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FRASIER, R.K.

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"Striking similarities have been noted in the internal development of the three great states of Western Europe during the fifteenth century. In each a period of unparalleled anarchy and confusion was followed by the erection of a strong central monarchical government, capable alike of defying the factions at home and of taking the lead in campaigns of aggression and conquest abroad."

----- R.B. Merriman in
The Rise of the Spanish Empire
Vol. II.

Chapter I.

Absolutism on The Spanish
Scene

In discussing the rise of absolutism in the national-monarchy complex, it is essential to sketch the basic spirit or temper of the time which accompanied this secular aggrandizement of power. The historical process commonly referred to as the "Renaissance" is too complex to allow any summary characterization. At times its physical development seems quite disparate to the spirit from which it rose. It is a period which lends itself quite easily to generalizations. I am about to engage in some of these hazardous generalizations, because a topic of the genre which I have selected requires it. It would be rank neglect on my part if I were to treat the physical development of these new monarchies with great precision and care (that is after all my ideal) but obstinately neglect the basic change in mood which accompanied it. The change in mood I would suggest is but one of the many theories which have been offered by competent historians. But it is the one which I feel contains the greatest degree of honesty and the one which accommodates itself most readily to the physical growth of absolutist institutions.

J.D. Mackie, in his work, The Earlier Tudors, in The Oxford History of England Series sees the Renaissance as essentially involving the application of "the critical spirit" to theories "far removed from actuality." Mackie would have us believe that the myth of the unity of Christendom and of the united order broke down when the gap between the theories that

man would like to hold on to and the actual facts which he saw before him in the physical world became so great as to preclude the acceptance of the ancient classical ideal. The breakdown of the ordered unity, "where Christ presided over the holy angels and new Jerusalem reflected the divine Harmony," was shattered when man's critical faculty no longer was willing to subordinate what he would like to believe with what he actually did believe. Translated into over-simplified terms, it was the birth of realism. Man began to paint the human body as he actually saw it and not as he would like to have believed it. The body became something more than a mere hindrance to the spirit. It developed into a good in itself and one which could be glorified accordingly. One of the natural corollaries of this breakdown in the ideal order and the rise of realism, was the acceptance of the natural monarchies as a fait accompli. They were no longer regarded as the temporary repository of secular power, but as an actual and physical means to an end ----- the end of natural welfare. The monarchs were quite willing to accept this rationalization of their rule as it lent itself quite easily to accumulation of power. They were usually not quite sure enough to demand their prerogative of "hereditary divine-right" as James I would 125 years later. It was enough that they were accepted and their unlimited power would not be questioned. They would have undoubtedly preferred a more formal apologia, but this was an era of rapid

and revolutionary change, and they were willing to accept what they had and leave it at that.

One of the great hazards which faces any culture is that of self-satisfaction. It is not so much that the populace becomes benumbed with their station in life and refuses to recognize gradual change as it is that the tendency becomes greater and greater to rely upon fixed principles. I do not intend to strike out in a lengthy argument for relativism, but from my limited exposure to the currents of history, it would seem to me that the decline of a culture becomes much more imminent when the actual capacity of that culture to solve its current problems is at its greatest point. This has always struck me as one of the greatest paradoxes of sociological history. In the process of development, any civilization evolves a pattern or system which it feels to be more satisfactory in solving its particular indigenous problems than any other. Consequently it finds the answers to its most immediate cultural questions coming quicker and quicker. But a gap quickly develops between the ability of this culture to solve its immediately pressing problems and its capacity to reconcile its long-range needs. In perhaps somewhat over-stated terms, what develops is that the culture is becoming sterile at the very time when its participants feel that it is developing in richness. The next question which comes to mind is: How is this hypothesis related to the subject with which we are dealing? I have already

indicated that I felt the great phenomenon of the Renaissance came about as a result of the gap between the facts which faced the cultural configuration of the fifteenth century and the theories which they manufactured to surround these facts. These people were essentially relying upon the fixed principles which had been left them in the form of a legacy of Ptolemy 800 years before. They were quite willing to accept the teachings of Ptolemy and all the other post-Roman Empire scholars as embodying the latest (and perhaps ultimate) in physical knowledge. Within the realm of this limited conceptual scheme which they had postulated, it was a very satisfactory system. It provided them with a series of answers which satisfied their immediate needs and they were quite willing to remain within the little world which they had built for themselves. But the advent of the fifteenth system and the new critical spirit made it impossible for any responsible deep-thinker to accept in toto the teaching of the past. Individuals began to think for themselves and to evolve their own answers and hypotheses to the pressing questions which faced them, and one of the most pressing was the new political scheme which had been ushered in. The new style monarchies with increased centralization of power were the particular invention of the fifteenth century to meet the fast-changing needs of the day, and the study of the institutions which they fashioned is relevant to any period of history which finds itself in the same situation.

In attempting to analyze the development of these super-monarchies from the state of chaos which was their genesis, there are several observations which we must make immediately in order to set the scene for that which followed. Professor Merriman indicates that he feels the reign of John II and Henry the Impotent of Castile is quite similar to the chaotic strife of the Armagnacs and the Burgundians in France and to the War of the Roses in England. It is quite certain that in all three countries there was a definite dearth of political leadership. If this vacuum had not arisen when it did in all three countries, it is quite conceivable that the absolutism of the Renaissance might have taken a different direction. All three of these complexes were beset with the paralyzing legacy of either an inefficient and effete monarch, or an equally disabling state of civil war. The birth of the modern spirit for all three of these countries was to have a very inauspicious beginning. But at the end of the period of turbulence, there was to emerge in each the very significant beginnings of the national state. It would be a gross anachronism to state that this period marked the actual physical development of the modern ideal of government, but, as I hope to emphasize throughout this essay, there was sufficient secularization in the minds of the majority of the citizens to discard the prevalent concept of a centralized government. We know that France was the first of these three states to achieve national unity followed by

Castile and Aragon, with Tudor England last, Merriman offers us a very simple explanation for the concomitant development of absolutism throughout this period: it was "the sole sure means of escape from the intolerable evils of baronial anarchy."¹ We do know that to a large extent these new monarchs would manipulate the rising and affluent merchant class to reestablish their control over the troublesome aristocrats. This has certainly been the prevailing theory down through the ages, but it is one which we must constantly be willing to revise and to reassess as new sources of information become available. Just how willing was the new merchant class to subordinate itself to the new monarchical bureaucracy. What was the extent of the loss of power of the aristocrats during the period which we have selected? These are the fundamental questions which we will have before us as we attempt to examine the rising authoritarianism.

All three of these leading countries developed a highly organized monarchical complex which could provide them with a necessary system of order to carry out their activities, but one of which the citizenry was skeptical always lest there be a consequent encroachment upon their "constitutional" liberties. There must be an immediate distinction made between the modern connotation of this term and the fifteenth century meaning. Historical perspective has transmuted this term until the difference is far more than semantic. The fifteenth century had no awareness of a constitutional legacy (with the possible exception of Stephen Langton's Magna Charta, and even here

there is room for doubt). The legacy of the Middle Ages had been one of conditioned acceptance of authority, and being children of their own age, it was natural to expect them to look for leadership to come from somewhere above them and not from someone among them. What they essentially desired was a system of comparative calm in which to carry "business as usual". This was a new term to the fifteenth century, but one of which they were rapidly to become aware.

I have decided to present this chapter on Spain at the outset in order to preserve a certain basic spirit of continuity which I feel pervades this period. There is no doubt in my mind but what the topical approach might be more satisfactory in dealing with certain limited fields (ie., the relations between the heads of state and the feudal nobility). To meet the particular needs of subjects such as this, however, I intend to devote my final chapter to the consideration of the universal treatment of the particular segments of the population which certainly transcended national boundaries. I discarded the topical approach for use throughout the whole essay as being too unwieldy and essentially unjust to the currents of historical perspective which had been building up through the years in each country. The Battle of Bosworth and the conquest of Granada are similar in some respects, but it would be unfair to both countries to lump them together and to dismiss them as merely heralding the advent of a new concept of government. I hope by taking this particular approach I will not be losing sight of the

particular uniqueness of my topic which is after all comparative in aspect. By being conscious of this hazard I hope to avoid any lapse into dry historical narrative which would destroy the essence of what I am attempting to portray.

Spain during the epoch of Ferdinand and Isabella manifested some very complex and mutually opposing characteristics. As R. Trevor Davies phrases it, "Spain is recognized as the home of sturdy democracy and the originator of representative institutions, and yet as being royalist to an almost idolatrous degree and the chosen model for autocratic monarchies; as mystical and scornful of worldly wealth and yet the producer of precious metal enough to overthrow the economic and social system of the whole of Europe; as tolerant beyond all others, yet the perfecter of the most efficient system of persecution in the world; as fanatically religious yet profoundly skeptical; as the protagonist of Catholicism yet the bitter opponent of the Papacy." To a very great degree, the essential tenor of this chapter on Spain will be an attempt to reconcile various interpretations concerning this very diverse society.

It shall be necessary to determine at the outset the physical make-up of Christian Spain; it was divided into three semi-autonomous complexes: Castile, Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia. Each of these four states contained their own individual set of institutions, and it was up to the two Catholic monarchs, Ferdinand and Isabella, to create a homogeneous configuration out

of what bordered on a seeming chaos. There were many Jewish and Moorish communities contained within these four states. It can be easily seen that these phenomena were in direct opposition to the ideal of the one Spanish state which Ferdinand and Isabella were working towards. We must consider for just a moment the psychological make-up of these two Catholic sovereigns. Both had descended from separate lineages and as such had inherited the tenor of their time. They were also preoccupied with maintaining to some degree the individual cultures from which they had arisen. They realized that the complete amalgamation of the four kingdoms at this time would have been a political impossibility. They viewed their marriage as being one of destiny for the future of Spain, but they were also cognizant that moving too fast in any one direction could cause serious injury to both states. It is significant to note in this regard the series of limitations which were imposed upon Ferdinand in Castile (the kingdom of Isabella) some nine months before the marriage. He was forced to acknowledge respect of "all the laws and customs of the western kingdom." All of the separate institutions of the countries participating in the union were to be maintained in their "pristine vigor." The queen was to have full authority to institute and to dismiss political, ecclesiastical and military appointees. One of the most significant provisions which Ferdinand accepted in order to become co-ruler over her larger and more prosperous kingdom was that which stated that "in deference to the greater

size and importance of the western kingdom", he was to maintain residence in Castile unless the queen gave her approval for him to leave. All public documents were to bear the signatures of both.⁴ Ferdinand, however, certainly had visions of reigning absolute whatever might have been contained within the terms of the marriage agreement. He boldly asserted soon after the marriage that he himself was the great-grandson of John I of Castile and that as such he had a legal right to rule that kingdom by himself. The logic for his proclamation stemmed from the ancient rule that females were forbidden succession to the throne. Unfortunately for Ferdinand this whole question had been decided earlier at the formal enthronement of Isabella, and his bold statement did little but arouse the fears and dislike of already apprehensive Castilians.

We can now begin to perceive soon after the actual marriage the beginning of a movement toward autocratic control. Ferdinand realized early that the dualism of the sort outlined by the marriage treaty of 1469 would never be adequate to allow him to control that he wished. His basic mode of action, therefore, became one of by-passing the restrictions which had been laid upon him. The Castilian advisers to Queen Isabella sensed his attitude at the outset and promulgated a directive of their own which was intended to be interpreted as an addendum to the marriage treaty itself. It proclaimed that justice was to be administered by both monarchs "when they were residing in the same place,

and by each separately when they were apart." This document was intended to intensify the inherent dualism of the ruling family.

Tanto monta, monta tanto
Isabel como Fernando." (5)

"One is as good as the other" became an unofficial password among the official families of both monarchs, and it reflected the endemic dichotomy of the sovereignty which they had chosen to accept. The principles of independent autonomy for the provinces was still retained despite the joint identification of the sovereigns. The only difference after the marriage was one of foreign policy --- they engaged in joint manipulation of the Spanish complex as one entity. I would tend to believe that this had a strong psychological impact on the individual Castilians and Aragonese. It is, of course, impossible to measure the influence that this change had upon the Spanish citizens and to decide whether or not it made them think of themselves more in terms of each other.

The only other institution that was to transcend the geographical boundaries of these two united but separate states was the Inquisition. We can discern the basic indications of a rapprochement between these two geographical units, but it would take much more than a joint period of rule lasting 34 years to make the transition complete. There were certain restrictions lifted in 1480 on the exportation and importation of certain commodities from one province to another, although the customs duties were stringently maintained. Both sovereigns seemed to favor a reevaluation of the institutions and customs in their realms

on an individual rather than collective basis. If in the process the institutional ties between the two countries were strengthened, then this would be an added by-product which would give great personal satisfaction to the monarch whose kingdom had inaugurated the change. I believe that it is a common fallacy to look at important historical personages such as these two Catholic monarchs as being institutions instead of the impressionable and basically human individuals that they in actuality were. We have no real knowledge that these two monarchs were really in love with each other, and as far as history is concerned, it simply doesn't matter. The fact of the situation is that they were married and that alone is important along with what they accomplished. This type of reasoning is certainly valid. I could not care less whether Ferdinand was in love with Isabella or not. But my point is that after reasoning for any length of time with a mode or system such as this, it is tempting to forget the human element altogether, and I believe that it is often that factor which is of the greatest import.

