THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATIONS OF 1940

By Madison F. Cole, Jr.

Approved
Allan W. Moger
5-26-71

Honors Thesis

Department of History

Washington and Lee University

1971

CONTENTS

Preface

An attempt to look at an election that is as recent as 1940 presents two problems. First, scholars, far more experienced than I, have examined all of the primary sources available, and submitted their conclusions. Second, little primary material, other than newspapers and periodicals of the day, is open for general research.

This paper does not attempt to give final answers on this topic. It is specifically concerned only with the nominations of 1940. The remainder of the campaign, while of interest, does not contain the element of the "unusual" that preceeded the nominations.

There has been, I feel, at least by the general public, too much attention devoted to the third term issue in 1940. Thus, an effort has been made by this writer to show how the campaign and its personalities reacted also to the war.

My gratitude is extended to many people: Mr. Emmett W. Wright, Jr. of Metairie Park Country Day School, who first suggested the topic, and read the initial paper on the subject; Mr. Robert Yevich and Mrs. William Strain who proof-read parts of the draft of the paper; Dr. J. D. Futch, III and Dr. Robert W. McAhren of Washington and Lee

University, who made timely suggestions and improvements in the preparation of the thesis; Mr. James A. Farley of New York, who gave of his valuable time, so that I might interview him. Finally there are two people who deserve special thanks - Dr. Allen W. Moger of Washington and Lee, who had to endure the torture of my fractured prose while reading the draft of the paper, and who gave a good deal of his time to help and guide me through it; and Mrs. Jay D. Cook, Jr. who spent many hours typing and re-typing the draft. Without their help, this paper would not have been possible.

May 15, 1971
Lexington, Virginia

Madison F. Cole, Jr.

INTRODUCTION

The presidential nominations of 1940 exemplify the actions and reactions of the political campaign to World War II. The cataclysmic events in Europe influenced greatly the other issues, such as the third term and the unusual personalities involved.

Both issues and events, however, were largely determined by two of the most colorful men who had appeared on the American political scene - Franklin D. Roosevelt and Wendell Willkie. William Allen White had called Roosevelt "the most unaccountable President this country has seen."[1] Certainly he was breaking precedent in running for a third term. FDR was very ambitious and some of his opponents felt that this conceit made the third term inevitable. It would be difficult, however, to explain his nomination apart from the war. Tugwell even states that Hitler made the third term unavoidable.[2]

It is not as easy to explain the "unaccountable" rise of Wendell Willkie and how he was forced or forced himself on the Republican Party, including the traditional bosses. This newcomer, at first, rankled some politicians. When he asked support from Senator James Watson of his native state of Indiana, Watson replied, "No Wendell, you have only been a Republican for two years." Willkie then responded, "Jim, you are a good Methodist, don't you believe in conversion?"

At which point Watson replied, "If a whore repented and wanted to join the Church, I'd personally welcome her and lead her up the aisle to a front row pew. But by the eternal, I'd not ask her to lead the choir on the first night out."[3]

The whole picture of the campaign, the war, and the people involved is explained by Lilienthal:

> The puzzling factor in this election promises to be not the New Deal nor the personality of Willkie and his opponent, but the changing international situation. Willkie profited by the fact that he has from the start been less isolationist than Taft or Dewey; finally talked about help to the Allies short of war, etc.; on this issue Taft was impossible to the Eastern crowd, who otherwise would have preferred his safeness and dullness. The effort to push the Republican Party into a peace at any price sort of position apparently failed, but they are always free, with such a flexible gent as Willkie as their candidate, to shift and change as election day approaches. The President, on the other hand, has to take action, from time to time, and responsibility for that action, and it is unlikely that his action will always or even generally conform to prevailing public opinion.[4]

FOOTNOTES

1 William Allen White, The Autobiography of William Allen White (New York, New York, 1946), pp. 647-648.

2 Rexford G. Tugwell, The Democratic Roosevelt, (Garden City, New York, 1957), p. 531.

3 Jonathan Daniels, The Time Between the Wars, (Garden City, New York, 1966), p. 309.

4 David E. Lilienthal, The Journals of David E. Lilienthal, Volume I, (New York, New York, 1964), p. 185.

THE BACKGROUND 1938-39

The Republicans

Jockeying among the Republicans began during the off year elections of 1938. Roosevelt was in trouble. He had tried to pack the Supreme Court the year before and failed. He had attempted to purge some members of Congress in the primaries and had again failed. The country, furthermore, seemed in a rebellious mood. The Democrats expected to lose some seats, and the Republicans were confident of gaining some. But no one, including the Republicans, dreamed they would make such a comeback. Non-partisan surveys had predicted GOP gains as somewhere between 30 and 53 seats.[1] The Republicans, in fact, picked up 89 seats - 81 in the House and 8 in the Senate.[2] Furthermore, the election produced several potential presidential candidates including Taft, Dewey, and Vandenberg. Senator-elect Robert A. Taft of Ohio, the son of the former President, was very articulate, though lacking somewhat in charisma. Thomas Dewey was the young District Attorney of New York City, who had achieved fame by "racket-busting." This fame had nearly catapulted him into the Governorship over enormously popular Herbert Lehman, who won by a very small margin. Senator Vandenberg, who abhorred the thought of life in the White House,[3] drew his support from isolationist groups. Accord-

ing to his son, the Administration's insistence on conducting foreign relations in secret with the British and French provoked him into the race.

There were many GOP dark horses, some of whom later would be favorite sons from their states - Governor Saltonstall of Massachusetts, Governor James of Pennsylvania, Governor Bricker of Ohio, and Governor Baldwin of Connecticut. The only one not mentioned at this time would be the eventual nominee.[4]

In January 1939 when Congress convened, it quickly found itself at odds with the President in disputes which involved a lot more than court-packing. The basic principle of New Deal spending and the question of neutrality would become hotly debated issues. The Administration suffered its first serious defeat on a relief bill in late January. Several pro-New Deal Senators, including Byrnes of South Carolina and Truman of Missouri, deserted the President to bring about the bill's defeat.[5]

The Republicans were delighted that the New Deal had suffered one of its few Congressional setbacks. No doubt one of the happiest was Tom Dewey. In February, polls showed that he was the choice of at least one-half of the GOP for his party's nomination. Vandenberg trailed with 15%, Taft had 13%, and Hoover 5%.[6] In May, Dewey still held the lead for the nomination.[7] By late summer, however, Vandenberg was

gaining rapidly in the polls;[8] Dewey, hoping to stop this, was campaigning in the Midwest.[9]

Robert Taft labored under several handicaps. Besides his low poll standing, he was a notoriously poor speaker. His performance at the Gridiron Club was "dull and boring."[10] His speech that summer announcing his candidacy did not inspire anyone, though he did declare himself opposed to foreign war and intervention in Europe.[11] The only thing that gave his announcement any political excitement was the fact that Governor John Bricker had decided not to be a favorite son. This assured Taft control of the Ohio delegation.

On September 1, Germany's invasion of Poland immediately changed the character of the campaign. The war, at first, probably benefitted Vandenberg, because he was the most experienced in terms of national political service.[12] The war seemed to bring other candidates into the race. By the middle of December, there were two more possibilities, Styles Bridges of New Hampshire and Publisher Frank Gannett of New York.[13] In addition, two national committeemen were actively working for ex-President Herbert Hoover.[14] There were other influential people working behind the scenes. One was Joseph Pew, multimillionaire oilman from Pennsylvania, another was Colonel Robert McCormick, publisher of the Chicago Tribune,[15] and another was Samuel Pryor, National Committeeman from Connecticut.[16]

The candidate that the war helped most was Wendell Willkie. Willkie had been first seriously mentioned for the Presidency in 1939. On February 23 of that year, Arthur Krock, after two years of quietly mentioning Willkie's name in his column, raised the possibility that he was a candidate. In the New York Times Krock devoted three paragraphs to Willkie, including that rather humorous quote, "I'd watch Willkie. He still has his haircuts country style."[17] Willkie continued to gain support through the year. On November 21, General Hugh Johnson, once head of the NRA, told the Bond Club in New York that "Willkie would make a very strong candidate.[18] Raymond Moley, another ex-New Dealer, told the Saybrook Club at Yale, "Willkie is the best man if the party had the nerve to put him up for the nomination."[19] After General Johnson's endorsement, Willkie remarked, "If the government doesn't stop attacking the utilities industry, I may need a job, and that is the best offer I have received."[20]

The question now comes, what was the attractiveness in a man who had no political experience, who was the head of an industry that only a few years before had been disgraced by its lack of public concern and shady financial dealings, who had been a Democrat for all but two years of his life, and who was generally little known outside of the financial world and New York City? The answer can be traced to many

things. Willkie was enormously popular. He seemed to captivate all those who came in contact with him. Marcia Davenport observed:

> And there he sat (in the chair), except when he was at meals or asleep for the whole length of his visit. Tennis, golf, bridge, poker, and social chat had no reality to him. Food and wine were tossed down unnoticed. Wendell's leisure, such as it was, went into a rolling boil of ideas thrashed out with other brilliant and challenging minds, into voracious reading, and into writing and eventually speaking, too, as he began to evolve the points of view, rooted in passionate beliefs, which transformed him from a tough, smart corporation lawyer into the articulator of constructive opposition to the monopolistic governmental theories of the New Deal.[21]

Willkie was a mid-westerner who had risen from a small-town lawyer to become head of one of the largest utility companies in the country, the Commonwealth and Southern Corporation. He still looked the part of a country lawyer with his rumpled suit and tossled hair. He was a big burly man with a warm personality. "Willkie was no more humble than he was simple. There was no self-doubt in his make-up. He was neither modest nor immodest, it just never occurred to him that he could be anything other than successful."[22]

He had become well-known when he took on the Government in the TVA fights. One columnist put it this way: "The trouble with Willkie is that he is articulate. He is the one businessman who presents his case against the Govern-

ment so forcefully as to attract wide attention.... Instead of dreading a Washington inquiry, as most businessmen do, Willkie uses it as a sounding board from which his views and prophecies reverberate to the nation."[23]

Even his enemies in the TVA fight liked him. David Lilienthal, head of TVA said, "He is one of the outstanding proponents of private enterprise who has done a real job of selling electricity at low rates."[24] Hugh Johnson pointed out though both Roosevelt and Willkie had charm, Roosevelt turned his on for the people he wanted to impress, and Willkie did not. Furthermore, "Roosevelt had one of the choicest hate collections in America. Mr. Willkie had none."[25]

Willkie was independent and, at times, stubborn. One person thought that his "mind seemed more inspirational than logical ... that the impression you got was that he would snipe at a subject from all sides; then, grabbing hold, he would roll it up in a ball and throw it at you."[26] The Nation did a series of articles on the Republican candidates and the final one was on Willkie. The last line probably summed up how many people would feel at the convention. "There is more fire and go in this man than in the whole colorless smear of Deweys, Tafts, and Vandenbergs."[27]

The Democrats

The Democrats in 1940 were still a vibrant and strong political party. They were still basking in their first sustained control of things since 1860. True, both the court-packing bill and the purge had been a failure, but those were minor political miscalculations. What was of concern to many Democrats were the results of the off-year Congressional elections and the resulting feuds their President had had with the new Congress. Their biggest concern was Roosevelt's indecision about running for a third term. First, there were many people who felt that only FDR could defeat a Republican; second, there were others who felt that a Democrat could beat a Republican but it had to be one with a dynamic personality (not Hull or Garner); third, some felt that a Democrat could beat a Republican but it had to be a "New Deal" Democrat (Wallace, Jackson, McNutt); and last, there were those who thought breaking the third term tradition was, in general, a bad idea even with Roosevelt as a candidate. This last group ranged from Democrats such as Garner, who opposed not only the third term but also the New Deal policies, to Farley, who though in sympathy with the New Deal was highly opposed to the third term in principle. No Democrat, it seemed, would be content to let nature take its course.

