

ARCHIVES
2393
Downing

CONFRONTATION IN KOREA: THE ROLE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
IN THE DISMISSAL OF GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements of the
Honors Program in American
History

Bruce E. Downing
May 8, 1969
History 296

Approved
June 1969
Allen W. Moyer

I have neither given nor
received unauthorized
aid on this paper.

Bruce E. Downing

CONTENTS

| | Pages |
|---|-------|
| PROLOGUE | 1-4 |
| Chapter | |
| I. Marshall-MacArthur - Politics and Personality | 5-18 |
| II. The Search for a Military Philosophy | 19-29 |
| III. Confrontation in Korea: June, 1950 - April, 1951 | 30-54 |
| IV. The MacArthur Hearings | 55-73 |
| V. Aftermath | 74-82 |
| EPILOGUE | 83-85 |

PROLOGUE

The two decades from 1940 to 1960 were a period of rapid and massive change for the American military establishment. The officer of 1940 was motivated by, and acted upon, a purely military interpretation of events. The professional officer of 1960 had evolved into a politico-military operator, acutely aware of the political goals to which military operations were geared. To the old-style officer, the duty of the commander was to attain complete military victory over the enemy. War was horrible and thus had to be fought as a moral crusade. "Americans had been taught to avoid war as the plague, but once in it, to pull out all the stops."¹ Military means were separate from political goals. To unite the two was to politicize war, which had been traditionally abhorred in America. War was a terrible but sometimes necessary evil, and to use it crassly for mere political gains was immoral. Thus in World War II military commanders had been given a great deal of leeway in their respective operations. Military considerations were always predominant in their thought.

With the occupation of Germany and Japan after the war, this freedom of action continued. "The American commanders in these countries occupied, in reality, highly independent positions. . . they were virtually laws unto themselves."² It was the philosophy supporting this situation that was to be challenged by the conditions of the Korean War. For that conflict was the first major limited war fought under the "nuclear umbrella." It thus set the tone for military operations in the following

years. The "Great Debate" which it fostered was thus significant in that it effectively altered the traditional attitudes of the American military.

It is my contention that the MacArthur controversy was an important watershed in both inter-factional struggle in the military and in the adjustment of the American military to the changing environment in which they operated. On the one hand was MacArthur and his supporters, and on the other, in opposition, were Marshall, Bradley and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The object of this essay is to examine the role of the military elite in the dismissal of MacArthur from command and the effect of this event upon the attitudes of the military establishment. It is my purpose to examine the effect of various personal and policy rivalries among the military upon the events leading to the downfall of MacArthur.

For "in the military, as in any large organization, the 'big issues' are personified by outstanding men and the factions that develop around them."³ Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the long rivalry between Douglas MacArthur and George Marshall. The careers of these two prominent soldiers were intertwined from Kansas in 1909 to Korea in 1951. Both were early marked for high rank and both eventually served as Chief of Staff of the Army. Each continued to be prominent even after their formal careers were over. Yet here the similarities end. For between these two leaders existed a long personal acrimony, the extent of which was to be duly revealed during the Korean controversy. The basis of this ill-feeling lay in their divergent personalities and attitudes. MacArthur was a dramatic, egocentric battlefield leader, whose entire life was oriented around the Orient. His long years

of command in the field had nurtured a bitter mistrust of the powers in Washington. Marshall, by contrast, was a quiet, brilliant officer whose staff work brought him into early prominence. Never a troop commander, the key years of his career were spent in Washington on staff duties. The gulf between these two officers was widened by their post-World War II experiences. MacArthur spent the entire period as our Pacific Commander. Marshall spent these years in Washington as, successively, Secretary of State, President of the American Red Cross, and Secretary of Defense. This era solidified their respective views on the relative importance of Asia and Europe to American security.

During the Korean War the men and their factions finally reached the culmination of their long conflict. The nine months between June, 1950, and April, 1951, was filled with a series of personal and policy disputes. First, Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not send all the reinforcements which MacArthur requested after the invasion in June, 1950. They also fought, and then reluctantly approved, his plan for the landing at Inchon in September, 1950. The conference at Wake Island in October was interpreted by MacArthur to be an attempt to burden him with the blame for the Chinese invasion. A misreading of a crucial January 1951 memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff caused MacArthur to believe that they approved his proposed policy for Korea. Thus the failure to actively implement his recommendations during 1951 was attributed by him to the influence of Marshall and Truman. February and March of 1951 was therefore a period of increasing conflict between the Defense Department and their Far Eastern Commander. The end result

of this growing estrangement was the unanimous recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April that MacArthur be relieved of command.

Rovere and Schlesinger claim that "the fact that the Joint Chiefs were not in agreement with MacArthur was, however, important but not really fundamental."⁴ I find myself at least in partial disagreement with that analysis. For the issue of civilian control of the military was not, as such, at stake in the MacArthur Hearings. For he had indeed relinquished his command and returned a solitary soldier. What was truly at stake was, first, the feasibility of limited war, and secondly, the degree of control which Washington should exercise over its field commanders. As even Courtney Whitney, one of MacArthur's strongest advocates, correctly noted, "no one has questioned the right of Mr. Truman, as President, to remove MacArthur, although millions have questioned his judgment."⁵ The issue at stake was professional, not constitutional, integrity. In this role, the Joint Chiefs were invaluable. By strongly stating their professional opinion that MacArthur's program was "militarily impractical" and that his actions amounted to insubordination, they formed the bulwark of the Administration's defense. It is therefore important to study the intra-military friction aired during the MacArthur Hearings to properly assess the significance of this controversy for the military establishment.