The history of the Spanish development throughout this period hinged on two proud Spanish aristocrats and, however great the national consciousness each possessed, they were above all else steeped in the legacies of their individual provinces. The result of this melange in the thinking of each of the monarchs was that change tended to be fluid. A sudden and deliberate period of transition was greatly feared by the advisers of both monarchs. Their "particularist" tendencies were too strong to allow them to become submerged in a fairly

immature theory of a national-state complex which had not yet gained great prestige. Thus Merriman feels that the absolutism which resulted was necessarily of a decentralized nature.

The problems which the Catholic monarchs faced and the solutions which they fashioned to meet them can therefore only be understood with this in mind.

The partnership which existed between Castile and Aragon was a very unequal one at best. Castile had been preponderant throughout the medieval era and her great size and economic resources brought her to the fore much as Piedmont was to do four hundred years later under Victor Emmanuel. This western realm therefore took the lead in the development of whatever homogeneous cultural institutions there were to be. She was to be much more influential than all three of the other Spanish realms together. The Court was almost always held in Castile. This was more of a gesture than anything else to the hyper-conservative barons who dominated Castile and who opposed change of any sort. The approach of the monarchs seemed to be that if they could coerce Castile into accepting their version of peaceful change, then the natural corollary, the assimilation of Aragon to their program, would be much easier. They realized that it would not be overly easy to convince Aragon, but if they could get Castile to agree, her momentum as the traditional economic and political pace-setter of the Iberian peninsula would greatly enhance the force of tradition

and would tend to cause it to operate with them rather than against them. Castile must therefore be understood as the focal point of Ferdinand and Isabella's germ of absolutism. As Merriman notes, "From the time of the union of the crowns, Castile overshadowed the other Spanish kingdoms; and though the latter's separate constitutions were not wholly abrogated until the advent of the Bourbons in the eighteenth century, they were so completely permeated by Castilian principles and methods that their practical importance was very slight."⁸

Until the fifteenth century, the Spanish had always seemed to manifest a great tolerance for religious dissent. However, Ferdinand and Isabella looked upon this religious diversity as being one of the chief reasons for the lack of a national self-consciousness in their kingdom. After all, how much brotherhood could an avid Catholic feel for an equally assiduous Moslem or Jew? A national state of the genre which they contemplated was incompatible with the religious diversification which pervaded their kingdom. Isabella herself was a fanatical Catholic and was very much concerned about the contamination of her personal faith. She was really the instigator of the request which she and her husband made to Pope Sixtus IV, which really precipitated the Inquisition. The Inquisition which they inaugurated was fundamentally different from its medieval ancestor as I shall soon indicate. The essential difference was that now married with the purely ecclesiastical basis of the medieval tribunal was the secular power of the state.

This change added a whole new dimension to its operation. The "spiritual and temporal swords" were welded together and the winner was the Spanish monarchy.⁹ Sixtus IV had really unknowingly granted the Catholic sovereigns permission to invade this heretofore completely church-dominated field. He granted the sovereign permission to appoint all the officials of this new institution. In addition, the crown could supervise the "instructions" which were to be issued to the Inquisitors. Additional impetus to their control was given when the period of inaugurating this new institution was the same as many of their other reforms.¹⁰ As Merriman says, "Everything was being directed toward centralization of authority in the hands of the crown at this very moment that the new institution first saw the light."¹¹

There were several other mechanisms by which these monarchs strengthened their temporal power. One of the most important of these new devices was the development of the Consejo Real and other subsidiary agencies which functioned under its general supervision. The Cortes of Toledo was very much in accord with the development of the sovereign's power because both consciously and unconsciously, the Cortes power was maturing along with it. By 1483 the Cortes had assumed enough power to summon another council -- the Consejo de la Suprema y General Inquisicion -- which served to augment the already¹² vast powers that they had wrung from the earlier councils.

"The Inquisition's privileges and prerogatives gave it 'supereminence' over every other institution in the state from

the time of its establishment; this high position was on the whole maintained and strengthened, despite occasional setbacks, during the two succeeding centuries." ¹³ The number of permanent courts under the crown of Castile reached the unprecedented number of 12 while Aragon was somewhat farther behind with a total of four. This institution derives the major portion of its significance from the fact that it was the only institution common to both of these kingdoms. Although Merriman does not mention this point, (and I am almost wholly indebted to him for the above information concerning this institution), it is quite possible that it reached the monolithic proportions it did solely because it was the sole institutional link between these two kingdoms. Although there is certainly more than an element of truth in the premise that authority can be successfully superimposed from above without popular support, it seems also to be an historical fact that institutions flower and blossom to a greater extent when the people who live under them are amenable to their existence.

Although there is no historical testimony as to the "popularity" of the institution per se, its gradual accumulation of power through these successive councils would seem to indicate (if not approval or enthusiasm) a less than begrudging acquiescence and recognition of its general purpose. Perhaps the populace of Spain was more psychologically prepared for common institutions than the advisers of the monarchs perceived. Except for the period 1507-1518, when Ferdinand married Germaine de Foix after the death of Isabella, there was but one Inquisitor General for

all the Spanish Empire. It would seem that the Inquisition served as a nationalistic focal point for all the sympathizers of a Spanish union. The price that Spain had to pay for the institution was a dear one however -- a pervading spirit of religious and racial intolerance which was to place an enduring stigma on any similar attempt to regulate religious and social habits.

Merriman offers a rather interesting theory concerning the establishment of the Inquisition and the ensuing economic decline of the Spanish complex. He feels that the Inquisition struck a savage blow at the Spaniards' innate desire for liberty. From this he draws the analogy that the realization that liberty was drawing farther and farther away from the individual precipitated an economic lapse which was to lead to her decline as a world power. I am in no position to quarrel with Mr. Merriman's analysis of the Spanish temperament since I am sure that he is better equipped to deal with this problem than I am, but his blunt statement that ipso facto the Spanish economic impulse suffered directly from the Inquisition seems a little over-extended. He acknowledged that the Inquisition became more and more popular with the Spanish people after its inauspicious genesis, and that concomitantly, "The Spanish moved from the most tolerant to the most intolerant nation in Europe Their passion for racial and religious unity had been fired at precisely the moment that they had at last attained the national consolidation for which patriots hitherto had so ardently but fruitlessly longed." (To

my mind it would seem that some sort of economic nationalism would be the logical result instead of what actually did occur.)

This coupling of a single-minded drive toward religious and racial homogeneity with a superficial uniting of the kingdoms in a figure-head was a very politic move. It engendered support from the patriots because they feared that the political unification might suffer if they offered religious opposition to the move in this direction. At the same time the support of the religious fanatics was obtained for the political amalgamation as they too seemed to regard this political experiment as a necessary evil subordinate to a greater good. These two movements became married to each other for better or for worse.¹⁵ It is interesting to note the sociological effects that the creation of the Holy Office had upon the several minorities which resided in Spain during this time. The Inquisition had no authority over the "avowed and professed Jews" who had no contact with the church. However, down to this period, there had been numerous conversos who had embraced the church because of the greater economic advantages which it offered. Now these conversos, of course, did fall within the jurisdiction of the Holy Office and they received more than their due share of harrassment. The actual effect of the Inquisition was to drive numerous conversos back into their original faith in order to escape the iniquities which were being propagated against them. This, however, was not the end which the Inquisition had set out to achieve. They wanted to purge the faith and the country in the process from all contamination both external and

internal. It soon came to realize that the expulsion of the Jews was the only avenue to a practical homogeneity. For economic reasons, however, expulsion at this time seemed definitely untenable and the monarchs did not openly sponsor it.

It was not until the conquest of Granada in 1492 that a suitable excuse presented itself.¹⁶ The discovery of the New World no longer made the Jewish controlled industries as necessary to the state as they once had been. An untapped source of revenue had been discovered to finance the operation of their government, and they were now ready to proceed with the promulgation of their religious sympathies. As Merriman recounts, "Some sort of recognition of God's goodness and mercy in delivering over the last stronghold of the infidel in the peninsula was clearly due."¹⁷ The edict of expulsion was signed at Granada on March 30, 1492, and directed that all professed Jews must either accept baptism or leave the land. The system which was fashioned to dispose of the exiled Jews' property lent itself to much fraud and robbery. There were very stringent limitations on the amount of gold and silver which could leave the country with these emigres. It soon became evident that Spain could never withstand such a loss as she forced upon herself by this expulsion. The monarchs, however, never seriously considered rescinding the edict which would soon relegate their country to poverty, even when the tremendous consequences which were developing became patent. They were rather more concerned that their neighboring countries should follow their lead. The price of the marriage of their daughter,

Isabella, to Emmanuel, the Portuguese king, in 1497 was that he should do likewise. The most tangible result of the expulsion was that there was readily available along the borders of the Spanish complex a ready and waiting fifth column of Jews (soon to be augmented by Moors and Protestants) quite angry at being expelled from their fatherland and quite anxious to do anything to arrest her development into a great power.

After the victory at Granada, Isabella offered quite liberal terms to the vanquished Moors and promised that they could "remain undisturbed in the enjoyment of their own property and customs, laws and religion."¹² She even invited the exiled Moors from Granada to take refuge in her kingdom -- a move which would indicate she had no idea of expelling her own Moors at any time in the near future. However, as early as 1492, she had revived the archbishopric of Granada and installed Hernando de Talavera as its chief figure, though it soon became obvious to the zealous Isabella that he was more responsive to the authority of Rome than that of Castile. Consequently, she appointed the very tenacious Francisco Ximenes de Cisneros as his assistant. "Inflexible determination and fanatic zeal for the propagation of the Christian faith were the principal traits of this extraordinary prelate..... from the moment of his arrival in Granada he dominated everything the gentle Talavera was simply elbowed aside."¹⁹ He emphasized the advantages of the Christian faith by the most convenient method available --- terror. "Baptism en masse" was celebrated almost everywhere. There was no longer any choice left open

to the Moors; they had to accept Christianity as a way of life or leave the country. We are fairly sure from historical testimony that Isabella was much more in the forefront of promoting this mass exodus of Moors than Ferdinand. He was much more concerned with the economic implications of their expulsion than with the religious. He was continually trying to soften his wife's open hostility, but as early as February 12, 1502, she signed the directive for their expulsion. This represented an almost complete reversal of her position of 1497. The reasons for this about-face are important because they mirror the significant transmutation in the Spanish economy precipitated by the discovery of the New World. In five short years, Isabella had effectively discarded the Moorish element as being a significant factor in the growth of her economy and had decided to pursue the policy of religious purity. As history would later witness, it was to become a very ominous decision for the future of Spain. In contrast to the edict against the Jews ten years earlier, this directive did not apply to Aragon but only to Leon and Castile. It was not until the era of Charles V that it was to be extended to cover the whole of the Spanish complex.

It is impossible to discuss the economic make-up of early sixteenth century Spain without some detailed information on one of the most phenomenal ancestors of the modern big corporation, "the Mesta." Spain's rather large population (by sixteenth century standards) supported itself chiefly by the production of raw wool. The migratory sheep farmer who transported himself and his family to southern Spain for the

winter months and back to the north for the summer played a very large part in the Spanish economy. "The introduction of merino sheep by the Moors in the Middle Ages caused Spanish wool to be reckoned the best in the world and enormously increased the foreign demand."²⁰ These sheep farmers had assembled themselves into a union around the turn of the thirteenth century in order to facilitate the handling of the multitude of trivial disputes which were bound to arise in such a large scale operation as this. The association was termed "El Honorado Consejo de la Mesta" by the sheep farmers and was immediately taken under the protective wing of the Spanish monarchs who saw it as a force which could provide the government with thousands of people in the future.