The speculation as to who might succeed FDR had begun even before the off-year elections. Time, in its issue of October 31, 1938, reported that Harold Ickes was the number one possibility for the nomination in 1940, and further stated that a candidate acceptable to FDR had to be built up "before Democratic National Chairman Jim Farley and his alliance of local bosses could conger up someone else!"[28]

The Republican gains in the off-year elections had surprised everyone including the President. FDR attributed the Democratic losses to home state issues.[29] His chief advisor, Farley, attributed them to the split in labor's ranks, dissatisfaction with the WPA, resentment against spending and increasing the debt and, farm prices.[30] Basil Rauch felt that some of the losses were due to Hopkins' statement that, "We will spend and spend, and tax and tax, and elect and elect," which Rauch felt "discredited" the administration.[31] The outcome was so bad that the usually astute newspaperman, Raymond Clapper, stated, "clearly, I think, that President Roosevelt could not run for a third term even if he so desired."[32] But domestic politics were not the only problem for the Democrats. The foreign policy position of the President was alarming many people. Vice President Garner even thought the less Democrats said about foreign policy the better.[33]

The main problem the Democrats had was the division

in their own ranks. This policy split between the down-the-line New Dealers and the more conservative Democrats existed throughout the party and included the Cabinet. Roosevelt's promise to continue national spending in order to stimulate the economy toward an $80,000,000,000 national income was the basic issue. Those in favor were Ickes, Perkins, and Wallace. Those opposed were Farley, Hull, Garner, and Morgenthau.[34] Since Ickes was too vocal and too eccentric to be seriously considered for President and Perkins was a woman, it was logical that Wallace became the symbolic leader of the pro-New Dealers. John Garner, at this point, was the leader of the more traditional Democrats. To many arch New Dealers he had become a symbol of sabotage. One said he was a "leader of reaction against six years of enlightened reform."[35] In late March, however, Garner led the Gallup Poll with 42% of the Democratic vote to 10 percent each for Farley and Hull.[36]

The other minor contenders were Paul McNutt, Senator Wheeler, Robert Jackson, Frank Murphy, and William O. Douglas. In addition three businessmen were often included in the speculation - Joseph Kennedy, Lewis Douglas and Jesse Jones. Most prominently mentioned among these contenders was young handsome Paul McNutt. McNutt was the first to come under the Roosevelt three-step program: 1. Boom him for the Presidency, 2. Watch him gain momentum and publicity as he con-

fidently feels he is the "chosen one," 3. Pull the rug out from under him. Time reported the following on July 17:

> What to do about Indiana's white-haired Paul McNutt, first and boldest Democratic candidate for Franklin Roosevelt's job was a question Roosevelt answered last week by inviting Paul McNutt to become head of the new consolidated Federal Security Agency. In that post at Washington, candidate McNutt could be kept under surveillance and controlled and throttled if necessary. Or he could be built up as heir-apparent if that seemed more desirable.[37]

FDR found himself with other difficulties. It was obvious to leaders in Congress and to political leaders in the Cabinet that the changes in the neutrality legislation desired by the President would not pass at this time. Roosevelt was not pleased when John Garner informed him: "We might as well be candid about this, Cap'n - you haven't got the votes."[38]

These matters still weighed heavily on FDR's mind when he summoned Jim Farley to Hyde Park in late July 1939, to discuss political matters.[39] The "Chief" also wished to confront Farley about the latter's public silence and personal objections to the third term.[40] According to Farley the main reason for the conference was to patch up (at least in the public's eye), the feud between himself and Roosevelt. FDR told Big Jim, "Of course I will not run for a third term." Roosevelt stated he would make this announcement when the time came to file in the North Dakota pri-

mary. Farley suggested that a public letter clarifying his position might also be necessary. The President did not answer, but moved into a discussion of the other candidates, saying he did not want Garner.[41] That summer many New Dealers came to believe that only Roosevelt could carry out New Deal policies and must run for a third term.[42]

The opening of war in Europe put politics on the "back burner." Both Republicans and Democrats kept quiet and the Administration especially had no desire to rock the boat while the Neutrality Bill was before Congress. On November 2, however, Henry Wallace at a press conference in Berkeley declared himself in favor of a third term. Farley and Ickes were aghast at this politically inept move,[43] and FDR publicly came down hard on Wallace.[44] The latter was already in trouble with the President because he had failed to help purge Senator Gillette. Farley was also unhappy with Wallace whom he considered an eccentric Democrat.[45]

In late September the President had called the Congress into special session to consider again the modification of the neutrality legislation. After two months Congress acted to make our neutrality laws more favorable to the western powers.[46] The war also caused a few people to change in favor of Roosevelt's running for a third term. Among those was former Senator McAdoo of California.[47]

Though Walter Lippman was sure FDR would not run, there were unusual soundings in the White House. Roosevelt wanted the convention moved to a later date, and he was telling callers that he was in favor of Cordell Hull, though in other circles he was objecting to Hull.[48] The President thus began the process that would assure his nomination if he should desire it. There is no conclusive evidence that his mind was made up. Farley felt, at least during the summer, he had made up his mind not to run. The assumption can be made, though probably never proven, that the war was a great influence on Roosevelt, and that even at this early date it had changed his thinking somewhat.

By the end of 1939 Roosevelt was challenged within his own party. On December 18 John Nance Garner announced, "I will accept the nomination for President. I will make no effort to control any delegates. The people should decide. The candidate should be selected at primaries and conventions as provided by law, and I sincerely trust all Democrats will participate in them."[49]

John Nance Garner was the most vehement in his opposition to the third term probably because he was the strongest in his opposition to FDR. He had been made Vice President in exchange for his pledged support at the 1932 convention. After Roosevelt blamed him for failing to work for the court-packing plan, the rift between them became serious.

He was probably too conservative and too rigid to receive the nomination, but if FDR did not run, Garner certainly would control a large bloc of voters.

He was unalterably opposed to Roosevelt's desire for a third term.[50] Garner felt that the party was bigger than the man, and that the party should be able to win on its own reputation. He was also upset by the importance in the Roosevelt administration of men who were not party regulars.[51] Roosevelt was equally unhappy with Garner. He felt Garner had not been totally honest with him, for on one occasion Garner had told him that he only wished to return to Uvalde.[52] The irony of this situation is that FDR told Farley and others as late as the summer of 1940 that he wanted to do nothing in 1940 but return to Hyde Park.

John Nance Garner was not the only important man in the Roosevelt administration to contest the President's right to a third term. Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, and James A. Farley, the Postmaster General, Chairman of the Party, and closest political adviser to FDR would also publicly challenge the incumbent. All three were opposed to the third term and to many of the inner clique surrounding Roosevelt. They were traditional in their viewpoint, and all of them felt FDR betrayed their trust in him. The irony of the situation is that none of them really wanted to be President in 1940, with the possible exception of Farley.

Their opposition was directed more towards the third term issue rather than to advancing their own political futures.

Cordell Hull was a mild-mannered diplomat from Tennessee who since 1933 had been Secretary of State. He had achieved prominence for his constant efforts to improve relations with Latin America and by the enactment of the Hull Reciprocal Trade Acts in 1934. He opposed Roosevelt's third term aspirations in principle, though he was loyal enough to his cabinet position not to openly break with the President. He felt a particular duty as Secretary of State not to openly discuss politics, while holding that sensitive post. Hull himself states, "The President has never talked a word of politics to me ... In view of the world situation I do not feel I should use my position to seek office."[52] Hull was the most likely choice to succeed Roosevelt. He was conservative, though not reactionary. He had a sense of tact, and was well respected.[53] He was the obvious candidate among traditional Democrats. Farley contends that if there had not been a war, Hull would have gotten the nomination.[54]

James Farley, a close personal friend of Hull was also prominently mentioned for the Presidency. It was a rare honor for Farley even to be considered for the Presidency, for he had, after all, never been elected to high

office. He was, however, enormously popular within the party. It was said that he knew more people by their first name than any man in America. An incredibly warm man, he had an open personality which immediately reflected his total honestly and sincerity. Politicians found out that if Farley could not go along with them, he told them so, but he never held it against them. He was known to the general public (though probably not as well known as Hull). Undoubtedly he was the choice, next to FDR, of the people that conscientously worked for the party. However, he had two strikes against him - little elective office experience, and he was a Catholic.

Of the others often mentioned, none really ever had a chance. FDR was well disposed to Solicitor General Jackson and Justice Douglas,[55] but not enough to think they could succeed him. None of them had a chance without FDR's support. The others - McNutt, Murphy, Douglas and Jones - never had his approval. Either through their own ego, or through Roosevelt's political "back-slapping" or both, they got the idea that they were ordained by the Champ.

FOOTNOTES

1 Time, November 7, 1938, p. 10.

2 Warren Moscow, Roosevelt and Willkie (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1968), p. 27.

3 Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. (Ed.), The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston, Mass., 1952), p. 4.

4 Time, November 21, 1938, p. 14.

5 Congressional Record, January 27, 1939, p. 587.

6 Time, April 3, 1939, p. 5.

7 Ibid., May 1, 1939, p. 21.

8 Newsweek, August 14, 1939, p. 15.

9 Time, August 7, 1939, p. 16.

10 Ibid., April 24, 1939, p. 18.

11 Herbert S. Parmet and Marie B. Hecht, Never Again (New York, New York, 1968), p. 70.

12 Ibid., p. 74.

13 Time, December 11, 1939, p. 22.

14 The two committeemen were Craeger of Texas and Spangler of Iowa. Parmet and Hecht, p. 70.

15 Moscow, pp. 25-26.

16 Parmet and Hecht, pp. 68-69.

17 New York Times, February 23, 1940, p. 22.

18 Ellsworth Barnard, Wendell Willkie (Marquette, Michigan, 1966), p. 148.

19 Parmet and Hecht, p. 71.

20 Barnard, p. 148.

21 Marcia Davenport, Too Strong for Fantasy (New York, New York, 1967, p. 271.

22 Donald B. Johnson, The Republican Party and Wendell Willkie (Urbana, Ill., 1960), p. 74.

23 Alva Johnston, "The Man Who Talked Back," Saturday Evening Post, February 25, 1939, p. 10.

24 General Hugh Johnson, "I Am Not Nominating Him," Saturday Evening Post, June 22, 1940, p. 9.

25 Ibid., p. 113.

26 Johnson, The Republican Party, p. 47.

27 McAlister Coleman, "Wendell Willkie's Hat Is On His Head," Nation, April 13, 1940, p. 472.

28 Time, October 31, 1938, p. 12.

29 James A. Farley, Jim Farley's Story (New York, New York, 1948), p. 154.

30 Ibid., p. 160.

31 Basil Rauch, Roosevelt From Munich To Pearl Harbor (New York, New York, 1950), p. 88.

32 William E. Leuchtenberg, Franklin Roosevelt And The New Deal (New York, New York, 1963), p. 272.

33 Time, February 27, 1939, p. 14.

34 Ibid., March 20, 1939, p. 12.

35 Ibid., March 20, 1939, p. 12.

36 Ibid., April 3, 1939, p. 15.

37 Ibid., July 17, 1939, p. 10.

38 Newsweek, July 31, 1939, p. 9.

39 Farley, Farley's Story, p. 189.

40 Newsweek, July 31, 1939, p. 10.

41 Farley, Farley's Story, pp. 186-187.

42 Time, June 5, 1939, p. 15.

43 Harold L. Ickes. The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes, Vol. III, (New York, New York), pp. 49-50.

44 Time, November 5, 1939, p. 13.

45 Farley, Farley's Story, p. 208.

46 Ickes, p. 51.

47 Time, November 27, 1939, p. 13.

48 Farley, Farley's Story, pp. 225-227.

49 Ibid., p. 217.

50 Moscow, p. 80.

51 Farley, Farley's Story, p. 205.

52 Ibid., p. 232-233.

53 Time, January 8, 1940, pp. 14-15.

54 James A. Farley, private interview held at Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D. C., March 13, 1971.

55 Ibid.

THE BUILDUP - JANUARY-MAY 1940

The Republicans

In January 1940 there was still a phony war in Europe and ther were three leading candidates for the Republican nomination - Taft, Dewey, and Vandenberg. Their chances were summarized by Time magazine:

> Dull, prosy, colorless with not a tithe of Franklin Roosevelt's great charm and personal magnetism, Bob Taft of Ohio is nevertheless today the No. 1 Republican Presidential possibility, according to the wisemen. Dopsters agree that Thomas E. Dewey looks good for the Vice Presidential spot; that Michigan's Senator Vandenberg is too honestly disinterested in the Presidency to command the convention; that only a miracle could give the nomination to Herbert Hoover or Wendell Willkie; that hardheaded Joe Martin of Massachusetts would still prefer the Speakership to any other job in the world. So they get around to Robert Alphonso Taft.[1]

Dewey's plan of attack was to win the primaries, and be so far ahead in the public opinion polls that the convention would have to give him the nomination. A Gallup Poll in January showed that 60% of the Republican voters favored Dewey as their nominee, while only 27% favored either Taft or Vandenberg.[2] In an attempt to keep this lead, Dewey campaigned vigorously during February and March. He took a tour of the Western states, travelled 7500 miles, shook hands with 15,000 voters, and held numerous press conferences.[3] In Chicago before 20,000 people, Dewey charged the New Deal with "crimes of intimi-

dation, coercion, ... extortion, larceny, and vested interest in human misery."[4]

His politicking paid off in the primaries. He had no opposition in Illinois or Maryland.[5] Dewey destroyed Vandenberg in the latter's neighboring territory of Wisconsin by capturing all twenty-four delegates. In Nebraska he completed his rout by defeating Vandenberg by 17,000 votes.[6]

Vandenberg was a mystery in the campaign.[7] Although he entered the primaries, it now seems that he did not really want the nomination or the election. "Vandenberg was more interested in advancing issues than in advancing party solidarity." What support he had until his primary defeats was from the Congressional wing of the party.[8]

Robert Taft's strategy was to avoid the primaries entirely, and win delegate support in state conventions. He sensed correctly that it would be disaster for him to take on the more colorful Dewey in an open primary, but he also knew that the old guard Republicans who controlled state conventions preferred him to the inexperienced District Attorney.

The unknown factor in the early months of 1940 was Wendell Willkie. The Willkie boom had begun with Krock's speculation in February 1939 that he would be an acceptable candidate. Krock gave the movement impetus in November

when he again mentioned the possibility of Willkie for the Presidency.[9] About a month later, an article by Willkie appeared in the Saturday Evening Post, entitled "With Malice Towards None." In that article he expressed part of his philosophy on government:

> The leaders of government today have flaunted their theory of liberialism more widely than any other government in our history, but they have said nothing about tolerance; they have, in fact, drained the vials of invective against all who have opposed them.
>
> Liberalism may guide men of wisdom to very different courses of action. Washington and Lincoln fought for the creation and preservation of the individual state. And yet all three of them were men of liberal faith.[10]

After a talk to the Sales Executive Club of New York, Dr. Paul Nystrom of Columbia University endorsed Mr. Willkie, stating that "the business outlook would be good if we had a Presidential candidate like our honored guest, Mr. Willkie."[11] But Willkie was not even mentioned in Dr. Gallup's February Poll.[12]

In Ohio he lashed out at the New Deal's policy towards business:

> Whenever the government assumes autocratic control over industry it must, in order to maintain this control, gradually surpress freedom of assembly, freedom of church, freedom of the press, and freedom of speech.
>
> In the end all forms of freedom stand or fall. Business is not something separate

from our lives. It is a part of life.

