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THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN THE SOVIET POLITY

by

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INTRODUCTION

This paper is an attempt to examine the role that the military plays as an interest group in Soviet politics. Early studies of the Soviet Union tended to stress the hierarchical nature of political control and the penetration of the entire Soviet society by the state and the Communist Party.[1] These studies recognized group conflict only in the form of factional struggles at the highest level of leadership of the Communist Party, and to a small extent in bureaucratic competition among the administrative organs of the state.[2] The Party was regarded as the only interest group, and it was considered monolithic; that is, not composed of groups of differing interests and behavior.[3]

After the death of Stalin in 1953 the Soviet political system was characterized by increasing interest group activity and group conflict.[4] Political scientists such as Gabriel Almond and James Coleman have suggested that the interest group activity which characterizes all political systems takes place in totalitarian countries in the dominant party of such countries.[5] It is this approach that this thesis will follow. As is the case with all group theory approaches; this approach must be tailored to take into account the political culture, social configuration, and institutional setting of the Soviet Union.[6]

The first order of business when discussing interest groups is to define the term for the reader. Gabriel Almond and

Bingham Powell in the book Comparative Politics define an interest as "a group of individuals who are linked by particular bonds of concern or advantage, and who have some awareness of these bonds.[7] These groups serve to articulate the common interests of their members.[8] Almond and Powell then go on to describe several types of interest groups, including the "institutional interest group." This type of interest group is "composed of professionally employed personnel, with designated political or social functions other than interest articulation."[9] This thesis will attempt to prove that the Soviet military constitutes just such an interest group.

The first part of this paper will attempt to prove that the Soviet military is a professional group linked by "particular bonds of concern or advantage." The first chapter of this thesis will examine Communist ideology in order to understand the role of the military as envisioned by the founders of the Soviet state. Such an examination is necessary to comprehend fully the political culture and institutional setting of the Soviet Union. As will be demonstrated, the early writings of Lenin and other Bolsheviks indicate a willingness to do away with standing armies and to replace them with a militia of the people. This was due to a basic distrust of a professional army, and this distrust colors the Party-military relationship to this day. Such a distrust has tended to foster a mental outlook among career military officers of "us" versus "them." Deviations in the military from the role called for by Marxist-

Leninist ideology may indicate areas where the military has asserted itself as a professional group.

The second chapter will then examine the events of the early history of the Soviet military which caused the military to develop into a highly professional institution. These causes were mainly related to the need of the Communist Party for protection from both internal and external threats to its survival. For reasons of military efficiency in meeting these threats, the Soviet military developed into a professional, hierarchically organized institution. This type of military differed greatly from that called for by Communist ideology. As a result of this type of organization, an elitist value system and a sense of separation from the rest of Soviet society developed.

Next, this paper will examine these characteristics which developed in the Soviet military, and which categorize it as a professional institution. Among these characteristics are expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. Each of these characteristics will be defined in this chapter and their applicability to the Soviet military enlarged upon. The writings of Soviet military leaders will be examined to determine to what extent the Soviet military retains these characteristics. Eye witness descriptions of the Soviet military will also be evaluated in this regard.

The second half of this thesis will be concerned with the interests that the Soviet military holds in common and the means by which these interests are articulated in the Soviet polity.

The fourth chapter will attempt to enumerate the vested interests of the military. Speeches, articles, and interviews with Soviet military leaders will be made use of in order to ascertain what interests are voiced by the Soviet military. These interests will include both those that relate to the proper functioning of the Soviet military (strategy, defense spending, etc.) and those that relate to the status of the military as an institution.

The fifth chapter will deal with the means of articulation of the interests of the Soviet military. These means include membership in the decision making bodies of the Party and associations with other interest groups, or with a Party leader. While the decision making process in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union remains to a great degree a mystery, this thesis will employ the information available in order to outline the channels of access by which the military articulates its interests. While much of the information is drawn from the 1960's, the conclusions drawn from it appear valid today.

The final chapter will draw on the last twenty years of Soviet history in order to demonstrate how the military has used its influence and just how effective such influence has been. In doing so, this paper will point out some of the limitations which are imposed on the military by the Party. Such limitations indicate that the military is not perfectly free from Party control, and no such claim will be made. Nevertheless, the examples of military influence on Soviet politics cited in this chapter do show that the military is able to exercise considerable

influence, particularly in military and foreign affairs, and budgetary allocations.

Before ending this introduction, I wish to recognize the literature which has influenced this thesis and upon which I have drawn. The writings of Raymond Garthoff and Dimitri Fedotoff White explored the professional nature of the Soviet armed forces, and first suggested the degree to which the military is separated from the rest of Soviet society. Roman Kolkowiecz, particularly in The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, explored fully the complex relations between the Communist Party and the Soviet military. Robert Conquest, Thomas W. Wolfe, John Erickson, among others have attempted to describe the role of the military in the Soviet decision making process. In this paper, I have attempted to draw together these different points of focus, and at the same time to compare the Soviet military to other professional militaries.

FOOTNOTES

Introduction

[1]H. Gordon Skilling, "Groups in Soviet Politics: Some Hypotheses," in Interest Groups in the Soviet Union, eds. H. Gordon Skilling and Franklin Griffiths (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 19.

[2]Ibid.

[3]H. Gordon Skilling, "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," in Interest Groups in the Soviet Union, op. cit., p. 8.

[4]Skilling, "Groups in...," p. 19.

[5]Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 40-41.

[6]Roy Macridis, "Interest Groups in Comparative Analysis," Journal of Politics, 23 (February, 1961): 41-44.

[7]Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p. 75.

[8]Ibid., p. 74.

[9]Ibid., p. 77.

I. The Role of the Military in Marxist-Leninist Ideology

One of the most important factors in the evolution of Party-military relations in the Soviet Union is the role of the military as conceived in Marxist-Leninist ideology. Samuel P. Huntington in his book The Soldier and the State recognizes two main influences on the structure of military institutions. One is the "functional imperative," or the need for security from imminent outside threats.[1] This factor will merit further attention later in this thesis. The second influence is the "societal imperative," or the social forces, ideologies, and institutions of the country itself.[2] Clearly, the ideology of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union falls under this heading.

This chapter will attempt to examine Marxist-Leninist ideology in order to understand the attitude of Communist doctrine toward the military, and the type of military prescribed for the Communist state by these writers. It will later be shown that the development of Soviet military deviated from that called for by Marx and Lenin. This deviation resulted in the emergence of the career soldier as a social and political group. It is important to understand the role of the military in Marxist-Leninist ideology in order to understand the constraints placed on the military by the Communist Party.

Socialism has traditionally viewed a professional standing army with suspicion if not outright hostility. This is true

partly because of the class character of the European armies at the time of the formulation of and agitation for socialist programs. The officer corps of these 19th century European armies were drawn from the aristocratic class. As such, they tended to be conservative or even reactionary in philosophy, and they were usually opponents of socialist thought. Thus socialists developed a generally anti-military bent. They tended to view a professional military as a bulwark of the capitalist power which they sought to destroy.[3]

Marx himself was more concerned with presenting the broad theoretical model of his thought, and as such spent little time detailing the transition stage from the dictatorship of the proleteriat to the withering away of the state. Nevertheless, as suggested by Huntington, there are serious differences between the Marxist view of man and the view of man commonly held by a professional military. As Huntington states:

> ...For the Marxist, man is basically good and rational; he is corrupted by evil institutions. He is naturally at peace with his fellow men. This was his condition before the beginning of history. This will be his condition when the dialectical processes grind to a halt...Like the military man, the Marxist sees struggle throughout, but unlike him he sees only class struggle. While the military man recognizes the role of chance and human freedom in history, the Marxist holds that all significant events are determined by economic forces. The Marxist view of history is monistic, while the military view is pluralistic. The Marxist also differs from the military man in his faith that history will come to an end with the realization of a more or less utopian society.
>
> Both Marxism and the military ethic recognize the importance of power and groups in human affairs. The Marxist, however stresses the importance of economic power, whereas the military man holds with Machiavelli to the superiority of the sword. For the Marxist the basic

> group is the class--mankind is cut horizontally; for the military man, the basic group is the nation state--mankind is cut vertically...To the Marxist economic imperialism is the basis of interstate wars. The only wars which he can sanction are class wars, and the only military forces which he can approve are class instruments. He does not recognize universal military values and forms; the character of every military force is determined by the class interests for which it is fighting. He is favorably disposed towards a military force organized upon "proletarian" lines and opposing capitalist interests.[4]

Marx viewed professional armies as exploiting instruments of the ruling class, and thus they had no place in the communist society.[5]

Certain details of the structure of the military can thus be inferred from Marxist philosophy. Since the state is a classless society, the members of the military must be drawn from the people rather than from a specially trained professional group. Since all men are equals, a democratic style of leadership would seem to be called for, rather than the legal-rational or hierarchical style of leadership commonly found in professional militaries. And, when the state finally "withers away" presumably the military would also wither away as a useless vestige of the state's power.

While Marx was concerned primarily with socialism in theory, Lenin had to deal with the practical problems of building the socialist state. In his writings, Lenin dealt with the problem of what role the military would play in socialist society. An article by Lenin entitled "Army and Revolution" appeared in 1905. In this article, Lenin echoed the socialist view that the standing army was not apolitical, but rather was a tool of

the bourgeosie and capitalists in power.[6] He writes of the "reactionary character" of such standing armies.[7] In Contrast, he advocated a people's militia:

> Military science has demonstrated the complete feasibility of the popular militia, which can stand at the summit of military tasks in defensive and in offensive war. Let the hypocritical or sentimental bourgeosie dream about disarmament. While there is still oppression and exploitation on earth, we must strive not for disarmament, but for universal, popular armament. Only it can entirely assure freedom. Only it can completely overthrow reaction.[8]

In one of his Letters From Afar, written at the end of March, 1917, Lenin recognized the need for the existence of the state for a certain period of transition. He wanted to destroy the state machinery of Imperial Russia, replacing it with another "merging the policy, the army, and the bureaucracy with the universally armed people."[9] Lenin advocated that the proletariat organize and arm all the poorest and most exploited sections of the population so that "they themselves may take into their own hands all the organs of state power, that they themselves may constitute these organs."[10] He did not wish to delve too deeply into the organization of this "revolutionary army," reasoning that when "the workers, and all the people as a real mass, take up this task in a practical way they will work out and secure it a hundred times better than any theoretician can propose."[11] He did, however, state that the militia would "just as naturally and inevitably assume in in it the leadership of the masses of the poor, as they took the leading

position in all revolutionary struggles of the people in the years 1905-07 and in 1917."[12] The formation of such a militia would guarantee absolute order and "a comradely discipline practiced with enthusiasm."[13] In summation, Lenin states "the people must learn down to the last man to bear arms, and down to the last man to enter the militia which replaces the police and standing army."[14]

While Lenin recognized the need for some sort of military, he thought this need was only temporary. In his book State and Revolution, he writes that once man has returned to his natural state of observing the "fundamental rules" of social existence, there would be no functions left for the state to perform, and therefore, no need for a standing army.[15]

Clearly such calls for a "revolutionary army," i.e. one organized along ideological lines, had a great deal of support among Bolsheviks both before and after their takeover. One basic principle of such an army was a minimum of centralized control. A great deal of the responsibility for the conduct and organization of the military was to be shifted from the central command to the local units themselves. The army was to be organized as a territorial militia rather than as a standing professional cadre.[16] A resolution passed at the All Russian Party Conference of the Bolsheviks in April, 1917, called for the Red Guard to be at the disposal of elective workers' regional organizations of the large proletarian centers.[17]

A resolution at the same conference called for the Red

Guard to be self-governing.[18] This also was typical of the democratic organization of the "revolutionary army." There was to be no rigid discipline and no ranks or insignia.[19] Commanders were to be elected and were to be subject to recall,[20] and the open questioning of orders was to be permitted.[21]

Recruitment in these militias was to be strictly on a voluntary basis, with no military conscription.[22] Enlistment was to be open to both men and women. Members of these territorial militias were not to be detached from their homes and jobs.[23] Control of Party organizations and Party organs in the military itself would be in the hands of the local Party leaders.[24]

Yet another principle of the "revolutionary army" was the replacement of orthodox strategy with revolutionary military doctrine, drawing its inspiration from Marxist-Leninist ideology.[25] Chief among the supporters of this type of revolutionary military doctrine was Mikhail Frunze, a former Tsarist noncommissioned officer who was to rise through the ranks of the Red Army. He stressed the need for a "specifically Marxist, proletarian, revolutionary theory of military affairs."[26] In an article in July of 1921, Frunze put forth the essence of his "single military doctrine":

> The "single military doctrine" is a doctrine which, adopted in the army of a given state, determines the character of the structure of the armed forces of the country, the methods of military training of its forces and their leadership, on the basis of the views prevailing in the state on the character of the military tasks that lie before it and on the methods of resolving them--methods which derive from the class essence of the state and are defined by the level of development of the productive forces of the country.[27]

He stated further that the tactics and training of the Red Army must be oriented to mobile offensive movements since the working class will be compelled by the course of the historical revolutionary movement to take the offensive against capitalism.