The four "quadrillas" who composed the mesta elected their own officers on a thoroughly democratic franchise, the small member who owned less than a dozen sheep having the same vote as some great noble or monastery who owned tens of thousands.²¹ Early in its development, the crown determined to retain ultimate control over this organization. Consequently the President of the Mesta was forced to become a crown nominee. The great monolithic bureaucracy which it soon became could be used by the crown to execute its wishes in rural districts which might be far removed from other officials of the crown. Judges of royal appointment were instituted soon after the Catholic monarchs came into power to try all infringements of the privileges

of the Mesta. These judges had almost dictatorial power over such matters "as ordinary highways and the enclosure of common lands." "In this way, strong in royal support, the Mesta was able to subordinate the interests of agriculturists and others to their own."²²

After the Jews were expelled in 1492 and the Spanish were deprived of their vast commercial experience, the Consulado of Burgos was set up to gather the Mesta wool and to ship it to Flanders, France, England and elsewhere to be sold by its factores. After the wool had been sold at the great fairs which were held for that purpose, the accounts were audited at Medina del Campo and each Mesta member received his due share of the profits in proportion to the amount of the wool he had supplied.²³ This corporation was similar to the medieval guild in many respects, but in certain other ways it reflected the influence of the modern capitalistic spirit. There was a premium placed upon higher production, and the individual would be rewarded commensurate with the amount that he contributed to the corporation. An effective clearing-house arrangement was instituted which insured the proper management of accounts. The power of this institution indicated the powerful influence that the bourgeoisie of Spain could have had if they had been able to solidify their marketing ventures into a stable exchange transaction. The crown was always able to retain more than a vestige of control over their operations even though it was never a direct partner.

Davies feels that "It has long been accepted as an obvious fact that Castilian agriculture was destroyed by the Mesta."²⁴ However, this rather blunt statement does merit some severe qualifications. At the beginning of the sixteenth century (when the Mesta was to achieve the pinnacle of its power under Ferdinand and Isabella) Castile produced more wheat than she consumed. Not until 1520 did the import of wheat become an agricultural necessity. This would certainly serve to indicate that the cultivation of wheat did not exactly prosper during this period. Since we know that the Mesta was utilized as an important source of revenue by the monarchs during this period and it is logical to postulate that the Mesta was primarily interested in obtaining as much land as possible for sheep and as little as possible for wheat, the result must have been the diminution in the production of wheat.

An interesting theory in regard to this decline (which I think is but an interesting theory) is that the decline was due to the tradition of the country. It was felt that tilling of the soil was a menial occupation fit only for serfs and Moriscos. The peasantry of Castile felt that their social status would not permit them to engage in such a humble occupation and would consequently seek an alternative whenever possible. My only criticism of this theory would be that it places too much reliance upon the impact that preconceived roles and status symbols play in history. It is quite true that

they do have some influence, but in an economic question such as this, I believe that it is incumbent upon the historian to find economic grounds for this theory and not to place too much emphasis upon rather nebulous sociological hypotheses, even though they are partially valid in some cases.

All trade to America was limited to a single port --- Cadiz, until 1503; and then Seville after that year. A House of Trade was organized by an ordinance of 1503 creating the offices of Controller, Secretary and Business Manager. From this nucleus sprang a large bureaucracy which would rival any modern corporation in its elaborate procedure. This House of Trade (or Casa de Contratacion) had three important functions: the responsibility of registering cargoes, regulating emigration of America, and the prohibition of smuggling. Through the natural process of development, it soon began to serve as a nautical university and became a center for research. It had supreme jurisdiction over everything that happened on board its ships, and in general, with everything in any way connected with American trade.

Castile has often been accused of practicing mercantilism with a vengeance. Davies seems to feel that this assumption is in need of careful revision and scrutiny. He notices that Aragon was allowed to share in American trade after the death of Isabella. However, this is probably not as much an indication of a slackness in the economic policies of Castile, as it is that Ferdinand merely usurped the power in order that she share

her wealth with Aragon. Charles V. went as far a little later as to allow some of his non-Spanish subjects to engage in trade with the result that German families such as the Fuggers and others acquired tremendous financial holdings. However, there were probably different considerations which prompted him to do this than were present in the reign of the Catholic monarchs.

All mineral mines were considered to be royal property during this period and they constituted a very valuable source of revenue for the crown. In practice, however, the Crown was content to settle for a very substantial percentage (one-fifth after 1504). All precious metals and minerals were required to be brought to the offices of the royal asseyor who would stamp them and abstract the royal percentage. The royal take amounted to 22,000,000 maravedis in 1505, but had risen to 46,000,000²⁷ by 1518. This source alone would have been sufficient to provide a financial subvention to the majority of the economic and social changes which had to be vented upon the Spanish political scene in order to alter the traditional Spanish pattern. We of the mid-twentieth century who have conditioned ourselves to thinking in terms of twelve figure budgets for spending in the public sector must take a minute to realize the tremendous impact which the influx of this revenue had.

Before we turn away from the Spanish scene, it is of fundamental importance to note here the influence that the centralization of government under Ferdinand and Isabella had upon the intellectual interests of its inhabitants and upon any

significant change which they might have precipitated in the universities. "The age of disorder that preceded the accession of Ferdinand and Isabella had done much to retard the growth of Spanish culture. By the beginning of the sixteenth century, much of the leeway had been made up, so that Erasmus spoke in the highest terms of Spanish erudition and corresponded freely with her more famous Scholars." ²⁸ Let us consider for a moment a case study of the University of Salamanca as being representative of Spanish university achievement. By the middle of the sixteenth century, its total enrollment was 6328 which almost no other university could equal. "It attracted students from all classes, from the wealthy noble surrounded by his attendants to the poor sopista who relied on charity for his livelihood (even in this era it would seem that universities were interested in class and geographical distribution). Though conservative and scholastic in its tendencies, it was by no means unreceptive of new ideas." Professor Davies cites the example of the Copernican system being taught here long before it was accepted elsewhere. Its biologists were also allowed to dissect the human body whereas in other universities there was still a moral stigma implicit in this practice. "Men and women were admitted without distinction to its courses of study and degrees; and two women at least, Lucia de Medrano and Juan de Contreras, were in the habit of giving public lectures to the university." ²⁹ Valladolid was another Spanish University which achieved world recognition for its superior medical school during this period under discussion.

The University of Alcala was founded under Cardinal Jimenes in 1508. This university was famous throughout this period as being especially receptive to the "New Learning." It was here where the Polyglot Bible containing the first Greek New Testament ever printed was published. Davies seems to feel that its Hebrew text of the Old Testament was so good that it was copied for centuries all over Europe. Not until the time of Ginsburg and Kennicott three centuries later was a better version available.³⁰

The printing press was also introduced early into Spain. An individual called Lambert Palmart was printing in Valencia as early as 1474 --- some three years before Caxton took up the trade at Westminster. After 1490 books could be imported duty free. A very interesting comparison is drawn by C. Habler in his The Early Printers of Spain and Portugal when he says that 720 books were printed in Spanish town before the end of the fifteenth century, while some 358 were printed in England during the same period.

There was also a very unusual political event which satisfied the ethnocentric aspirations of the Castilian middle-class. After Isabella's death, the crown of Castile went to the issue of her marriage with Ferdinand, Joanna. But this heiress had done much to arouse questions as to the soundness of her mind, and the provision that Ferdinand was to be regent was included in Isabella's will. When Ferdinand married Germaine de Foix on March 22, 1506, there was a great deal of resentment within the Castilian kingdom that their country was falling into alien hands.

Ferdinand set their fears to rest and carved himself a permanent place in the hearts of the citizens of Castile, when, after conquering Spanish Navarre with the help of the Holy League in 1512 he turned over the title of the realm to the Castilian crown. It turned out to be a very politic maneuver as he was still able to effectively control the province as if it had been his own, and at the same time, utilize it as a mechanism to assuage the fears of the nationalistic Castilian citizenry. Ferdinand had more than a little of the Machiavellian in him as he was quite willing to sacrifice his own personal aggrandisement and pride to the end that the Castilian-Aragonese complex might grow.³¹

But Ferdinand was never able to eliminate completely the underlying conflict which was threatening to erupt at any time between his two kingdoms. Castile and Aragon still regarded each other as somewhat strange bed-fellows and the death of Ferdinand in January, 1516 precipitated an awkward situation. Charles, the issue of Joanna, was due to succeed to the throne and he was known to be almost completely Flemish in his temperament. A movement arose in favor of his younger brother, Ferdinand, who at least had been brought up in a Spanish environment and would have been much more susceptible to Spanish influence. Cardinal Jimenes was the individual who really averted this civil strife by proclaiming Charles to be King even though he had no legal right to accomplish this. The state of the turbulence was so great that the nobles were even making gestures of alliance with

the towns ---- a marriage of interests which had never been attempted before. The prospect of rule by a Fleming was almost unbearable to the proud Spanish temperament. Charles repudiated the good Cardinal through the misguided advice of his Flemish councilors and thus was lost to him the only sensible adviser who could have helped him steer a clear course between the two opposing factions. ³² It would serve no purpose in an essay of this type to deal with the various means by which the future Charles V contrived to secure the proper oaths of allegiance from the Cortes of his kingdom and to secure an ample allotment from them to carry on his various interests. Then too a discussion of the future Emperor after the death of Maximilian in January 11, 1519, would entail some discussion of his contemporaries, Francis I of France and Henry VIII of England, which no doubt would be interesting, but which, by definition, we have excluded from the scope of this essay. The situation in Spain was of quite a different genre than that which existed in France and England. The fundamental problem which faced Ferdinand and Isabella after their marriage (and which still faced Charles V in 1519 to some extent) was unity. All their authoritarian and mercantilistic measures were orientated toward this one over-riding criterion. Every economic measure was considered from the viewpoint of unifying the Aragonese-Castilian complex in order to change the particularist and somewhat nationalistic pattern of social consciousness which had been developing over the continuum of their separate existences. This was the greater good in the minds of the Dual Monarchs and even the people themselves were subordinate to it.

Footnotes

1. The Rise of the Spanish Empire, R.B. Merriman, 79.
2. Ibid.,
3. The Golden Century of Spain, (1501-1621), R.Trevor Davies, 3.
4. Merriman, op.cit, 81
5. Ibid., 81.
6. Ibid
7. Ibid., 84.
8. Ibid., 85.
9. Ibid., 86.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., 87.
12. Ibid., 89.
13. Ibid.,
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid., 91.
17. Ibid., 92.
18. Ibid., 94.
19. Ibid., 95.
20. Davies, op.cit. 18.
21. Ibid. 19
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid. 21.
24. Ibid. 21.
25. Ibid., 22.
26. American Treasure and Price Revolution in Spain,1501-1650,Earl J. Hamilton, Preface.

Footnotes

27. Davies, op.cit. 22.

28. Ibid., 23.

29. Ibid., 24.

30. Ibid., 25.

31. Ibid., 26.

32. Ibid., 27.

ENGLAND

The rise of the English national monarchy provides the historian with a much more definitive set of limiting points. While there is some doubt as to whether John II of Aragon and Henry IV of Castile might not have laid the foundation stones of absolutism in the Iberian peninsula, and whether Charles VII and Louis XI might not have properly conditioned the declining nobility to accept their fate of political subjugation, there appears to be little divergence in historical circles about the massive impact which the accession of the Tudors precipitated. The battle of Bosworth in which Henry Tudor, the Lancastrian claimant, defeated Richard III, the incumbent Yorkish representative, was to have far-reaching implications for the destiny of the English monarchy. The English populace had grown quite weary of civil war and dynastic struggles. Their spectatorial vantage point had provided them with little opportunity to discern any ideological or political differences between the two encounters. As Sir Thomas More said, "these matters (the War of Roses) be king's games, as it were, stage-plays; and for the most part played upon scaffolds." The man in the street had become quite disillusioned about the natural order of things. The ceaseless civil wars for a detached monarchy seemed to represent a state of near-anarchy. The depth of a political and social vacuum had been reached and the individual was in a quandary as to which direction was really the way out. The personality of Henry VII was one which was perfectly suited for his age. He had but a very shadowy hereditary claim to the throne

and thus realized from the outset that he must substitute political vigor for the lack of a legitimate claim. His temperament was one which was properly conditioned to the execution of an executive prerogative. He would be instrumental in forming a working partnership with parliamentary government, but only because parliament was generally in tune with his wishes. He was politic and tactful and, although not prepossessing in personal appearance, could display great charm. In sum, his intuitive grasp of what it meant to be a politician before the age of politicians had really arrived was to serve him in great stead in erecting a monolithic national state. In England, much as in our day, there existed various lobbyists who exercised a paramount influence upon the formation of both domestic and foreign policy. The battle of Bosworth had never completely exterminated the Yorkist faction, but it had effectively cleared an avenue to a compromise. Henry was quite satisfied with an agreement to marry Elizabeth of York and thereby attempt to eradicate any talk of an illegal usurpation. The War of Roses had been a power struggle between two dynasties. Its resolution had been accomplished by a conditional surrender predicated upon a political compromise. Henry was now taking steps to pacify the stilted social consciousness of the period by consummating a dynastic marriage which would unite the two houses.

The towns had been the chief economic unit throughout this period. They had oscillated from one faction to another

with very little regard for legitimate determination of the rightful ruler. Economic considerations loomed paramount in the determination of the allegiances during this period. The new capitalistic-orientated bureaucracy were sharply affected by the hazardous travel conditions and their influence was directed towards the fostering of a quick and well-ordered peace. "Business as usual" was considerably more important than any determination of legitimacy.