> The American people are opposed to excessive power in anybody's hands.[13]

Willkie had previously stated his economic views in an article, "Idle Money, Idle Men" in the Saturday Evening Post.[14] Other articles gained him attention. One in the Atlantic Monthly on the shortcomings of the economy caused the New York Times and David Lawrence to publicly praise him.[15]

Willkie's prolific writings for large magazines began to generate interest among people with influence and money. The first major Willkie support came from Russell Davenport, Editor of Fortune. Davenport had first met Willkie while doing an article on the Commonwealth and Southern Corporation, and was one of the first to suggest to Willkie that he run for the Presidency.[16] Two financiers, Charton MacVeagh, an executive with J. P. Morgan and Company, and Frank Altschul, a former vice chairman of the Repulican National Finance Committee were among other early converts. Willkie also received invaluable support from Irita Van Doren, book editor of the New York Herald Tribune, and Bruce Barton of the advertising firm, Batten, Barton, Durstine, and Osborne.[17]

Davenport and MacVeagh had started a small Willkie campaign headquarters in January of 1940 in the Murray Hill

Hotel. Two events significantly strengthened Willkie, the April 1940 issue of Fortune which devoted a large section to him, and his phenomenal radio performance on "Information Please." The issue of Fortune contained an editorial endorsement of Willkie, a strong appeal in the form of a petition entitled "We the People," and a lengthy statement of his own position. The editorial praised him as follows:

> A modern government, he points out, cannot side-step certain far-reaching economic problems - taxation, for instance, the budget, and above all public works. But trouble starts as soon as you attempt to solve these economic problems by social judgments. The social judgments must be made; they may even come first. But to carry them out effectively it is necessary to take a businesslike approach.
>
> The principles he stands for are American principles. They are progressive, liberal, and expansive. One cannot dare to doubt that they will eventually prevail...
>
> Mr. Willkie certainly deserves the respect and attention of his countrymen.[18]

In his "We, the People" Willkie lashed out against the New Deal. His first statements were especially biting:

> In this decade beginning in 1930 you have told us that our day is finished, that we can grow no more, and that the future can not be the equal of the past. But, we, the people, do not believe this, and we say to you: Give us the vested interest that you have in depression, open your eyes to the future, help us to build a New World.
>
> In this decade you have separated "busi-

> ness" and "industry" from the ordinary lives of the people and have applied against them a philosophy of hate and mistrust, but we, the people say: business and industry are part of our daily lives; in hurting them you hurt us. Therefore, abandon this attitude of hate and set our enterprises free.
>
> You - the politicians of both parties - have muddled our foreign affairs with politics; with vague threats and furtive approaches; with wild fears and inconsistent acts; and we, the people, say: give us a foreign policy that we can trust and upon which we can build towards the future. We are against aggressors; we are for foreign trade; and we recognize that our own standards of living can be improved only by raising the standards of the other countries of the world.[19]

These quotes are significant because they were not only read by the readers of Fortune, but by thousands of others in reprint form. Oren Root, a young Wall Street lawyer, a few days later ran an advertisement in the New York Herald Tribune asking for contributions to help distribute the "We, the People" petition.[20] The same day the supporters in the Murray Hill Hotel sent out 2,000 telegrams to the Willkie clubs suggesting a huge response to the petition. Root was so deluged with mail that he had to take a leave of absence from his beleaguered law firm's office.

There is some confusion as to what happened. Neither writers Parmet and Hecht nor Barnard mention the 2,000 telegrams. They furthermore seem to imply that Root had to

convince Davenport that sending out the petition was a good thing, although as Barnard points out, little could be done about it at this point.[21]

Willkie's statement which appeared in Fortune points up some of the sharpest criticism of the New Deal. A short part of it bears repeating here, not only because it states Willkie's philosophy, but also because it reveals the differences many people had with the New Deal:

> We need a new kind of budget, a new concept of the government's responsibility toward the taxpayer ... For the first time in American history we have heard serious talk about classes instead of individuals. The increase in government power has thus been rationalized into a whole philosophy. It is a philosophy of defeat ... For it indicates that the men to whom we have surrendered our power have acquired a vested interest in depression.[22]

The other thing that gained Willkie so much attention was his performance on "Information Please." Life magazine stated:

> By performances like this, Wendell Willkie has won for himself an astonishing popularity outside the normal Republican fold. According to Columnist Raymond Clapper he "is doing more than anyone else to put businessmen back into political responsibility."[23]

With all of this publicity, Willkie attracted prominent people to his campaign - the Luces, the Cowles, who owned several newspapers, Lammont duPont, and Thomas W. Lamont of the House of Morgan.[24] He also gained friends among key politicians - Kenneth Simpson, National Committee-

man from New York, who hated Dewey; Governor Raymond Baldwin of Connecticut; and Samuel Pryor, National Committeeman from Connecticut.[25] Pryor's support was particularly vital as he became Chairman of the Committee on Arrangements in May after Dr. Ralph E. Williams suddenly died of a stroke. John D. M. Hamilton, Chairman of the Republican National Committee, and a quiet supporter of Willkie's, picked Pryor over Committeeman R. B. Creager of Texas, a Taft supporter.[26] Pryor's committee had the responsibility of allocating seats in the galleries, which, when the time came, were packed for Willkie.

The Democrats

Roosevelt was able to avoid discussion of the third term in January of 1940 because of preoccupation with the war in Europe.[27] But Henry Wallace was talking again. At the Jackson Day Dinner in January he had "expressed the hope that FDR would run, adding that certain circumstances might develop in which his nomination would be imperative."[28]

Roosevelt was non-commital for a long period of time. The United States News in its issue of January 5, 1940, stated that he intended to retire ... (but) that the President would alter that intention if necessary to stop the nomination of Mr. Garner or someone else who does not meet the "liberal"

standard.[29] James McGregor Burns, the Roosevelt biographer, sees the President's delaying action in an entirely different light:

> Roosevelt was not one to make a vital political decision years or even months in advance and then stick to that decision through thick and thin. His method through most of his career was to keep open alternative lines of action, to shift from one line to another as conditions demanded, to protect his route to the rear in case he wanted to make a sudden retreat, and foxlike, to cross and snarl his traitor in order to hide his real intention.

More than any situation Roosevelt ever faced, the third term demanded this kind of delicate handling.[30]

Roosevelt's indecision concerning the Presidency was displeasing to a lot of people, including those who wanted the nomination if he did not, but they did not want to lose favor by "jumping" ship. However, it was most irritating to those who felt he should not run, and who were becoming more and more convinced that his refusal to discuss the third term meant that he would run.

There was still enough doubt to cause speculation and most of that centered around Cordell Hull. "FDR leaked his name which gave many politicos a sharp case of the cramps. The militant New Dealers were unhappy because they considered Mr. Hull a single-track fuddy-duddy. Those Democrats pledged irrevocably to the candidacy of John Nance Garner were not happy for they felt Hull would draw support

from the traditional Democrats that Garner needed. Finally, concern existed among Republican wiseacres who thought Hull would be hard to beat, and who would much prefer a split Democratic party anyway."[31] James Farley, considered Hull extremely qualified and said that "with his long years of public service, he was the ideal man to be nominated."[32]

Many New Dealers didn't agree, and as early as January 15 it became obvious that most of them were supporting a third term. Attorney General Jackson said, "He is our Lincoln," Paul McNutt, "The plain people of today adore Franklin Roosevelt;" Secretary Wallace, "I hope the nominee in 1940 will be President Roosevelt."[33] In Massachusetts and New York delegates were lined up for FDR, who had obviously decided that he was the strongest vote-getter in the party.[34] Others opposed to Hull, Garner, etc., feeling that FDR would not run, wanted a New Dealer and seemed to be turning to Robert Jackson. The occasion of Roosevelt's witnessing Jackson's swearing in as Attorney General prompted one news magazine to say that Jackson was his real favorite as his successor.[35] Farley himself felt that Roosevelt was very favorably inclined to Jackson.[36]

Speculation continued as dates arrived for filing in Presidential preference primaries. Garner had announced for the primary in Illinois. The President made no statement and allowed his name to be entered. Farley, who in January

had received Roosevelt's permission to enter the primary in Massachusetts, was the only announced candidate there.[37] Farley took Roosevelt's permission to mean that FDR was not a candidate.[38] He also felt that any delegates he won would eventually support Hull, and by entering his name he was preventing a party fight. He had reason to believe that if he had not been on the ballot, Senator Burton Wheeler, Joseph Kennedy, and possibly even Senator Millard Tydings would have gotten in the race.[39] Others in the party were not so certain that Jim Farley's intentions were all that noble. They contend that Farley was smart enough to know that his Roman Catholic religion would prevent his nomination for President.[40] Hence they felt he was prepared to release his delegates to Hull, in exchange for Hull's naming him as the Vice Presidential nominee.

Many people felt that the President would have some announcement on March 4, the seventh anniversary of his inaugural. But as March 4 came and passed, the President had said nothing and was still in the race. In the New Hampshire primary the delegates committed to Roosevelt received between 7,500 and 10,500 votes, as compared to the two Farley delegates who got 3,592 and 4,503. The Garner delegate had 2,819.[41] As one pundit put it, "Of course the Roosevelt delegates won. It would be utterly amazing if anywhere, except possibly in a rare and isolated district

any Democrat could beat the President in a primary."[42] The Roosevelt bandwagon could not be stopped. Even the Massachusetts delegation reneged on Farley, who had won their primary with the President out of the race. They told Farley they were for him, after something happened to Roosevelt.[43]

The President was confusing people with planted stories. Ernest Lindley, the President's official biographer, reported a conversation the President had with a member of Congress. According to Farley, it was Bob Doughton of North Carolina.[44] In the conversation, Roosevelt is to have stated that he would not run again,[45] and to have favored Hull for President and Jackson, McNutt or Wheeler for Vice President. He then went on to say that he was opposed to Farley on religious grounds. This infuriated Farley.[46] If FDR was talking for the record he would have been wise to have been a little more discreet. Furthermore, Jim Farley was tired of the President's deceiving him. He had wanted to avert an open break with the President, and he now felt that the third term issue involved party unity. His mind was made up and the last week in March, Farley announced, "To clear up any misunderstandings, let me say that my name will be presented to the Democratic National Convention in Chicago and that's that."[47]

As early as February, Roosevelt had told intimate

friends that his course of action would be influenced by the war in Europe.[48] FDR was obviously concerned about the effect of a lame duck President on the war. He had reached the conclusion that if he was not going to run, itwould be of greater benefit to withhold announcement for as long as possible. If the war continued, it might force him to seek re-election. Now as Hitler struck at Norway, it seemed that Roosevelt was moving closer and closer to the latter course of action. Robert Sherwood describes what went through Roosevelt's mind in making that decision:

> Pending the appearance of further evidence (which is always possible but, I should judge, highly unlikely) it may be assumed that it was Hitler and Mussolini - and also Churchill - who made up Roosevelt's mind for him. Had the Phony War still continued, with no sign of a break - or, after it did break, had the British Government advised the White House that it must sue for peace in the event of the fall of France - then nothing but overinflated personal vanity could have induced Roosevelt to seek a third term. Granted that Roosevelt had his full share of personal vanity - no man would run for President of the United States in the first place without it - he also had the ability to form a highly realistic estimate of the odds against him, and taking the most cynical view of the prospect, and leaving all questions of patriotic duty out of it, he would best serve the interests of his own present prestige and his ultimate place in history by retiring gracefully before the storm broke and thereby leaving the reaping of the whirlwind to his successor. However, as long as Britain held out, and as long as there remained a chance that German victory might be prevented, Roosevelt wanted to stay in the fight and sincerely believed that there was none among all the available candidates as well qualified to aid in the prevention as he.[48]

Paul McNutt also made a decision that he would run for the Presidency. Bruised and battered from the New Deal, he decided to take his case to the people. One of his opponents, Jim Farley was already with the people. Farley visited in twelve southern and midwestern states in twelve days covering 3,524 miles.[50] This "politicking" was making Roosevelt edgy. In late April he announced that he would take a 21 day tour of national parks on a non-political trip.[57]

By May, 1940, the war had spread to the low countries, and Europe was in bad shape. That month FDR finally decided to make his views known to one man - Cordell Hull.[52] Why? No one can say for sure, but probably because he had championed Hull for the Presidency for some time and he felt an obligation to his one faithful former warrior who had not openly broken with him on the third term and because Hull had done this out of respect for the President's position in the world today.[53] The decision, that he would be a candidate, though probably not told to Hull in those words, was thus at last released to one man.[54]

Hull was the front-runner behind Roosevelt.[55] He was not saddled with Garner's conservatism or Farley's Catholism. As Burns states:

> Hull knew that Roosevelt's support was all he needed, he chose to wait. Unlike Farley or Garner, he captured virtually no delegates,

in the end he became utterly dependent on the President. If, on the other hand, Roosevelt ultimately decided not to run, Hull would be a suitable compromise candidate. How much of this complex manuevering was deliberately planned by the President, how much was sheer accident in the midst of utter confusion no one could tell. But it was certain that by hiding his plans, Roosevelt was adding to the confusion, and that he was expecting to benefit from it. The Sphinx waited."[56]

FOOTNOTES

1 Time, January 29, 1940, p. 22.

2 New York Times, January 7, 1940, p. 14.

3 Time, February 26, 1940, p. 15.

4 Ibid., April 8, 1940, p. 18.

5 United States News, April 12, 1940, p. 15; April 19, 1940, p. 14; April 26, 1940, p. 14.

6 Time, April 22, 1940, p. 15.

7 Vandenberg, p. 4.

8 Johnson, The Republican Party, pp. 26-27.

9 New York Times, January 17, 1940, p. 39.

10 Wendell Willkie, "With Malice Towards None," The Saturday Evening Post, December 30, 1949, p. 23.

11 New York Times, January 17, 1940, p. 39.

12 Parmet and Hecht, p. 76.

13 New York Times, January 30, 1940, p. 4.

14 Willkie, "Malice Towards None," p. 64.

15 Parmet and Hecht, p. 70.

16 Moscow, p. 53.

17 Ibid., pp. 53-55.

18 "Business-And-Government," Fortune, April 1, 1940, pp. 46-47.