Not all Bolsheviks agreed that the new Soviet Army should be organized along ideological lines. Leon Trotsky, a political opponent of Frunze, recognized the need for an effective professional army to deal with the threat of the German and Allied incursions into Russia, as well as with the threat of the White Army which controlled large regions of the Soviet Union. He argued against an ideological orientation for the Red Army in the Eleventh Party Congress:

> War is not a science; war is a practical art, a skill ...War is a profession for those who correctly learn military business...How can the maxims of the military profession be determined with the help of the Marxist method? That would be the same thing as to create a theory of architecture or a veterinary text-book with the help of Marxism.[29]

In this speech, Trotsky drew from a well-known article of Karl Marx, in which Marx stated "insurrection is an art, just as war is, like other forms of art, and is subject to definite rules."[30]

We have then fairly clearly identified the basic principles of the socialist "revolutionary army." These are a minimum of centralized control and a territorial organization; no rigid discipline, ranks or traditional military virtues, but the election of commanders and questioning of orders; voluntary recruitment in place of conscription; and revolutionary military strategy based on Marxist ideology in place of orthodox strategy.

As opposed to this, the traditional, professional military specialists favored a hierarchic structure of organization; strict discipline and adherence to the virtues of courage, blind obedience, loyalty to the uniform, and service to the country; centralized control; and traditional strategy.[31]

It remains to be demonstrated that the particular circumstances of the founding of the Soviet Union forced the Red Army to be organized on a more or less traditional basis. A compromise was reached between the dictates of ideology and those of the need for an effective fighting force in the Soviet Union. The need for security dictated the organization of a professional military along the lines of those found in Western countries. This resulted in the emergence, as we shall see, of professional military elites who, while tightly controlled by the Communist Party, were able to make their political power felt on issues which fell within their zone of interest.

I.

[1]Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 1967), p.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Edward Hallett Carr, A History of Soviet Russia, vol. 5: Socialism in One Country, 1924-1926 (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1960), p. 373.

[4]Huntington, pp. 92-93.

[5] Roman Kolkowiecz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1967), p. 22.

[6]Walter C. Clemens, "Lenin on Disarmament," Slavic Review 23, 3 (October, 1964): 505.

[7]Carr, p. 373.

[8]Clemens, p. 505.

[9]Dimitri Fedotoff White, The Growth of the Red Army (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 26.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Ibid., p. 27.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Carr, p. 373.

[15]Rodney Barfield, "Lenin's Utopianism: State and Revolution," Slavic Review 30, 1 (March, 1971): 47.

[16]Kolkowiecz, p. 39.

[17]Fedotoff White, p. 22.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Kolkowiecz, p. 39.

[20]Carr, p. 373.

[21]Kolkowiecz, p. 39.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Carr, p. 373.

[24]Kolkowiecz, p. 39.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Carr, p. 383.

[27]Ibid., p. 386.

[28]Ibid., p. 387.

[29]Ibid., p. 390.

[30]Ibid., p. 390, fn. 1.

[31]Kolkowiecz, p. 39.

II. The Early History of Party-Military Relations

Having looked at the ideological aspect of the founding of the Soviet military, this paper will now consider the factors surrounding the founding of the Soviet military which have had a lasting impact on the character of that institution. Roman Kolkowiecz in his book The Soviet Military and the Communist Party recognizes three such factors in the early history of the Soviet military. The first was the political and military threats present at the founding of the Soviet military. The second was Trotsky's improvisation under stress. And the last was Stalin's personal power designs and his skill in the art of statecraft.[1] This paper will attempt to examine each of these factors in detail.

The immediate situation facing the leaders of the Soviet polity in the days following November, 1917, was unfavorable for the continuance of the Communist regime. In the days before the signing of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the German Army was within striking distance of Petrograd.[2] In the Far East, Japanese troops were poised to take the Maritime Provinces of Russia.[3] At the same time there was the threat of intervention by the Allies in order to prevent the dissolution of the second front against Germany, and the loss of Russian supplies to the Germans.[4] These armies faced only token resistance from Red Guard units and disorganized members of the old Tsarist Army.[5] These units

were also needed to maintain order in the cities in the face of riotous mutinies on the part of some units of the Tsarist army who are sometimes described as being more inclined toward anarchy than toward Marxist revolution.[6]

The Red Guard were militia units of armed workmen, mainly from the Petrograd area. They were poorly trained and poorly equipped, and thus not really effective.[7] The Communists also had the loyalty of a few elements of the Tsarist Army at their disposal, mainly the Latvian Rifles Regiment, the Fourth Cavalry Division, and some armored car units.[8] It soon became apparent that while the Red Guard units were capable of maintaining order within the major cities of the Soviet Union, they were incapable of dealing with the threat of the White Army which sought to overthrow the Communist regime.[9] There was a need for a larger army with officers who could lead and who had formal military training. And so on January 28, 1918, Lenin appointed Leon Trotsky to organize the Red Army.[10]

Trotsky had a two stage plan for the development of the Red Army. Stage one consisted of organizing a centralized, professional army to deal with the threat of the White Army within the Soviet Union, as well as with the threat of intervention from outside Russia.[11] In the second stage Trotsky envisioned a gradual change to the more revolutionary army called for by Marxist ideology.[12] Trotsky's reasoning was more pragmatic than ideological in that he thought a militia would present less of a burden on the Soviet economy than a professional army.

The Bolsheviks appointed a Council of Defense by decree of the Central Executive Committee on November 30, 1918. Actual control of the army and navy, however, rested in a bureau of that council, the Revolutionary War Council, consisting of Trotsky, I. I. Valsetis, and S. E. Aralov. Valsetis, a former Colonel of the General Staff in the Tsar's army, was the supreme commander. His orders pertaining to strategic matters were not subject to question, although they had to be countersigned by one other member of the Council.[13]

The major points in Trotsky's organization of the Red Army were outlined in the decisions of the Eighth Party Congress in March of 1919. One point was that the Army was to have a definite class character. That is, soldiers were to be recruited only from the worker and peasant classes.[14] To quote from the Party programme of March, 1919:

> The Red Army, as the arm of the proletarian dictatorship, must of necessity have an openly class character, i.e. be recruited exclusively from the proletariat and semi-proletarian strata of the peasantry which stand close to it. Only in connection with the abolition of classes will such a class army be transformed into a socialist militia of the whole people.[15]

Another point of Trotsky's plan approved in the Eighth Party Congress was the use of former Tsarist officers as commanders in the Red Army.[16] These officers were euphemistically referred to as "military specialists," the term "officer" being in disfavor with the Soviet government. Between June 12, 1918 and August 20, 1920, 48,409 former Tsarist commissioned officers served in the Red Army. Between the same dates, 214,717 non-commissioned officers were drafted into the Red Army.[17] Trotsky

attempted to use these noncommissioned officers to create an officer corps in the Red Army. The appointment of former Tsarist officers to positions in the Red Army caused a furor in the Party among those who regarded these officers as essentially bourgeois.[18] Both Lenin and Trotsky saw this step as necessary for the survival of the Soviet Union, and both looked forward to the time when Red commanders, trained in Communist doctrine, could take over these positions.

In addition the Soviet military administration coöpted many of the bureaucrats from the central and local military administration of Tsarist Russia. Over 10,000 of these bureaucrats were recruited into the Soviet military bureaucracy, and this figure does not include those army officers in the Tsarist army who had been assigned bureau work and joined the Red Army.[19] The training and experience of this group played a role in the formation of the Red Army. They provided a degree of continuity between the organization of the Tsarist army and that of the Soviet army.

Another point in the Party programme called for the abolition of the elective principle in the choosing of officers. On April 23, 1918, before the All-Russian Central Executive Committee Trotsky stated, "The undoubted danger of electiveness is that tendencies of the so-called army syndicalism could penetrate into the army, i.e. that the army would regard itself as an autonomous body, which gives itself its laws."[20] A more practical consideration is cited in the Party programme:

> ....It may generally be asserted that the less seasoned the army units, the more fortuitous and transitional their composition, the less practical testing the young command staff have undergone, the less advisable it is to apply the principle of electing commanding officers, and, on the contrary, the growth in the unit's internal cohesion, the soldiers' development of a critical attitude toward himself and his commanding officers, the creation of sizable cadres of battle-trained officers at lower and higher levels who have manifested their qualities in the conditions of new war, create favorable conditions for the increasingly broad application of the principle of election of commanding staff.[21]

Yet another ideological prescription of the Bolsheviks was abandoned in March, 1918, that of the territorial organization of the army. It was determined that for the sake of efficiency the army should be highly centralized.[22] Trotsky characterized the civil war period as a struggle "for the creation of a centralized, disciplined army, supplied and administered from a single centre."[23] Another reason for forming a hierarchical structure is that it was adaptable to minority party control. In January, 1918, there were only 115,000 Party members in Russia.[24] It would have been nearly impossible for the Party to supervise a large army organized as a territorial militia.

Another point of the Party programme was that the military would be standing "only for the duration of the civil war."[25] Thereafter, it would be organized as a militia. Trotsky's reasoning for this was mainly pragmatic, not ideological. The military situation and the need to preserve and expand Soviet power throughout Russia called for a regular army because such an army was more efficient than a militia.[26] Stalin argued for such an army in the Party Congress saying that the militia

units would be undependable since "the nonworker elements who constitute the majority of our army will not fight voluntarily for socialism."[27] Trotsky argued before the same body that it would take months, even years to organize a real "peasant-worker militia."[28]

According to Trotsky, after the war when there was no internal or external threat to the Soviet state, the concern of the Soviet leaders would shift to economics. At this time a militia formation might better suit the Soviet military, since the militiamen could continue working on farms or in factories while receiving military training. As Trotsky stated before the Seventh All-Russian Congress of Soviets in December, 1919, "a militia has the fundamental advantage over a standing army, that it does not separate defense and labor, does not divide the working class from the army."[29] A militia system would not be as great a drain on the economy as a large standing army.

The principle of compulsory military service was introduced by decree of the Soviet of People's Commissars on June 29, 1918. All males from 18 to 40 were liable for military service.[30] By November 164,000 private soldiers, 110,000 former noncommissioned officers, and 23,000 officers and civil servants had been drafted into the Red Army.[31] The Eighth Party programme defends compulsory service by stating:

> ...Originally, we created an army on the basis of volunteer service. Moreover, at the same time we began introducing obligatory military training for workers and peasants who do not exploit the labour of others, we also started

> the conscription of several age groups of the labouring classes. These contradictions were not gratuitous blunders, but grew out of the situation and represented completely conditions bequeathed us by the imperialist war and bourgeois (February) revolution."[32]

One final point in the programme of the Eighth Party Congress which should be mentioned is the introduction of the commissar system in the Soviet military. Commissars were used to supervise the work of the commanding officers in each unit, as well as to direct the political work of the Communist Party in these units.[33] Problems of administration and supply were under the joint control of the commander and the commissar, and commissars were authorized to exercise discipline over the troops, including severe punishment.[34] The role of the commissar in military affairs and the principle of unity of command was to become an area of friction between the military and the Communist Party. This point will be developed further in a later chapter dealing with the interests of the Soviet military.

Following the Civil War, Trotsky oversaw the demobilization of the Red Army. During the era of the New Economic Policy it was necessary to return men to the fields and factories in order to reduce the load on the economy caused by the military.[35] However, such calls for the reorganization of the Red Army did not gain the full support of all Soviet communists. One group opposing Trotsky's plan was headed by I. Smilga. In December, 1920, he presented his thesis before a private meeting of military delegates to the Eighth All-Russian Congress of Soviets;

> The militia system, of which the basic characteristic is the territorial principle, is faced with an insuperable obstacle in the path of its introduction in Russia. Given the numerically weak proletariat in Russia, we would not be able to insure proletarian guidance in these units. Even greater objections to the introduction of the militia system arise from the viewpoint of strategy. With the weakness of our railroad system, we should not be able, in case of war, to concentrate forces on the threatened directions...Furthermore, the experiences of the Civil War has incontrovertibly shown the territorial formation were entirely unsuitable, and that the soldiers deserted. Therefore, the return to this organizational form would be a crude, unjustifiable error.[36]

Another group which opposed Trotsky was led by Frunze and included K. E. Voroshilov and S. I. Gusev.[37] This group constituted the advocates of the "single military doctrine" discussed earlier in this paper. While many supporters of this doctrine were uncommitted on the question of reorganization of the military,[38] Frunze spoke out against it, particularly after the peasant rebellions and the Kronstadt uprising in 1921. In 1922, he wrote:

> It is clear that under conditions of the weakening of the union between the workers' class and the peasantry, the militia system could become a weapon in the hands of the counter-revolution. This circumstance was fully realized by the Communist Party, and therefore, regardless of the liquidation at the end of 1920 of the external fronts, we did not do anything in that sphere as yet.[39]

Gradually a compromise emerged between these competing groups. The standing army was largely, but not completely, demobilized and was supplemented by militia units organized territorially. From March of 1921 to December of 1923 the size of the Red Army declined from 4,400,000 to 560,000.[40] This was clearly a low point in the history of the professional officer in the Soviet Union. In a paper published in 1922,

Frunze, himself an ex-officer, spoke of the "unheard of difficulties in material conditions of existence, with the external worry about the satisfaction of the elementary needs of one's unit, one's family and one's self."[41] Morale among officers was low and the percentage of graduates of military cadre school who became Communist Party members dropped from 70 per cent in 1918 to 42 per cent in 1923.[42] A committee appointed by the Central Committee to study the conditions in the Red Army reported that "at the present time, the Red Army has no combat value."[43]

Military officers in the Red Army expressed their disapproval of the arrangement openly. Tukhachevski spoke out against the militia system both in the Soviet press and at Party meetings. His criticism was based on his hopes to expand Communism by force of arms into other lands.[44] Other professional military officers opposed the militia because they saw little demand for their talents, education, and experience in an army of the militia type.[45]