1. MARSHALL-MACARTHUR: PERSONALITY AND POLITICS

"Military politics is as hectic as any in civilian life . . . (any senior officer) knows his way around in the game of Army politics. No man ever reaches the top without learning the ropes."⁶

Among the several and excellent accounts of the Truman-MacArthur controversy the aspect of military politics has often been somewhat disregarded. By viewing this affair as more a clash of policies than of personalities, the impact of personal factors has been considered by some as of secondary importance. In the military, political infighting is no less important or prevalent than in any other sizable organization. For the importance of judicial use of personal obligation and preference can be crucial to an officer's career. In this system, friendships and shared experiences play as important a role as does professional respect. As General Omar Bradley, a principal participant in the Korean controversy, noted in 1951:

For military command is as much a practice of human relations as it is a sense of tactics and a knowledge of logistics. When there are people, there is pride and ambition, prejudice and conflict. In generals as in all other men, capabilities cannot always obscure weaknesses, nor can talents hide faults.⁷

The two most influential military personalities involved in the Korean debate were Generals of the Army Douglas MacArthur and George Marshall. Of the two, MacArthur has long been considered the greatest American military figure of this century. A flamboyant combat general during World War I, Chief of Staff during the inter-war period and winner of the Medal of Honor during World War II, Douglas MacArthur was, in 1951, the senior officer in the United States Army. Despite his long service under the gaze of an admiring public, he remained an enigma to those with whom he came into contact. As General George Kenney, his World War II Air commander, remarked: "Very few people really know Douglas MacArthur. Those who do or think they do, either admire him or dislike him. They are never neutral on the subject."⁸ For he did not possess merely a great military mind but also an imposing and domineering personality. As one general who served under him, commented, MacArthur always maintained an aura of "self-righteousness and an air of infallibility" which made close personal relations sometimes difficult.⁹

Yet to many of those who served with him, the sense of distance and aloofness proved compellingly attractive. As one of his staff officers noted (in a quite serious manner) to a visitor who had just met MacArthur in 1947, "Now you have spoken to God." Over the length of his career, the General gathered around him officers fiercely loyal to his person. Many of these were known as the "Bataan Crowd," as they had served him since 1941. Among these were Generals Charles Willoughby, Bonner Fellers and Courtney Whitney. "To them, everyone in the world was either for MacArthur, 100% in favor of everything, or against him, an

enemy."¹⁰ Other important supporters had served in the China Theater during the War: Edward Almond, George Stratemeyer, and Albert Wedemeyer.

Much of the dislike for MacArthur stemmed from the actions of these men. For they were all quite sensitive to criticism and all literally believed that MacArthur was the greatest man that had ever lived. Unfortunately they carried their loyalty to somewhat ludicrous extremes. In their determination to defend the General, "any criticism of MacArthur brought forth a prompt and thunderous reply. No publication was too small or obscure to catch the eagle eye" of the staff.¹¹ This extreme defensiveness has been traced to their shared belief that a personal and political plot in Washington was attempting to discredit the General and win his dismissal. We need not speculate on the suspected membership of the conspiracy. As this attitude was largely shared by MacArthur himself, it is understandable why the Korean controversy was so often argued on such a personal level.

These men were in high positions, to be sure. Yet as one scholar has noted, "the entourage which he created was regional in scope and, in fact, limited to the Far East."¹² This was to have important ramifications in his struggle with Marshall and his faction. For MacArthur's supporters were on the wane in 1951, while those of Marshall occupied pivotal positions. As one observer of military politics remarked at the time, "the history of the post-war period has been one of unsuccessful struggle by the other factions to oust the Eisenhower-Bradley bloc."¹³ The culmination of this struggle was the dismissal of MacArthur in 1951.

The career of George C. Marshall differed markedly from that of his opponent. Not a graduate of West Point, he distinguished himself as Chief of Operations for the First Army in France. During the post war years he was aide to General Pershing and an instructor at the War College. In 1927 he was appointed assistant commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia. The five years which he spent there were crucial in their effect on the composition of the Army elite in the 1940's and even the 1950's. For one hundred and fifty future generals in World War II were students during this period and fifty more were instructors. It was here that Marshall trained two future Army Chiefs of Staff: Omar Bradley and Lawton Collins - men who were to be instrumental opponents of MacArthur in 1951. As Bradley later noted, "from General Marshall I learned the rudiments of command."¹⁴ Collins also remarked of the "spirit of Benning, which was a marvelous thing."¹⁵

Thus when Marshall was to choose senior commanders in 1940 and 1941, he was able to pick men that he knew personally and professionally. Most important, "his personnel appointments filled central staff positions in Washington and manned key posts in the military structure for the European Theater," for it was assumed that he would command that region during the war.¹⁶ He was thereby setting the stage for his confrontation with MacArthur, as both he and his appointees became identified with Europe. For the Far East "was not the most advantageous place to be during World War II. Europe . . . was where the guns, glamour, girls, and fresh new stars were."¹⁷ Indeed, a skilled general, first in his West Point class of 1924 and first in his class to be promoted to

general in 1942, received no promotion during the ten years which he served in the China Theater. Thus a group of young officers, who rose to high positions in the European Theater, became known as "Marshall's Men."