"With the dynastic issue itself, England felt little concern, but she was very anxious to see the end of uncertainty which seemed likely to bring the purposeless quarrel to an end. 2 For her, the proper authority was the Crown."

Richard III during his brief tenure (1483-1485) seems to have been the only king of England during this epoch to enunciate the belief that the authority of the king had roots in the directives of Parliament. The precept had long been accepted that the Parliament had primary responsibility for making law in accordance with which the king should reign, but the kings had nonetheless occupied the position of preeminence. "The apathy of England toward the dynastic quarrel

"..... of the two noble factions; the general relief, amongst the nobility at least, at the disappearance of the hard-handed Richard; the general desire for stable government---- these things provided for some sort of guarantee that any rule which promised some sort of peaceful order would be accepted." 3

It would be exaggeration to say that the baronage had been destroyed by the civil war. But by any standards, it has been considerably maimed. The greatest names had been killed in the wars and their progeny, as a general rule, did not possess the

depth of perseverance or adeptness at political compromise which had been evident in their fathers. Of the fifty-four noble families which had been present at the last parliament before the civil war in 1454, eighteen were represented at the beginning of Henry's first parliament.

"Apart from the accidents of attainder and legal process and the mere wastage of civil war, estates were less remunerative than they had been, and the nobles as a class did not take to merchandise. Their incomes, based largely upon customary rents from land, were fixed, while prices were already on the upward grade. They felt the pinch of this age more keenly because they were great spenders." 4

The self-confidence and morale of the great baronage had been shaken. "The long and brutal struggle had sapped the ancient honour and the ancient sense of duty." An acute sense of self-awareness had arisen which had not been so predominant during the Middle Ages. "Mutual distrust" seemed to characterize the ambivalent temperament of these people. Thus it seems that the nobility was far from capable of offering a solid front to the impending challenge of the national state complex.

The Church itself was "ill fitted to act as a check upon royal authority and still less to be a substitute for it. Its position in the field of politics was not unlike that of the nobles. It had great strength, yet that strength could be employed in alliance with the royal powers more readily than in opposition."⁵ The church was undoubtedly accepted as the central element in the society of the time. The Chancellor of the realm was invariably a cleric down til 1529 when Sir Thomas

More came to power. The transforming effect of the renaissance was a prerequisite for the technical skill needed for the administration of government. Until this period the government had found it quite easy to prove church benefices for its officials and to thereby supply them with a living wage. Promotions were generally granted by the crown with the tacit approval of the court of Rome. "It was one of those undefined working arrangements which are of the essence of English politics."⁶ The pope would make sure that the king's nominees were not opposed, and the crown replied with the quid pro quo that the papal taxes would be promptly paid. Thus much of the political authority which the church enjoyed during this period stemmed from this de facto agreement with the Crown.

Henry's rise to power was accompanied by the realization that the mere titular acquisition of the crown was not enough to consolidate his rule over the variety of factions which opposed him. He set out to ensure that the actual power of government in the lower echelons of government service passed from Richard's supporters to his own men. Twelve new Knight baronets were established. Pembroke became the duke of Bedford and Stanley the earl of Derby.⁷ These physical manifestations of power passing from one elite to another was accompanied by another less tangible process. Henry wanted to buttress his kingdom with the notion of promotion by merit alone. Although it is obvious that political patronage would continue to be a potent force even down to the day of Queen Elizabeth II, Henry was effective in generating the image of a just and incorruptible sovereign. Henry's

oligarchy was basically aristocratic. More than half the time they came from dissatisfied Yorkist families who had been repelled by Richard III or Edward IV, and who had turned to the Lancastrian upstart in order to receive the political reward that accompanies every change of administration. Many of the Yorkist castles were placed in trust by the crown to be distributed at the discretion of the King whenever some great favor might be rendered. The Earl of Oxford was "keeper of the lions, lionesses and leopards" in the Tower of London with wages of 12 pence a day for himself and 6 pence a day for the support of each animal.⁸ The forests provided a invaluable source of patronage which could be doled out by the King to his influential friends.

Despite the sense of insecurity which Henry must have experienced immediately after his assumption of the crown, he dismissed all the foreign mercenaries in his employ soon after the coronation, with the exception of a small corpus of regular guards which were organized after the French model. He was apparently looking into the future and expected to justify his government by popular support rather than superimposing it from above. Only twelve days after his arrival in London, Henry issued the writs for his first parliament. This move was obviously directed toward creating a facade of duly-constituted authority. It would also enable him to put his finances on a more sound fiscal basis and to more thoroughly prepare for the reward of the faithful and the destruction of the political heretic. His opening statement to parliament clearly mirrors this desire as

he says that he has come to the throne "by just inheritance and by the right judgment of God given in battle." In an addendum he declared to "maintain all his subjects in their rights and possessions except such persons as had offended against his royal majesty who would be punished in parliament." Henry did not inaugurate^{any}/new and radical relationship with parliament, but merely revived and extended the prevalent concept in the light of the socio-economic conditions wrought by the War of the Roses. Henry demanded that the Commons invest his succession with a front of legitimacy even though he fully realized that this action would far from satisfy the insurgents. It is rather paradoxical that the acquisition of this prerogative by parliament (the right to delineate the succession to the throne) did not arise originally from a desire of Parliament to assert its natural superiority, but rather from a conscious effort by the crown to manufacture an aura of legitimacy to shroud its own authoritarian programs. The crown superimposed natural superiority upon parliament to shore up its own authority and to create the prerequisite system of order. It would be rather ingenuous, however, to suppose that this declaration of the right of succession was anything more than a de facto recognition of an accomplished fact.

It would be not quite true to maintain that Henry adopted a single-minded attitude of vengeance for vengeance's sake toward his political enemies. He realized that he would have to present a formidable front against opposing political

factions to deter them from consolidating their forces against him. But he also issued a general pardon for all those individuals who would "submit and swear fealty to the new King" Cromwell was to characterize this policy later on as "healing and settling." It was directed toward fostering an awareness that the Tudor dynasty would demonstrate force and violence when the occasion demanded, but that they would otherwise manifest a fundamental desire to implement peace and respect for all human rights. Sir Francis Bacon was the chief practitioner of the royal will during this period and it is felt by many historians that he was the chief architect of the "act of resumption" by which Henry declared himself the proprietor of the crown lands which had been claimed by Henry IV in 1455.

Henry realized that to a large extent the political stability of his realm would be determined by the fiscal soundness with which it met its obligations. The treasury was empty when Henry came to the throne and the royal jewels were in pawn. The crown owed money in France and was forced to borrow more from the merchant companies to meet its current liabilities. Henry compiled a rather comprehensive list of all the various sources of revenue available in his domain and erected a rather elaborate fiscal structure with quotas to be abstracted from the various areas of the crown lands.

"There is in the Public Record a manuscript, incomplete and of uncertain date, which includes an 'estimate of the daily diet and expense of the king's household' provision, in round sums, is even made for contingencies such as the entertainment of ambassadors and 'the enlarging of the principal feasts.'" 14

The bill of attainder and the act of resumption served as very powerful instruments in implementing the royal will during this restive period. A hostile noble who did not demonstrate his good faith by an act of propitiation would suddenly find his lands seized and himself imprisoned for a substantial period of time. A vacuum had been generated by the decline of the openly hostile nobles and the other elements of society who had supported the loser, and it was into this area that Henry was determined to intrude. To compound this instability at home, the general attitude of her far neighbors was far from comforting. Ireland always seemed to exhibit a fond affection for Richard Plantagenet, and the French still nourished a distaste for anything English because of the still-vivid memories of the invasions.

"For the first twelve years of his reign the new king was constantly engaged in putting down rebellions, checking conspiracies, and passing laws which made it dangerous as well as difficult to ferment local disorder. It was his settled policy to represent the risings against his authority as things of small account, and it was partly because of the supreme confidence that he always showed that he won; but it was not till after 1497 that he established a clear ascendancy and stood forth in the eyes of Europe as the founder of a dynasty which had come to stay." 15

Henry's basic concept was to institute a foreign policy mid-way between two extremes which would provide him with a period of grace in which he might investigate some positive steps which could make the equilibrium permanent. It seems fairly certain that Henry realized the value of a lasting peace and his basic dilemma was to carve a path for England through the welter of petty jealousies which had constituted the basic facts of life

in this period of revolutionary transition. Henry wanted to fortify the status quo to ensure that no foreign support would be forthcoming to his domestic enemies. Professor Mackie feels that the chief characteristics of the diplomacy of the period were "the individualism" and "the realism" which were at the core of the renaissance.

"Treaties were still fortified with threats of apostolic censure; but the papal thunder was not infrequently disregarded as a brutum fulmen, solemn promises were readily broken, and each prince sought his own ends by all the means in his power. Just titles were valuable ---- if they could be made in fact ---- and, since the state was identified with the person of the prince, royal marriages, and even personal idiosyncrasies were matters of high diplomacy. The result was a political ... kaleidoscope where the patterns would change and mingle and divide with baffling uncertainty,..... a melodrama very different from the old-fashioned mystery where established characters played their recognized parts upon a familiar stage..... .. recent developments in the political world had not only altered the old balance, but had brought the protagonists into relation with distant powers whose collective interests embraced the affairs of all Christian Europe; and the diplomacy of an English king was now affected by events which occurred in the Mediterranean, in the Baltic, and at Vienna." 16

The Parliament of 1489 clearly manifests Henry's desire to have government play a paternalistic role in government. Some of the measures which were introduced in parliament were rather common; he sought to regulate the conduct of butchers, capmakers, wool-merchants, and dealers in bullion. Money was appropriated for the army which was soon to embark for Brittany. The Spanish treaty of Medino del Campo with France had just been consummated

This treaty provided that Britain and Spain should make joint war upon France. Spain was highly disturbed that she was not able to obtain Roussillon and Cerdagne from France and was willing to fight if necessary. England was disturbed over Charles VIII's conquest of Brittany and his marriage to the heiress, Anne. This province gave Charles a dangerous advantage over England in case of war and, although neither party to this treaty wanted to fight, each was willing to adopt a bellicose attitude to see if some concession could not be arranged. As it turned out Spain never did fight because Charles ceded Roussillon and Cerdagne back to her to secure his frontier before he embarked on the Italian campaign. After Charles married Anne of Brittany, however, Henry summoned the famous "War" Parliament and declared his intentions to renew the war with even greater fervor. ("That war ---- the previous one ---- was to defend another man's right, this is to recover our own." ¹⁸) The war was fought and won without a battle being engaged. The treaty of Etaples in 1492 reimbursed Henry for his expenditures in the Brittany campaigns and both monarchs were glad to cease this absurd war with no clear-cut victory either way.

The traditional method of obtaining revenue for the crown had been divided proportionally between the clergy and the laity. The clergy had been authorized to provide one-fourth of the money while the laity contributed the other three-fourths. I have mentioned previously that Henry had ordered a thorough census taken of all the sources of revenue available to the crown. This study convinced him that a more progressive tax

structure should be arranged. An income tax of 10% was established to extract the money from the laity and a property tax of $\frac{1}{8}$ on all personal property. This system would have provided enough long-term revenue to have waged a sustained foreign campaign. Since the treaty of Etaples had settled the conflict in Brittany, he could now devote himself to his ledgers and develop the economic strength of his country. It is rather symptomatic of the age that the exalted medieval conception of honor (which Henry himself had invoked by his own statement) could dissolve so readily in front of the specter of a debit and credit balance sheet. There are those historians who feel that Henry never intended to fight at all, but merely organized this expedition to obtain recompense for the outstanding debts owed his predecessors by the French monarchy. We certainly do know that Henry respected the value of the crown. It was to be the chief instrument upon which he would rely in fashioning his new monarchy. Henry was quite willing to risk an insurrection at home by waging this particular "war" in order to secure a propitious and quick settlement for French gold.