In 1925 the job of completing the reorganization of the Red Army fell to Frunze on Trotsky's ouster from the Defense Ministry. Frunze planned several reforms designed to attract young Communists into the officer corps. In 1922 22.5 per cent of the officers were Party members; in 1926 the proportion had risen to 47 per cent.[46] And yet, the influence of the former Tsarist officers was still not broken. As late as 1926, only 7.3 per cent of the highest commanders in the Red Army were of proletarian origin, and only 31.7 per cent were of

peasant origin. Fully 61.5 per cent were of other than proletarian or peasant stock, and most of these had come from the ranks of the Tsar's officers.[47]

Frunze also sought to improve the efficiency of the army by improving the status of the officers. Material condtiions of the officers were improved. Pay was increased by as much as 30 per cent in the case of junior and field offiers.[48] Provisions were made for social insurance and pensions. Certain privileges were also granted officers such as a separate officers' mess.[49] Nevertheless, the material conditions in the Red Army lagged far behind those of other European armies. An army division commander's pay in January, 1926, was 150 rubles a month as compared to approximately 280 rubles a month in the German army and approximately 1,020 rubles in the British army.[50] Also, 70 per cent of the Red Army officers were poorly housed, and married officers often lived with their families in a single room.[51] All this despite the fact that in 1921 the Tenth Party Congress had resolved that since the army had become a "permanent profession" it was necessary to take measures for a real improvement in the material position of the officer corps especially of its lower ranks."[52]

Another reform instituted by Frunze was in the area of military discipline. The revolutionary egalitarianism of the Civil War was dropped in favor of strict military discipline. As Bukharin stated at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern in June, 1924:

> Our army is in a high degree similar to the quite ordinary bourgeois army. Once upon a time we thought that the structure of our army would look quite different; no forced discipline, only conscious discipline. But experience showed that the forms of conscious discipline in this literal sense are inapplicable, though naturally this consciousness plays a larger role with us than in other armies. Therefore we have various measures of compulsion in the army, and that is absolutely necessary: we even shoot deserters...This formal structure is like that of a bourgeois army.[53]

In November, 1924, Frunze criticized the attitude of some commissars and officers toward discipline:

> In many cases instead of a firm and categorical request to carry out an official duty we have an unprincipled "currying favour" with the rank and file Red Army men, a desire to display a special "democratic spirit."
> This "democratic spirit" is the crudest perversion of any and every rule of discipline in our Red Army. A command is a command. To persuade and exhort men to carry out orders is in itself a crude breach of discipline.[54]

Frunze also made the point that discipline is not "based on the class inferiority of the rank-and-file soldier," but rather "on the necessity for a correct division of labour, correct leadership and correct responsibility."[55]

Another area of concern to which Frunze turned his attention was that of political control over commanders. There was pressure within the ranks of the Red commanders to abolish the commissar system since these officers felt they had proved their loyalty to the state during the Civil War. These commanders suggested that the commissars' educational function could be handled by local Party committees.[56] However, the Thirteenth Party Congress in 1924 decided that, except in cases of outstanding merit, all commanders must have commissars assigned to them.[57] The tasks of the commissar during the time of the

NEP was changed. The commissar's duties became more concerned with troop morale, with party propaganda, and with political education.[58]

When Frunze succeeded Trotsky in January, 1925, as People's Commissar for War, he left no doubts as to which side he favored in the question of unity of command. A circular issued in the spring of 1925 entitled "One Man Command in the Red Army" declared that the tasks of the corps of commissars must be radically changed.[59] Operational and administrative functions were entirely in the hands of the commanders, though the commissar "retains the direction of political and party work in the unit and is responsible for its sociopolitical condition."[60] A few weeks after the circular was issued, Frunze commented that the issue of unity of command had been "settled in an entirely precise and definite way."[61] The one thing delaying its application was the need to retain and reallocate the commissars, who were too influential to be merely discarded.[62]

Opposition to this reform among Party members and among commissars was much stronger and more persistent than Frunze had expected. By the end of 1925 unity of command had been achieved in 73.3 per cent of corps commands, 44 per cent of divisional commands, and 33.4 per cent of regimental commands.[63] The death of Frunze in October of 1925 further postponed the completion of reforms in this area.

Following Frunze's death, Voroshilov was appointed to his position. An uneasy compromise was reached between the advocates

of unity of command and the commissars.[64] However, as the percentage of officers who were Party members rose, due both to the rise in the number of graduates of military school who were Communist Party members and to the growing number of senior officers admitted into the Party in recognition of their services, the need for commissars diminished.[65] Nevertheless, the Red Army had developed enough esprit de corps and professionalism to insure that demands for Party control through the use of the commissar system would reoccur.[66]

In the 1930's, Stalin's fears of "capitalist encirclement," and his mistrust of Germany in the West and Japan in the East, led to increased attention to military effectiveness. This concern was manifested in increased professionalization and modernization of the Soviet armed forces which took place during the first and second Five Year Plans from 1928 to 1938. The emphasis of these Five Year Plans can be clearly discerned in a phrase used in the Fifteenth Party Congress when it stated that "maximum attention must be given to a most rapid development of those aspects of the national economy in general, and industry in particular, which will carry the main burden in insuring the military and economic viability of the country in times of war."[67] The result of this industrialization for the Soviet military was increased mechanization and modernization of the armed forces.

Along with the increase in material support for the military there was a need for increased competency in military leadership and training. Stalin initiated several reforms intended to

enhance the military profession in order to improve morale and attract bright, young Communists to the military profession. In September, 1929, A. S. Bubnov was appointed People's Commissar for Education. He immediately reorganized the educational system to stress mathematics, physics, and chemistry, subjects which were of great importance in the technical military schools.[68] Bubnov also insured that the educational curriculum had a strong ideological base.[69]

In 1927 a massive military youth organization was created from several voluntary groups that had dealt with propaganda.[70] This group was named OSOAVIAKHIM which is an acronym for the Society for Promotion of Aviation and Chemical Defense. This Society afforded the young the opportunity to do premilitary training while in primary and secondary schools.[71] By 1932 it had an estimated 20 million members.[72] A variation of this organization exists today.

In 1928 the Revolutionary Military Council issued a statement whose purpose was to guarantee the job security of commanding personnel. This order, which was No. 225, was intended to create the opportunity for service careers for commanding personnel.[73] The order entitled commanders to a personal rank which they retained on leaving active duty.[74] Each rank, or "service category" as it was euphemistically called, was assigned a predetermined rate of pay.[75] All promotions from one category to another were to be solely on the basis of merit.[76] This order also raised the age limit of an officer, enabling him to

make the military a lifetime career.[77]

Many experts such as Kolkowiecz and Fedotoff White place great stress upon this order as "the dividing line in the development of the Soviet officer corps."[78] They feel this order represents the completion of the process of professionalization of the Soviet military since it recognized military officers as career soldiers. As White says, "With the introduction in 1928 of this statute...the process of crystallization of the officer corps of the Red Army had achieved a very substantial success."[79] Erich Wollenberg, who observed the Soviet Army during this period, says that in the early 1930's the international spirit and socialistic basis of discipline in the Red Army were dissolved. There were no longer low-key, friendly relationships between officers and men in the Red Army.[80]

Raymond Garthoff in his book Soviet Military Policy tells of the gains made by the officer corps under the leadership of Marshal Tukhachevsky in the years from 1931 to 1937. He writes: "The new officer class wanted a return to traditional and hierarchical personal ranks, insignia, and privileges, and the opportunity to give these advantages to their sons."[81] He goes on to describe this new officer class:

> The class of officers just emerging was given lessons in French, in polo, in dancing, and in the social graces. Many of the newly "cultured" Civil War heroes divorced their too-proletarian wives and married young women with more appropriate savoir-faire. It again became necessary, as before the Revolution, for junior officers to have their commanding officer's approval before they could marry.
>
> Count Ignatyev, the Imperial Army Attache in Paris before the Revolution, returned to the Soviet Union in the 1930's

> and became a consultant on precisely such matters of cultural form. Thus, in custom and deportment, as well as in military art and tactics, "specialists" from the old regime were found indispensable.[82]

Improvements were also in the socioeconomic conditions of the officers. Arthur W. Just in a book published in 1936 describes the living conditions of the Soviet officer as being similar to that of the middle class in the West, but in comparison to the average Soviet citizen, the officers were very well off.[83] Between 1934 and 1939 there was a significant increase in officers' pay, as the table below shows. Notice also that the differential in pay between the highest and lowest ranks increased

Rank	1934	1939	% Increase
Platoon Commander	260	625	240
Company Commander	285	750	263
Battalion Commander	335	850	254
Regimental Commander	400	1200	300
Division Commander	475	1600	337
Corps Commander	550	2000	364

TABLE I. COMPARISON OF PAY BETWEEN 1934 AND 1939[84]

The military also received advantages in the other material conditions of life. New apartments were constructed solely for the use of military officers and their families.[85] Special stores, theaters and clubs were designated for use only by military families. The officers were also given access to vacation and rest facilities denied to most other Soviet citizens.[86]

In September, 1935, new personal ranks were given to commanding officers. These ranks ranged from lieutenant to

Marshal of the Soviet Union.[87] Rank could only be rescinded by court order and not, as had been the case, by a mere administrative ruling.[88] These revisions in the system of rank further added to the status and career security of the officer. A tightening of military discipline and a return to military etiquette, such as the obligatory salute, further increased the stature and authority of the officer.[89]

While recognizing the strides made by the military in the area of professional autonomy, one must recognize that there were limits to the authority and responsibility the Party allowed the military to share. Faced with increasing army unity in demands for a relaxation of the policy of collectivization of agriculture in the interests of the morale of the soldier peasantry, the Party began to fear the rise of an "Army opposition."[90] Liddell Hart states that these demands were partially successful at the time of Japanese threats in the Far East.[91] However, the spread of the fear of "Bonapartism" caused conditions to occur which resulted in the Great Purge from 1937 to 1938. The Great Purge decimated the ranks of the professional officers. For example, 3 of 5 Marshalls, 57 of 85 corps commanders, all military district commanders, 13 of 15 army commanders, 110 of 195 divisional commanders, 220 of 406 brigade commanders, and between 15,000 and 30,000 out of 75,000 to 80,000 lower grade officers were eliminated.[92] While creating a feeling of fear and suspicion among the officers, Stalin also attempted to rebuild the system of Party control through the commissar system.[93]

The external threat of Germany and Japan and the inefficiency shown by the Soviet Army in the Russo-Finnish War of 1939-1940 forced Stalin to abandon his anti-military campaign. The Great Purge had caused the rapid promotion of the new class of officer who was too inexperienced to function effectively in the field. Nevertheless, these officers tended to be a more homogeneous group; one holding common values, beliefs, and loyalties.[95]

Once again Stalin attempted to enhance the status, prestige, and authority of the commanders. He added the ranks of "general" and "admiral" to the Soviet ranking system.[96] He laid down new training principles stressing military matters over political education.[97] A new disciplinary code was introduced with severe punishments for insubordination.[98] And, finally, the functions of the commissar were again reduced to education and political indoctrination.[100]

As Kolkowiecz notes, the events between 1937-1941 illustrate the cyclical nature of relations between the Party and the military. Threats from an "Army opposition" cause the Party to tighten controls on the military and reduce the professional autonomy given the officers. However, when external threats or internal dissension are to a high degree present, the Party is forced to give more freedom and prerogative to the military, and the military's position vis-á-vis the Party improves.[101]

This chapter has traced the organizational development of the Soviet military, and has shown a tendency to move away from

the type of organization called for by Marxist ideology and toward that of the professional, bourgeois military. A result of this organizational development was the rise of the professional officer. As can be seen in the history of the military under Trotsky and Stalin, the reasons for this development were mainly the practical considerations of both the internal and external situation of the Soviet Union between 1918 and 1941. During this time the importance of the military to the Party varied with the seriousness of the threats to the security of the Soviet state. Similarly, the power and influence of the military varied with its indispensability to the Party. Future chapters will explore the modern conditions which necessitate a strong military posture for the Soviet Union, and what these conditions mean in terms of the influence of the military on Soviet politics.

II.

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[6]Ibid., p. 45.

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[29]Quoted in Ibid.

[30]Fedotoff White, p. 42.

[31]Ibid.

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[34]Fedotoff White, p. 79.

[35]Kolkowiecz, p. 40.

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[38]Ibid.

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[40]Ibid., p. 188.

[41]Quoted in Ibid., p. 188.

[42]Ibid., p. 187.

[43]Quoted in Ibid., p. 188.

[44]Ibid., p. 198.

[45]Ibid.

[46]Carr, p. 415.

[47]Fedotoff White, p. 205.

[48]Carr, p. 403.

[49]Ibid., p. 404, note 3.

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[61]Fedotoff White, p. 412.

[62]Ibid.

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[70]Ibid., p. 52.

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[72]Kolkowiecz, p. 52, note 55.

[73]Fedotoff White, p. 300.

[74]Kolkowiecz, p. 52.

[75]Fedotoff White, p. 302.

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[87]Kolkowiecz, p. 54.

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[93]Kolkowiecz, p. 56.

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[95]Garthoff, p. 36.

[96]Kolkowiecz, p. 62.

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[98]Amnon, p. 260.

[99]Erickson, p. 555.

[100]Amnon, p. 260.