The most famous of these were Eisenhower and Bradley. For Marshall picked both these men from the ranks of obscurity and made them prominent military figures. Eisenhower, long an aide to MacArthur, impressed Marshall with his performance during the Louisiana maneuvers in 1940. The two had met in 1930, and Marshall had asked Eisenhower to join him at the Infantry School but another assignment intervened. He was then marked by the General for higher command. After serving from 1941 to 1942 as an aide to the Chief of Staff, he was sent by Marshall to command the invasion of Africa in 1942. From there he went on to the command of all the Allied forces in Europe and four stars in 1944.

Bradley's rise to high position was even more rapid. He first came into contact with Marshall in 1929 at the Infantry School. By 1940, he was just a lieutenant colonel in an obscure staff job in Washington. In that year, Marshall made him the Assistant Secretary to the General Staff, whose job it was to brief the Chief of Staff. In February, 1941, Marshall appointed him to command the Infantry School - a move that shot Bradley up from a lieutenant colonel to a one-star general in one jump. From there he was sent to Africa in 1942 to command a corps under Eisenhower. In 1943 he was transferred to England to prepare for the invasion of Europe, during which he was an army group commander. In barely more than four years, he went from a battalion commander to an army group commander. Thus the careers of the two central figures in the European Command were personally and markedly influenced by the hand of General Marshall.

Bradley's original dispute with MacArthur stemmed, so the latter believed, from the fact that MacArthur had not approved of his handling of the Ardennes offensive in 1944. For this reason, he had refused to choose Bradley to be commander of the proposed invasion of Japan. It was the personal ill-feelings which arose from this incident, MacArthur contended, that led to Bradley's action in 1951. Part of this can also be attributed to Bradley's "fundamental conviction that to win the war, we must first assure victory in Europe."¹⁸ Thus in his memoirs he speaks rather harshly of MacArthur's "pressure" on the War Department for a more rapid buildup of Pacific forces at a time when reinforcements were badly needed in Europe.

Again entering into the problem was the vast gulf between the personalities of the two generals. We have seen that MacArthur was often distant, dramatic and somewhat aloof. Bradley was "by nature . . . reasonable, patient and self-effacing," and thus quite popular with the troops. The story is told of Bradley's eagerness in France to reach the front to get a better idea of the situation. His practice was to hitch rides with passing vehicles until he arrived at his destination. Automatically being offered a seat by startled enlisted men, he would reply:

'No thanks, son,' swinging on to the running board and giving the boy a pat on the shoulder. 'No thanks, son. You're much more tired than I am. I just wanted to see how things are getting along here. Go ahead.'¹⁹

It is difficult to imagine a similar reaction by Douglas MacArthur or even that the great soldier would place himself in such a situation.

As the military analyst Morris Janowitz has noted, the "striking aspect of the Marshall alliance is its direct and indirect line of descent."²⁰ At the Infantry School, Marshall and Bradley met the four men who were to command Army Corps in Europe: Courtney Hodges, Lawton Collins, Leonard Gerow and Jacob Devers. The range of Marshall's influence was increased by the ability of senior commanders to name their own subordinates. Generals Alfred Greunther, Matthew Ridgway, Maxwell Taylor and James Gavin, all assistants to Eisenhower, were second generation "Marshall Men." Ridgway, who was to replace MacArthur in Korea, served with Marshall at Benning and was secretary to the General Staff during 1940-41. Lyman Lemnitzer, later commander of U.N. Forces, was also a protege of Eisenhower.

The experience of General Lawton Collins is an important example of Marshall's influence. Collins had commanded the 25th Division on Guadalcanal with distinction and had caught the eyes of men in Washington. When Eisenhower and Bradley asked for senior commanders for the Normandy Invasion, Marshall recommended Collins. For ever since Benning he had held Collins in high esteem. Writing to him in August 1936, Marshall commented that the War Department would be "showing signs of real modernization when they reach down and pick you and several others of your stripe" for promotion.²¹ The transfer to Europe proved a crucial move in his career. For, at the time, he was a quite young division commander; chances for his getting a corps in the Pacific were slight. Europe was obviously the best place for Collins to get ahead. Bradley named him "one of the most outstanding field commanders in Europe," noting his "unerring tactical

judgment." ²² A handsome, articulate man, there was no doubt at the end of the war that he was one of the Army's coming young men. Grooming him to be Chief of Staff, Bradley created the new post of Vice Chief of Staff and appointed Collins to fill it. The next year, when Bradley was named Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, "Lightning Joe" Collins replaced him as Chief of Staff. This appointment was crucial. For with the arrival of Marshall in September, 1950, as Secretary of Defense, it completed the deployment of personnel in the Marshall-MacArthur confrontation.

The relations of these two generals were long in conflict before the showdown in 1951. Their long relationship began in 1909 when both were stationed at Fort Leavenworth. Marshall went on to fame as a staff officer in France while MacArthur gained a reputation as a great fighting officer and his first star. At the time of MacArthur's retirement in 1935 as Chief of Staff, Marshall was still waiting for his promotion to brigadier general, while MacArthur had four stars. Allegations have been made that MacArthur had held back Marshall's promotion because of differences dating back to World War I. The problem arose in 1918. Marshall, as Operations officer for First Army, wrote out a directive for the capture of Sedan which ended with the words: "Boundaries will not be considered binding." This "ambiguous and extraordinary" sentence, noted MacArthur, "precipitated what narrowly missed being one of the great tragedies of American history." ²³ For one corps of the Army began to pass directly in front of MacArthur's brigade and would have been fired upon had not he quickly remedied the situation. This incident also reveals his contempt for the headquarters, "miles to the rear," as he phrased it.