The true source of law for the majority of the English people was still divine law. The law of nature was the concrete manifestation of the higher order of things which God had created. To the extent that secular or positive law coincided with natural law, the masses were quite willing to believe God's lieutenant on earth was successfully wielding his mandate. When the Lancastrian succession attempted to deviate from this higher order, however

they were destined to encounter severe public discontent. No matter how divergent fact was from theory in the mind of the ruler, the two were still coincident in the mind of the man in the street. Thus it appears that the people of Britain were far removed from any renaissance in political theory. They were still wedded to the traditional beliefs. It was the particular genius of Henry VII that he was successfully able to create a government based upon the new political scheme of things, while at the same time leaving the medieval theory of government unscathed in the minds of the masses. While the people could never really distinguish in their own mind between the administrative machinery and the government itself, there was a definite cleavage between the two as far as Henry was concerned. The working arrangement is really quite similar to the modern corporate structure which has arisen in the twentieth century. Just as there is a separation between ownership and control in the modern corporation, there was also a gap between the institutions of the people and the actual government. The people might own "stock" in various governmental organs by virtue of the fact that they were represented, but the real decisions of the government were made by a board of directors which Henry dominated. The royal judges, the council, and the council in parliament might occupy esteemed positions in the new monarchy, but they never rose above being a glorified committee system which was also subordinate to the executive. Professor Mackie chooses to call him "an autocrat by consent", and, in many senses, he fits this pattern perfectly.²⁰ We do know that the ultimate authority of this gradual

centralization emanated from the royal person himself, but it is important that we consider also the mechanical institutions upon which this dynamic influence operated. There were three great courts which operated in Westminster Hall ---- king's bench, common pleas, and exchequer.²¹ Their general responsibility lay in administering the common law and, although they were almost always appointed by the king and were within his realm of effective patronage, it is significant that throughout our particular period almost all of the justices had rather impressive credentials to testify to their experience with jurisprudence. They were authorized to negotiate between parties and would receive a fee for every decision they rendered. They were therefore quite willing to enforce the rule of law upon society as each additional judgment meant a substantial increase in their own material welfare. The general opinion of historians seems to be, however, that they did not abuse this privilege beyond that which might be expected. These three courts would often meet in concert to discuss the application and legitimacy of the old statutes and to help draft new legislation. It operated somewhere between the modern Supreme Court and House Rules Committee. In addition to these courts of common law, the court of chancery proved to be very influential. In essence this was an equity court which sought to rectify an injustice which might have been perpetrated by too strict an interpretation of the law. The chancellor really operated as a "keeper of the king's conscience."²² All four of these courts exercised parallel authority in determining the valid legal precepts of the period. There was also a special type of justice who was appointed by special commission to carry

justice to the relative far reaches of the islands. This judge would also be a regular justice with an area of his own and thus would bring to bear the same legal code here as was exercised in the rest of England.

Henry proceeded to go much further than his predecessors in reducing the power of the sheriff. The sheriff had been the traditional ally of the noble family, and Henry recognized this immediately as a pernicious influence which must be erased. His tenure was reduced to one year and many of his duties were transferred to the justice of the peace. This latter officer was to rise in stature throughout the Tudor's reign. They began to have authority in certain specific areas as agriculture, industry, vagabondage, and economic matters in general. Their ultimate responsibility was "to preserve good order and to recover for the crown the authority lost to the over-mighty subject,"²³ Each successive parliament witnessed the extension of the justice's power into areas which had previously been reserved either for the sheriff or for other agents of the crown. The parliament of 1495 permitted them to hear all "statutory offenses" short of felony with indictment and granted them jurisdiction²⁴ over sheriffs and baliffs who were found guilty of extortion.

The king had another alternative method which he could use to expand the royal prerogative. In addition to the promulgation of additional edicts which could spell out the royal power in greater detail, the king could revise existing edicts and oftentimes change the original meaning entirely from what

had been intended by parliament. This method proved to be especially useful when the honeymoon between parliament and the king was fast drawing to a close. The king was successful in creating vague and nebulous areas out of what had one time been rather limited and specific powers. The result was that the justice of the peace was given almost complete license to investigate all breaches of the peace in place of the more regimented schedule which he had followed previously. Parliament had evidently become a little concerned about the hegemony which this particular class of royal agency was beginning to achieve and in order to head off any encroachment of their own power, they began to resist any direct expansion of the justice's power. Henry, being the shrewd and facile administrator that he was, chose to use this back door to achieve his objective and thus avoid any untimely rift with parliament.

"While their powers were thus lavishly increased, the justices were brought more and more under the control of their royal master. The Council was vigilant in its surveillance, and as councillors were named in each commission, it was well informed. The courts of common law could control the quarter session by writs of mandamus for omissions, and certiorari, for things done." 25

By a system of checks and balances such as that described above, the king could prevent any inordinate aggrandizement of power lest the servant become more omnipotent than the master. He had more than a passing fear that one of his special arbiters of justice might become a creature of the local aristocracy and thereby subvert the very end he hoped to achieve. To eliminate

this possibility the public was informed that if any man felt he had been abused by the justice, he could seek "remedy" either from a neighboring justice, a justice of assize, or the court of chancery. These justices operated as the very embodiment of royal power. An authoritarian regime is only effective to the extent that it can convince the citizenry that the justice which it dispenses (although autocratically conceived) is for the good of society. If a sufficient gap ever arises between the government's definition of justice and what the masses hold it to be (i.e. if the masses feel that a special interest is being served rather than the general interest) then popular support of the existing government become little more than a myth. Henry could always place himself in a posture of empathy with the man in the street and thereby anticipate the moments of great domestic crisis and head them off.

The circle of Henry's chief advisers in political and judicial matters was known alternatively as "the royal council" and the "court of star chamber"²⁶. The royal council was in many ways the prototype of the cabinet system which has been prominent in the American political tradition. By much the same process, pf selection in which geographical distribution and representative occupations are considered, Henry was also careful to include men whocould represent the various areas of national life. He always included several clergy, a couple of nobles, representatives from the commoners, and one or two officers from the military service. The number of men who attended these meetings varied between six and ten. In the sessions of this extremely influential

group were forged most of the decisions which affected the whole of English national life. They would generally meet four times a week to consider matters of general policy affecting the entire realm, or would meet in the star chamber to exercise their judicial capacity. Because of the historical notoriety which has attached itself to the decisions which this council reached in this particular place, it acquired its more famous name. It would be a misconception to regard this council as an innovation as in reality it had been meeting since the days of Edward III.²⁷ However, the political influence which it came to exert over the king was new and, when coupled with expanded jurisdiction in judicial matters, resulted in an entirely new concept in government. Each member of the council would have a primary responsibility in a certain area and was the head of the bureaucracy in that particular field. In judicial matters, they were theoretically limited to abstaining in matters of "life, limb and freehold", but this distinction was frequently violated in practice. The court did not hesitate from exerting their influence in certain cases which were still pending in lower courts.²⁸

The people of England were just beginning to emerge from a political lethargy. Henry Tudor respected this new sense of self-awareness. The new preoccupation with economic, social, and cultural affairs could be turned into a definite asset in a new nationalized monarchical system which could respect the

right of the people to demand changes, on the one hand, and then justify a temporized status quo, on the other.

"A silent social revolution was to be brought about by the rise of comfortable middle-class households. The centers of social life had once been the parish church and the monastery and the great noble's hall. All of these had been very public places and the life in them a very communal life. alongside this, the smaller private house with its close family circle was growing up.... It has been held that the growth of this home life fostered a new kind of personal or family religion and brought about a decline in the importance attached to sacramental, corporate worship as well as to the monastic ideal." 29

This new social individualism was to be transformed into a powerful force for the promotion of national unity. It was the singular contribution of Henry Tudor that he could grasp the spirit of the times with one breath and mould it into a militant national consciousness with his next.

England Footnotes

1. The Earlier Tudors, 1485-1558, J.D. Mackie, 10
2. Ibid., 12.
3. Ibid., 15.
4. Ibid., 18.
5. Ibid., 23
6. Ibid., 30
7. Ibid., 34.
8. Ibid., 35
9. Ibid., 51.
10. Ibid., 54
11. Ibid., 37
12. Ibid., 56.
13. Ibid., 57.
14. Ibid., 63
15. Ibid., 44.
16. Ibid., 66.
17. Ibid., 67.
18. Ibid., 72.
19. A. Political and Social History of England, Frederick A. Dietz, 173.
20. op.cit., Mackie, 34.
21. Ibid., 193.
22. Ibid., 198.
23. Ibid., 210.
24. Ibid., 211.
25. Ibid., 216.

26. Ibid., 219.
27. Ibid., 221.
28. Ibid., 224.
29. The Tudors, Christopher Morris, 51.

FRANCE

French society at the death of Charles VII in 1461 was a confused welter of personal relationships and interrelationships. To this date her political and sociological development had been colored by a succession of personal loyalties which extended from peasants to landowner and from noble to noble. The fabric of society had been conditioned by this allegiance of a personal nature which one individual paid to another. This is not to say, however, that there had not been some dissolution of the concentric bonds which had been in existence since the dissipation of the Roman Empire. The Renaissance of Charles Haskins, while primarily a revival of the critical spirit in art and letters, had also generated a desire among the traditional have-nots to throw off their bonds to the soil and to assert their individuality. It was not simply a case of nurturing that desire until it reached a full-blown reality, however, that was sufficient to change the direction which medieval society had been moving for centuries. It was necessary that a series of strong men should succeed to the French throne and to provide the sociological substitute for the feudal allegiance in a very rudimentary form of nationalism. The house of Valois down to the ascension of Charles VII had made some very shadowy gestures toward centralizing control of what was really no more than a geographical expression. The assumption to the throne by Louis XII saw the king practically sovereign in his own domain, but still quite limited both in legal authority and in actual practice

from expressing his sovereignty over the lands of his great vassals. For the purpose of this essay, there needs to be no real distinction shown between the holders of the traditional fiefs and the holders of the appanages. This latter designation was applied to those cessions of territory which the king made to some vassal who had rendered some special service to him in battle or for some other reason. It was territory freely given, but of course, Louis XII would not be too hesitant about asserting royal control over a county like Gex which had been renounced by Charles VII. It was reward enough (from the royal point of view) that the vassal's family had secured the income from the land for several generations, and it now high time that it revert back to the throne. It is important to keep in mind the geographical composition of France during this period for, in a large measure, geopolitics would determine many of the measures which the monarchy would institute. The geographical

expression, "L'Artois et la partie de la Flandre en deca de L'Escaut, qui doivent l'hommage au Roi. Puis la frontiere suit tres irregulierement la Meuse et la Saone, tantot en deca tantot au dela. Apres Lyon, c'est une ligne tres compliquee jusqu'aux Alpes, avec des enchevetrements: il y a des terres francaises, sur le versant du Sud-Est, tandis que les hautes vallees de l'ubaye et du Verdon sont piemontaises. Enfin, sur la Mediterranee, le point terminal est fixe entre Nice a l'Est et Antibes a l'Ouest." (1)

Lorraine, France-Comte, Bresse, Burgundy, the county of Gex, Savoy, Nice, and Brittany were all very significant "lacunae" in the monolithic structure which the monarchy was determined to erect. Charles VII had managed to extract certain special

interests from the principalities of Orange and Avignon, but aside from this, the French geographical structure had been static for some years. The Hundred Years War and the Plantagenet claim^S of French soil had certainly given the earlier members of the house of Valois enough to worry about. The Tudors were to be much more concerned with digesting and consolidating their own territory throughout our period of investigation, and this would provide the French kingdom with a sufficient period of repose to inaugurate its own program of recovery. "Les seigneuries feodales" were quite prevalent in the central Loire basin, the central plains, and in the Pyrennes.⁽²⁾ This rather heterogeneous configuration had its genesis with Saint Louis, the progenitor of the house of Bourbon. Not until the annexation of Lorraine in 1766 under Louis XV was the French state as we know it today to be complete. "Il existe encore une multitude de seigneuries qui forment une veritable marqueterie dans le domaine royale."⁽³⁾ This particular "patchwork" was composed of the counties of Guines and Ardres in the North and Central parts; the counties of Dunois, Longueville, d'Aumale, d'eu, de Quix, and numerous others. It is important to realize that all these diverse complexes in no way were adjoined to the French national-state by a common bond of nationalism. They were not exhilarated by the contemplation of a Pan-Francais movement. It was to be the particular genius of Charles VIII and Louise XII to translate the individualism of the renaissance into an intense sense of self-awareness and to thereby substitute the moral universal national-state idea for the previous adhesion to the feudal principality. There seems to be no question

but what the cultural developments throughout this period greatly heightened the individual's awareness of his own dignity and made him more cognizant of achieving an intelligible and meaningful existence in this world. The Middle Ages had fostered a negation of the activities that could be accomplished in this world in the hope of enhancing the achievements that could be realized in the next. This was an adequate explanation as long as men were willing to accept a renunciation of all earthly endeavor. It was this period of the renaissance, however, which saw a revaluation of the attainments that were possible in the arts, and also of the attainments that were possible in statecraft. We have already witnessed the direction that this impetus would take in the Spanish complex. France would participate in many of the basic reforms common to her two chief rivals but she would also contribute others thanks to conditions which were essentially French.