19 Wendell L. Willkie, "We, The People," Fortune, April 1, 1940, pp. 64-65.

20 Moscow, p. 61.

21 Barnard, p. 150.

22 Willkie, "We The People," p. 64.

23 "Wendell Willkie Exhibits Versatility As Guest Star of Information Please," Life, April 22, 1940, p. 80.

24 Moscow, pp. 62-63.

25 Barnard, pp. 158-159.

26 Parmet and Hecht, p. 101.

27 Moscow, p. 78.

28 Ibid., p. 81.

29 United States News, January 5, 1940, p. 15.

30 James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion And The Fox (New York, New York, 1956), p. 409.

31 Time, January 8, 1940, p. 14.

32 Farley Interview.

33 Time, January 15, 1940, p. 11.

34 United States News, March 8, 1940.

35 Ibid., January 26, 1940, p. 27.

36 Farley Interview.

37 Time, February 26, 1940, p. 14 and March 4, 1940, pp. 17-18.

38 Farley, Farley's Story, p. 224.

39 Farley Interview.

40 Time, February 5, 1940, p. 20.

41 United States News, March 22, 1940, p. 18.

42 Time, March 4, 1940, p. 20.

43 Ibid., p. 18.

44 Farley, Farley's Story, p. 225.

45 United States News, March 15, 1940, p. 26.

46 Farley, Farley's Story, p. 225 and Time, April 1, 1940, pp. 13, 14.

47 Farley Interview.

48 Time, March 4, 1940, pp. 17, 18.

49 Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, (New York, New York, 1948), pp. 172-173.

50 Time, April 22, 1940, p. 14.

51 Ibid., April 29, 1940, p. 15.

52 Farley Interview.

53 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. I, (New York, New York, 1948), p. 855.

54 Farley Interview.

55 Ibid.

56 Burns, The Lion And The Fox, pp. 414-415.

ACTIVE WAR AND THE NOMINATIONS MAY-JUNE 1940

The Republicans

In May and June the war began to influence the campaign when Hitler suddenly released his forces on a startled Europe. Time magazine perhaps put it best:

> This week, Nazi Germany launched her spring offensive. Like a cunning torch applied to tinder it set Northern Europe afire. Germany struck Norway first, Denmark fell in a day, Sweden was taken without resistance. Only Norway was willing to fight, and her fate was doomed.[1]
>
> Hitler had put his fate again to the test. The rape of Scandinavia was certain to cover him with the world's hate. The rest of the world was already against him. His gamble was that if the stroke were decisive the rest of the world would no longer count. It remained to be seen whether he had overreached himself.[2]

By early May, the Allied Northwestern Expeditionary Force was in Norway trying to save that country from Nazi domination. Norway fell the second week of May. On May 10, Hitler turned South into Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.[3] The grave crisis produced bitter debate in the British House of Commons. As tempers flared, Conservative Charles Amery turned to Neville Chamberlain and said, "You have sat here too long for any good you have been doing. Depart, I say. Let us have done with you. In the name of God, go!"[4] Four days later, in "the most spectacular failure in English political history since Palmerston,"[5] Neville Chamberlain turned over the seals of government to

long time adversary, First Lord of the Admirality, Winston Churchill. Thus, in May, the war dominated the interest of the American people. Politics, for the present, took a back seat.

Some of the leading papers of the country were calling for bi-partianship in the government. The New York Herald Tribune said that "the President (must) recognize the inadequacy of existing machinery for administration."[6] In a similar vein, the Providence Bulletin said, "The best brains are available to Mr. Roosevelt today, if he will put aside his inhibitions against business and industry that have been so characteristic of the past seven years."[7] The attention of the country was occupied by the war. It had become more and more obvious that isolationism was not in vogue. The Gallup Poll reported in May that for the first time most Americans believed that the United States would eventually enter the war. Dewey on May 17 said that a national defense board should be established. Landon, Taft, Dewey, and Hoover supported Roosevelt's request for a billion dollars for preparedness.[9] Willkie went a step farther than these men and advocated direct aid to the Allies.[10]

The war was of great aid to Willkie but with the convention only a month away, he needed to make even greater strides. In early May, at the request of publishers John and Gardner Cowles, Jr., he made a rousing speech in St.

Paul to seven hundred Republicans who screamed, "More, more" when he had finished. The speech was more important in the long run than its normal impact would suggest. The radio part did not go well because Willkie did not read effectively from his prepared text. But once the radio program was over and there were no time resrictions upon him, Willkie, realizing he had made an ineffective address, suddenly flung the text at the audience, and declared, "Now I'm off the air and I don't have to use so damn much fine language. What I have been trying to say is, we sure got to get rid of that bunch, and I'll tell you how to do it."[11] In the process he convinced Harold Stassen, the Republican keynoter, and six Minnesota delegates.[12]

Willkie now seemed greatly interested in the nomination. In the next fews he spoke in fourteen cities: Indianapolis, Des Moines, New York, Kansas City, Akron, Denver, St. Louis, Lincoln, Omaha, Washington, Boston, Hartford, Providence and Brooklyn. He dwelt heavily upon two themes: first, the need to aid the Allies with everything we had; and second, to prepare America militarily for war.[13] His intelligence amazed and impressed many people, including the news media. His interventionist stand did not hurt him with the latter group. In May he had gained the support of many newspaper publishers, when he spoke before them at their convention. Time, New York Times, United States News, and Newsweek

were all pro-Ally, and all but Newsweek were obviously pro-Willkie. The press has been called by one of his biographers, "the most powerful agent in Willkie's rocket-like ascent to a dominant position at the convention."[14]

Tom Dewey was running unopposed in the New Jersey primary. About a week before the election, however, Willkie clubs began to appear in New Jersey towns. On election eve a mass meeting was held in one town to persuade people to write in Willkie's name. The write-in campaign was moderately successful. Dewey received some 256,659 votes, Willkie's write-in total was 18,792.[15]

Willkie's chief problem involved his identification with the Eastern Establishment and the conservative nature of his support (bankers, lawyers, financiers, insurance interests, owners of businesses, and doctors.) They were part of the "country-club" set, and they scorned the big government of the New Deal.[16] On May 21, a group of supporters in his native Indiana organized a rally for Willkie to try and change this image. They rented Manhattan Center, gave out box lunches, had his former English teacher at Indiana University introduce him, and persuaded CBS to broadcast his speech as a news event, rather than as paid political time. His topic was the consequences of a German victory.[17]

Willkie had to take his fight to more than just the people. He needed support from the politicians, including

Alfred E. Landon. Landon was known to regard Willkie as inexperienced and too close to Eastern business interests. Sam Pryor arranged a meeting between the two men. Landon was impressed by Willkie and left him with the thought that he was a serious contender.[18] Dewey also needed the support of either Landon or Hoover to get the nomination.

Two things were clearly evident. Willkie, for whatever combination of reasons, was gaining rapidly in the polls, and the war was clearly having its effect on all the candidates. On May 10, Willkie had the support of 3% of Republicans, on the 17th, 5%; on the 31st, 10%.[19] Frank Freidel summed it up, "National defense was suddenly the most important issue."[20]

Twenty-four days before the Republican Convention opened the New York Times headlined, "75% of B.E.F. Reported Safely Out of Flanders ... Roosevelt Warns War Imperils World."[21] Driven back to the sea, the British Army had miraculously been evacuated under a heavy fog from Dunkirk.

The same day (May 31) as Dunkirk, Willkie made a biting speech against the Roosevelt administration:

> Today we are unprepared to meet the crisis of the world and our unpreparedness is not just military unpreparedness.
>
> We are unprepared because we have not taken democracy seriously. We have been unfaithful to the ideal of liberty. We have confused liberty with license ...

> We have a madman across the seas with the greatest instrument for destruction in his hands that the world has ever seen. Consequently his acts will be felt in the United States spiritually, economically, and industrially.
>
> Let's remove from power those who have sought to divide us into classes, who have sought to turn industry against the people and make people fearful of industry.
>
> Planes and guns are not built by emotional appeals over the radio, and they are not built by attacks on business.[22]

Immediately after Dunkirk, Churchill told the House of Commons:

> We must be very careful not to assign to this deliverance attributes of a victory. Wars are not won by evacuations, but there was a victory inside the deliverance which must be noted.
>
> We shall not flag nor fail. We shall go on to the end. We shall fight in France and on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air.
>
> We shall defend our island whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on beaches, landing grounds, in fields, the streets and on the hills. We shall never surrender and even if, which I do not for a momemt believe, this island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving then our Empire beyond the seas armed and guarded by the British fleet, will carry on the struggle until in God's good time the New World with all its power and might sets forth to the liberation and rescue of the old.[23]

The next day Willkie spoke in St. Louis and recalled another bit of Churchillian prose as he praised the Prime Minister for his honest promise of 'blood, tears, toil, and sweat.' He called on our own national defense

program to make the same kind of promises. He stated again that the New Deal was trying to divide the country, and this division was the reason for our lack of preparedness.[24] Willkie questioned the New Deal's ability to increase production as long as they continued to attack business. This was the stand he would take throughout the summer, as he spoke out on foreign policy, endorsed the sending of American supplies to the Allies, and national defense preparations.

Willkie had been the first Republican candidate to support the war issue.[25] His opposition in the Republican Party either said the wrong thing, avoided the issue, or tried to minimize it. "Taft, the No. 1 Republican Bumbler took off around the U.S. putting his foot in his mouth." Republicans from eight states, including Alf Landon, had told him there was more and more midwest sentiment for "substantial" aid to the Allies and had warned him to go slow on isolationism. However, the day he received this advice, Taft made his strongest appeal for strict U.S. neutrality, financial as well as military, in World War II. Dewey announced his foreign policy the same week and it only included avoidance of foreign entanglements.[26]

Willkie was gaining momentum by the day. He journeyed west to Kansas City, was introduced by Alf Landon and told the crowd, "I'm the cockiest fellow you ever

saw. If you want to vote for me, fine. If you don't go jump in the lake and I'm still for you."[27] By June 12 there were 500 Willkie Clubs and requests for Willkie buttons were running at 50,000 a day. The latest Gallup Poll (around June 10) showed Willkie in second place among Republicans with 17% support to Dewey's 42%. Democrats-for-Willkie groups were organized, led by Lewis Douglas, former Director of the Budget and now President of Mutual of New York, and John W. Hanes, former Under-Secretary of the Treasury.[28]

On June 10, the same day that Italy declared war on Great Britain and France, the President spoke at the University of Virginia and denounced Italy in his famous "the hand that held the dagger" address. The reaction to the speech was generally favorable. Thomas Dewey was one of the few that disapproved, calling it the "voice of a belligerent."[29] Dewey was trying to build up his image as a peacemaker and statesman. He had lost momentum and would not get the nomination on the first ballot. His slippage in delegate support was due to several reasons. First, his inexperience hurt him. The American people were not sure if a thirty-eight year old District Attorney, no matter how young and glib, could handle the problems of the World War. Second, Dewey had peaked too soon. And third, he never really had either the Old Guard Republicans

or the Eastern "progressive" wing behind him. The Old Guard considered him too progressive and too young. The Eastern establishment, though liking his attractive manner, felt he was too inexperienced and too young.[30] Examples of the latter included Governor Baldwin, the favorite son of Connecticut, who ultimately supported Willkie, and Mayor Marvin of Syracuse, a Gannett supporter, but one that Dewey had hoped would release delegates to him on the second ballot.[31]

Dewey knew that his lead was slipping. After wavering for several weeks, he, using a Willkie theme, finally attacked Roosevelt for having "those people (Wallace, Perkins, Woodring) in his confidence who had forced the nation into domestic warfare." He also said FDR was not being honest with the people on the question of cost of national defense.[32] There was rebellion in Illinois when its delegation refused to be bound for Dewey after one ballot, although he had won the primary there. His manager in Illinois attributed Dewey's weakening support to the "worsening" European crisis.[33]

Dewey was having the most trouble in his home state of New York where he had gotten into a row with Frank Gannett, and Kenneth Simpson, Republican Committeeman. After Simpson would not support Dewey, the latter succeeded in ousting him from his post as National Committeeman.