[101]Kolkowiecz, p. 79.

III. The Military As A Professional Group

This section of the thesis will attempt to analyze the characteristics of the Soviet military and to point out how these traits differ from those desired by the Communist Party. The Party would like to see a thoroughly integrated and politicized military. It seeks to deny the military a separate identity. It attempts to do this through political controls within the military exercised by the Main Political Administration at the ministry level, the Political Departments at the military district level, and the Political Sections which are at the divisional level.[1] To quote from the basic handbook given to party political workers in the Soviet military:

> The political organs strive to...guard daily the uninterrupted influence of the party on all activities and affairs of the Armed Forces....They must always approach problems in such a manner that the interests of communism are given priority....The party demands that all aspects of military life be systematically penetrated.... The political organs must extend their influence into all facets of the activities of the forces...they must react to even the smallest deviations from Marxist-Leninism, to any opposition to the policies and directions of the party.[2]

The traits these organizations seek to develop and reinforce in the military are egalitarianism, subordination to ideology, proletarian internationalism, involvement in society, and anonymity.[3] That the military is able to resist total integration by the Party is an indication of the power and influence of the influence of the military in Soviet society.

Samuel P. Huntington distinguishes three specific characteristics which the military officer shares with other professions: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.[4] This chapter will attempt to show how the Soviet military meets these three criteria, and how these characteristics differ from those desired by the Communist Party.

Expertise implies a specialized skill or knowledge in a particular field. Such a skill or knowledge is generally acquired through some sort of professional training or education. This professional training is generally received in an educational institution run by or affiliated with the profession itself.[5] The Soviet military seems to meet these criteria of expertise. Knowledge of military affairs is not common among laymen, but must be acquired through a rigorous period of training. Several military academies have been established in the Soviet Union to train officers. These were first opened during the Civil War, when the Communists relied on the instructors of the Military schools and Ensign schools of the Tsar's army to instruct the future Red commanders.[6] In the 1940's exclusive cadet schools were opened in the Soviet Union where the sons of military officers could be sent at eight or nine in order to be raised "in an atmosphere of military caste."[7]

Evidence indicates that cadets received more than just military training in these schools. As early as 1920 letters from Red officers show a strong loyalty to their schools and fellow cadets. They had developed a sense of esprit de corps

and an elitist view as regards the common uneducated soldier.[8]

In 1924 D.A. Petrovskii writes:

> Professionalism is the scourge which lashed morally officers at all times and in all countries...Our Red commanders would graduate from Command Courses, would leave for the front...should they show knowledge and enthusiasm for their work they were sent to the highest military school...They become members of the new officer's group, and no agitation whatsoever, nor beautiful speeches about the necessity of contact with the masses would be of any avail.[9]

The importance of this military expertise is greatly increased in today's army. As Chief of the General Staff Zakharov states in Krasnava zvezda (Red Star, the Defense Ministry daily) of February 4, 1965:

> With the appearance of nuclear missiles, cybernetics, electronics, and computer technology, the subjective approach to military problems, harebrained scheming and superficiality can be very expensive and wreak irreparable harm. Only a deep, scientific grounding of decisions and actions, only a thorough consideration of actual reality and of the laws of warfare will insure the successful solution of the problems of strengthening the country's defense capacity and the armed forces fighting power.[10]

This new technology of warfare has caused the rise of the military technocrat. These military engineers have acquired technical expertise through years of training in their field. Figures indicate that by January, 1959 the proportion of technical officers in the Soviet military was three times greater than the close of World War II.[11] In early 1965 that proportion had risen three and one half times higher, and in certain forces, such as rocket, antiaircraft and naval units, 65 to 70% of the officers were technicians or engineers.[12]

While figures indicate that 93% of the officer corps were

Communist Party or Komsomol members in 1968,[13] there was a distinct tendency for technical officers to avoid political work and indoctrination. General of the Army I. Pliev recognized this trend when he spoke of the technical officer's propensity for "crawling into their technical shell."[14] Marshal Biruizov also spoke of this subject:

> It is not a secret that among our military engineers, especially among the young, one finds a desire to be appointed to positions where their duties would be concentrated on servicing military equipment. Having obtained such a position they feel themselves "free" of any involvement in the education of personnel.[15]

The Party rejects the idea that the "military engineer is a pure specialist who has little left, after attending to complex systems of contemporary weapons, to carry out other duties."[16]

Thus the Party faces a dilemma with regard to the technical officer. On the one hand, he is necessary for defense in an era when the threat of a war of a highly technological nature, i.e. nuclear war, is constantly present. At the same time these officers challenge strict Party control on the grounds that it detracts from their professional duties. The position of the technical officer is further enhanced by the fact that he possesses knowledge and skills that would command lucrative civilian jobs in the event that he is dismissed from the armed forces.[17]

A second characteristic which the Soviet military holds in common with other professions is the notion of responsibility. The professional is performing a service which is essential to society.[18] The professional's motive is responsibility to society,

not monetary reward.[19] This responsibility motive calls for a code of ethics as well as certain values and ideals which are commonly held.[20]

The primary responsibility of the military is the defense and security of the country. In meeting this responsibility, the military has adopted several ideals or values. These values can perhaps best be summed up in three words: duty, honor, country. The term "duty" means self-effacing devotion to one's responsibility. This value is implied in responsibility since the professional is motivated by the desire to serve society rather than by a purely selfish desire to better himself materially. Honor incorporates the values of heroism, self-sacrifice, discipline, tradition, and esprit de corps. As Huntington states, "The officer submerges his personal interests and desires to what is necessary for the good of the service."[21] "Country" incorporates the values of patriotism and nationalism. The professional officer is deeply loyal to his country. He is also apolitical in that his primary loyalties are to his country and the military, not to any particular government or ruling elite.

These values can clearly be seen in the writings of the Soviet military establishment. General Makeyev wrote in Izvestia of February 12, 1963: "The concept of military honor has existed since time immemorial, it is as old as armies,... bravery, selfless dedication, and military skill were revered."[22] He continues:

> The people say: The soldier is at war even in peacetime. But the soldier serves his appointed term and then goes into the reserves, while the officer--who is also a soldier--is at war all his life. He lives through the heat and frost of the training exercises in the fields, the deserts, the mountains and the forests. He goes on frequent long sea voyages. He bears so much adversity and deprivation, so many trials! And the officer endures it all, overcomes it all, and never loses his cheerful spirit. He holds dear his honor of an officer and citizen.[23]

It is interesting to note that during the Second World War, when the Soviet polity was in danger of being conquered, Soviet leaders relied on patriotism rather than Marxist ideology to rally the military and the populace. This trend was particularly visible at the crucial battle around Stalingrad in 1942. Stalin made a number of changes in the political education of the soldiers designed to appeal to the patriotism of the defenders of this city.[24] Along with material and status rewards, there were created new orders for valor and achievement named for distinguished Tsarist military leaders.[25] In addition the new cadet schools created for the sons of the military were named for Suvorov and Nakhimov who were imperial military heroes.[26] General Makeyev acknowledges the Russian military tradition in saying that "Soviet military officers are the successors to and the continuers of the glory of Russian arms--the glory of Poltava, Gangut, Borodino, and Sevastopol--and the traditions of the Surorov Military School."[27]

One can also see that the values of the military tend to produce a positive self-image. To quote from General Makeyev again:

> The overwhelming majority (of officers) are people of a rich internal life, high culture and varied interests...
>
> Soviet officers are proud of their calling. They are proud but not conceited. They have inherited all that is best from the progressive Russian officers, who raised on high the banner of Russian glory.[28]

The last characteristic of a profession that Huntington identifies is that of corporateness. This refers to a feeling of unity among the members of the profession and a collective consciousness of themselves as being separate from the rest of society.[29] The professional group determines its own standards of competence and responsibility.[30]

In the Soviet military corporateness is found almost to the point of institutional closure. Officers share common educational experiences, a common circle of acquaintances, and a language common to their profession.[31] Soviet career officers tend to be drawn to one another. They almost always exclude political officers from their association, and counter-intelligence officers are avoided.[32] As one Soviet officer said, "In an institution where each man is a brother to his fellow man even an unknown soldier is best friend to each of us."[33]

There is a distinct tendency for the sons and daughters of military officers to marry the offspring of other military officers. For instance Marshal Zhukov's daughters are married to the son of Marshal Vasilevsky, himself an officer, and to the nephew of Marshal Voroshilov.[34] This is one example of a trend toward imbreeding in the Soviet military by some noted writers.

There is also a tendency for the military elite "to conduct themselves snobbishly."[35] It seems the higher the rank of the officer, the more successful he is in insulating himself against political education. Marshal Malinovsky observed: "It so happens that real, demanding control over political self-education reaches, at best, up to the regimental command, but higher on its decreases and in final analysis comes to nothing."[36] Major General D. Reshetov, acting chief of propaganda and agitation in the Main Political Office of the armed forces, wrote that in the Leningrad military district certain officers managed to completely avoid attendance at political study groups. He states further that among the officers and admirals of the staff and headquarters of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet not a single person attended the evening schools of Marxism-Leninism.[37]

The attitude of the officers to political education seems to be one of lack of interest. Men in the audience sleep, talk, or read books.[38] One officer who was acting as a Party secretary stated that Party and Komsomol meetings were "quite like sour apples--they set your teeth on edge."[34]

The principal reason for lack of interest in political indoctrination is not its boring nature, but rather the fact that excessive Party control, supervision, or indoctrination detract from the performance of the military's professional duties. Colonel General V. Tolubko, the First Deputy Commander of the Soviet Strategic Missile Forces, wrote that certain political duties overburden officers to the detriment of their

professional duties and further professional training. He states: "Officers sometimes complain that they never have the opportunity to prepare adequately for their duties. In these units where such difficulties occur, it is necessary in the coming year to unburden the officer of excessive loads and do away with the unnecessary wastes of time."[40]

These three characteristics of the Soviet military, its technical expertise, its sense of responsibility, and its corporateness, tend to describe the Soviet military as basically elitist. The Soviet officer views himself as a cut above the rank-and-file soldier, as well as above the average citizen. This elitism can be seen in the military's preference for a hierarchical structure of organization, the demands for status rewards and military caste, and their demands for professional autonomy and their belief that their training and skill uniquely qualify them to make the decisions on matters regarding the defense of the Soviet Union.

The professional officer prefers a hierarchical organization in which the levels of authority are clearly distinguished, and which is highly stable. The reasons for this attraction to a hierarchical structure are many. Such an organization is highly efficient, that is, it is closely integrated, responds to the commands of a few men at the top, and therefore, can be rapidly mobilized for service over large areas of land.[41] Such an organization matches the traditional training and values of these officers. They are trained to command, to

obey orders from superiors without question, and to demand unquestioning obedience from those under them.[42] A hierarchy separates the officer corps at its top from the rank-and-file soldier as well as from the rest of society.[43] This style of organization thus reinforces the basic values of the professional military.

The system of status and caste found in the Soviet military described by Raymon Garthoff:

> The Soviet officer today is the only military representative of a modern world power to sport epaulettes and velvet lapels, leather boots, and a dress dirk at his side. Marshals (several grades), generals, field grade officers, and junior officers are carefully separated, and each has separate messes and recreational facilities. A field grade officer and a company grade officer are not social equals. Personal orderlies are assigned to field grade, as well as to general grade officers.[44]

Along the same lines, the military is very sensitive to their image as presented in the Soviet arts and literature. Major General Makeyev in the article previously cited complained: "Unfortunately, the service of the officer in peacetime is still not reflected as clearly as it should be in the press and in literature and art."[45] This point will be more fully developed in the chapter dealing with the group interests of the Soviet military.

The demands for professional autonomy and a role in the decision making process as it concerns military affairs can be seen in the press organs of the Soviet military. Since these press organs are controlled by "political" generals, generals who are not career soldiers but Party politicians, the demands

are often subtle and offset by praise for the Party, Marx and Lenin. General Shtemenko, discussing the relationship between Party and the military in the decision making process, writes:

> Communist Party leadership of the armed forces is, as the Party Program points out, the keystone of military development. At the same time, of course, due respect is paid to the conclusions of Soviet military science and the recommendations of our supreme military command.[46]

Similarly, Marchal M. V. Zakharov, while recognizing the overall supremacy of the Party, states: "Persons who, in trying to give weight to their superficial and premature judgments, resort to quoting so-called 'iron logic of military thinking' and the 'strategic foresight' of someone who may not have had a direct milieu."[47] Clearly the Soviet military leaders view themselves as the chief repository of knowledge of military affairs. They warn that failure to utilize that knowledge is detrimental to Soviet security. This issue of military autonomy will be discussed further in the next chapter.

In summary, this chapter suggests that the Soviet military exists as a professional group separate from the mainstream of Soviet life. The Polish sociologist J. J. Wiatr writes:

> The proper functioning of modern armies--including socialist--necessitates the existence of people who dedicate themselves to the military profession, who acquire necessary qualifications, and to whom military service becomes a full-time profession. Such a group is distinct from other professional social groups in society, it has specific attitudes and unique points of view. The extent of its internal cohesiveness depends on the many factors pertaining among others to its history and social make-up.
>
> Even preliminary results of current research support the hypothesis that in the socialist army military professionals constitute a separate social group with certain characteristics of internal solidarity.[48]

These characteristics of a socialist military are in contradiction to traits which the Communist Party would like to see in the military. Instead of egalitarianism one finds elitism. The military rejects reliance on ideology in place of military science. The military promotes nationalism and patriotism. It remains separate from society, and calls for status rewards in recognition of its service. The existence of these traits in the face of Party opposition indicates the military constitutes a unique social force in the Soviet Union.