"Mais, au debut du XVI^e siecle, la situation des feodaux meme les plus independants, ne saurait se comparer a celle qu'ils avaient au moyen-age. Ils ont perdu tous les grands droits regaliens. La monarchie intervient sans cesse chez eux, exige d'eux des soldates, leve chez eux comme chez elle, des impotes, les soumet a ses Parlements, en somme les domaine."(4)

There had indeed been a certain fundamental change in outlook among the majority of these principalities. Most of the peasants came to be more concerned with their station in life. The great land-owners gradually began to perceive that a vast transformation was beginning to take place in the texture of society which might well affect their vested interests. The medieval Weltanschauung had clothed the individual with a protective

mantle of certainties. An individual had found his position in society pretty well defined in a rigid social framework. The advent of a money economy and the rise of capitalism had wrenched the order of things until an individual of low birth could achieve a position of prominence by virtue of his merit alone. All at once everything absolute seemed to degenerate willy-nilly into a welter of relatives. Everything which the middle ages had seemed to view as the inevitable results of cause and effect relationships suddenly became tenuous. The implications of this period of transition upon the French scene were terrific. The immediate reaction of the feudal barons to this change in perspective was an attempt to centralize government within their own little spheres of influence. The Duke of Orleans established a "Chambre des comptes." The Duke of Bourbon established an almost complete and autonomous administration. But this shift in outlook demanded something far more extensive. The central government had several advantages which were to be instrumental in helping them to be victorious. They were already provided with the basic machinery which could help them to subdue the feudal appanages. They were destined to receive some support from the **embryonic spirit of nationalism** which the Hundred Years War had fostered. Perhaps most important of all, their adversaries were irrevocably committed to their own special interests. If the Duke of Burgundy, who governed almost as much territory as did the king, had ever been able to consolidate his own territory and to form any sort of effective coalition at all among the foes of centralization, the French national state would have been dormant for at least another fifty years.

There were in fact three superficial coalitions formed against Louis XI, one in 1465, the second in 1467, and the third in 1472. The barons attempted to clothe the endemic lack of harmony which existed among them by calling the first of these wars "War of the Public Good." This attempt was so ineffectual that it was discontinued in the second war. The third war saw the resumption of an attempt to discover a suitable "raison d'etre" with it ostensibly being waged with the purpose of rescuing the young Charles VIII who, it was maintained, was being held en bail by the regent Anne de Beaujeu and her husband. This last attempt was so outrageous that it resulted in their losing any degree of popular support which they might have captured by elucidating their real purpose. (5)

The dynastic marriage was to be as instrumental in forging the French body politic as it was on the English and Spanish scenes. Louis XI had attempted to gain the hand of Mary of Burgundy for himself in order to integrate that particular province into his grand design. Unfortunately he was not able to prevent the facile Maximilian of Austria from wooing this strategic princess and adding the Burgundian succession to his blossoming empire. By shrewd diplomatic negotiation, however, he was able to consummate the treaty of Arras in December of 1482 whereby the Dauphin Charles was promised the hand of Margaret (issue of Maximilian and Mary) and that she should bring Artois and Franche-Comte to the French state as a dowry.

It is rather strange that no mention was made of the main body of the Burgundian legacy, that of Burgundy proper, other than Louis received it as "compensation for the felony of Charles the Bold."⁽⁶⁾ It seems rather incongruous that Maximilian would have been as careful as he was to consummate a politic marriage with Mary and then let the most important part of her patrimony slip through his fingers. Compounded with this is the inordinate amount of hospitality which Philip the Good (Mary's father) had displayed to Louis XI in protecting him from the anger of Louis's father, Charles VII, after Louis had taken part in a heinous plot against the crown. Nonetheless the treaty of Arras was a very gratifying one from the French point of view and severely exasperated Richard III and Henry VII. It was this fait accompli more than any other stroke which prompted the Tudors to renounce the Plantagenet claims of French soil and to turn instead to their own realm. After the treaty of Arras, Burgundian power to resist the overtures of the king was nonexistent. In addition, in 1481, the family of Anjou had died out and the last Angevin had seen fit to bequeath Maine, Anjou, and Provence to the house of Valois. Thus, by two fantastic strokes of good fortune, the French national state was beginning to take shape.

There were three central problems with which Charles VIII and Louis XII had to come to terms: the first was the confused state of the Common Law, the second was the establishment of a single system of weights and measures throughout

the kingdom, and the third was the suppression of the inland tolls which acted as a severe deterrent to inland commerce. Charles VII had drawn up plans to remedy the heterogenous complexion of the droit coutumier, but he actually accomplished very little. However, in many respects, the recognition that a certain problem existed was of greater significance than the actual methods that were used to eliminate this. By enunciating his intention to introduce conformity into the divergent schemes Charles had established a pattern which his successors could refine. After the English had been driven back across the Channel, the Crown became preoccupied with unifying the French dualism. This traditional dichotomy between the droit coutumier and the droit écrit had resulted in a welter of conflicting interpretations. The fundamental desire was to eliminate as much of the droit coutumier as possible and to couch the existing law in the form of the droit écrit. One of the strongest influences upon the Roman Law of this late fifteenth century and the early sixteenth century came in the form of a universal movement which had tremendous repercussions over all three of the countries under discussion. This was the rise of the Humanist school under Cuius, the great law professor at Toulouse. They were especially influential in France where we have seen that the endemic dualism of law required more work than in our two other countries.

"The new method introduced in the sixteenth century in the science of Roman Law is not the result of an isolated manifestation, but is at one with the general revolt of the human mind against the burdens of traditions and its accompanying abuses. Thus it has a close affinity with the religious insurrection of Luther and Calvin, with the philosophic doubt of Descartes, with the general literary revolt in Europe, with the efforts to reintroduce classical types of architecture....."

in a word, it indicates the passing away from medievalism to modernism." (7)

Alciati, Denis Godefroy, Jacques Godefroy, DuTillet, the brothers Pithou and Bouchard were all instrumental codifying the irregularities in jurisprudence which had arisen with the passing of time.

"L'organisation judiciaire..... continua. Ce fut une preoccupation constante pour la Royaute d'assurer ou d'etendre l'action de sa justice. Le Parlement de Bourgogne enstitue par Louis XI, puis supprime par Charles VIII fut reconstitue et fixe a Dijon; celui de Provence fut etabli par Louis XII, en 1501, apres avoir ete deja ebauche sous Charles VIII; l'Echiquier de Normandie fut rendu permanent, par une ordonnance de 1499, Un parlement dans une province, c'etait l'autorite, autant que la justice du Roi, rapprochee et presente." (8)

Louis XII does seem to have maintained more of an abiding interest in the propagation of equitable justice than his predecessors. He was the chief architect of "le grand ordonnance" of 1499 which instilled a note of clarity and order into the judicial procedure of his day.

"l'Ordonnance de 1499, reprenant en cela un edit de 1493, s'attaquait a la venalite, introduite depuis peu dans les offices de judicature; et, contra la venalite, les rois allaient l'elever aussi souvent et aussi vainement que contre le nombre exagere des procureurs et la longueur des proces Elle declarait egalement que les affaires devraient etre jugees "diligement", mais la procedure restait secrete; que la 'question' ne pourrait etre infligee que sur l'avis de gens notables (9) et non suspects", mais la question etait maintenue."

In addition, the offices of "lieutenants" "generaux des baillages" and "prevots" were reserved for graduates of the university. This regulation effectively removed those offices from the list of benefices which could be doled out to the sons of illiterate grandees. I have indicated already the extent to which these

monarchs were concerned with eradicating the droit coutumier. Lavisse seems to feel that the greatest strides in this direction were made under Louis XII rather than Charles VIII. "Un recueil des Coutumes de France fut edite en 1516. Les documents relative a la revision de la Coutume de Paris montrent comment se faisait la redaction. Des representant de la Noblesse, du Clerge du Tiers Etat furent convoques avec des membres de l' ordres judiciaire."⁽⁹⁾ This union of the three classes resulted in a fairly equitable apportionment of the special interest laws which had developed indigenously in the far reaches of the commonwealth. By summoning a fairly representative body into session to consider these laws, compromises could be effected and no one class could be severely dispossessed.

The question of establishing a uniform system of weights and measures was one which had far-reaching implications for the French monarchy. Unfortunately it was also one with which they had the slightest degree of success. The kingdom was too extensive and feudal states had not been sufficiently assimilated to a point where any centralization in this particular matter could become complete. The Estates-General under Charles VII in 1454 had ordered a study made with a view toward eradicating the antiquated system. However, entrenched special interests were successful in lobbying for their special system. It was quite natural for one province which produced a particular crop in great quantity to endeavor to retain its indigenous system which undoubtedly resulted in a favorable evaluation. The conflict of interest which arose in this particular situation

was great, and any tenable solution had to wait for a more
(10)
auspicious time.

The suppression of inland tolls encountered quite similar opposition. The prestige of the national-state complex had not yet acquired sufficient momentum to engender the proper spirit of compromise which was a prerequisite to a just solution. As long as these inland tolls were still a reality, economic nationalism of the genre which was essential to nourish a notion of political nationalism could never be realized. If the French monarchy had been able to solve these internal problems sooner than they did, the solid wave of vested interests which were destined to fight them bitterly might have been diminished. Louis XI had gathered around him "qualified persons or experts" on particular questions. This was undoubtedly the genesis of the Conseil du Roi which was so important under Charles VIII
(11)
and Louis XII. He would convoke the Estates of various provinces upon occasion and, in one instance, even convened the Estates-General. It is fairly apparent, however, that in all cases his objective was merely to receive advice or approval but never to submit to any control. In 1468 he submitted a rather extensive program of reforms to the Estates-General which allowed for a degree of provisional representative government, but these reforms were never instituted. He gathered around him for the most part the lesser nobility, le noblesse de l'epee, and the bourgeois of a rather modest social station whom he could easily manipulate. They recognized completely that they were the creatures of the king and made no sustained effort to assert

their individuality against the common weal. The renaissance notion of the dignity of man had been superficially expounded during this period but it had yet to be absorbed. "He continued his father's efforts to restore the economic life of France; he favored the upper capitalistic bourgeois and the corporations which assured discipline of labour. He took interest in industry, set about the exploitation of mines, and introduced into France the weaving of silk. He thought, it is said, of founding a commercial company for the exploitation of the Levant. One of his last ordinances was one authorizing the clergy, the nobles, and his own officials to engage in trade..... he founded a university at Bourges in 1464, and in spite of the ill-will of the libraires jures (sworn booksellers) he caused the first printing that was erected in the capitol to be established in the Sorbonne."⁽¹²⁾ It would seem then that Louis XI laid the economic foundation for the political consolidation that was to follow. Some sort of class unity had to be fostered which could transcend the decaying provincial bonds of unity. If a peasant in Burgundy could identify himself with a peasant in Brittany or Gex and justify his existence as playing some part in a national economic effort, the period of transition between feudal and modern society could become much smoother. A sense of group loyalty in something bigger than oneself had to arise and fill the vacuum or otherwise anarchy would ensue. The guild system was still quite prevalent and interchange of ideas between various guilds in different provinces was being accomplished. The modern capitalistic system

was coming into flower. Division of labor was being thought of not only as a means toward accomplishing some economic task but also as a method of implementing a more efficient statecraft. It was the genius of Louis XI that he could channel the economic and sociological enthusiasm which invariably accompanies a period of flux like this into a more effective political configuration. His two successors were to carry the task even farther.

Anne of Beaujeu was the regent of Charles VIII during his minority from 1481 to 1489. The grandees took this opportunity to demand political rights commensurate with their social station. Anne was forced to guarantee the ancient right that the Estates-General could determine the composition of the Royal Council. The deputies, however, were so shocked at being accorded this ancient prerogative that they neglected to appoint the councillors. Many of the nobility saw this interregnum as an excellent opportunity to assert their ancient liberties over a "lame-duck" king. Duke Francis II of Brittany attempted to vacillate between the overtures of Richard III of England and Maximilian of Austria for the hand of his heir, Anne. The famous story of the proxy marriage between Anne and Maximilian which was later revoked by the military conquests of Charles VIII need not be reiterated. However, various ramifications of this particular liaison were to have disastrous implications for the geopolitical structure of France. Charles ordered the marriage between Maximilian and Anne rescinded and married her himself. This gave him effective control over her province, but it also automatically revoked the treaty of Arras of 1482 whereby Charles was to marry Margaret of Austria and receive the Burgundian patrimony. This failure to

secure the north-eastern frontier of France was to continually plague the French state as it presented a soft under-belly which could be used to rejuvenate the Plantagenet claims. Historical perspective informs us that it was not, but it continually operated as a limiting factor upon the scope of the reforms which Charles and Louis could pursue. The real reason that Charles chose the province of Brittany over the Burgundian succession gives us a rather graphic picture of the nature of his mind. Down to the time when the impact of the new world was experienced, the intelligent political scientists believed that the future of the French state lay with her harbors in Provence and the Mediterranean basin. This, of course, was the ultimate consideration which prompted Charles to pursue the Neopolitan adventure. He had become so enthusiastic about resuscitating the Angevin claims in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies that he would subordinate the consolidation of France's very own frontiers! He returned Rousillon and Cerdagne to Spain, and Artois, Franche-Comte, and Charlois (the Burgundian legacy) to Maximilian. He was merely fortunate that the very ridiculous clause of the treaty of Arras had given him Burgundy proper carte blanche and that Maximilian was engaged in an Hungarian adventure so that he could not pursue Mary of Burgundy's claim any further. Louis XII was to become even more desirous of adventures upon the Italian peninsula thanks to the fact that his mother had been a Visconti. This biological link, when coupled with the beckoning of Ludovico il Moro, was to result in a series of

Italian campaigns which strained the French treasury. There is that tempting "if" in history that if Charles and Louis had not embarked so tenaciously upon the Italian campaign, there would have been no real necessity for reforming the French treasury. There is also the possibility that the feudal barons would have been much more able to wage an effective battle against the French monarchy if the monarchy itself had not been engaged in a foreign struggle which tended to unite in spirit if not in fact the French people.