Many Dewey delegates were not happy with this purge. Tom Dewey had accomplished his goal, but in doing so alienated many of the New York delegation who were loyal to Simpson, including Mayor Marvin.[34]

The convention was only two weeks away. Dewey's loss of support had become obvious to all the candidates. He and Taft were involved in a dispute over delegates. Each claimed to have a majority of the delegates in Indiana, Kentucky, Montana, Alabama, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Wyoming. Dewey claimed a total of 400-450, Taft claimed 390. Newsweek and the New York Times said Dewey had 300, Taft 250.[35] Other first-ballot strength was divided among dark-horses and favorite sons as follows:[36]

Arthur James	72
Arthur Vandenberg	67
Herbert Hoover	44
Hanford McNider	33
Wendell Willkie	26
Frank Gannett	24
Styles Bridges	24
Joe Martin	20
Arthur Capper	18
Raymond Baldwin	16
Charles McNary	10
Hamilton Fish	2.5
Unknown	94

While Dewey fought Republicans in New York, Willkie was confident of the nomination. He said, "The nomination will be made on the sixth or seventh ballot and the nominee will be the free choice of the delegates. My supporters say I will be the nominee and I think I should be."[37] He

also announced that Rep. Charles Halleck of Indiana would place him in nomination and Rep. Bruce Barton of New York would second him.[38] He claimed that twenty-two of the thirty-four delegates in Massachusetts would be his on the second ballot after a token vote for Congressman Joe Martin.[39] He picked up all sixteen Connecticut delegates, who assured him of their vote on the second ballot.[40] In Providence, Governor Arthur Vanderbilt announced his support, as did six of the eight Rhode Island delegates.[41]

Another plus in Willkie's favor was the surprising pro-Ally composition of the platform committee. The committee had been chosen the day after Marshall Petain had rejected the extraordinary offer from the British "to make a complete and permanent marriage of the two empires,"[42] and sued for peace.

As the convention approached, the momentum was clearly with Willkie. The New York Times headlined, "Willkie is called 'The Man to Beat'."[43] There were even reports of Taft and Dewey joining forces to block Willkie.

> As in a wartime blackout started by air raid sirens, supporters of most of the Republican Presidential candidates groped in some perplexity today as they sought to explain the rapidly growing sentiment in behalf of Wendell Willkie and to arrive at a general conclusion that he was "the man to beat" at the convention next week.[44]

A day later, the Times reported both the Willkie movement

and the stop Willkie movement were becoming increasingly popular.[45] It is very possible that nothing Dewey or Taft could do would change the situation. The "Sage of Emporia," William Allen White, stated that, "The immediate political effect of the situation (the war) is to give the boom of Wendell Willkie a considerable impetus."[46] David Lawrence wrote that Willkie's nomination, "which was believed impossible a few years ago, was decidedly within the realm of possibility at this time."[47] The person, however, that the war helped most was the President. A poll showed that 57% (an increase from 47%) of Americans supported a third term.[48]

The effect of the international situation can be seen further in the Gallup Poll released on June 15. The Poll showed that within the last month there was a decided increase in the number of states leaning towards the Democrats. The only Republican states were Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, South Dakota, Kansas, Iowa, and Nebraska with a total of 43 electoral votes.[49] Perhaps the most important indication of the war can be seen in its impact on the news media. With the Republican convention only three weeks away, it seems odd that in the first ten days of June there was not a front page story about the candidates. There were few on the second page. A story about the convention, Willkie, Dewey, etc. might be found

on page nine or ten. The headlines until the convention opened were six-column, three inch headlines entirely concerned with the war. The covers of Time magazine, from the invasion of Norway to the end of June, included: Falkenhorst (May 13); King Leopold (May 20); Marshals of the Royal Air Force (May 27); Weygand (June 3); FDR, with the sub-caption "Planes Cost Money - A Lot of It," (June 10); Reynaud and Staff (June 17; and Mussolini and Badoglio (June 24).[50] Newsweek had Churchill, Mussolini, British Navy, etc. On June 24 it had Willkie on the cover with the caption, "Can the Dark Horse Willkie Win the GOP Derby?"[51] The news media tended not to report the political events except on the inside pages. Everybody was concerned about the war.

As the professionals began to move into Philadelphia, there was an obvious stir among the delegates. The hotels were crowded. In addition to Robert Taft's 102 rooms at the Benjamin Franklin, six other candidates had rooms there. Dewey took 78 rooms at the Walton. Arthur Vandenberg installed himself at the Adelphia, Frank Gannett, in addition to renting 48 rooms at the Franklin, had rented out the entire Harvard Club. Wendell Willkie, meanwhile, had two rooms at the Franklin and two in the Land Title Building.[52]

Willkie may have had only four rooms in Philadel-

phia but he had 750 Willkie Clubs across the country; and new ones were being formed at the rate of 20 to 40 per day. In addition, there were at least 50,000 Willkie volunteers in the field. He spoke before the largest audience ever in attendance at the National Press Club. Willkie attributed his success to a "trend." The Republicans about to assemble in Philadelphia knew that they were meeting in the "hour of Hitler's greatest triumph and democracy's greatest defeat." Columnist Ray Clapper wrote:

> Republicans have just one issue in this campaign. It is whether Mr. Roosevelt or a Republican could do a faster, better job of obtaining the industrial production for defense ... On that point Mr. Willkie is the only man the Republicans have who stands a chance of making an effective case.[53]

This Republican Convention had never been allowed to act and react as it would have liked. All winter the future candidates and delegates were forced to consider the third term and what might happen if FDR ran again. "The issues were grave."[54] When Hitler stormed through Europe, Chamberlain was forced to resign, Italy declared war, and France sued for peace. But it must have been shocking to Republicans to wake up on Friday morning, June 21, and read the headlines in the Times. The first one was not unexpected, though terribly bitter. "France Gets Terms at Compiegne Today." The second headline was

bitter and unexpected "Knox and Stimson are Named to Cabinet."[55] Both prominent Repbulicans, the former had been the party's nominee for Vice President in 1936. The latter had served as Taft's Secretary of War and Hoover's Secretary of State. Since it had been rumored for some time that Roosevelt had tried to persuade Knox to be Secretary of the Navy, his appointment was not totally unexpected. The nomination of Stimson was a surprise, although it had been generally known that FDR and Secretary Woodring had long since ceased to agree on aid to Europe, some party leaders wished to read Knox and Stimson out of the party. Dewey called the appointments the making of a war cabinet. Observers seemed to think their nominations conceivably hurt the internationalist wing of the Republican party, and its leading candidate - Willkie.[56]

James Hagerty the next day reported that the Willkie boom continued despite the appointments of Knox and Stimson. In addition, the Willkie Clubs were starting a massive mail and telegram drive. Kenneth Simpson, ousted New York National Committeeman, had received more than 100,000 telegrams, cards, etc., three days before the convention opened. In addition, some 500 Willkie Club supporters arrived in Philadelphia on Sunday to drum up enthusiasm for him.[57]

Dewey's people were still pointing to his large showing in the Gallup Poll and his gain in the primaries. He gained the disputed South Carolina delegation from the Republican National Committee as it decided in his favor rather than Taft's.[58]

The day before the convention, a small fight loomed over the foreign policy plank of the platform. Dewey announced he was in favor of aid to the Allies as long as it did not violate either international or national law. Willkie, however, favored aid to the Allies and reciprocal trade.[59]

On Sunday, the 23rd, Governor Baldwin of Connecticut withdrew as a favorite son and announced that all of Connecticut's sixteen votes would go to Willkie on the first ballot. Willkie also received the support of Mayor Marvin of Syracuse and three national committeemen, Pryor of Connecticut, Hallanan of West Virginia, and Weeks of Massachusetts.[60] Willkie backers persuaded him that he needed an organization to control his interest at the convention. Such a group was formed the day before the convention.

Republicans as they gathered in Philadelphia agreed it was "the damndest convention that ever was.... Nothing went the way things had always gone. The professional politicians said it was the fault of the people. It was

the fault, too, of another interloper.... Wendell Lewis Willkie, 48, product of Indiana's Main Street and New York's Wall Street, was in town. The convention had not invited him; the convention wished he were somewhere else."[61] On Monday, June 24, as the delegates awoke that morning, the headlines seemed a mirror of the past month. "France Yields Fleet Under Armistice, Gives up West Coast, Half of Country; Britain and Petain Regime in Open Break," "New Gains for Willkie as Republicans Gather for Convention Today."[62]

At 11 a.m. John Hamilton, Chairman of the Republican National Committee gavelled the twenty-second Republican National Convention into order. After the usual preliminaries, the convention adjourned. It reconvened that night to hear the boy wonder of Minnesota, thirty-three year old Governor Harold Stassen, deliver the keynote address. His address contained the usual amount of political malarky. He came down hard on the Democrats for neglecting our foreign policy, and received his loudest ovation when he declared:

> And then by his politically timed appointment on the eve of this convention of two men of our own party to these Cabinet posts, the President made an eleventh hour confession of failure in his national defense administration.

He then went on to endorse the role of free enterprise:

> We must realize that the answer to all our problems of a domestic nature is not to shrug our shoulders and say 'let the government do it.' The role of government must be that of an aid to private enterprise and not a substitute for it.[63]

Time was not overly impressed: "No orator, using gestures out of the book, huge Mr. Stassen handled his problem well, but only well: from him no hearer got any sense of a collapsing world."[64]

But the candidates were thinking of things other than the keynote address. Dewey's campaign manager predicted that he would get the nomination on the second ballot. Herbert Hoover announced his intention to remain at the convention after he made his speech Tuesday night and hopefully receive the nomination. Wendell Willkie, meanwhile, greeted delegations at his hotel. He had picked up the support of Ralph Carr and others from Colorado. Carr would second his nomination. He also made gains in the key New Jersey delegation, gained twenty-seven votes from Massachusetts and three from Delaware.[65] In addition, most of the Maryland delegation, despite Dewey's win in the primary had decided to abandon him in favor of Willkie.[66]

There was only one depressing note for Willkie. A statement signed by eight senators and congressmen, including the future Vice Presidential nominee, Senator McNary, urged the nomination of a candidate who "with a

past record consistently supporting Republican policies and principles and whose recognized position and recent pronouncements are a guarantee to the American people that he will not lead the nation into a foreign war." There was further concern about Willkie's ability to win votes in the West.[67] This was offset somewhat by Governor Carr's endorsement, mentioned above.

On Tuesday, the Republican Convention met to consider the platform and its key foreign policy statement. The platform had a stronger anti-war plank than was expected. The preamble read:

> The Republican party is the party of Americanism, preparedness, and peace. We accordingly fasten upon the New Deal full responsibility for our unpreparedness and for consequent danger of our involvement in war.

To appease the more interventionist wing of the party, the plank expressed sympathy for "oppressed peoples in their fight against aggression and favoring assistance to those nations not inconsistent with international law." The platform implied that the candidate should be allowed to chart his own ideas within those general guidelines stated in the plank.[68]

That same night the convention heard Mr. Hoover denounce the New Deal saying, "It was leading us down the same suicide road that had brought disaster in

Europe." He closed with an attack on individualism saying:

> If man is merely one of the herd, running with the pack, Stalin is right, Hitler is right, and God help us for our follies and greeds, the New Deal is right.

He then virtually challenged the delegates to nominate him if they had the courage to make a real fight for the election.[69] If the speech had not been delivered in Hoover's typically boring style, he might well have gotten the nomination he so desperately wanted.

There was a good deal of politicking behind the scenes. Dewey's campaign manager, J. Russell Sprague, predicted Dewey would have 400 votes on the first ballot, 450 on the second, and momentum enough to give him the nomination. The New York Times gave him 377, Taft 250 to 274, and Willkie 75 to 100.[70] Willkie reported additional support. He was to pick up at least thirty of Pennsylvania's seventy-two votes after they had fulfilled their obligation to Governor James, and also a few from upstate New York that were originally Frank Gannett's.[71]

After finally adopting the platform on Wednesday, the convention opened with the nominations. New York nominated Dewey and Gannett. Ohio did the same for Taft and then Representative Charles Halleck, admist boos from the delegates and cheers from the galleries, nominated

Willkie. While the galleries cheered, the delegates glared at them.[72] The people in the galleries were so obviously for Mr. Willkie and so loud in their support that Colonel R. B. Creager of Texas, Taft's floor manager, and others, accused Willkie and Sam Pryor, the Chairman of the Committee on Arrangements, of packing them. Willkie on Wednesday picked up additional support from Keynoter Harold Stassen, the former Senator Daniel O. Hastings of Delaware, and the split New York delegation. In addition, the New York Herald Tribune gave him a strong endorsement calling him "Heaven's gift to the nation in its time of crisis."[73]

The preliminaries were over; the convention was ready to do business. At 4:50 p.m., Alabama opened the roll call. "The experts knew how the first ballot would go and they had a fairly accurate idea of the second." When the first ballot was concluded, the outcome was fairly close to the predictions. Dewey's 360 votes were 17 shy of his anticipated total. Taft was some 61 short with his 251 votes. Willkie had 105, a gain of 5 over his speculated total. The Taft people were scared, and began to put the pressure on the delegates. The galleries, cheered every votefor Willkie and screamed and roared at every switched vote.

