
41. See Urban, Fundamentals of Ethics and Sorley, op. cit., Chap. II.

42. Sorley, op. cit., P. 51.
43. Ibid., P. 53.
44. Ibid., PP. 212-213.
45. Urban, Beyond Idealism and Realism. P. 208ff.
46. Ibid., P. 209.
47. Ibid., P. 211.
48. Ibid., P. 212.
49. F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality. P. 283.
50. Sorley, op. cit., P. 190.
51. Ibid., P. 191.
52. Raynor Johnson, The Imprisoned Splendor. P. 98.
53. Sorley, op. cit., P. 191ff.
54. This whole problem of existence is perhaps most important for the physical sciences.
55. Sorley, op. cit., P. 228.
56. Ibid., P. 232.
57. Ibid., P. 238.
58. Ibid., P. 238.
59. Ibid., P. 239.
60. Paul E. More, Platonism. P. 181.
61. Ibid., P. 195.
62. Bagavad-Gita. Tr. C. Isherwood. P. 131.
63. Johnson, op. cit., P. 25.
64. B. A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science. P. 310.

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