From this incident is said to have arisen MacArthur's 1933 decision to appoint Marshall the Senior Advisor to the Illinois National Guard. Marshall and his friends felt that the appointment "by intention or not, put him off the main career road to high command in the Army."²⁴ The story itself, as Marshall's official biographer notes, is not borne out by an examination of the facts. Their difference in 1918 was forgotten and MacArthur "categorically denied that he sent Marshall to Illinois . . . to interfere with Marshall's advancement in the Army."²⁵ Yet the mere fact that the assignment was considered a serious check by Marshall led to a certain amount of personal acrimony. At least MacArthur seems to have considered this the beginning of their feud. Though both he and Marshall denied any personal ill feelings, each thought the other to be resentful over the incident. For, in an interview in 1956, MacArthur noted that, during the Korean controversy, "Generals Marshall and Bradley . . . were both personally hostile to me. General Marshall's enmity was an old one but General Bradley's was more recent" - the Ardennes affair in 1944.²⁶ Thus, from at least MacArthur's viewpoint, the feud was old and deep-seated.

During the Second World War, their differences were more strongly pronounced and prophetic of the future. As several observers have noted, "their styles were different. MacArthur was colorful, even flamboyant; his words were dramatic. Marshall was calm, precise . . ."²⁷ The latter, as Chief of Staff, began to fill important posts with officers of his own choice. Though he was not prejudiced, he did not promote all of MacArthur's proteges. More important for the future, the two generals began to differ

seriously on strategic grounds - Marshall supporting Roosevelt's European centered plan with MacArthur advocating that the main effort be made in Asia. With the resulting flow of supplies to Europe, advance in the Pacific was retarded. As a result, MacArthur grew bitter with the men who blocked his path to glory. As General Kenney, his Air Chief in World War II, noted, in 1942 MacArthur wanted to advance "but hadn't anything to go with. He felt that Washington had let him down and was afraid that they would continue to do so."²⁸ This lack of support grated on the General throughout the war. The then Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, noted in his diary in 1944, that MacArthur, in an interview with a news correspondent, had criticized the entire war strategy as "completely useless" and had "lashed out in a general indictment of Washington." He also criticized the men in Washington for their lack of battle experience - a remark which could only be taken as a personal attack on Marshall's staff experience in the First World War. In this report he also stated that "Europe is a dying system," not worth the effort to save it.²⁹ Asia was the new center of world history. Thus, in 1944, were the battlelines of the Marshall-MacArthur rivalry clearly drawn.

At the time of MacArthur's dismissal, the European "Marshall Men" reigned supreme in the Army. The old general had been out of touch with the mainstream of Army politics and participated only at the periphery. Marshall relinquished his post as Chief of Staff to Eisenhower in November, 1945, who was replaced, in 1948, by General Bradley. Then in August, 1949, Collins assumed the post. In April, 1951, Eisenhower was the Supreme

Commander of Allied Forces in Europe. Though he did not play a major role in the MacArthur Hearings, he did lend his support to the European orientation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The other two members of the Joint Chiefs during the MacArthur dispute were General Hoyt Vandenburg of the Air Force and Admiral Forrest Sherman of the Navy. Vandenburg was to be an articulate and convincing supporter of Truman's policies during the hearings. It was his arguments based upon the primacy of Europe in our strategic planning that so effectively countered the criticisms of MacArthur. While not formally a "Marshall Man," he served as commander of the Ninth Air Force in Europe during World War II. He worked in close conjunction with Bradley in connection with that post and accompanied him on several post-V.E. Day trips through occupied Germany. A nephew of Senator Arthur Vandenburg, and an "old hand at dealing with Congress," he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Air Force in April, 1948.

Admiral Sherman was the one Chief of Staff who did not have the deep experience in, and resulting attitudes toward, the European Theater. A protégé of Fleet Admiral Nimitz, World War II commander in the Pacific, he was commander of the aircraft carrier Wasp in the South Pacific at the outset of the war. After tours of duty as aide to Nimitz and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, he assumed command of the Sixth Task Fleet in the Mediterranean - his only major experience in this theater. Because of his long service in the Pacific, he was the most sympathetic to MacArthur of all the service chiefs. His broad-minded approach to global strategy placed him in the middle ground between the opposing factions in the dismissal controversy.

The object of this chapter has been to illustrate that the "political behavior of the military elite . . . cannot be understood without reference to the natural history" of their rivalries and loyalties.³⁰ This is not to establish a direct correlation between personal relationships and professional performance. Several officers whose careers were promoted by Marshall became members of the MacArthur camp, notably Generals Joseph Stilwell (an old friend from Infantry School), Mark Clark and James Van Fleet. For both personal attachments and experience mold the outlook of professional officers. Yet it is important to remember that military politics is indeed as hectic and as irrational as any in civilian life and that it does have important ramifications upon professional attitudes.