On the second ballot, Dewey slipped twenty-two

votes, about what was expected. Taft gained only 14, and Willkie gained 66. Joe Martin then adjourned the convention for two hours. At 8:30 the roll call started for the third ballot. When it was over Taft had gained only nine votes, while Willkie in cracking New York and Pennsylvania picked up 80 votes. Dewey's votes were released at the beginning of the fourth ballot. Willkie and Taft picked up almost identical support. The rest of Dewey's votes came over on the fifth. Again they were split between Taft and Willkie. Willkie still held a fifty-two vote lead - 429 to 377. The sixth was crucial. The Taft people wanted an adjournment, with the tide going towards Willkie. Joe Martin, in an attempt to play fair, allowed the convention to proceed. At the end of the sixth ballot, Howard C. Lawrence, Senator Vandenberg's campaign manager, walked to the platform and announced that Willkie had received 35 of the 38 Michigan votes. This gave Willkie 500, only two short of victory which were quickly supplied by Pennsylvania. "The people had won. For the first time since Theodore Roosevelt, the Republicans had a man they could yell for and mean it."

There were many reasons for the sensational boom for Willkie's candidacy: The personality and experience of Roosevelt, and the World War. These two issues influenced the people - the galleries; the Willkie club types, who

participated in the chain mail bombardment of the delegates; and most important, the delegates.

One cannot discount the influence of the mass media. With the Luce and Cowles publishing empires, the New York Times, and the New York Herald Tribune supporting Willkie, it was hard for him not to be a contender.

There was in the final analysis, no one else. Thomas Dewey was too inexperienced, Robert Taft too dull, and his views on the war too outdated, and Arthur Vandenberg was too blase.

> The delegates couldn't understand it.
>
> They could no longer read the newspapers with any enjoyment for all the important political columnists were daily comparing the nomination of anyone but Willkie to the Fall of France - Ray Clapper, Mark Sullivan, Arthur Krock, Dorothy Thompson, Walter Lippmann, Westbrook Pegler, Hugh Johnson.
>
> From the first night the galleries had shouted, "We Want Willkie!" over and over in a college yell. Delegates could hardly get into their rooms past the bundles of pro-Willkie telegrams from back home. The suits came back from the hotel valet with Willkie buttons pinned on. Long distance calls came from their wives, pastors, bankers, luncheon clubs, saying with one voice, "Willkie!"[74]

FOOTNOTES

1 Time, April 15, 1940, p. 26.

2 Ibid., April 22, 1940, p. 26.

3 Ibid., May 20, 1940, p. 22.

4 Ibid., May 20, 1940, p. 34.

5 Ibid., May 20, 1940, p. 36

6 United States News, May 31, 1940, p. 25.

7 Ibid., p. 25.

8 Parmet and Hecht, p. 104.

9 Time, May 27, 1940, p. 21.

10 Parmet and Hecht, pp. 104-105.

11 Joseph W. Barnes, Wendell Willkie (New York, New York, 1952) p. 163.

12 Barnes, p. 161; Barnard, p. 161.

13 Barnard, p. 162

14 Ibid., pp. 164-165.

15 Parmet and Hecht, p. 91.

16 Ibid., pp. 93-94.

17 Barnard, p. 164.

18 Parmet and Hecht, pp. 109-110.

19 Barnard, p. 163; Parmet and Hecht, p. 101.

20 Frank Freidel, America In The Twentieth Century (New York, New York, 1960), p. 378.

21 New York Times, June 1, 1940, p. 1.

22 Ibid., June 1, 1940, p. 7.

23 Ibid., June 5, 1940, p. 6.

24 Ibid., June 7, 1940, p. 2.

25 Time, June 3, 1940, p. 17.

26 Ibid., June 3, 1940, p. 16.

27 Ibid., June 10, 1940, p. 23.

28 Parmet and Hecht, p. 198.

29 New York Times, June 3, 1940, p. 1.

30 This is supported by Parmet and Hecht's suggestion that Dewey was least popular in New England.

31 Parmet and Hecht, p. 113.

32 New York Times, June 9, 1940, p. 6.

33 Parmet and Hecht, p. 113.

34 Ibid., p. 124.

35 Newsweek, June 17, 1940, p. 41; New York Times, June 17, 1940, p. 19.

36 New York Times, June 17, 1940, p. 19.

37 Ibid., June 13, 1940, p. 10.

38 Ibid., June 13, 1940, p. 10.

39 Johnson, The Republican Party, p. 69.

40 New York Times, June 16, 1940, p. 20.

41 Ibid., June 17, 1940, p. 17.

42 Ibid., June 18, 1940, p. 1.

43 Ibid., June 19, 1940, p. 1.

44 Ibid., June 19, 1940, p. 16.

45 Ibid., June 20, 1940, p. 1.

46 Ibid., June 19, 1940, p. 2.

47 Time, June 10, 1940, p. 23.

48 New York Times, June 5, 1940, p. 18.

49 Ibid., June 16, 1940, p. 6.

50 Time, May 13, 1940 to June 24, 1940 (Covers).

51 Newsweek, June 24, 1940 (Cover).

52 New York Times, June 16, 1940, p. 5; Newsweek, June 24, 1940, p. 31; Parmet and Hecht, p. 122.

53 Time, June 24, 1940, pp. 17-19.

54 Ibid., July 8, 1940, p. 9.

55 New York Times, June 21, 1940, p. 1.

56 Ibid., June 21, 1940, p. 1.

57 Ibid., June 22, 1940, pp. 1, 10.

58 Ibid., June 22, 1940, p. 10.

59 Ibid., June 23, 1940, pp. 1, 2.

60 Ibid., June 24, 1940, p. 1.

61 Time, July 8, 1940, p. 10.

62 New York Times, June 25, 1940, p. 1.

63 Ibid., June 25, 1940, p. 17.

64 Time, July 8, 1940, p. 12.

65 New York Times, June 25, 1940, pp. 1, 16.

66 Parmet and Hecht, p. 125.

67 New York Times, June 25, 1940, p. 18.

68 Ibid., June 26, 1940, pp. 1, 16.

69 Ibid., June 26, 1940, p. 17.

70 Ibid., June 24, 1940. p. 16.

71 New York Times, June 26, 1940, p. 18.

72 Ibid., June 27, 1940, pp. 3, 4.

73 Ibid., June 27, 1940, p. 4.

74 Time, July 8, 1940, pp. 9-16.

MAY 1940 TO THE CONVENTION

The Democrats

On May 3, Roosevelt told five thousand Democratic women at the White House that it was time "for each would-be candidate to quit condemning each and every act of this administration and tell us just how you would change the laws if you were in power."[1] During the week Roosevelt agents tried to secure the support of the Texas and California delegations. The Texas delegates agreed to support Garner, but gave a strong endorsement to the New Deal.[2] The President also overwhelmingly won the California primary with 712,000 votes to Garner's 110,000. He did not fare as well in Alabama, where Speaker William B. Bankhead was to lead a favorite son delegation, or in Maryland where arch-opponent Senator Millard E. Tydings had control of the delegation.[3]

By the middle of May the results had become obvious. FDR, short of an outright refusal, would be the nominee. Garner's losses to Roosevelt in Wisconsin by a three to one margin, in Illinois by a six to one margin, and in California and Texas had severly hurt his chances. The same month Roosevelt won the delegates from Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Michigan. With the big eastern block of New York and Massachusetts he had more than enough votes for the nomination.[4] He even had the

support of a Republican - Mayor Fiorello H. LaGuardia.[5]

The only question in the minds of the Democrats, now, was, "Would Roosevelt accept the nomination?" If he would not, the only possible alternative was Cordell Hull, who in a Gallup Poll led Dewey by 2%, while Roosevelt only led by 4%.[6] In a poll of Democrats, Hull had widened his lead over all other contenders (excluding FDR).[7]

There was still speculation as to "whether the convention would pay James A. Farley's bill for services rendered by offering him the nomination for Vice President."[8] Farley would have had to be the Vice Presidential nominee on a ticket with Hull, as Federal law prohibited him from running with Roosevelt, since both were from the same state.[9]

The President could not neglect the war. Germany had invaded the low countries, and Prime Minister Chamberlain was forced to resign.[10] On Thursday, May 16, 1940, he asked a joint session of Congress for a one billion dollar appropriation to equip the armed forces for national defense.[11] "As he entered the House Chamber, the legislators ignoring party affiliations, sprang to their feet and began applauding wildly in what could only be interpreted as a demonstration of national unity in a time of international crisis."[12]

On the 10th of June, Italy declared war on France, and FDR and the United States took sides. "Ended was the myth of U.S. neutrality."[13] The war had forced the President to take sides. Also, Mrs. Dwight Morrow, mother-in-law of isolationist Lindbergh, Walter Millis, author of Road to War, and two editors of the New Republic all came out in favor of the Allies.[14]

> In the United States, the national mood changed overnight. In Times Square great crowds, grim-faced, awesomely silent, blocked traffic as they spilled into the middle of Broadway to stare up at the bulletins on the Times Building. Suddenly the country felt naked and vulnerable. Only the British stood between Hitler and the United States. If Germany struck across the Channel with the same ferocity and cunning that had annihilated opposition in western Europe in a few weeks, Britain might well be flying the swastika by the end of the year, and Admiral Raeder might be commanding the British Fleet.[15]

In June, Roosevelt, to secure bi-partisan support, appointed Frank Knox and Henry Stimson, two prominent Republicans to the Cabinet in posts to co-ordinate the war effort. James McGregor Burns' description of the appointments and what transpired in Roosevelt's mind is excellent:

> Actually the President had been planning since the outbreak of war to make his cabinet bi-partisan. He had hoped to appoint Landon as well as Knox, but this plan repeatedly fell afoul of Landon's refusal to come in unless Roosevelt publicly opposed a third term. Several other factors delayed the cabinet shuffle: Roosevelt's reluctance to oust Harry Woodring as Secretary

> of war; his concern that Knox's appointment might lead to difficulties with the publisher's old enemy, Boss Kelly; the arrangements that had to be made with Boss Hague of New Jersey to nominate Secretary of the Navy Edison for governor of New Jersey. When Landon in mid-May still demanded the third-term disclaimer, Roosevelt seized on a suggestion of Frankfurter's to choose Stimson. He then waited two weeks and announced the appointments just as the Republican convention was getting under way. As usual, Roosevelt's timing was perfect; the date fitted both the needs of the crisis abroad and politics at home.[16]

The President sat back and watched the Republicans. He was somewhat shocked by Willkie's ability to stampede the convention. A cartoon in Time probably summed up the GOP dilemma. On it was a huge silhoutte of Roosevelt against the podium and the title was "Among Those Present." Democrats were caught unprepared by Willkie's nomination. "Until last week no one had stopped to think what Mr. Roosevelt might do if the GOP came up with a red-hot candidate who would also be a powerhouse as an administrator." His nomination did nothing but convince Democrats that FDR should run. Tom Corcoran trumpeted that Mr. Roosevelt had no choice left but to run. "Even ole John Garner sadly made up his mind that Franklin Roosevelt was the only Democrat who could beat this man."[17]

Roosevelt was concerned that a man of Willkie's political appeal was now his opponent. The "Champ" considered Willkie the most formidable opponent that the Repub-

licans could have named. "He had the glamour noticeably lacking in other Republican candidates. And though Roosevelt was concerned about the attractiveness of Willkie, he was delighted at his foreign policy stand, calling it a 'Godsend for the country!'" From the beginning Willkie clearly supported the peace time draft and the destroyer-for-bases deal.[18] Roosevelt decided to use Willkie's business background against him in the campaign.

"The Champ" still had a formidable fight ahead of him, and it occurred to him that perhaps he had better begin to tip his hand. He thus made up his mind to tell Jim Farley what he had told Cordell Hull six weeks earlier, that he would be a candidate! Roosevelt obviously had been playing his cards close to his chest for the past month. Neither Farley nor Hull was aware of the Stimson and Knox appointments until they were announced.[19] Farley was summoned, for the second time, to Hyde Park on July 8 to hear what else the President had been keeping from him.

The conversation rambled until FDR explained that he did not withdraw from the North Dakota primary because of the war. He then announced to Farley, "Jim, I don't want to run and I am going to tell the convention so." Farley told him his renunciation would have to be specific, at which point the President explored the various ways he could decline the nomination. He then told Farley:

> You know, Jim, I want to fully explain my position in order to be honest with myself about the situation, because I am definitely opposed to seeking a third term. In justice to my conscience I want that thoroughly understood by the delegates and the country.

After Farley suggested that he issue a Sherman statement, Roosevelt replied, "Jim, if nominated and elected, I could not in <u>these times</u> refuse to take the inaugural oath, even if I knew I would be dead within thirty days."[20]

Jim Farley felt that the reason FDR did not confide in him earlier, was that he (Farley) would take some action to prevent the renomination or at least damage his chances.[21] Farley also believed that the President never had any intention of not running and if there had been no war would have found some other excuse to run. Furthermore, he felt that short of war, the President could not have been renominated, and Hull would have been nominated and elected.[22]

The Democrats thus prepared to move into Chicago. There was disunion in the ranks, the delegates might nominate Roosevelt, but they were not going to be altogether happy doing it. Farley "had turned sour on the doubt, confusion, rumor and counter-rumor which rent the Democratic party."[23] By now most people knew that Franklin Roosevelt would run; there was no one else.