III.

[1]Roman Kolkowiecz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 84.

[2]Roman Kolkowiecz, "The Military" in Interest Groups in Soviet Politics, eds. H. Grodon Skilling and Franklin Griffiths (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 139-140.

[3]Kolkowiecz, The Soviet..., p. 21.

[4]Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 8.

[5]Ibid., p. 9.

[6]Dimitri Fedotoff White, The Growth of the Red Army (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 57.

[7]Raymond Garthoff, Soviet Military Power (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 37.

[8]Fedotoff White, p. 60.

[9]Ibid., p. 64.

[10]M. V. Zakharov, "Imperative Demands of the Times" Krasnaya zvezda (February 4, 1965), in Current Digest of the Soviet Press XVII, 6 (March 3, 1965), p. 13.

[11]Albert Parry, The New Class Divided: Science and Technology Versus Communism (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1966), p. 130.

[12]Ibid.

[13]E. Crowley, A. Lebed, H. E. Schultz, eds., Party and Government Officials of the Soviet Union 1917-1967 (Metuschen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1969), p. 177.

[14]Kolkowiecz, The Soviet..., p. 313.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Ibid., p. 63-64.

[18]Huntington, p. 10.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Ibid., pp. 63-64.

[22]N. Makeyev, "The Honor of a Soviet Officer," Izvestia (February 12, 1963) in Current Digest of the Soviet Press 15 (March 6, 1963): 36.

[23]Ibid., p. 36-37.

[24]Kolkowiecz, The Soviet Military..., p. 67.

[25]Garthoff, p. 37.

[26]Ibid.

[27]Makeyev, p. 37.

[28]Ibid.

[29]Huntington, p. 10.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Kolkowiecz, "The Military," p. 137.

[32]Garthoff, p. 37.

[33]Kolkowiecz, The Soviet..., p. 310, note 5.

[34]Garthoff, p. 37.

[35]Parry, p. 131.

[36]Ibid.

[37]Ibid.

[38]Ibid., p. 133.

[39]Ibid.

[40]Kolkowiecz, The Soviet Military..., p. 344.

[41]Ibid., p. 21.

[42]Ibid.

[43]Ibid.

[44]Garthoff, p. 37.

[45]Makeyev, p. 37.

[46]S. Shtemenko, "The Queen Gives Up Her Crown," Nedalya (January 31, 1965) in Current Digest of the Soviet Press 17 (March 17, 1965): 13.

[47]Zakharov, p. 14.

[48]Kolkowiecz, The Soviet..., p. 328.

IV. The Scope Of Interests Of The Military

The preceding chapters have attempted to depict the Soviet military as a professional group with values and attitudes that differ from those of the Communist Party and Soviet society in general. In order to show that this professional group qualifies as an interest group, this chapter will attempt to prove that the members of the Soviet military "are linked by particular bonds of concern or advantage."[1] It is these common "concerns" which the interest group articulates to the decision makers in order to maximize its interests.[2] This chapter will attempt to enumerate the interests which the military holds in common. The next chapter will deal with the means of articulation of these interests.

Roman Kolkowiecz distinguishes between two kinds of interest held commonly in the Soviet military.[3] One type of interest he terms ideological. It refers to an interest in the betterment of the image and status of the Soviet military, as well as to an interest in the propagation of the values and beliefs which characterize the military.[4] It should be stressed that this type of interest in no way refers to ideology in the sense of Marxist-Leninist ideology. The second type of interest is termed functional. These interests relate to the capability of the military to defend the Soviet state, and the Communist Party, against aggression.[5]

In attempting to enumerate these interests, this paper will rely on quotations from speeches, interviews, and articles of military leaders, as well as the analysis of experts on Soivet politics. There is a heavy reliance on articles published in Krasnaya zvezda (Red Star), which is a publication of the Ministry of Defense. While articles written by Soviet military leaders are often couched in terms of obeisance to the Party and Marxism-Leninism, the careful reader is able to discern a pattern of interest claims commonly held in the Soviet military.

The ideological interests of the Soviet military present themselves in concern over the image of the military which is depicted in art, literature, and news media. Such concern can be clearly seen in a speech before the plenary session of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union delivered by General A. A. Yepishev in June, 1964:

> The remarkable and heroic achievements of the Soviet people and of their army and navy and the fervor of the armed struggle against the enemies of the homeland have found a brilliant and worthy reflection in our literature and art. At the same time, in recent years certain erroneous tendencies have appeared in the creative work of individual writers, artists and film workers who have turned to the theme of Soviet man's military exploits. The fact that in the portrayal of the events of the Great Patriotic War a tendency to depart from fervor, from the very heroism of the exploit, has been noted recently in some works of literature and art cannot but cause anxiety. When reading certain literary works or looking at those films in which the heroes dash about in fear of death, one involuntarily senses a striving on the part of the authors to belittle the courage and heroism of Soviet people and to single out primarily their human weaknesses.
>
> There are also cases where individual authors of literary works who are unfamiliar with the contemporary life of the army and navy depict it in a distorted form and intentionally or unintentionally belittle the enormous significance that military labor has for the cause of building communism and for our homeland's security.

> The military-patriotic education of the population is a question of state importance, and great attention should be focused on it. The military-patriotic theme should be given greater importance in literature, the theater, films, television, radio, and the press...[6]

This concern with the image of the military as presented to the Soviet people is echoed by an article in Krasnaya zvezda of 1964 written by Marshal Malinovsky:

> In recent times, mistaken tendencies in representing the last war have appeared. Motifs of pacifism and the abstract rejection of war have made themselves felt in certain works of literature and painting, and in the movies.[7]

Clearly the military wishes the Soviet people to hold a positive image of the duties and accomplishments of the military.

This concern with the image of the military has been heightened by recent trends toward anti-militarism within the youth of the Soviet union. This trend toward pacifism can be seen in a letter from students in a military academy to Marshal Budenny complaining of comrades who derided the military values of "service to public interests, personal self-sacrifice, genuine heroism, and the lofty exaltation of the forces of the spirit."[8] In this letter, printed in Krasnaya zvezda, these students complained:

> There cannot be any beauty, they affirmed, where people are preparing to kill other people. And, furthermore, the very harshness and severity of military service, the need for constant subordination, the limitation of freedom, and the strict regime make any beauty impossible. We objected and said that these ideas betray pacifism, that speaking of the beauty in fulfilling military duty while defending the homeland does not at all mean to preach militarism.[9]

Such sentiments as those expressed in the first sentences of the

above quotation threaten the morale and discipline of the entire Soviet armed forces. Furthermore, they adversely effect the status which the military holds in the minds and hearts of Soviet citizens. The military feels the strength of Soviet arms should be a source of pride to all Soviet citizens, and that the Soviet soldier should be looked upon as a hero.

For similar reasons the Soviet military is concerned about the place given it in Soviet history by the Communist Party. The Party regards the Soviet historian as a propagandist; objectivity and detachment are not encouraged. The main debate between the Party and the military on this matter concerns the history of World War II. The military resents the fact that the Party and the political generals claim credit for the victory over Nazi Germany, while giving the military only token praise.[10] The military, through the publication of memoirs and articles on the history of World War II, tends to present a different picture of the war than does the Party. The military blames Stalin, and by extension the Party, for the Soviet defeats at the beginning of the war.[11] They blame the purges of 1937, Stalin's rigid strategic doctrine, and his refusal to allow preparation for possible attack for these initial defeats.[12] The military claims that in 1941-1942 it opposed a superior enemy and succeeded in repulsing him despite being inadequately supplied.[13] Reflecting these feelings the military seeks a rewritten history of World War II in which it is given due credit.

The military's ideological interests lie in the growth of military and patriotic values among Soviet citizens, particularly the young. The military organizes public relations projects to improve the image of the military among Soviet citizens.[14] This image is propagated through training of the young in military-patriotic values. This attitude can be seen in an editorial entitled "Prepare Young People to Defend the Homeland" which appeared in Krasnaya zvezda, a daily publication of the Ministry of Defense. This editorial urged full military cooperation in the pre-military training of Soviet students and young people. It states:

> Officer's Houses, unit clubs and the military press have been called upon to make an appreciable contribution to the further development of mass defense work. Military magazines and military district and fleet newspapers must systematically use their pages to shed light on questions connected with mass defense work and the heroic and patriotic training of young people. Wider propagandizing of the activity of DOSAAF (All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy of the U.S.S.R.) and its best organizations is necessary.[15]

The military hopes that such military-patriotic training will result in a better appreciation of the contributions of the military to Soviet society.

The fundamental interests of the Soviet military center around more concrete political demands. These interests relate to the efficient functioning of the Soviet military in defending the homeland from aggression. One of these interests concerns the maintenance of high levels of investment in heavy industry which is the backbone of defense industry.[16] This interest in economic planning also includes greater support for research

institutions.[17] The military supports plans to disperse these industrial facilities in order to minimize the effects of nuclear warfare.[18] The military advocates more emphasis on the stockpiling of large reserves of defense related materials by Soviet economic planners.[19] These demands are intended to insure an adequate defense production and to insure the survival of such defense industries in time of nuclear war.

These points are the main theme of an article written by General of the Army V. D. Ivanov, General Major A. Ovsyannikov, and Colonel M. I. Galkin which appeared in Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil (Communist of the Armed Forces) in June, 1966. In this article the authors state:

> In contemporary war the role of economics is changing in its essence. The timely creation of reserves of nuclear weapons is acquiring exceptional significance by the use of which the military-political goals of war might now be achieved in the beginning period. The significance of reserves of other material means, collected in peacetime, has grown becoming the object of armed attack because of the availability of strategic rockets carrying thermonuclear charges to the opposing sides. However, it is not excluded that war might assume a prolonged nature also. Then no less significant than the timely creation of reserves will be the vitality of the most important branches of the economy and the ability to restore those branches during war.[20]

The article concludes that electric power, machine building, chemical industry, oil, gas, coal, transportation, and agriculture must be developed to enhance the defense potential of the Soviet Union.[21] It should be stressed that the military has concerned itself with the economy only in so far as it relates to the defense capability of the Soviet Union.

Another concern of the Soviet military is that sufficient

attention be paid to civil defense. As Marshal V. I. Chuikov, the Chief of Civil Defense in the Soviet Union, writes:

> The outcome of nuclear rocket war will now be decided not only on the battlefield, it will be in significant measure be predetermined by strikes on the rear areas and on important political and economic centers. Victory in such a war will depend to a large degree on the ability of the state to survive. Therefore, civil defense, the basic significance of which is to assist the government to survive in war, assumes in truth a state and national character.[22]

The importance of civil defense to the possible outcome of a future war, and therefore to the functional success of the Soviet military, places it in the domain of military interests.

Opposing the military interests in investment in heavy industry, technological research, and civil defense are consumer-oriented interests which seek a more diversified economy. Leonid Brezhnev said in an article in November, 1964: "The national economy must develop harmoniously, it must serve the interests of achieving...the constant rise in the people's living standards. The development of heavy industry must be subordinated to the requirements of constant technical re-equipment of the whole economy."[23] To which Marshal Zakharov in February of 1965 replied that the Soviet Union needs "a powerful heavy industry--the foundation of foundations (sic) of the whole socialist economy and the firm defense capabilities of our country."[24]

A second functional aim, closely related to that of large investment in heavy industry, is that of the appropriation of a large defense budget. These demands are usually in the form of requests for the development of new weapons systems to match or exceed those of the "imperialist" countries. Such claims of

inferiority in strategic weaponry can gain leverage for the military over Party leaders in this area. To quote from the memoirs of Nikita Krushchev:

> I know from experience that the leaders of the armed forces can be very persistent in claiming their share when it comes time to allocate funds...They're always ready to throw in your face the slogan "If you try to economize on the country's defense today, you'll pay in blood when war breaks out tomorrow.
>
> ...Some people from our military department come and say, "Comrade Krushchev, look at this! The Americans are developing such and such a system. We could develop the same system, but it would cost such and such! I tell him there's no money; it's all been allotted already. So they say, "If we don't get the money we need and if there's a war, then the enemy will have superiority over us!" So we discuss it some more, and I end up giving the money they ask for.[25]

The military seeks these appropriations to enable it to properly carry out its primary responsibility to defend the Soviet Union.

Some Soviet military writers suggest that the arms race should be viewed as a never ending dialectical process. Colonel S. I. Krupnov writes in Krasnaya zvezda of January 7, 1966:

> The problem is not limited to the search for the most effective way of using modern weapons. The appearance of new means of struggle always brings into being corresponding countermeans which in the end also lead to changes of the methods of military operations.[26]

A. Milovidov, writing in 1971 in Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, states:

> The supply of technology cannot stand still, any more than the development of the military art can. This is especially true now when there is stormy renewal and perfection in all spheres of human activity, including military affairs.[27]

One must be cautious in evaluating these claims of the dialectical nature of the arms race. The military often presents its interest

claims couched in terms of Communist ideology. This is not to say that these writers are not sincere in their belief in the necessity of continued arms development. However, one should note that the dialectic as used in Marx was not continuous, but ended with the attainment of the classless society. Perhaps the issue is better stated by Marshal A. A. Grechko who said: "The main thing here is not to lag behind the rapid development of scientific and technical thought and promptly to introduce its achievements in military practice."[28] Through the increased application of technology the military hopes to insure the superiority of Russian arms.