"For more than a century the Estates General had met so frequently that they had become an essential organ of the monarchy. They were authorized to fix the rates of taxation, to nominate men to the council of the king, and to designate the regent, if the king were a minor. Government appeared to be moving in a parliamentary direction. The Estates General which met in 1484 fulfilled all the duties which the previous parliaments had done, but after this date the king shook off all forms of supervision. Henceforth they were only occasional assemblies."⁽¹³⁾ This date of 1484 was indeed pivotal because after this period rule became much more personal in nature. The Conseil du Roi was to provide a valuable forum where the various aspects of a particular measure were discussed, but no longer was the ideal of a representative provincial government upheld.

"..... la monarchie a superpose presque partout l'administration centrale a l'organisation feodale. Elle a etabli des elus au coeur des domaines seigneuriaux. Dans cette intervention constante, elle est singulierement servie par les sujets memes des seigneurs, qui souvent reclament sa protection."⁽¹⁴⁾

The citizenry of Limoges were quite adamant in insisting that officials of the central government be installed in the high bureaucratic positions between 1487 and 1493. This would seem to indicate that the feudal nobility had so entrenched themselves in the minds of the bourgeoisie and peasants as being the servants of vested interests that popular support could no longer serve the nobility's claim for the right to home rule. (15) We know that the feudal seigneuries had been extremely harsh in extracting the taille and other taxes from the dispossessed classes. The populace during this period seems fairly well disposed toward the notion of a change in administration. The mere desire to foster a more universal union for nationalistic purposes was certainly subordinate to more material considerations. While some segments of this society may have discerned an ideological affinity between themselves and the desire for a more universal body-politic, it seems that they were certainly in the minority. At times the feudal grandees themselves recognized the advantages of a more centralised government.

"D'autre parte les seigneurs eux memes empruntent au Roi ses officiers pour les faire sieger au tribunal feodal, introduisant ainsi chez eux leurs adversaires les plus redoutables." (16)

A fifth column force for the monarchy began to arise among these discontent peasants. Charles and Louis maintained a close scrutiny over these appanages to discern any sign of popular support for union with central government. Many of the displaced nobles began to seek the minor bureaucratic positions with the state. These lesser nobles were perhaps much more to the left (in regard to centralisation) than the king

himself was. They have been quite satisfied with a leveling process which, would if not restore them to their place of grandeur, at least cause their rich cousins to be subject to somewhat the same process.

"From now on, the chancellerie and the superintenance des finances, with their staffs of generaux des finances and treasueriers de France had a permanence which was ensured by tradition..... new administrators were enrolled of humbler extraction. The new administrators were given specialized tasks in finance and were called secretaires signant en finances..... and later secretaires d'etat. The supreme courts, which had gradually been separated from the king's court, were being constituted side by side with le conseil du roi, with more precise functions established by ordinances the existence of the le Grand Conseil was recognized by the ordinance of 1498. The parlement was still the supreme organ of the judiciary, and since the middle of the 15th. century, a number of regulations had completed the definition of its power." (17)

This rather definitive quote depicts the essence of the process of centralisation which was taking place. Le Chambre des Comptes and La Cour des Aides were established to help administer the royal income more effectively. Provincial estates became much more numerous. District supreme courts were established which made appeals to the Parlement of Paris much more infrequent. The kingdom was divided into four great generalities which served as the centers for financial administration. These were Languedoil, Languedoc, Normandy, and Outre-Seine-et-Yonne to which were added the newly acquired provinces of Picardy, Burgundy, Dauphine, Provence, Brittany and Guyenne. (18) The villages now began to organize themselves more on the order which the towns had done centuries before. Constitutions became guaranteed by charters and councils began to administer the local affairs.

In a rather curious and ambivalent process, the texture of society seemed to become more centralised at the same time that it was becoming less centralised. The local governments seemed to be exerting more authority at the same time that the monarchy itself was, and surprising enough, there seemed to be no conflict of interest. It was a geometric system of checks and balances before anyone had ever articulated a justification for the system. It seemed to work and nobody really knew why. It was essentially the government of the ancien regime before the evils of pluralism and tax farming had rendered it static. To be sure, it had the vices of its virtues. There were times when the central government and the chief practitioner of the local autonomy came into conflict. But there was really no longer any doubt as to who would win the argument. It was a centralised regime which could fashion popular support to its own purposes because it provided the safety valve of local autonomy.

The central government was beset with another paralyzing problem with which it could not cope by merely organising another council or appointing another committee. This was the religious crisis which had frustrated Christendom ever since the Great Schism of 1378. The conflict of conciliar authority with the pope had taken form in France in the form of Gallicanism. This movement recognised the pope only in an honorific capacity. The Church was to be reduced to another governmental department, to be administered as a national unit according to the decisions of its own councils and under the guidance of its own bishops. Within the general movement itself there were several distinct

schools of thought which were trying to point the movement in a particular direction usually to suit their own best interests. The king obviously wanted to use Gallicanism to buttress the monarchy while the clergy were generally more concerned with manipulating the movement to free them from any unnecessary ritualistic ties with the pope. The Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges in 1438 had fixed the status of the church in France. "Benefices should be filled by free election, papal taxes were abolished, and there were to be no more appeals to the court of Rome in ecclesiastical matters."⁽¹⁹⁾ Since that time the Pragmatic Sanction had been alternatively ignored and enforced according to the caprice of the particular monarch. Charles VIII decided to display himself as a reformer of the clergy in order to nurture any fifth column aid he might receive in the Italian campaigns. Charles held a conference in Tours in 1493 to prepare a program of reforms, but they were never instituted. Louis XII went much farther in this direction under the urging of Cardinal George d'Amboise, archbishop of Rouen. D'Amboise had decided upon two courses of action; one was that he himself should be pope, and the second (if the first failed) was that a strong national church in France should be erected. "His ambitions were turned toward Italy, and he was the chief architect of Louis's ambitions in that country."⁽²⁰⁾ A legatine bull was issued (with Julius II's permission) which made George d'Amboise the pope's representative with unlimited powers to carry out the reforms in France. The real Gallicans became rather disturbed by this turn of events because they realized they were merely

being traded the authoritarianism of the king for the authoritarianism of the pope. Louis called a conference at Pisa in 1511 to discuss the various ramifications of the schism which had taken place, but it failed thanks to a series of military defeats in Italy and Julius^U's counter-offensive. The French public became subject to an intense program of propaganda. Jean Lemaire de Belges, Pierre Gringore and various other jurists and canonists became to republish the printed text of the Pragmatic Sanction and legal commentaries on its efficacy. The germ of Gallicanism became quite strong and would remain so down to and including the reign of Louis XIV and Bishop Bossuet. A group of theologians known as the Rigoristes arose to attempt to restore an aura of order and discipline into what had degenerated into a chaos of conflicting interpretations. They advocated a return to the basic spirit of mysticism which had been flourishing undisturbed in Flanders and the Rhineland. The pristine vigor of these reformers resulted in the Synod of Sens (1485) and the assembly of the clergy at Tours (1493).⁽²¹⁾ These particular convocations merely resulted in a reiteration of the precepts of the Pragmatic Sanction and a hope that the church would no longer be manipulated by any group to attain temporal ends. This wish was in vain, however, because the monarchy fully recognized that political institutions could only go so far in fostering a spirit of respect and veneration. The spiritual side of man's existence must also bear some bond (tenuous though it might be) with a national cause. This national cause was to be Gallicanism and,

in its particular sphere, it was to be a very important factor in engendering a spirit of allegiance.

"la societe de la fin du quinzieme et du commencement du seizieme siecle n'agit pas de hautes conceptions en matiere de gouvernement, de legislation, d'esthetique ou de croyance; mais elle a des intentions, de la bonne volonte, des preoccupations morales; seulement elle ne cherche encore le progress que dans ses propres traditions; elle n'est qu'a son insu entraine vers les nouveates de l'avenir." (22)

Thus it was that the French national state emerged. We must not expect too much from her. There was still to be that period of trial and error, of revision and adaptation, and of discarding and innovating which has operated to shape so much of our Western experience. But the start had been made, and it generated a whole new outlook on the optimistic nature of man. Man^{had}/once again become a creature of purpose!

Footnotes (France)

1. Histoire de France, Tome cinquieme, Ernest Lavissee, 133.
2. Ibid., 134.
3. Ibid., 135.
4. Ibid., 136.
5. The Story of France, Vol.I., Thomas E.Watson, 282.
6. A Short History of the French People, Vol.I. by Charles Guignebert translated by F.G.Richmond, 409.
7. Roman Law in the Modern World by Charles Phineas Sherman, 231.
8. op.cit., Lavissee, 144.
9. Ibid., 141.
10. Ibid., 148.
11. Ibid., 206.
12. Op.cit., Guignebert, 411.
13. Ibid., Guignebert, 419.
14. op.cit., Lavissee, 139.
15. Ibid., Lavissee, 142.
16. Ibid., Lavissee, 138
17. op.cit., Guignebert, 419.
18. op.cit., Lavissee, 145.
19. The New Cambridge Modern History, edited by R.R.Potter, 85.
20. Ibid., 88.
21. Ibid., 93.
22. op.cit., Lavissee.

SUMMARY

It is not adequate, however, to merely indicate the external aspects of this centralisation without attempting to investigate some of the less tangible factors which coalesced to form these national monarchies. We do know that in our epoch the foundations of the modern lines of communications were being laid. London, Paris, and Seville had become much closer not only in spirit, but also in the actual distance. We shall now attempt to discover how much cross-fertilisation and free-association of institutions there actually was between these three pivotal centers.

In each of these states which we have studied we know that power was being increasingly concentrated in the hands of the king. Whereas in Spain and in France the royal will had become allied with the church, in England the monarchy was strengthened by its alliance with parliament. The Spanish Inquisition had effectively wedded the spiritual and temporal swords with the result that the royal prerogative had become predominant in both spheres. Sixtus IV had provided the Catholic Monarchs with a powerful instrument to cultivate the royal power. It was to be the only institution common to both Castile, and Aragon, and the results which it generated were to have great influence for centuries to come. The impact of Gallicanism was its counter-part in France. The chief distinction between the Gallican tradition and the Inquisition, of course, was that one was produced with the consent of the pope and the other without. Gallicanism received its raison d'etre from the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges in 1438 which essentially relegated the church to the

rank of a royal instrument. The pope denied the Sanction's validity, of course, just as he denied all the proclamations of the Council, but the opportunity had been provided for any authoritarian king to manipulate it to the royal advantage. In England, however, the papacy never became a working partner with the crown. The ground-work had been laid by Edward III in 1351 when he sponsored the Statute of Provisors which forbade any papal appointments in the English Church. This dictum had been softened somewhat by the Compromise Act, the Statute of Praemunire, in 1353. But this act also served to isolate any influence which the court of Rome chose to exert. The successive kings had all affirmed this act with great fervor, but none of them ever used it to as great political advantage as its two brother kingdoms did. The English monarchs apparently felt that using a spiritual institution for temporal ends could cause much more trouble than the end it would achieve warranted.

On the parliamentary side of the ledger, however, the results were quite different. The Cortes of the Iberian peninsula and the Estates-General of France were destined to political subjugation, while the parliament of England would begin a meteoric rise which would carry it into our own day. The parliamentary tradition in Spain and France ceased to be a barometer which reflected the public will. It became much easier for the Conseil du Roi and the unofficial advisers of Ferdinand and Isabella to decide upon measures which could implement the natural state than it would be for them to merely suggest these same measures to a representative public forum.

The latter method was obviously unsatisfactory because there were so many special interests in both of these countries than compromise legislation really would have meant nothing at all. In England, however, there was much more of a homogeneous society. While vested interests were still present, they were not as obtrusive as they were in the other two countries. The English parliament in addition had a tradition of supremacy behind it ever since the days of the Magna Charta. The supreme irony was that the superiority of parliament was really forced upon them by the anxious desire of the king to assert his legal right to the throne and not by parliament itself. If a Yorkist candidate had been victorious, he would perhaps have not needed to force this duty of proclaiming the succession upon parliament because his hereditary right would have spoken for itself. Thus the working partnership between crown and parliament came into being. It was a unique relationship for its time, but it proved to be equally as effective as the method which was being used on the mainland.