Roosevelt was unalterably opposed to the Farley-Garner wing gaining control of the party feeling that they

represented the forces of reaction and isolationism.[24] During the week before the convention opened there were meetings of pro-Roosevelt (which meant anti-Farley) Cabinet officers and Congressional leaders to plan the strategy. When these people asked Roosevelt whom they should consult in Chicago he replied, "In that event, if I were you I'd consult Jimmy Byrnes."[25]

On Thursday July 11, word leaked to the press that FDR would accept a draft, and he told Ickes that he would accept the nomination, "If I am forced to run."[26] The other candidates were quickly withdrawing. McNutt made it clear that he was supporting FDR for a third term, although he kept his campaign headquarters open in the hopes that he would take second place. Senator Wheeler indicated he would not be a candidate for the Presidency. This left only Garner and Farley, and they had meager support. Accurate reports had ninety percent of the delegates in favor of Roosevelt. There were even rumors that Roosevelt might accept the Presidency only until the war was over, and then resign.[27]

On Friday, the arrival of Byrnes and Hopkins in Chicago dispelled any doubt that the President would seek the renomination. The plan was for Byrnes to be the floor leader and Hopkins the liason officer. They closeted themselves so well that most delegates and even bosses had no

idea of what was going on. Farley said (in answer to a reporter's question) that he was waiting for Hopkins to call and would be glad to see him. Hopkins never called. When a reporter asked Farley if he knew what was going on, he said, "Sometimes." Boss Crump of Memphis told the press - "For all I know, I might as well be in the Fiji Islands."[28] However, when Perkins, Ickes, Wallace, and the rest arrived in Chicago they found to their dismay that Roosevelt headquarters were not with Byrnes but had been firmly established in the Blackstone Hotel suite of Harry Hopkins. Here was the Chicago end of the only private line to the White House.

There were a few other Roosevelt cronies there, but Hopkins was really running things. Ickes' description of this contains his usual sarcasm:

> I got in touch with both Hopkins and Jackson... There seemed to be no immediate occasion for a conference. As a matter of fact, there was never any occasion for a conference because Harry was running things to suit himself and he doesn't like to share any possible credit with anyone else.[29]

There were a great many efforts to make the nomination by acclamation. On Saturday, Senator Byrnes tried to get Garner, Farley, and Wheeler to withdraw as candidates. He also tried to persuade Farley to stay on as Chairman and run the campaign.[30] Even as late as Sunday night Ed Flynn and Vince Dailey made an eleventh hour attempt to get

Farley to withdraw. It was one of those backroom sessions where no deals are made, and no one is sold down the river. In this room of the politically famous Blackstone Hotel, two party professionals tried to persuade their superior, the party boss, not to buck the President. Farley stated he did not have the votes to win anything and then he reiterated to Flynn his opposition to the third term. Farley stated that the reason for all this pressure on him to withdraw was that the President did not want him or anyone else to poll at least 150 votes.[31]

There had been rumors that Alabama would yield to New York for the introduction of a resolution to nominate by acclamation. Thus, there would be no speeches or roll call.[32] It was reported Friday, however, that enough delegates were opposed to Roosevelt's renomination to prevent it being done by acclamation. Efforts continued Saturday to have a nearly unanimous convention nominate Roosevelt.[33]

Farley put a stop to the rumors when he told the press in Chicago, "My name will never be withdrawn. I am certain that a roll call and vote will be taken. If any attempt is made to diverge from this procedure it will be resented."[34]

The next day, Monday, Roosevelt asked him on the phone if he had heard the rumors. Farley said he had and

they were "perfectly silly." He told the President, "There just has to be a ballot," at which point Roosevelt agreed, and the matter was dropped.[35]

Cordell Hull was still in the news. On Friday it was reported that he would decline the nomination for Vice President.[36] Some of the delegates upon hearing this, were talking of naming their own man for Vice President.[37]

The first day of the convention - Monday, July 15 - opened with a good deal of platform bickering and the usual speeches. Especially upsetting to the President was a proposed motion by Senator McCarran of Nevada for an anti-third-term plank in the platform. It was understood that this plank had the support of Senators Bryd and Clark. (The precedent for such a plank was the 1896 Democratic convention.)[38]

Mayor Kelly gave the first speech of the day and virtually placed FDR's name in nomination when he said:

> The salvation of this nation rests in one man because of his great experience and sincere humanitarian thinking...
> We will stand and put forward and confirm again that God has sent a guardian of our liberties, the kind of man that mankind needs, our beloved President, Franklin D. Roosevelt.

"His speech may have been intended to produce a spontaneous demonstration. If it was, it failed."[39]

That night Jim Farley and Speaker Bankhead delivered addresses. Farley closed his speech with, "I firmly believe

that every member of this great gathering will give our successors and the new national party organization their total support."[40] That settled one issue - Farley was stepping down as National Chairman and would not run the campaign that fall. Speaker Bankhead, in the keynote speech, advocated national unity while chastizing the Republicans.[41]

Farley, still had no word on what the President would do. A reporter asked him who was nominating FDR; Farley replied: "Apparently, I am not the only one around here who does not know anything."[42] Before the session Tuesday night, Farley did receive a call from the President. Secretary Perkins, horrified that Farley knew nothing of what was going on, had told the President to call him. FDR said only that Barkley had his message and would read it to the convention.[43]

Senator Barkley was the permanent chairman of the convention. At the conclusion of his address he added FDR's message:

> And now, my friends, I have an additional statement to make on behalf of the President of the United States. I and other close friends of the President have long known that he had no wish to be a candidate again. We knew, too, that in no way whatsoever has he exerted any influence in the selection of delegates or upon the opinion of the delegates to this convention. [sic]
>
> Tonight at the specific request and authorization of the President, I am making

> this simple fact clear to the convention.
>
> The President has never had and has not today any desire or purpose to continue in the office of the President, to be a candidate for that office, or to be nominated by the convention for that office.
>
> He wishes in all earnestness and sincerity, to make it clear that all the delegates to this convention are free to vote for any candidate.
>
> This is the message which I bring you tonight from the President of the United States by the authority of his word.[44]

The Times' description of the events protrayed the reaction of the delegates. It was in error, of course, on the origin of the cheers for Roosevelt.

> The demonstration which followed was seen as proof that Byrnes and Hopkins were ready to complete their plan to draft the President....
>
> The great majority of the delegates remained in their seats, seemingly not knowing just what the situation was. The paraders were confined mostly to a few delegates carrying the standards....[45]

The clamor of course was the famous voice from the sewers. The voice was coming from the basement of the convention hall. Mayor Kelly had arranged for Thomas D. McGarry, the Chicago Commissioner of Sewers to plant himself in the basement and yell these cheers through the open PA system. In addition, Kelly men were swelling the crowd of demonstrators.[46] After the demonstration, Senator Byrnes stated the President had been "called," and would have to run. Secretary Hopkins concurred, saying Roosevelt was

wanted by the masses of the American people.[47]

The next night Franklin Roosevelt was nominated on the first ballot. Farley, Garner, and Senator Tydings of Maryland spoiled FDR's bid to have his nomination by acclamation by having their names placed before the convention. None of the speeches aroused the delegates except Senator Carter Glass's nomination of Farley. Glass, the old respected Senator from Virginia, had long since broken with the New Deal, but few expected him to buck the President in such an obvious way. Glass was ill, but stung by vitriolic letters castigating him for Farley's religion, and firm in his conscience, he came to the convention to make the nomination. He was booed by the delegates as he began, but he kept on, standing on the platform as a symbol of all those who resented the New Deal.[48] Glass quoted Thomas Jefferson as being opposed to the third term principle and stated that Jim Farley had never foresaken these principles of his party.[49]

"The Roosevelt draft had been indicated a long time before the delegates assembled in Chicago and it moved relentlessly to its successful conclusion under the management of inner circle New Dealers assisted by Senator James F. Byrnes of South Carolina as floor leader."[50]

Arthur Krock probably put the nomination in its truest light:

> The "draft" of President Roosevelt for a third nomination which culminated in the stadium here tonight, was never able to shake off the quotation marks which surrounded it when initiated by Secretaries Ickes and Hopkins, Corcoran, and other members of the White House inner circle.[51]

Some were not pleased with the idea of the President releasing the delegates who then turned around and drafted him. Among those unhappy was Senator Clyde Reed of Kansas who stated, "I have too high an opinion of the intelligence of the people of this country to believe that they will accept this as a draft movement." Senator Holt of West Virginia, "This draft movement has been so phony that anybody who would consider it seriously would be subject to further education. It is very unusual that Mr. Hopkins, the Cabinet member closest to the President and the man who has been living at the White House, would go to Chicago to carry on a third term movement against the President's wishes."[52]

Roosevelt then chose Henry Wallace as his running mate. His choice of this idealistic, almost mystic, man upset many Democrats and brought into the open the resentment a lot of them had felt all week concerning this managed convention.[53] That night, others, besides Wallace, were placed in nomination including Representative Rayburn, Paul McNutt, Jesse Jones, Senator Alva Adams of Colorado,

and Speaker Bankhead. All withdrew except Adams, Wallace and Bankhead. Jesse Jones had done his best to get nominated and had friends in the party, but then Texas supported Rayburn, which left Jones without a home state. (Jones was popular enough to have been a serious threat to Wallace's chances, and had Farley's support.)[54] Many people had hoped to draft the likeable Paul McNutt. McNutt's nominator stated he was drafting McNutt as that procedure seemed to have precedent in the convention. McNutt was almost drowned out by cheers of "We Want McNutt" when he tried to withdraw.[55] At the same time there was no enthusiasm whatsoever for Wallace. Every time Wallace's name was mentioned it was greeted with catcalls.[56]

After the nomination, Eleanor Roosevelt spoke for ten minutes and pleaded for party unity. It did not work. As the balloting began it was clear that Bankhead would draw a considerable number of votes, and did. Flynn described the terrible time he and others had of convincing the delegates they should be for Wallace:

> His acquaintance with the political leaders was very slight. I was probably the only political leader throughout the country with whom he had been friendly. The representatives of city organizations went to work to gather as many votes as possible. After I had communicated to the leaders of the convention the fact that the President wanted Wallace nominated, Hopkins spent day and night talking to the leaders and delegates.[57]

One impassioned delegate shouted into the micro-

phone, "Just because the Republicans have nominated an apostate Democrat (Willkie) let us not for God's sake nominate an apostate Republican (Wallace)." Byrnes reflected the President's possible displeasure at the refusal to nominate Wallace by moving from delegation to delegation whispering, "For God's sake do you want a President or a Vice President?"[58]

There was a good deal of truth in the above statement. Since early morning when the news broke that Wallace was the choice of the nominee there had been complaints. At breakfast FDR was adamant in his support telling Rosenman, "I won't deliver that speech until we see whom they nominate." That night Roosevelt became extremely unhappy with the delegates' rebellion. Hopkins was on the telephone minute by minute to Roosevelt, who was playing solitaire in the White House. Roosevelt, at one point, was so disgusted he called in Rosenman and dictated a letter to the convention renouncing the nomination. Pa Watson, the President's military aide, wanted to tear it up and told Rosenman, "I don't give a damn who's Vice President and neither does the country." Wallace got the nomination. When Wallace finally won, FDR went upstairs to change to a fresh shirt. He looked tired. He returned downstairs with clean shirt, looking very vibrant and strong. He, speaking from the White House, addressed the convention. Hopkins

had persuaded Wallace to stay away from the Hall and not deliver an acceptance speech.[59] Then the convention adjourned "sine die."

The Democratic convention did nothing to enhance its party's image. Its delegates left feeling disgruntled and confused. They did not object to what happened so much as to how it happened. They did not specifically object to Roosevelt's running for a third term. Most of the delegates, even the ones opposed to the third term in principle, accepted Roosevelt because the war had scared them and because FDR was a proven leader.

> Whatever credit was to be awarded the White House amateurs, it was plain all along that most of it ought to have gone to Hitler. It was he who made the third term really inevitable. He was in the process of reducing all Europe to subserviency. His tanks and planes were enforcing his will. His was no political victory. He used naked force by preference and sneered at the processes of politics. The man who was his implacable enemy could hardly be denied a continuation of his leadership.[60]

Many objected to the backroom maneuverings of the convention, and the fact that the only man in contact with Roosevelt, (Hopkins), they found very difficult to see, visably or personally.

A convention is, for the most part, made up of party regulars. And these party regulars were disgruntled to see the "old pros" on the outs with Roosevelt. They

were upset because in the place of the "old pros" were idealistic, professorial types who had held little public office, and had even less experience in the handling of politics. These people held this group (Corcoran, Ickes, Hopkins, etc.) responsible for the conception of the purge of 1938 and its subsequent failure. They resented them, because they had no influence with any of them. Few of them ever saw Hopkins, only rarely saw Corcoran. They saw Ickes but heartily disliked him. Furthermore, they were resentful of the treatment that FDR had given Farley and Garner.

The "draft" movement from the beginning was ludicrous. Roosevelt would have been better off to say "that under the present conditions of the world, I am offering for re-election." The draft seemed more ridiculous in light of the "voice from the sewers." As stated above, the delegates did not know from where the voices were coming. The next day, according to Farley, they were incensed when they found out! This smacked of dictatorial control. Whether Roosevelt approved of this tactic in advance, no one knows. Certainly, however, Hopkins must have known.

FDR's choice of Wallace was poor. He chose Wallace because he "would appeal to the farm states, where isolationist feeling was strong."[61] Yet there were other candidates certainly, McNutt, possibly Jones or Jackson that the

farm states would have accepted. The fact of the matter is that FDR wanted a New Dealer. He felt, no doubt, that Jones was too conservative and he could not trust Ickes. Hopkins was ill and had no appeal, McNutt was too ambitious. What the President saw in Wallace that he did not see in Jackson no one seems to know, for the President seemed to be very favorably disposed towards Attorney General Jackson.