I have also attempted to trace the pattern of personal and professional animosity between Marshall and MacArthur which arose in the First World War and was exacerbated in World War II. Particularly significant in this regard is the mistrust and bitterness which MacArthur revealed in his relations with higher headquarters in Washington - a situation which was to be dramatically repeated during the Korean War. An interesting aspect of this relationship is that no officer who served under MacArthur in the Pacific rose to a senior position in the army after the war. The list of Chiefs of Staff from 1939 to 1960: Marshall, Eisenhower, Bradley, Collins, Ridgway, Taylor, Lemnitzer - contains only men whose original and formative battle experience was in the European Theater. This only illustrates all the more the isolation of MacArthur and his supporters from the center of power - an isolation which developed into a near paranoia during the Korean War years.

Thus in this chapter I have attempted to reveal the interrelationship of personal attachments and strategic prejudices. Progenies of Marshall were sent to Europe where they gained both rapid promotion and a strategic bias: favoring Europe over Asia. While MacArthur's sixteen years of continuous service in the Far East from 1935-1951 had solidified his judgment of the strategic primacy of Asia. Isolated for so many years from the new developments in military politics, emboldened by his long series of successes, and strengthened by his "self-righteous" attitude, he thus dramatically confronted the Defense Establishment over the policy issues raised by the Korean Conflict.

2. THE SEARCH FOR A MILITARY PHILOSOPHY

"The essence of the problem can be briefly stated; the Korean war was the first important war in American history that was not a crusade."¹

Douglas MacArthur was a product of his own temperament and the environment in which he developed. As simple as this statement may appear, it well illustrates the basic difference between the two opposing military camps in the Korean controversy. MacArthur belonged to the liberal tradition in America which taught that war was a "completely different state of existence to peace, an aberration, and it can only be justified when fought as a crusade against tyrants in a mood of righteous indignation."² Military consideration must then be separate from political concerns, for war must not be used for a political purpose, it must be "jihad." This attitude is typical of men of his generation - Wilson, Bryan, Roosevelt - who went through the horrors of the First World War. "War was horrible, and whoever unleashed it must be smitten and destroyed."³

In this philosophy, the task of the military leader was simple: destruction of the enemy. Since war took the form of a crusade, no

restrictions were placed upon the military effort. The entire country must mobilize to destroy the evil aggressors. Thus did MacArthur believe that when war was entered into, maximum force must be applied to make the conflict as brief as possible. For as he told the West Point Class of 1933: "We cannot violate these laws and still produce and sustain that kind of Army that alone can insure the integrity of our country."⁴ He steadfastly retained this faith in the traditional American military philosophy throughout his fifty-two years of military service. In his famous address to the West Point Class of 1962, he declared that "yours is the profession of arms, the will to win, the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory, that if you lose, the nation will be destroyed."⁵ This school of thought, predominant in both the First and the Second World Wars, taught that the military commander must have the widest discretion in action if he is to achieve success. Military necessities must therefore be the dominant factor in any decision. Thus were Pershing in World War I and Marshall and MacArthur in World War II, allowed great freedom of action in their daily operations.

The experience of MacArthur's Pacific Theater served only to reaffirm his original attitude toward war. First, his distance from higher headquarters was immense, making effective control almost impossible. In realization of this condition and in deference to MacArthur's professional stature, Washington maintained only the most nominal of controls on its Commander of the South Pacific during the war. Therefore he became accustomed to this lack of restriction of his conduct. From 1935 to 1951,

he returned to the United States only once and all of this time was in command of a large number of troops. Secondly, the nature of the war in Asia reinforced his traditional view of war. In Europe, due to the relatively minor cultural and social differences, the American conquerors were able to sympathize and identify with the enemy. In sharp contrast, "in military operations in the Far East, the enemy was satanized to a greater degree."⁶ Their rabid ideology was not only markedly different from that of the Allies but it also caused the war to be fought bitterly and even fanatically. No such mutual slaughter, such as Tarawa or Iwa Jima, took place in the European Theater. Thus a deep gulf existed between the population and the occupation troops in Japan that was unknown to the soldiers in Germany, but which was especially apparent to MacArthur. For in his long exercise of almost absolute power in Japan, notes George Kennan, he displayed "extraordinary powers of resistance to any Washington generated pressures which went contrary" to his inclination.⁷

Morris Janowitz, in his classic analysis, separates the military into two major groups of philosophy: absolutist and pragmatist. "For the absolutist," he notes, "limited wars, should they occur, would represent a weakness in United States foreign policy."⁸ MacArthur falls clearly into this group. The absolutist believes that anything less than victory represents disaster for the nation. And any policy, such as the concept of limited war, which does not have military victory as its goal is defeatism. To adopt the concept of the limited war was to politicize international conflict, thus limiting the powers of the military commander. In Korea, MacArthur was concerned more with the military security of his troops

while Ridgway was acting to strengthen the system of mutual alliances. From 1945 to 1952, the pragmatic forces in the Army, headed by Marshall and Bradley, were in control of the basic policy decisions. For these men "limited war could be fought to contain the Russians, and to maintain the alliance system required for national security."⁹ These officers conceived of Russian aims more as expansionist, than ideological, as did the absolutists. Moreover they accepted the need to subordinate military strategy to political purposes. The absolutists could not envisage a situation in which total military victory would not be the ultimate goal. Thus MacArthur refused to accept the concept that war could be limited in means and fought for limited goals.