Another functional interest of the Soviet military is the acknowledgment of the military as an instrument of foreign policy and the recognition of the danger of war as it exists in the present international situation. Military leaders seek to depict foreign powers as ruthless, ambitious, and unpredictable.[29] The military also stresses the necessity for the preparation for a limited, localized war instigated by imperialist forces.[30] In this way they seek to justify large defense appropriations and the high sociopolitical status of the military.[31]

Even as Pravda attacked U.S. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger for his advocacy of a strong defense posture in June of 1975, Marshal Grechko, then Soviet Defense Minister, called for increasing the readiness of the Soviet armed forces. He said:

> Imperialism is hard pressed, but the forces of reaction and aggression have by no means laid down their arms... Our party and its Central Committee take full account of the actual alignment of forces in the world arena and

> soberly evaluate the potential of the reactionary forces of imperialism and their incessant attempts to turn back the wheels of history and return to the "cold war" era.
>
> While building up its military potential in Europe, imperialism is simultaneously seeking to keep up tension in Southeast Asia, the Near East and the Eastern Mediterranean.
>
> The imperialists assign a special place in their plans to the creation of a united anti-Soviet front with the participation of China...
>
> Therefore, our party, in pursuing its active peace loving foreign policy, constantly combines it with increased vigilance and shows tireless concern for strengthening the country's defense capability and for increasing the combat might of the Armed Forces, outfitting them with up-to-date military material and weapons and improving their combat readiness.[32]

The military constantly reminds the Party that successful foreign policy is best made from a position of strength. Grechko further illustrated this point in a book entitled The High Calling by means of a parable:

> To restrain aggressors, to halt their greedy intentions, is possible only through force. The tiger never attacks the elephant, even when he is thoroughly starved. He does not attack him because the elephant is stronger than the tiger...[33]

It is perhaps relevant to note that discussion of the threat posed by imperialist encirclement becomes more frequent before Party Congresses when the Five Year Plans are being debated.[34] Nevertheless, it is typical of all military organizations to have a pessimistic outlook on the international situation and to make a worst case analysis of enemy capabilities and intentions.[35] Such an analysis entails overestimating enemy capability and assuming the worst about enemy intentions in order to insure one's own safety.[36] Such tendencies could be seen before the 24th Party Congress which was to approve the

Party policy on detente. General A. Yepishev at that time argued for caution with regard to imperialism which "is capable 'of every barbarity, atrocity and crime,' to use Lenin's words."[37] Clearly the Soviet military leadership harbor serious doubts about the policy of detente.

The last functional interest to be discussed here is the military's demands to manage its own internal affairs and to formulate strategic policy. Military professionals have managed the Ministry of Defense at the top levels since 1955, and at all other levels since the Civil War.[38] Military men make most of the routine decisions concerning military manpower, weaponry and strategy.[39] Nevertheless, the military has had a system of polical control forced upon them. Also, control over strategic policy has been taken from the hands of the military and is retained by the Party, which allows the military a subordinate role in its development. The military fears the Party might commit Soviet forces to situations they are not prepared to deal with.[40] For this reason the military wishes to play a larger role in strategic policy formulation.

Among the leaders of the Soviet military, men such as Malinovsky, Zakharov, and Krylov have been known to oppose the Party on questions which dealt with military autonomy. In 1961, then General of the Army Krylov wrote an article in Krasnaya zvezda which criticized undue Party interference with the officer's function and authority. While recognizing the superiority of the Party, Krylov wrote:

> Edinonachalie (authority to command) presupposes full independence of the commander within the rights granted to him. That is why I would especially like to single out the exceptional importance of (allowing) the officer to develop the ability and habit of independently undertaking appropriate decisions concerning various problems which may face him in his daily duties as well as in combat. (Italics in original)
>
> There is no doubt that the growing role of mobility in military operations sharply elevates the importance of firm and uninterrupted control of the forces. That is why it is necessary to have at the head of a subunit, regiment, and soedinenie (a unit larger than a regiment, usually a division) a commander who is able to use his full authority boldly, decisively, without looking back over his shoulder...
>
> (Many officers) waste a lot of time while making a decision or when giving orders because they feel it is their duty to consult ahead of time literally all their assistants (the Russian word here is zamestiteli, an obvious reference to political officers, whose full title is zamestiteli po politicheskoi--Kolkowiecz) and helpers, and to listen to their opinions and suggestions.[41]

It should be noted that this rather bold attack on political controls did not adversely affect Krylov's military career.[42] He has since been promoted to Marshal of the Soviet Union and is a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. One should also note that Krylov did not attack political controls as such, but only as they hinder the commander in performing his functions.

The military also seeks a more scientific approach to military policy formulation. The military wants the Party to rely on their expertise in the formulation of military policy. In this way they hope to avoid military policy blunders, such as the Cuban missile crisis. The military argues that in the age of nuclear weapons, one strategic miscalculation could have

disastrous results for the Soviet Union. Military leaders tend to be conservative. They oppose any moves of accommodation or withdrawal which would leave the Soviet forces in an unfavorable military position. At the same time, they oppose "adventurism" which could lead to unnecessary war.[43] V. Ivanov writes in Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil in 1969 about the importance of military advice in strategic policy making:

> The more the political leadership relies on the conclusions reached by military science, the more effective its decisions will be, the more the unity of political and military leadership will be attained. Lenin often stressed the importance of specialized knowledge and the role of specialists in leading any cause, including the defense of the country.[44]

Articles written by Marshal Zakharov and General Shtemeko, cited in Chapter III, provide further examples of the military's demands for a greater role in the decision making process on military strategy.

Having discussed the particular interests of the Soviet military this paper will now turn its attention to the means of articulation of these interests.

IV.

[1]Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p. 75.

[2]Ibid., p. 74.

[3]Roman Kolkowiecz, "The Military" in Interest Groups in the Soviet Union, H. Grodon Skilling and Franklin Griffiths, eds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 139.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Ibid.

[6]"Speech by A. A. Yepishev, Director of the Chief Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy," Pravda (June 21, 1964) in Current Digest of the Soviet Press 15 (July 24, 1963): 17.

[7]Roman Kolkowiecz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 319.

[8]Petrov, Klimenko, et al., "Settle Our Argument," Krasnaya zvezda (January, 1963), in Current Digest of the Soviet Press 15 (February 13, 1963): 33.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Kolkowiecz, The Soviet Military..., p. 177.

[11]Ibid.

[12]Ibid., p. 178.

[13]Ibid., p. 177.

[14]Timothy J. Colton, "Civil-Military Relations in Soviet Politics," Current History 67 (October, 1974): 182.

[15]"Prepare Young People to Defend the Homeland," editorial in Krasnaya zvezda February 11, 1971) in Current Digest of the Soviet Press 23 (March 9, 1971): 34.

[16]Kolowiecz, "The Military," p. 141.

[17]Colton, p. 181.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Ibid.

[20]V. D. Ivanov, A. Ovsyannikov, M. I. Galkin, "The XXIII Congress of the CPSU on the Military Threat and the Problems of Strengthening the Defense Potential of the Country," in The Nuclear Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs, eds. W. R. Kintner and H. F. Scott (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968), pp. 332-333.

[21]Ibid.

[22]I. Chuikov, "The Tasks Are Important, Crucial," in The Nuclear..., op. cit., p. 188.

[23]Kolkowiecz, "The Military," p. 142.

[24]Ibid.

[25]Nikita Krushchev, Krushchev Remembers, ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970), pp. 519-520.

[26]S. I. Krupnov, "According to the Laws of Dialectics," in The Nuclear..., op. cit., p. 239.

[27]Colton, p. 181.

[28]A. A. Grechko, "The Homeland's Invincible Shield," Pravda (February 23, 1971) in Current Digest of the Soviet Press 23 (March 23, 1971): 5.

[29]Kolkowiecz, "The Military," p. 143.

[30]Colton, p. 181.

[31]"Speech by Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko," Krasnaya zvezda (May 30, 1975) in Current Digest of the Soviet Press 20 (June 25, 1975): 9.

[33]Kolkowiecz, The Soviet Military..., p. 266.

[34]Kolkowiecz, "The Military," p. 144.

[35]Colton, p. 163.

[36]Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 127 and 129.

[37]A. Yepishev, "On the Army and Navy's Right Flank," Pravda (March 25, 1971) in Current Digest of the Soviet Press 23 (April 20, 1971): 37.

[38]Colton, p. 161. This trend has ended with the recent elevation of a civilian, D. F. Ustinov, to the post of Defense Minister. While this may appear to be a reduction in the status of the military, it is too soon to draw any conclusions.

[39]Ibid.

[40]Kolkowiecz, "The Military," p. 144.

[41]Kolkowiecz, The Soviet Military..., pp. 159-160.

[42]Ibid., p. 262.

[43]Raymond Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1958), p. 37.

[44]Quoted in Colton, p. 181.

V. The Means Of Articulation Of Military Interests

This chapter will explore the means of articulation of military interests in the Soviet Union. This paper makes the assumption that decisions concerning general policy and guidelines for more specific policy decisions are made in the upper levels of the Communist Party and not in the Soviet government.[1] This chapter will attempt to analyze the amount of contact between the higher levels of the Party and the military and to show how the military through these contacts is able to make inputs in the decision making process.

The military will be defined in terms of the elite of the military establishment. This elite can be defined as the officers who serve as deputy minister, first deputy minister, and minister in the Defense Ministry, the commanders of national service divisions, field commanders of strategic districts, and general inspectors. The organizational structure of the military can be seen in rough outline in Table I.

The Party headed by two main organs: The Central Committee and the Politburo or Presidium. The Central Committee is the broader body and includes representatives of almost all functional interests in the Soviet system.[2] It meets only two or three times a year for a few days at a time. The Central Committee is not important as a supervisory body but rather as a source of information and communication with interest groups in Soviet society.[3]



TABLE I. ORGANIZATIONAL OUTLINE OF DEFENSE MINISTRY[4]

The military has traditionally been well represented in the Central Committee; since the 1930's about one tenth of the total membership has been made up of military men. (See Table II) In 1952 the percentage of military men who were full members stood at 4.8, in 1956 it was 4.5.[5] In the years after Stalin's death

the percentage of military officers who held full member status in the Central Committee rose to 8.0 by 1961.[7] In 1966 the percentage stood at 7.2 and in 1971 it was 7.9.[8] This was the highest representation afforded any ministry.[9]

Party Congress	Total Central Committee Membership	Total Military Membership	Percentage
Sixteenth(1930	137	5	3.5
Seventeenth(1934)	139	8	6.0
Eighteenth(1939)	139	15	10.7
Nineteenth(1952)	236	26	11.0
Twentieth(1956)	255	20	7.8
Twenty-second(1961)	330	31	9.5
Twenty-third(1966)	360	32	8.9

TABLE II. TOTAL MILITARY REPRESENTATION IN CENTRAL COMMITTEE 1930-1966[6]

Table III depicts the degree to which the officeholders in the Ministry of Defense also serve in the Central Committee of the Communist Party. The year 1965 was chosen due to the availability of data on the members of the Central Committee and the Ministry of Defense. As can be seen, the members of the military hierarchy down to the level of Deputy Minister, and even beyond, are members of the Central Committee of the Party. With the exception of A. A. Yepishev, who heads the Main Political Administration, each of these men is a career soldier.[10]

When membership in the Central Committee is analyzed on the basis of rank irrespective of position in the Defense ministry, certain relationships are apparent. Of the 18 Marshals of the Soviet Union alive in 1966, 14 were on the Central Committee as members of

TABLE III. MILITARY ELITE AND MEMBERSHIP ON CENTRAL COMMITTEE IN 1965[11]

Military Elite	Status on Central Committee	
	Full Member	Candidate
Minister of Defense		
R. Malinovsky	R. Malinovsky	
First Deputy Ministers		
A. Grechko, Com. in Chief Warsaw Pact Forces	A. Grechko	
V. Chuikov, Com. in Chief Land Forces	V. Chuikov	
M. Zakharov, Chief of General Staff	M. Zakharov	
Head of Main Pol. Adm.		
A. Yepishev	A. Yepishev	
Deputy Ministers		
N. Krylov, Com. in Chief Strategic Missile F.	N. Krylov	
I. Bagramian, Head of Army Service and Supply	I. Bagramian	
K. Moskalenko, Chief Insp.	K. Moskalenko	
V. Sudets, Com. in Chief, Antiaircraft Defense		V. Sudets
K. Vershinin, Com. in C., Air Force	K. Vershinin	
G. Gorshkov, Com. in Chief, Navy	G. Gorshkov	
V. Penkovsky, Head of Combat Training		V. Penkovsky
Inspectors General		
I. Konev	I. Konev	
K. Rokossovsky		K. Rokossovsky
V. Sokolovsky	V. Sokolovsky	
S. Timoshenko		S. Timoshenko
A. Yeremenko		A. Yeremenko
Com. Strategic Districts		
Y. Savitsky, Com., Antiair. Air Forces		Y. Savitsky
P. Koshevoy, C. in C., Soviet Army, Germany		P. Koshevoy
A. Stuchenko, Com. Transcaucasian Mil. District		A. Stuchenko

Com. Strategic Dis.	Full Member	Candidate
I. Pliev, Com., North Caucasian Mil. Dis.		I. Pliev
M. Kazakov, Leningrad Mil. Dis.		M. Kazakov
I. Batitsky, Moscow A. A. Defense Dis.		I. Batitsky
I. Yakubovsky, Kiev Mil. Dis.	I. Yakubovsky	
Others		
S. Rudenko, First Dep. C. in C. and Chief of Staff, Air Force		S. Rudenko
F. Golikov, Marshal of S.U.	F. Golikov	
S. Budenny, Marshal of S.U. (retired)		S. Budenny
A. Getman, Col. General		A. Getman
A. Chabanenko, Admiral		A. Chabanenko

candidate members, while the other four had retired from active duty.[12] Likewise, one of the two Admirals of the Fleet, one of five Chief Marshals, and three of seventeen Marshals were either full members or candidate members of the Central Committee.[13] In 1967 seven percent of the Communist Party membership was in the Soviet military (including enlisted and non-commissioned officers),[14] while 8.9 per cent of the Central Committee of the Communist Party elected at the Twenty-third Party Congress in 1966 were military professionals.[15]

This military representation on the Central Committee serves two main purposes. It provides a reservoir of expertise for decision makers in the Politburo to draw upon when deciding questions of defense or foreign policy. In recent years when the technical side of military questions has grown more and

more complicated, this expertise has grown in importance.[16] A second function this representation serves is that of a status reward for the military from the Party in return for playing by the "rules" of democratic centralism.[17] These rules allow for military input before the decision of the Party is made, but demand strict obedience after that time.[18]

These final decisions on matters of important policy are not reached in the Central Committee, but rather in the Politburo of the Communist Party. Military representation in this body does not have a long tradition. Only two professional military men have ever attained full membership in the Politburo: G. K. Zhukov in 1957 and A. A. Grechko from 1973 to 1976. Grechko was one of twenty-one members of the Politburo, thereby giving the military a 4.8 per cent share of the membership.[19] This percentage is approximately proportional to the percentage of Party members who are military professionals.

Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to underestimate the influence of the military on the Politburo. Decision making in the Politburo comes only after the various options and proposals have been reviewed and discussed by the appropriate "Section" of the Central Committee Secretariat.[20] These "Sections" are composed of full members of the Politburo who specialize in that particular policy area, candidate members of the Politburo, and regular advisors from the various institutions with a stake in the decision.[21] One of these "Sections" deals with military and intelligence matters. In 1962 it was composed of Malinovsky

(Defense), Ustinov (Defense Industry), Semichastny (State Security), and Gromyko (Foreign Affairs), in addition to its regular Politburo members.[22] These "Sections" consider advice from the operational levels of the Party and government, and make recommendations to the entire Politburo. The Politburo then reaches a decision by consensus.[23] As previously stated, once a decision is made, no opposition is tolerated by the Party.

This method of decision making allows the Politburo to make use of the expertise found in the Central Committee as well as that of the lower levels of the Party and government ministries. The military is thus able to make inputs in decisions concerning leadership, strategic planning, and budgetary allocations.[24] As Defense Minister Malinovsky said in Krasnaya zvezda of April 17, 1964: "Party leaders study (Defense Problems) in detail...and consult with leading military cadres. Only after this is a concrete decision taken."[25] However, once a decision is made all debate or military opposition to that policy ceases, unless some sort of power struggle is taking place in the Party hierarchy. Later in this paper we shall see how such a power struggle presents to the military an opportunity for the further exercise of political power.

A second means of influencing the decision making process is the association of military and party leaders in coalitions of varying composition and duration.[26] Some of these coalitions involve groups with common interests, such as that between the administrators of the defense industry and the military. Others

are of a more personalized type, such as that between a Party leader and those military men who serve in his district and are under his control.

The military and the defense industry have common interests in the growth of heavy industry and in increased budgetary allocations for defense. The Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1971 contained sixteen defense industry representatives.[27] One of these administrators, D. F. Ustinov, was then a candidate member of the Politburo.[28] He has recently become Minister of Defense and has assumed the rank of General of the Army. The mutual support of the military and defense industry can be seen in support both gave to the Kozlov-Suslov faction which opposed the Krushchev policy of lessening of tension with the U.S.[29] The military and heavy industry both have an interest in the maintenance of international tension, and in the creation of at least the illusion of external danger so as to insure a high priority for budgetary allocations to defense industry.[30]

The personal association of military and Party leaders is best exemplified in the rise of the so-called "Stalingrad" group in the Defense Ministry under Krushchev. This Stalingrad group was composed of officers who had served under Krushchev on the Stalingrad front and in the Ukraine during World War II.[31] As Krushchev rose to power in the Party, these military officers assumed higher positions both in the Party and in the Defense Ministry. The officers' reasons for associating themselves with Krushchev dealt mainly with the protection he

afforded from Stavka (Supreme Headquarters Staff) in Moscow.[32] Field commanders resented Moscow interfering with the day-to-day operation of their units.[33] In return Krushchev acquired a group of loyal military decision makers who would offer advice with his own personal preferences in mind, who would faithfully execute that advice, and who would control opposition to him within the military.[34] As this paper shall later reveal, attempted reforms by Krushchev of economic priorities, strategic doctrine, and the structure of the officer corps resulted in the disintegration of the Stalingrad group as a collective unit. Officers were forced to choose between professional and institutional interests and personal loyalty.[35]

The rise of the Stalingrad group can be traced in Table IV. The rapid rise of this group slighted other military leaders who had served on other fronts during World War II.[36] Paralleling the rise of Krushchev and the Stalingrad group was a trend toward increasing the emphasis on the decisive nature of the Stalingrad battle, while playing down the role of Stalin and Marshal Zhukov at Moscow and Berlin during World War II.[37] Conversely, after the fall of Krushchev in 1964, the role of the Stalingrad generals in World War II came under attack in the published memoirs of several former generals.[38] The role of Stalin in World War II has received more favorable treatment, as has the role of Marshal Zhukov, who was on hand to hear Brezhnev's speech on the twentieth anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany.[39]

TABLE IV. RISE OF STALINGRAD GROUP IN CENTRAL COMMITTEE[42]

Party Congress	XIXth (1952)	XXth (1956)	XXIIInd (1961)	
Full Members	Konev	Konev Malinovsky Moskalenko	Konev Malinovsky Moskalenko Grechko Chuikov Biruizov	Krylov Yakubovsky Golikov Vershinin Bagramian Zakharov
Candidate Members	Bagramian Grechko Chuikov	Bragramian Grechko Chuikov Biriuzov Yeremenko Gorshkov	Yeremenko Sudets Savitsky Pliev Penkovsky	Kazakov Getman Varentov Batitsky

Since Krushchev's departure there have been no wholesale changes in the status of the Stalingrad group. One possible explanation is that Brezhnev served in the Ukraine with Krushchev in 1943,[40] and therefore has had personal contact with the members of this group. A second explanation is that considerable opposition had developed in the military to Krushchev after the attempted reforms of 1961 and thus these military leaders had no opposition to Brezhnev's takeover.[41] Krushchev's plan of heavy investment in the chemical industry for the production of fertilizer and the high priority he gave consumer goods production were inimical to the interests of the military,

who favored investment in heavy industry and defense.[43] In any case, the ranks of the Stalingrad group are slowly being thinned by death, and a new generation of military leaders is emerging, with different personal and political contacts.

Having discussed the normal pattern of political participation of the military in the Soviet Union, mention should be made of the one instance in which the military can exceed its narrow advisory capacity. There is no regularized procedure in the Soviet Union for the succession of one Party leader on the death of another, or for the replacement of a living Party leader by another.[44] The unstable nature of this transfer of power results in the need for power seekers to form coalitions of the leading institutions of Soviet society; i.e., the Party apparatus, the secret police, the military, and the state bureaucrats.[45] As a source of great potential coercive power, the support of the military in such unstable circumstances is very important. While the military as yet has not aspired to a formal political role, it has served to balance one faction against another in hopes of promoting its professional interests.[46]

This chapter and the last have attempted to define the interests held by the Soviet military, and the means at their disposal to articulate these interests. The next chapter will attempt to provide examples of the articulation of these interests drawn from recent Soviet history.

V.

[1]John S. Reshetar, The Soviet Polity (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1974), p. 110.

[2]Michael T. Gehlen, "Group Theory and the Study of Soviet Politics" "Interest Groups and Communist Politics," in The Soviet Political Process, ed. Sidney Ploss (Waltham, Mass.: Ginn and Co., 1971), p. 44.

[3]Ibid., pp. 44-45.

[4]Raymond Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1958), p. 45.

[5]Robert H. Donaldson, "The 1971 Soviet Central Committee: An Assessment of the New Elite," World Politics 24 (April, 1972): 398.

[6]Roman Kolkowiecz, "The Military" in Interest Groups in the Soviet Union, eds. H. Grodon Skilling and Franklin Griffiths (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), p. 168; also, Roman Kolkowiecz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 331.

[7]Donaldson, p. 398.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Timothy J. Colton, "Civil-Military Relations in Soviet Politics," Current History 67 (October, 1974): 162.

[10]Gehlen, p. 45.

[11]A. I. Lebed, H. E. Schultz, R. Taylor, eds., Who's Who in the U.S.S.R. (New York: The Scarecrow Press, 1966), pp. 1016-1017 and 1024-1027. I am indebted to M. T. Gehlen, op. cit., pp. 46-47 for the form of this table.

[12]A. I. Lebed, et al., pp. 1027 and 1016-1017.

[13]Ibid.

[14]T. H. Rigby, Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 348.

[15]Kolkowiecz, "The Military," p. 168.

[16]Gehlen, p. 48.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Leon Goure, Foy Kohler, Mose Harvey, eds., The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy (Coral Gables, Fla.: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1974), p. xiv.

[19]Colton, p. 162.

[20]Goure, et al., p. xiii.

[21]Gehlen, p. 49.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Goure, et al., p. xiii.

[24]Gehlen, p. 49.

[25]Colton, p. 161.

[26]Ibid., p. 162.

[27]Ibid.

[28]Ibid.

[29]Vernon Aspaturian, Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971), p. 567.

[30]Ibid., p. 568.

[31]Thomas W. Wolfe, "The Military" in Prospects for Soviet Society, ed. Allen Kossof (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 132.

[32]Kolkowiecz, The Soviet Military..., p. 255.

[33]Ibid.

[34]Ibid., p. 220.

[35]Ibid., p. 223.

[36]Wolfe, p. 132.

[37]Kolkowiecz, The Soviet Military..., p. 255.

[38]Wolfe, p. 132.

[39]Ibid., p. 523, note 60.

[40]A. I. Lebed, et al., p. 142.

[41]Kolkowiecz, The Soviet Military..., p. 293.

[42]Ibid., p. 355.

[43]Ibid., p. 292.

[44]Reshetar, p. 369.

[45]Kolkowiecz, The Soviet Military..., p. 31.

[46]Wolfe, p. 121.

VI. The Recent History Of Party-Military Relations

This chapter will attempt to present examples of the use of military influence in recent Soviet politics. These examples show not only the extent of the influence of the Soviet military, but also the limitations of that influence. When these limitations are exceeded, the Party is willing to sacrifice the prestige, morale, and efficiency of the military in order to maintain the dominance of the Party in Soviet politics.

The first example of the military's influence in Soviet politics which this paper will examine occurred following the death of Stalin in 1953. The disunity of the Party leadership at this time weakened Party control over the military.[1] A struggle for power began between Beria, Malenkov, and Krushchev. Beria was unacceptable to the military, who had a hatred of the former secret police chief which dated from World War II.[2] Evidence indicates that the military actively participated in the Malenkov-Krushchev conspiracy resulting in the arrest of Beria. Garthoff reports that Marshal Khuvkov and Marshal Konev personally arrested Beria.[3] Army units outside Moscow were alerted and entered the city on the day of Beria's arrest. Marshals Konev and Moskalenko were on the tribunal that tried Beria and sentenced him to death.[4] Following Beria's execution, Marshal Zhukov replaced Beria on the Central Committee.[5]

Following the execution of Beria the struggle for power

centered between Krushchev and Malenkov, with Krushchev's power being based in the Central Committee and the Secretariat of the Party, and Malenkov's in the government bureaucracy and the Party Presidium (Politburo).[6] The military eventually supported Krushchev due to disenchantment with Malenkov's foreign and economic policy. Malenkov saw the international situation as being characterized by an easing of tension.[7] He stressed the need for economic policies geared toward consumer goods production rather than heavy industry.[8] Budget allocations for defense dropped from 113.8 billion rubles in 1952 to 100.3 billion rubles in 1954.[9] Krushchev, meanwhile, openly supported the military's views on the need for development of heavy industry and a strong defense posture.[10]

The showdown between Krushchev and Malenkov occurred during the January plenum of the Central Committee in 1955. The issue which precipitated the showdown was the budget of 1955. During the winter of 1954-55 many military leaders, including Bulganin, Konev, Zhukov, Sokolovsky, and Kurasov made speeches or wrote articles warning of the danger of the international situation and calling for a higher priority for defense spending.[11] In the January plenum, Malenkov's economic policies were repudiated and he was voted out of the Premiership.[12] The military unanimously supported the Krushchev faction in the voting of this plenum. The rewards for the military were the position of Defense Minister for Marshal Zhukov (the first time it was held by a career soldier), the position of Premier for Marshal

Bulganin (a political general), and the promotion of eleven generals to Marshal of the Soviet Union.[13] Also, political controls were lessened on commanding officers.[14]

These two events in the rise of Krushchev illustrate how the military is able to play one faction against another during times of instability in the Party leadership. The success of this balancing act resulted in a threefold reward for the military. A party leader hated and distrusted by the military, (Beria) was eliminated. Military expenditures had a high priority in making out the new budget. The military gained greater institutional autonomy through the rise of Zhukov to the post of Defense Minister and the relaxing of controls on commanding officers.