The convention had a "thoroughly irritating outcome."[62] Flynn and Time summed up the convention succinctly and objectively:

> The 1940 Democratic convention in Chicago was not a very cheerful gathering... Harry Hopkins went to Chicago as the personal representative in a sense, of the President... Hopkins was not a political leader ... There was bitterness among the organization leaders at his presence there. While they had nothing against him personally, they felt that he, representing the President, distinctly lowered their own prestige... I think it is only fair to say that a majority of the delegates in Chicago were not enthusiastically for the remonination of the President, although they felt that if they did not go along the party would be so hopelessly divided that no candidate would have a chance of winning... To nominate Wallace in the convention, however, was a horse of another color. He had no political background whatsoever. His acquaintance with the political was very slight.[63]

Time said:

> In Chicago, the convention was existing. To many an appalled observer, it seemed to be doing little more than that.... The Republicans had been leaderless; the Democrats had been bossed into apathy.[64]

FOOTNOTES

1 New York Times, May 4, 1940, p. 7.

2 Ibid., May 6, 1940, p. 12.

3 Ibid., May 5, 1940, pp. 1, 19.

4 Time, May 13, 1940, pp. 23-24.

5 Burns, The Lion And The Fox, p. 436.

6 New York Times, May 12, 1940, p. 2.

7 Ibid., May 15, 1940, p. 16.

8 Time, May 20, 1940, p. 25.

9 Burns, The Lion And The Fox, p. 414.

10 Time, May 20, 1940, pp. 34, 36.

11 Ibid., May 27, 1940, p. 16.

12 New York Times, May 17, 1940, p. 1.

13 Time, June 17, 1940, p. 13.

14 Ibid., June 17, 1940, pp. 14-15.

15 Leuchtenberg, p. 299.

16 Burns, The Lion And The Fox, p. 424.

17 Time, July 8, 1940, p. 10.

18 Sherwood, p. 174.

19 Farley, Farley's Story, pp. 240-244.

20 Ibid., pp. 250-251.

21 Ibid., pp. 251-252.

22 Farley Interview.

23 Time, July 15, 1940, p. 9.

24 Sherwood, pp. 171.

25 Ibid., p. 176.

26 Ickes, p. 238.

27 New York Times, July 12, 1940, pp. 1, 16.

28 Ibid., July 13, 1940, pp. 1, 5.

29 Ickes, p. 241.

30 New York Times, July 14, 1940, pp. 1, 5.

31 Farley, Farley's Story, pp. 266-270.

32 New York Times, July 13, 1940, p. 5.

33 Ibid., July 14, 1940, pp. 1, 16.

34 Ibid., July 15, 1940, p. 6.

35 Farley, Farley's Story, pp. 271-272.

36 New York Times, July 13, 1940, pp. 1, 5.

37 Ibid., July 14, 1940, pp. 1.

38 Ibid., July 16, 1940, p. 1.

39 Ibid., July 16, 1940, pp. 1, 4.

40 Ibid., July 16, 1940, p. 2.

41 Ibid., July 16, 1940, p. 4.

42 Ibid., July 16, 1940, p. 1.

43 Farley, Farley's Story, pp. 278-279.

44 New York Times, July 17, 1940, p. 1.

45 Ibid., July 17, 1940, pp. 1, 5.

46 Farley, Farley's Story, p. 284.

47 New York Times, July 17, 1940, p. 4.

48 Farley Interview.

49 New York Times, July 18, 1940, p. 5.

50 Ibid., July 18, 1940, p. 1.

51 Ibid., July 18, 1940, p. 5.

52 Ibid., July 18, 1940, p. 6.

53 Ibid., July 19, 1940, p. 1.

54 Joseph T. Flynn, The Roosevelt Myth (Garden City, N. Y., 1949), p. 158; Farley, Farley's Story, p. 278.

55 New York Times, July 19, 1940, p. 3.

56 Flynn, p. 158.

57 Ibid., pp. 157-158.

58 Sherwood, p. 179.

59 Burnes, The Lion And The Fox, p. 429.

60 Tugwell, p. 530.

61 Burnes, The Lion And The Fox, p. 428.

62 Tugwell, p. 534.

63 Flynn, pp. 156-157.

64 Time, July 22, 1940, pp. 10-12.

CAMPAIGN AND CONCLUSION

The two candidates hardly came to blows in the campaign. Though Willkie was eager "to take on the Champ," the third term had been settled at the Democratic convention long before; and now was "Fait Accompli." People were unwilling to drop Roosevelt in midstream of the current world crisis. The fact, that for most of the campaign Willkie refused to support the isolationist sentiment, made the third term, the New Deal, and Roosevelt's politics the only debatable issues. Roosevelt even refused to campaign for two months, leaving it to Ickes, Wallace, and others.

The campaign opened in Ellwood, Indiana where Willkie challenged the spending of the New Deal, proposed a debate between himself and Roosevelt, and challenged "the right of this President to a greater honor than accorded to our Presidential giants. Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, and Woodrow Wilson."[1] The speech, on the whole, was not good. Russell Davenport and a group of amateurs were running the campaign for Willkie. He never really accepted the professional politicians, nor they him. He spoke too much and too often and lost his voice.

Meanwhile, the economy was booming for the first time in thirteen years. As he spoke in the Northwest, people

went back to work in the aircraft factories; in Pittsburgh the steel mills were humming.[2] If this was not war, it was wartime production and Roosevelt was their leader.

Roosevelt was acting the part - he did his campaigning in defense plants, airports, shipyards and other defense installations. He let the vitriolic Ickes attack Willkie and this Ickes did with glee. He called Willkie a "simple, barefoot Wall Street lawyer" and tried desperately to associate Willkie with Morgan enterprises.[3]

Roosevelt stayed above the campaign and quickly regained the lead in the polls. Willkie desperately started out on a campaign trip and quickly made three mistakes. He kept on challenging the "Champ" which said in essence, let's forget about the third term and fight it out. This helped Roosevelt who loved a fighting, exciting campaign.[4] He got tongue-tied in Cicero, calling it Chicago and when he tried passing it off with, "to hell with Chicago" it backfired among the pious and the people of Chicago.[5] He then tried challenging Roosevelt about the Munich conference, saying that FDR had sold the Czechs down the river. Roosevelt refuted that on October 23, when he finally opened his campaign at Philadelphia. The lines were drawn and the verdict was in, but it would not hurt to watch anyway.

Willkie had shown a conviction to put country above self by approving of the destroyer-bases deal, though he

did not like FDR's bypassing Congress. As Willkie became more desperate so did his quotes about the war - the most famous being, "If his promises are as good as his others, your boys will be on the transports in six months." In Boston, Roosevelt retorted with one statement that won him more support than any other when he said, "I have said this before, but I shall say it again, your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars."[6]

Though Willkie constantly gained from a low point at the first of October he lost the election by 449 to 82 electoral votes and 27 to 22 million popular votes. Willkie could not overcome two things, as Murrow said, "He was up against the greatest vote getter of all times," and the war. People trusted Roosevelt to lead them through the war. Willkie was the most popular Republican up to that time, but he could not stop Hitler or Roosevelt.[7]

Wendell Willkie travelled and later wrote a best-seller called <u>One World</u>; Franklin Roosevelt of course served his third term and was reelected for a fourth term. Willkie was not embittered; he gave support to Roosevelt and the Allies before Pearl Harbor and worked hard in the war effort. He did not follow Republican isolationism. This stand, plus his repudiation of the professionals in 1940, left him almost without a party. He was not without a country or a people; his book sold many copies and was

widely acclaimed.

AFTERTHOUGHTS

Willkie was more than just a personality - he was a brave businessman candiate. Roosevelt was more than a personality - he was a brave political leader. Between them the country saw two of the weirdest conventions and one of the fiercest campaigns it had ever seen. Yet through it all was that omninous over-riding voice, or rather voices, one from Britain and one from Germany.

These voices controlled the Republican convention, the Democratic convention, and the campaign. This is best pointed out by Jonathan Daniels, who says, "That the nomination of the strongly pro-Ally Willkie was a decisive step against dictatorships."[8] Daniels also points out the fallacy of the third term issue by saying the conservative wing of the Democratic Party hid behind this ussue to get control of the party and to stop the third term. One can thus point to the fall of Europe, the closeness of war, the war mood in America, and the support of the Allies, all issues, as instrumental, not only in the nomination of Willkie, but also of Roosevelt.

FOOTNOTES

1. Edward R. Murrow, "I Can Hear It Now, 1933-1945." Columbia Records, New York.

2. Burns, The Lion and The Fox, p. 443.

3. Ickes, p. 221; Johnson, The Republican Party, p. 125.

4. Sherwood, p. 185.

5. Dillon, Mary E. Wendell Willkie, (Philadelphia, Pa., 1952), p. 371.

6. Burns, The Lion and The Fox, p. 448.

7. Morrow.

8. Daniels, p. 381.

PRIMARY SOURCES

ARTICLES, PERIODICALS, AND PAMPHLETS

Alsop, Joseph and Kintner, Robert. "Taft and Taft." Life, March 18, 1940, pp. 90-97.

Bush, Noel F. "New York's District Attorney Has Become No. 1 Republican Hopeful." Life, April 22, 1940, pp. 84-95.

"Business and Government." Fortune, March, 1940. pp. 38-39.

"Business and Government." Fortune, April, 1940, pp. 46-47.

"Fortune Survey XV." Fortune, October 1938, pp. 87-92.

Johnson, Gen. Hugh. "I Am Not Nominating Him." Saturday Evening Post, June 22, 1940, pp. 9 ff.

Johnston, Alva. "The Man Who Talked Back." Saturday Evening Post. March 25, 1939, pp. 10ff.

McAlister, Coleman. "Wendell Willkie's Hat Is On His Head." Nation, April 13, 1940, pp. 269-272.

Newsweek. Various Issues, 1939 - July 1940.

Time. October 31, 1938 - July 29, 1940.

"Underlying Issues of the Campaign." Yale Review XXV, (Autumn, 1940), pp. 1-61.

United States News. January 5, 1940 - June 28, 1940.

"Wendell Willkie Exhibits Versatility as Guest Star of 'Information Please.'" Life. April 22, 1940, p. 80.

Willkie, Wendell. "Idle Money, Idle Men." Saturday Evening Post. June 17, 1939, pp. 7ff.

Willkie, Wendell, "We, The People." Fortune, April, 1940. pp. 64ff.

BOOKS

Acheson, Dean. Present At The Creation. New York, New York, 1969.

Davenport, Marcia. Too Strong For Fantasy. New York, New York, 1967.

Farley, James A. Jim Farley's Story. New York, New York, 1948.

Flynn, Edward J. You're The Boss. New York, New York, 1947.

Hull, Cordell. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. Vol. I. New York, New York, 1948.

Ickes, Harold L. The Secret Diaries of Harold L. Ickes. Vol. III: The Lowering Clouds, 1939-1941. New York, New York, 1954.

Krock, Arthur. Memoirs. New York, New York, 1968.

Lilienthal, David E. The Journals of David E. Lilienthal. Vol. I: The TVA Years, 1939-1945. New York, New York, 1964.

Rosenman, Samuel, (Ed.). The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. IX. New York, New York, 1941.

Vandenberg, Arthur H., Jr. (Ed.). The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg. Boston, Mass., 1952.

White, William Allen. The Autobiography of William Allen. New York, New York, 1946.

NEWSPAPERS

New York Times. Various Issues January 1, 1940 - May 1, 1940.

New York Times. May 1, 1940 - July 19, 1940.

GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

U.S. Congress. Vote on Senator McKellar's Amendment for Additional Appropriation for Work Relief. H. J. Res. 83. 76th Congress, 1st Session, January 27, 1939. Congressional Record, I, 887.

PERSONAL INTERVIEW

Private Interview with James A. Farley, March 13, 1971, Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D. C.

SECONDARY SOURCES

BOOKS

Barnard, Ellsworth. Wendell Willkie. Marquette, Michigan, 1966.

Barnes, Joseph W. Wendell Willkie. New York, New York, 1952.

Burns, James MacGregor. Roosevelt: The Lion and The Fox. New York, New York, 1956.

_____. Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom. New York, New York, 1970.

Dillon, Mary E. Wendell Willkie. Philadelphia, 1952.

Freidel, Frank. America In The Twentieth Century. New York, New York, 1960.

Johnson, Donald B. The Republican Party and Wendell Willkie, Urbana, Illinois, 1960.

Leuchtenberg, William E. Franklin Roosevelt and The New Deal. New York, New York, 1963.

Link, Arthur. American Epoch. New York, New York, 1963.

Moscow, Warren. Roosevelt and Willkie. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1968.

Parmet, Herbert S. and Hecht, Marie B. Never Again. New York, New York, 1968.

Perkins, Dexter. New Age of Franklin Roosevelt. Chicago, 1957.

Rauch, Basil. Roosevelt From Munich to Pearl Harbor. New York, New York, 1950.

Robinson, Edgar E. The Roosevelt Leadership 1933-1945. Philadelphia, Pa., 1956.

Sherwood, Robert E. Roosevelt and Hopkins. New York, New York, 1948.

Tugwell, Rexford G. The Democratic Roosevelt. Garden City, New York, 1957.

White, William S. The Taft Story. New York, New York, 1954.

RECORDINGS

Murrow, Edward R. "I Can Hear It Now, 1933-1945," Vol. I. Columbia Records, New York, New York.