He charged that "Mr. Truman's policy reversed United States military doctrine of a century and a half from reliance upon attack to defense,"¹⁰ which was indeed the basic principle of the containment policy. Due to his isolation from Washington and his necessarily limited range of interest, MacArthur did not keep pace with the necessities of a rapidly changing world. The collision of his stubborn military philosophy with the "limitations of coalition warfare in the nuclear age" made him appear a military anachronism. For while MacArthur condemned containment as defeatist, the supporters of Marshall contended that he did not adequately grasp the dangers of total war in the nuclear era. Thus, to each of the opponents, the policy of the other seemed immoral - one of the reasons the confrontation over Korea was so intense.

Therefore once again did the Marshall-MacArthur factions find themselves on different sides in a policy dispute. During the Second

World War, the conflict was over the respective priority of Asia and Europe. With the advent of the nuclear era, the debate continued on the proper military posture to support American foreign policy. The Marshall group, due to their temperaments and experience, tended to support the Truman Administration policy of strategic deterrence or containment. This viewpoint places the greatest emphasis upon political goals, setting limits on the military means needed to attain these ends. In part, this represents a realistic appraisal of the strategic weaknesses of the United States Army versus the overwhelming strength of the huge Soviet Army in Europe. Realizing that it was not militarily feasible to attempt to "roll back" the Russians from Eastern Europe, these officers readily agreed to the containment policy and the strategic primacy of Europe in our defense plans. Thus Marshall was instrumental in influencing the policy of non-intervention in China - an act for which the absolutists never forgave him. In their eyes, the evil enemy (in the form of Communism) was trying to subvert freedom in China. Intervention was therefore required. Yet Marshall's advice was based upon a realistic appraisal of our country's military resources. The pragmatists were also opposed to the use of nuclear ^{ARMS} in either China or Korea. This decision was due both to the unsuitability of the terrain and to the political objections of our allies. MacArthur's plan to use such weapons ¹¹ was based on the traditional doctrine of use of all available force to achieve victory. Thus once more did personality conflicts blend into policy differences.

This collision was all the more heated because the dispute over limited war was mixed with a widespread feeling that MacArthur, in following

so independent a position in both Japan and Korea, had violated the unwritten precepts of the American military tradition. In the manual, The Armed Forces Officer, an honorable man is defined as one who:

. . . holds himself to a course of conduct because of a conviction that it is in the general interest, even though he is well aware that it may lead to inconvenience, personal loss, humiliation and grave physical danger.¹²

MacArthur, an Old-Army officer, believed in this definition and followed it explicitly. For he honestly believed that limited war was appeasement, and that appeasement was defeatism. The adoption of this policy would mean disaster for the nation, and he fought it to the end, even at the cost of his position. This attitude was widely criticized by the pragmatic generals. In 1951, Bradley stated that, ^{because of} ~~due to~~ the history of the Cold War, "we are intensely aware that a military effort cannot be separated from political objectives."¹³ General Collins described MacArthur's dilemma more directly when he declared that "military men have got to recognize that there will always be some political considerations which must be reserved for the government at home."¹⁴ For MacArthur was correct when he stated that Truman had reversed traditional military policy. The conditions of war had changed - so must the attitude concerning the conduct of war. Yet certain aspects of the pragmatic philosophy had long been a part of our military heritage. As General Eisenhower simply stated it, "when you put on a uniform there are certain inhibitions which you accept."¹⁵ MacArthur dared to challenge this long accepted tenet of military conduct. The task of the military is to advise the civilian leaders on the proper course of action. It is

their privilege and responsibility to argue for what they consider the best policy. But once the decision has been made, they must execute it to the fullest or resign their commissions. Thus was Ridgway critical of MacArthur's public disagreement with public policy, arguing that "it was neither his privilege nor his duty to take issue with the President's decision after it had been made known to him."¹⁶

To properly understand the meaning of the Marshall-MacArthur conflict, one must realize the divergence between the absolute and the pragmatic point of view. For acceptance of limited war by the pragmatic generals meant reliance upon realistic goals rather than ideological ends. The question which they asked was "What can be done?" rather than "What ought to be done?" As Ridgway remarked, MacArthur's plan was no less than the "dislocation of Communism throughout the world by use of armed force," at a time when we were "woefully unprepared" for a full-scale war.¹⁷ Whereas Marshall was concerned with coordinating military policy with feasible political ends. As Dean Acheson noted, "when he thought about military problems, nonmilitary factors played a controlling part."¹⁸ This is the essence of the pragmatic military philosophy. Marshall realized that time and circumstances had altered military considerations, while MacArthur clung to "the classic mission of the commander: destruction of the enemy force." The wide difference in attitudes is well illustrated by Ridgway's statement on March 12, 1951, three weeks before he ~~relieved~~^{succeeded} MacArthur, that "if China fails to throw us into the sea, that is a defeat for her of incalculable proportions" and a victory for the Allied cause.¹⁹

Thus far we have discussed both personal and policy differences between the Marshall and MacArthur factions in the military establishment. All of these conflicts centered around one basic issue: European or Asian orientation. This issue has been discussed previously as it influenced other areas of concern. But it is necessary to understand how this topic acts as a synthesis of the several points of friction between the two groups. For Douglas MacArthur was considered in 1951 to be among the most knowledgeable of all Americans in Asian affairs. His first assignment, in 1903, had been in the Philippines. From there he was sent to Manchuria in 1905 with his father, as an observer to Russo-Japanese War. He served again in the Philippines from 1922-25, when he was commander of the Military District of Manila. Returning again in 1935, MacArthur was made a Field Marshall in the Philippine Army. From 1935 to 1951 he was on continuous service in the Far East. From 1940 to 1951, he was Commanding General, United States Army in the Pacific and, later, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Theater. From 1945 onwards, he was also Military Governor of Japan. During his long career, he therefore had a total of twenty-two years of service in the Far East - almost all at the highest levels.