Military support was later essential to Krushchev's survival of the attempt of the "Anti-Party group"(Malenkov, Molotov, Kagonovich, and supporters) to relieve him of the position of First Secretary of the Party in 1957. By this time Zhukov had been appointed a candidate member of the Presidium. At a Presidium meeting on June 18, 1957, the "anti-Party group" attempted to vote out Krushchev, subject to the approval of the Central Committee plenum on June 22. The "Anti-Party" faction had a small majority in the Presidium, but in the face of strong opposition by Zhukov, including the threat of force, the coup failed.[15] Zhukov was thereupon elected to full membership in the Presidium.[16]

The events surrounding the downfall of Zhukov present an

example of the Party's reaction to a military leader who exceeds the limits of influence proscribed by the Party. Once Krushchev had rid himself of rivals in the Party, he realized that the military had assumed the role of "king-maker" in Soviet politics and that this role threatened the supremacy of the Party over the military, as well as the security of his own rule. Zhukov at the June plenum sought major revisions of the Party-military relationship. He wanted the Main Political Administration to report to him as Defense Minister, and not to the Central Committee.[17] He sought military representation in the leadership of the secret police.[18] He also sought a formal denunciation of the Stalinist purges of military leaders in the 1930's.[19] Zhukov also forced Krushchev to modify his plan for the decentralization of the economic ministries. The defense industries were further centralized and placed under the Ministry of Defense Industry.[20] Zhukov, a very popular hero, tended to play up his role in World War II and seemed to seek out public attention and fanfare much as a politician would.[21] Such behavior not only violated the Party's rules of behavior for the military, but also the standards of professionalism and apolitical behavior of the Soviet military as well. This behavior alienated many professional military men from Zhukov, most notably the Stalingrad group.[22]

In October, 1957, Zhukov left on a visit to Yugoslavia. On October 26, 1957 he was replaced by Malinovsky as Defense Minister.[23] Not until he returned from Yugoslavia was he expelled

from the Presidium and the Central Committee of the Party. This was a reversal of the order in which Malenkov and the "Anti-Party group" were disposed of a reversal which suggests Krushchev did not want Zhukov to have access to the armed forces while his political demise was being carried out.[24]

The case of Marshal Zhukov suggests that the Party will not tolerate a military officer who crosses the thin line between being an advisor and being a political force in his own right. The removal of Zhukov eliminated the threat of a military coup in the Soviet polity and diminished the influence of the military in the decision-making organs of the Party. Some writers suggest, however, that the experience of the period from 1953 to October 1957 served to sharpen, not to diminish, the interest of the military in the political process.[25]

After a "cooling-off" period Krushchev further strengthened the role of the Party versus the military. The role of the MPA and Komsomol in the military were enhanced.[26] Much of the military commanders authority was transferred to party organs within the units. Only those commanders who were Party members could head and direct these organs.[27] The military responded by means of bureaucratic inertia. Discipline, morale, and efficiency declined at a time when the government was attempting to modernize weaponry and re-equip the armed forces.[28] Middle-level commanders began to attack the reforms in military magazines such a Krasnaya zyezda. The combat readiness of the military was so diminished that Krushchev was forced to compromise, acting

on the advice of the Stalingrad group.[29] Political work was curtailed, especially when it interferred with military training and combat efficiency.[30] A collective approach to administration was agreed upon, and the authority of the political organs transferred to party committees, which were more satisfactory to the military.[31] The military also agreed to the removal of the remaining Zhukov supporters in the Defense Ministry.[32] This compromise illustrates that the Party cannot afford to maximize its control over the military due to the loss of efficiency and the lowered morale that results. It also illustrates the usefulness to a Party leader of personal supporters in the military who can mediate Party-military disputes.

In January, 1960 Krushchev renewed his efforts to reform the military. He proposed a reduction in the size of Soviet forces, including a cut of 250,000 (sic) men in the officer corps.[33] He proposed a new strategic doctrine based on the reliance on strategic nuclear weapons to deter imperialist aggression.[34] At first the support of the Stalingrad group and the MPA was enough to silence critics in the military, but by December of 1960 signs of military "obstructionism" were apparent. An attack on the new strategic doctrine of Krushchev by General Kraselnekov was printed in Krasnaya zvezda of November 18, 1960.[35] At the Twenty-second Party Congress in 1961 Defense Minister Malinovsky stated: "We also believe that under modern conditions any future war would be waged...by mass armies of many millions."[36]

The Stalingrad group began to split over the issue of strategic doctrine in 1961. Generals Krylov and Zakharov wrote articles criticizing the Party's interference with the duties of an officer.[37] Both men called for a greater military role in the formulation of strategic doctrine.[38]

Krushchev responded to these attacks in 1962 by replacing MPA Chief Marshal Golikov, a career solider, with General Yepishev, who had had a long association with Krushchev and had been in the security police.[39] The MPA tightened controls on the military, with particular attention to the Defense Ministry, tne Ground Forces, and the military academies.[40] The result of this was a violent battle of words between the officers and the party control organs in the respective press organs of each. The Stalingrad group became split between the supporters of Krushchev (Marshals Biriuzov, Moskalenko, Chuikov, Yeremenko, Sudets among others) and those whose loyalties remained in the military (Marshals Malinovsky, Zakharov, Grechko, Krylov, Voronov, and Rotmistrov).[41] Military disapproval of the Party's policy decisions was heightened by Krushchev's failure in Cuba in 1962.[42] Epishev and the Krushchev supporters of the Stalingrad group appeared to have won a victory in 1963 with the replacement of Zakharov with Biriusov as Chief of the General Staff.

Kurshchev, however, through attempted reforms of the Party bureaucracy in industry and agriculture, alientated much of his support in the government bureaucracy and the Party.[43] As

Krushchev left for his dacha in Gagra on October 2, 1964, Pravda carried an article stating:

> In composing the long range plan for the next period, Comrade N. J. Krushchev emphasized, it is necessary to be guided by the fact that the chief task of the plan is a further rise in the living standard of the people. Whereas during the period of the first five-year plans and in the postwar years we laid chief stress on the development of heavy industry as the basis for an upsurge of the economy of the entire country and on strengthening its defense capability, now, when we have a mighty industry, when the defense of the country is at the proper level, the Party is setting the task of more rapid development of the branches that produce consumer goods.[44]

Such an economic policy, is clearly contrary to the interests of the military in regards to the need for continued development of heavy industry and continued high levels of spending for defense.

On his return to Moscow, Krushchev found a strong opposition had developed in the Presidium and in the Central Committee composed of diverse institutions who were opposed to his social and economic reforms.[45] He was forced to resign both his Party and government position, and he disappeared from the political scene. While the evidence does not indicate that the military was in the forefront of this movement, the military definitely did not oppose it. Unlike the events of 1957, no military leader was willing to speak on the behalf of Krushchev.

Following Krushchev's demise, both the military and the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership observed a "cooling-off" period.[46] Certain concessions were granted to the military by the Party leadership. On the death of Chief of Staff Biriuzov, the once

deposed Zakharov returned to his former position.[47] Soon articles appeared, such as the Zakharov and Shtemenko articles cited in Chapter III, which called for greater professionalism in military policy making. The state budget for 1966, contrary to Krushchev's ideas cited above, showed a five percent increase in defense expenditures.[48] High school and university books were written to emphasize military and patriotic values, and schoolchildren were taken to visit the sites of the glorious battles of the Great Patriotic War (World War II).[49] All these moves were in some way designed to appease the military, and to earn their loyalty to the present regime.

In recent years relations have been good between the Party and the military in the Soviet Union. The military has tended to accept Party organs in the military, and to support the Party line in return for the Party's underwriting of defense expenditures and improving the status of the military profession.[50] The military tends to support major power agreements on limiting arms to the extent that it has reduced the prospect of major clashes which these leaders consider risky.[51] As Osbourne states, "Unless the Brezhnev administration uses the climate of negotiations as justification for reducing military appropriations, Grechko and his colleagues are likely to acquiesce in this policy."[52] Nevertheless, the military leadership is wary of the intentions of the capitalist world in regards to detente, as the speech by Grechko cited in Chapter IV demonstrates. The promotion of Grechko to full Politburo membership in 1973 seems

to indicate a recognition of the importance of military preparedness at a time when the Soviet leaders have been pursuing a policy of accommodation and arms limitation.[53] Such recognition may account for the cautious, step-by-step approach taken by the Soviets in the recent Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty talks.[54]

VI.

[1]Raymond Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1958), p. 37.

[2]Roman Kolkowiecz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 78-79, note 166.

[3]Garthoff, p. 22.

[4]Robert Conquest, Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), p. 144.

[5]Garthoff, p. 22.

[6]Kolkowiecz, p. 243.

[7]Roman Kolkowiecz, "The Military" in Interest Groups in the Soviet Union, eds. Gordon Skilling and Franklin Griffiths (Princeton: Princeton University, 1971), p. 154.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Kolkowiecz, The Soviet Military..., pp. 112-113.

[10]Ibid., p. 113.

[11]Ibid., p. 110.

[12]Conquest, p. 255.

[13]Kolkowiecz, "The Military," p. 155.

[14]Ibid.

[15]Conquest, p. 312.

[16]Kolkowiecz, The Soviet Military..., p. 252.

[17]Garthoff, p. 30.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Ibid., p. 31.

[20]Ibid., p. 30.

[21]Kolkowiecz, The Soviet Military..., p. 253.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Conquest, p. 338.

[24]Ibid., p. 337.

[25]Michael T. Gehlen "Group Theory and The Study of Soviet Politics" in The Soviet Political Process, ed. Sidney I. Pless (Waltham, Mass.: Ginn and Co., 1971), p. 48.

[26]Kolkowiecz, "The Military," p. 157.

[27]Ibid.

[28]Ibid., p. 158.

[29]Ibid.

[30]Kolkowiecz, The Soviet Military..., p. 148.

[31]Kolkowiecz, "The Military," p. 160.

[32]Ibid.

[33]Ibid., p. 160.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Ibid., p. 164.

[36]Ibid.

[37]Kolkowiecz, The Soviet Military..., p. 262.

[38]Ibid.

[39]Kolkowiecz, "The Military," p. 165.

[40]Ibid.

[41]Kolkowiecz, The Soviet Military..., p. 265.

[42]Ibid., p. 269.

[43]Ibid., p. 287.

[44]"On Main Directions in Working Out the Plan for the Development of the National Economy in the Period Immediately Ahead," Pravda (October 2, 1964) in Current Digest of the Soviet Press 16 (October 28, 1964): 11.

[45]Kolkowiecz, "The Military," p. 299.

[46]Thomas W. Wolfe, "Problems of Soviet Defense Policy Under the New Regime," Slavic Review 24 (June, 1965): 175.

[47]Ibid., p. 178.

[48]Kolkowiecz, The Soviet Military..., p. 303.

[49]Wolfgang Leonhard, "The Domestic Politics of the New Soviet Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 52 (October, 1973): 65.

[50]John Erickson, Soviet Military Power (London: The Royal Services Institute for Defense Studies, 1971), p. 29.

[51]Robert Osbourne, The Evolution of Soviet Politics (HOmewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1974), p. 298.

[52]Ibid.

[53]Ibid., p. 293.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this paper has shown that the Soviet military is able to influence the policy decisions of the ruling Communist Party within a narrow range of issues. The range of issues open to military influence is not static, but changes reflecting the degree to which the ruling elite needs the support of the military. Under conditions of internal dissension or external threat, the military possesses a greater degree of influence over a wider range of issues than under relatively stable conditions of Party rule. Under all conditions, there exists a limit, however fine, beyond which the military may not exercise their influence with impunity. The Soviet military appears to have struck a compromise with the Party. In return for high social status, a rather large share of the budget, and influence on a limited number of political issues which concern them directly, the military has accepted Party controls and has generally remained one of the chief pillars of support of the Communist regime. The potential coercive power of the military has remained just that, potential.

The interests which the military articulates to the decision makers in the Party can be categorized as those that deal with military status and those that deal with the efficient functioning of the military. Among the former are the military's interest in its image as projected by the various communication

media, their interest in the role given the military in Soviet history, and their interest in the inculcation of military-patriotic values in the youth of the Soviet Union. Among the latter are the interest of the military in the development of heavy industry, the interest in a large defense budget, and their interest in the maintenance of high levels of international tension. There is a certain degree of overlapping between these two groupings. For instance, increased status is likely to have a positive effect on morale, and therefore, on military efficiency.

The means of articulation of the military's interests are twofold. One is the representation of the military in the policy making organs of the Party. The second is the close associations formed by the military with other groups of similar interests, or with Party leaders themselves. Both of these means provide channels of access for the military to make their views known to Party decision makers. The weight these views carry depends to a large degree on the indispensability of the military to the Party. In today's world, where the threat of rapid destruction via nuclear weapons is very real, the military is almost indispensable to the survival of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union. Just as there are limits to the extent the military may exert its influence in the Party, so too are there limits to the amount of control the Party may exercise over the military. Beyond these limits the effectiveness of the Soviet military declines to such a degree that the Party

is left vulnerable to outside attack. Thus, it seems to be the unique role of the Soviet military as defender of the Communist homeland that contributes most to its influence in Soviet politics.

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