All three countries used substantially different methods to reclaim the territory which they felt should revert to the crown but which was occupied by unfriendly nobles at the moment. Henry VII and Francis Bacon pushed the act of resumption through Parliament which endowed them with the legal right to reclaim all land which had been of royal origin going back to Edward III.⁽¹⁾ The marriage act itself between Aragon (including Catalonia and Valencia) and Castile provided the crown with the framework within which they could operate to castigate all

rebellious nobles. Many of the nobles which they had to subdue were autonomous by tradition only and had no legal right whatsoever to claim jurisdiction over their lands. The geographic unity of Spain was completed by the cession of Rousillon and Cerdagne by Charles VIII and the conquest of Navarre in 1512. The biggest trouble spot was, of course, in France where the existence of many feudal appanages and autonomous principalities greatly complicated the headaches of the monarch. We have seen in the chapter on France some of the devious means which he adopted to assert the royal claim. Not all of the problems of geographic centralisation were solved, however, by mere territorial acquisition. In Spain we know there was a multitude of Jewish and Moorish millets which, although theoretically submissive to the crown, greatly disrupted the complexion of society. Ferdinand and Isabella saw no alternative to actual expulsion, and this decision was to have far-reaching effects upon the Spanish economy. England and France did not have this diversity of religion and thus they could concentrate more upon the actual seizure of lands.

The bureaucracy of the Mesta proved to be the most effective way of dispensing justice in the far corners of the Spanish complex. It was a very elaborate mechanism with crown-appointed officials and their jurisdiction cut across the lines of mere territorial infringements. In actual practice, they would investigate and try any offenders of the royal law. While there were royal Spanish courts also, we know that their

efficacy was greatly hindered by the welter of contradictory legal systems which dominated the Spanish scene. The Mesta had a set of specific instructions from the crown and thus could operate with their own ground rules.

The justice of the peace had risen to the fore in England and his power was destined to become almost absolute in an ever-widening sphere. His position was quite analogous to the judicial officials of the Mesta or to the occasional royal representative. The judicial ordinance of 1499 in France strengthened the power of the "lieutenants", "generaux des baillages", and "prevots". This last group of officials particularly came to exert a much wider arc of influence. Neither the officials of the Mesta, nor the "prevots" however, could ever approach the power of the justice of the peace. Henry VII seemed to pride himself upon his system of local justice. None of the other two countries had an official heretofore as strong as the sheriff, and Henry realized a vacuum could easily arise if he deemphasized one official and did not concomitantly promote another. By elevating the justice of the peace and creating a strong bond between him and the crown, he was laying a strong foundation for royal intrusion in other fields.

This process of centralisation was accompanied in all three of our countries by a unilateral revival of the principles of Roman Law. It was quite easy for the rulers to find support in the Roman public law for the principles of absolutism. It

also provided a common denominator with which to judge their transactions with other European countries. As long as each country persisted in upholding the supremacy of their individual territorial law it was impossible to arrive at any equitable settlement. There was a considerable effort in France to erase the distinguish between the droit coutumier and the droit ecrit. We know that France employed men such as Denis Godefroy and DuTillet in this regard, but France was really more concerned with resolving the distressing conflict in these laws than with developing any consistent legal philosophy. Hence her concern with Roman Law was much less than the other two countries.

In England, the death of Edward I had seen the end of ecclesiastic judges and laymen gradually began to take their place. However, generally in this period the caliber of the education available to the laymen was insufficient that this change precipitated a sharp decline in the general level of justice. "Common Law courts finally became so narrow, rigid, and ignorant that suitors were driven to appeal elsewhere to obtain justice."⁽²⁾ The Equity court was the chief mechanism whereby the principles of Roman Law were introduced into the English judicial system. We remember that the office of the Royal Chancellor was often called "the Keeper of the King's Conscience" because his function was to prevent any injustices which might arise from too legalistic an interpretation of existing law. The practical result of this court was that the Chancellor had almost a free license to enunciate into being any new judicial precedents which the

monarch might desire. The growth of this Chancellor's jurisdiction came to be bitterly resented by the courts of Common Law and the Parliament much as they had grown to resent the justice of the peace. What resulted was essentially a contest between the "feudal customary law of Germanic origin and the Roman Law ~~was~~ the latter, however, disguised under the name of Equity." This Court of Chancery was to be one of the chief instruments which the crown could use in expanding its control over the realm. The principles of Roman Law were introduced into the Court of Admiralty and into the military courts; the students of Oxford and Cambridge were to be tried in their own university courts and not in the usual courts of the realm. These university tribunals were in close association with the new humanistic concept of law which was then flourishing and, thus, tended to be influenced by the Roman principles of jurisprudence.

The Visigoths and Moors had left the Spanish complex rent with many conflicting fueros (laws). We have indicated in an earlier section of this paper how eager the citizens of Castile and Aragon were to retain their individual identities. While they were willing to accept a titular union of their two kingdoms, they jealously retained the privileges and prerogatives of their separate lineages. Isabella commissioned two jurists, Dr. Montalvo and Dr. Carvajal, to investigate the many conflicting and overlapping laws which pervaded her kingdom of Castile and to publish a study as to the best method of promoting a more homogeneous system. The Ordenances reales de Castille

was published in 1484. However, successful this study might have been in codifying certain sections of public law, it left untouched many aspects of private property. The Dual Monarchs did not accept this report because of its eclectic nature, and decided to forego any revision until a more comprehensive study could be obtained. In 1505, the Cortes of Toledo composed the Leyes de Toro which set forth some eighty-three laws dealing the legal reorganization of the Iberian peninsula. This body of law also suffered from being rather inconsistent but it ranked as an improvement over the heretofore unregulated conglomeration of laws. But far more than the individual provisions of Roman Law itself was the fundamental concept of the unity of the Empire and of Christendom. By invoking the spirit of the law which had existed under Justinian, these various rulers hoped to nurture some notion of a well-ordered, well-regulated body politic. All of these rulers recognized that their tenure depended upon creating an organic society conditioned by a rule of law. By reviving and rejuvenating the Roman spirit in these renaissance states each ruler hoped to generate a sense of participation in a national body, a body which would be personified in a prince who owed allegiance to none but God himself.

The dynastic marriage was to be a very important instrument in entrenching the royal will within the political framework of these countries. Henry VII married Elizabeth of York, Edward IV's daughter, in an attempt to pacify the purists on the English scene who were disturbed about his shadowy legal right. The Yorkist-Lancastrian debacle had created a relatively unstable society in which the rich grandees were on their way down and the merchant class on their way up.

We have already seen how preoccupied Henry was with stabilizing the status quo. He felt that a relatively static social structure was a prerequisite to any authoritarian moves which the crown could make. In contrast, it was the inherent stability in Spain which really precipitated the marriage between Ferdinand and Isabella. Henry II of Aragon and Henry IV of Castile had contemplated this marriage for some time before it was consummated. They recognized that the balance of power almost dictated that a consolidated force be erected south of the Pyrenees to counteract that which was being built to the north by Louis XI. But there was no compelling need at that particular time for a dynastic marriage as there was in England. By the end of their particular reigns, however, history had proved them to be wrong. The union of Ferdinand and Isabella was of tremendous significance for the future of Spain, while there is much doubt as to whether Henry's marriage to Elizabeth really did accomplish its original objective. The dynastic marriage came to be the traditional method for cementing international alliances during this period. We have mentioned that the ill-fated treaty of Arras in 1482 would have effectively consolidated France's frontiers if it had been executed, but Charles VIII chose to discard it in favor of a more propitious marriage with Anne of Brittany. Since Charles married her, he could not very well marry Margaret, daughter of Maximilian, which had been the price of the Franche-Comte and Artois in 1482. The treaty of Medina del Campo in 1490 between Spain and England culminated in the

famous union of Henry VIII and Catherine of Aragon (although she did marry Henry's brother first). This treaty was to bind the Spanish and English complexes together for almost fifty years in a belligerency against France. Spain was guilty of duplicity, by negotiating the treaty of Blois in 1505 with France, which gave Germaine de Foix, the cousin of the French king, to Ferdinand in marriage. Thus, it appears that at least on the surface, Spain was to emerge as the most successful practitioner of the marriage alliance. In fact she did, but not because of any of the above-mentioned manipulations, but rather because of the famous Hapsburg liaison between Joanna the Mad (daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella) and Philip the Fair, son of Maximilian. The issue of this marriage was, of course, the famous Charles V. In him the separate lineages of the Austrian and the Spanish Habsburgs were united and it was this figure who during his time was to come closest to the world-state idea of Charlemagne. The Realpolitik of the day accepted unconditionally the marriage contract as being a primary force in politics, and in many respects, it was the most facile negotiator with the best equipped dowry who would emerge as the leader in the balance of power struggle.

Thus we have observed the diverse paths which the renaissance rulers chose to carve their national monarchies. All of them were aided by a powerful but subordinated oligarchy, be it the Royal Council in England, le Conseil du Roi in France, or the unofficial council of advisers in Spain. All

of them had the power to suggest, but never to execute, that function alone being residual in the royal prerogative. The renaissance was a period of history which demanded broad and decisive action. Whether one believes that the men make the period of history or that the period makes the men, there can be no real doubt in this instance that the two were in accord. Just as there was a great transition in art and letters during this epoch, there was an equally great dislocation in the prevalent political configurations. Indeed this whole period lends credence to Dr. Toynbee's thesis that political, sociological, and cultural disciplines cannot be isolated from each other. They must be constantly juxtapositioned and rearranged in order to arrive at a truly intelligible relationship. This I was unfortunately unable to do because of time-space limitations, but even a brief analysis such as I have made indicates that these rulers were compelled by something more than sheer aggrandizement of power. There was a spirit afoot in this age which demanded greatness of all its inhabitants whether they were artists, sculptors, or politicians, and it is the political manifestations of this grandeur which we have just seen.

Footnotes (Summary)

1. The New Cambridge Modern History, edited by G.R. Potter, 81.
2. The Earlier Tudors, J.D. Mackie, 216.

Critical Bibliography

1. The New Cambridge Modern History, volume I, The Renaissance, 1493-1520, edited by G.R. Potter; Cambridge University Press, 1957- a very authoritative source which was of especial interest in evaluating the role which the church and other institutions played in the history of the period.
2. The Golden Century of Spain, 1501-1621- R.Trevor Davies- St. Martin's Press- London, 1954- a very comprehensive evaluation of the Spanish scene during this period of transition- better in political rather than social or institutional history.
3. The Rise of the Spanish Empire, Volume II, the Catholic Kings; The Macmillian Company, New York, 1918- equally as enlightening as Trevor Davies on political developments, and better in most of the aspects of social transition- not quite as up to date however, as Davies.
4. American Treasures and the Price Revolution in Spain, 1501-1650, Earl J. Hamilton, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1934- a very meticulous and thorough investigation of the impact of American treasure on the Spanish scene- Unfortunately, its most valuable insights were outside the span of my essay.
5. The Earlier Tudors, 1485-1558, by J.D. Mackie, Oxford University Press, Clarendon, 1952- the most valuable of any source used on this paper- a very exacting treatment of developments on the English scene.
6. A Political and Social History of England by Frederick C. Dietz The Macmillian Company, 1937- provides a rather interesting summary of the period, but of no use in the writing of the paper itse.f
7. The Tudors, by Christopher Morris, The Macmillian Company, New York, 1957- an excellent guide to the social revolution in England during this period.
8. The Tudor Age by Majes A. Williamson, Longmans, Green and Co. a fairly good study, but not of too much value in my paper.
9. The History of England from the Accession of Henry VII to the Death of Henry VIII, 1485-1547, Vol. 5, by H.A. L. Fisher, Longmans, Green and Co., 1924- an

excellent study of this period which parallels Prof. Mackie's book in many respects - not as up-to-date, however, as The Earlier Tudors.

10. History of England by G.M. Trevelyan, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1926- a good general study of the evolution of the British Isles, but of no specific value in my paper.
11. Histoire de France - Tome Cinqieme, Earnest Lavisse, Librairie Hackette et Cle Paris, 1911- a most comprehensive source on the centralization of the French monarchy.
12. A Short History of the French People, by Charles Guignebert, translated by F.G. Richmond- The Macmillian Company, New York, 1930- a rather cursory study of the period which relies on the most part upon Lavisse.
13. The Story of France, by Thomas E. Watson, Vol. I., The Macmillian Company, New York, 1899- a very general study of the period.
14. A History of France by Andre Maurois translated by Henry Benese Farrar, Straus and Cudahy- New York, 1956; a thoroughly interesting and unorthodox history of the period, but one which is also, infortunately, so full of historical conjectures that its value in my essay was limited.