MacArthur had long advocated the importance of Asia in strategic planning. Before the Second World War, he warned of an attack on the Philippines. "Too late, Washington had come to realize the danger," he notes in his memoirs.²⁰ His criticism of the war strategy and the preference for Europe has already been discussed. In that famed interview in 1944, (noted by Forrestal), he also had stated that "the history of the

world will be written in the Pacific for the next ten thousand years."²¹
 Europe was a decadent system, as its problems were insoluble. "It is worn out and will become an economic and industrial hegemony of Soviet Russia," he continued. Stalin realized this and thus was looking greedily at the Pacific. For the Soviet leader realized that "the Pacific will become and remain an industrial and economic sphere of world development." MacArthur ended his report with an attack on those people in Washington who "were guilty of 'treason and sabotage' in not adequately supporting the Pacific while hammering Germany." He thus called for a second front in Asia and not in Europe. When this proposal was rejected, he "bitterly condemned the Europe-first strategy as espoused by Russian Communists and British imperialists."²²

Thus the crux of MacArthur's later argument was crystallized as early as 1944. In opposing Roosevelt's European oriented plan, he thereby gained the support of several isolationist Republicans. These men favored a war in Asia to involvement in an "internationalist" war in Europe. In 1947, he forecasted disaster for Japan if China should fall to the Communists. When it did succumb in 1949, MacArthur predicted that Washington's failure to properly support him in Japan would become "the greatest blunder in the history of the United States."²³ All this occurred because of the Truman Administration's continued preoccupation with Europe. He and his loyal staff attributed their poor support to a "lack of spirit" and to a global strategy which they "claimed failed to recognize the paramount importance of Asia in the scheme of American security."²⁴

In opposition to this view of the future importance of Asia, was the bulk of opinion among the Marshall-Bradley group. This factional

conflict between the Europe-first and the Asia-first advocates "was primarily a difference in managerial perspectives," as we have previously seen.²⁵ Marshall firmly believed that the defense of Europe was "vital to our entire international position," and that adoption of MacArthur's proposals would seriously jeopardize this posture. Likewise Bradley was oriented toward Europe as the key to our entire defensive scheme. His strongly expressed conclusion was that:

. . . if Soviet Russia ever controls the entire Eurasian land mass, then the Soviet-sattelite imperialism may have the broad base upon which to build the military power to rule the world.²⁶

MacArthur's previously expressed opinion was that Russian control of this area was inevitable and that "the Soviet strategy was to defend in Europe but to advance by way of the flanks" in Asia and Africa.²⁷ General Ridgway, commander of the Eighth Army in Korea under MacArthur, disagreed with that analysis completely. Based upon his wartime service as commander of the 82nd Airborne division in France, he felt that "the loss of Western Europe would promptly tip the scales in Russia's favor."²⁸

The event which finally hardened the position of the MacArthur faction was the fall of China in 1949. As Marshall had been envoy to China in 1945-46, and had vetoed any direct support of Chiang with American troops, it was towards him that much of MacArthur's wrath was directed. As his information officer noted, how Marshall, a military man, could have committed "the mistake that is the nightmare of all soldiers - underestimating the enemy - MacArthur would never understand."²⁹ His request for more troops because of this debacle, was also denied by Washington. Thus he declared that "the decision to withhold previously pledged American

support was one of the greatest mistakes ever made in our history . . . its consequences will be felt for centuries."³⁰ The General called this tragedy, "the failure of those in authority," and never forgave Bradley and Collins for supporting Marshall's recommendations on China. Their response to his protests in 1949 was prophetic of the later events in Korea. The Joint Chiefs emphasized that the North Atlantic alliance was "the key to American foreign policy and fears were aroused that American involvement in full scale war would weaken the European defense, and spread into a third World War."³¹ Serious action in China would have involved upwards of one million men, at a time when 175 Soviet divisions were stationed in Eastern Europe alone. Once again the Army chiefs were forced to plan according to Russia's capabilities versus our potential reaction. This MacArthur refused to accept, ever scornful of the Joint Chiefs' knowledge of Asia.

Thus the divergence in viewpoint between MacArthur and the Marshall bloc was becoming increasingly serious as June, 1951, approached. Basic to the dispute was MacArthur's inability to adapt his attitudes toward war to the necessities of modern technology and strategy. Thus, by 1951, "his understanding of the changes in world power relationships had only a surface relationship to that of the leaders in Washington."³² He continued to approach war as a crusade to punish the aggressor rather than to serve a political purpose. Containment was appeasement, which was equated with defeat in the mind of MacArthur. Therefore, he became both personally and professionally isolated from the Marshall-Bradley faction which was supreme in Washington.

MacArthur also demonstrated a growing tendency to publicly differ with Administration policy on Asia. Indeed his attitude became so arrogant that Averill Harriman believed that he should have been dismissed in 1949 when he repeatedly acted contrary to the public policy for Japanese occupation.³³ Thus the effect of wielding so great and so arbitrary a power was beginning to reveal itself in MacArthur's relations with his nominal superiors in Washington. He also attacked the China policy of the Administration and bitterly resented what he believed to be a tragic disregard of the true importance of Asia to the security of the country. Thus the seeds of future confrontation were sown during these quiet years - only to be so bitterly reaped in 1951.

3. CONFRONTATION IN KOREA: JUNE, 1950 - APRIL, 1951

"Many observers now rate the 100,000 man South Korean Army as the best of its size in Asia."

-TIME: June 5, 1950

With improvements in recoilless weapons, the bazooka, and the shaped charge, "it may well be that tank warfare as we know it will soon be obsolete."¹

Secretary of Army Frank Pace: June 2, 1950

On June 25, 1950, several divisions of the Inmun Gun, The People's Army of North Korea, struck across the 38th Parallel - thus beginning the final episode in the Marshall-MacArthur controversy. The four divisions of the South Korean Army on this line were quickly smashed and began to retreat. American forces in the country were weak, both in numbers and in equipment. Once more, as MacArthur records it, "I was being thrust into the breach against almost insuperable odds. Once again it was Bataan - and Corregidor - and New Guinea."² And once again was that pattern in his life to be repeated: the gaining of an impossible victory in the face of imminent defeat, while being undermined by treasonous lack of support in Washington. In our examination of MacArthur's long career, we have

observed this in the Philippines during the 1930's, in the Pacific in the Second World War, and in Japan after 1945. The final link in this chain was to be forged in the rugged expanses of Korea.

For MacArthur's situation was truly desperate. With Truman's decision to employ American ground forces, he hastily attempted to organize his troops in Japan. However his three divisions were spread all across the country in occupation duty and could only be committed in a piecemeal fashion. These troops fought a series of bitter delaying actions down the length of the peninsula. But they were unable to stop the North Koreans, who held enormous superiority in men and tanks. Though the Communists only used 100 tanks in the original assault, they were very effective. For the anti-tank capabilities of the Allied forces were nil and thus the armor was instrumental in the early successes of the North Koreans. Therefore, on July 7, MacArthur requested reinforcements from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He estimated that his "immediate need was for not less than five full-strength combat divisions and three tank battalions, together with supporting artillery."³ To his professed "amazement," these requests were not entirely approved. The reasons given were that no increase in the Army had been authorized and that our military strength had to be maintained in other parts of the world. MacArthur angrily charged that this was "the old faulty principle of 'priorities,' under which the Far East was again at the bottom of the list."⁴ He thus repeated his original request more vigorously but was again rejected. Thus, even in the early days of the war, were relations between Tokyo and Washington tinged by bitterness. When his visit to Formosa in July,

1951, was criticized in the American press, his attitudes toward those who opposed his actions were well illustrated. "This visit," he declared at the time, "has been maliciously represented to the public by those who invariably in the past have propagandized a policy of defeat and appeasement in the Pacific."⁵ This outlook was to characterize his relations with Washington throughout the war. All who criticized or questioned MacArthur's actions were henceforth advocates of appeasement.

The basic issue was indeed the principle of priorities. For it was well known to MacArthur and his generals that the American defense policy was centered upon Europe. As General Edward Almond, his chief of staff, noted, "General Bradley was oriented toward Europe and nothing could break him from it."⁶ He should not have been surprised by the reluctance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send a large number of troops to support what was considered an effort of secondary importance. As it is concisely expressed in the official Army history of the war:

The general outline of the JCS strategy was simple. Unless a global war broke out, the United States forces would remain in Korea and exact pressure on the enemy to encourage him to negotiate. There would be no military victory in this limited war . . . patience, perseverance, and pressure keyed the United States position.

This was not a new policy when the war began, as MacArthur must have realized. As early as September, 1947, the Joint Chiefs had declared that "from the standpoint of military security," the United States has little "strong interest" in defending Korea.⁸ If that country were to be captured by the Communists, Japan could easily be defended by air and naval action. Yet they also realized the damaging effect which a precipitate withdrawal from

Korea would have on our prestige in Asia. Thus their ultimate policy recommendations during the war should have been of little surprise to the informed observer.

This response was also influenced by more practical considerations. For during its then young life, the Defense Department had overseen the dismantling of the military strength created during the Second World War. Thus the divisions under MacArthur's command were one-third under regulation strength: each regiment had only two, instead of the normal three, battalions. So weak was the Army, that the limited forces with which we entered Korea were virtually all that could be spared from the reserves slated for the defense of Europe. After our original deployment in Korea, our strategic reserve consisted of one combat division: the 82nd Airborne. MacArthur had been out of Washington for over fifteen years, but must have realized the public pressure for postwar demobilization. It is indeed possible, however, that he was not entirely aware of the urgent nature of our manpower problem. As Secretary of Defense Marshall commented in 1951, "We started in June from a state of bankruptcy as to available trained reserves" and were in a "serious dilemma" for some time.⁹ Whether MacArthur would believe such statements is another question. At any rate, friction soon developed between the Far Eastern commander and his superiors in Washington. On August 4, Averill Harriman, the President's envoy, briefed MacArthur in Tokyo on the Administration policy. MacArthur's impression was that there was no fixed policy for Asia and that the situation in the Far East was little understood and mistakenly downgraded in high circles in Washington.¹⁰

The personality difference, as well as the policy dispute, was also exacerbated by the intra-military controversy over the Inchon landing. MacArthur's plan was to withdraw all of his reserves from Japan, and the First Marine Brigade from the Pusan beachhead, for a surprise amphibious attack upon the port of Inchon on the western coast of Korea. This city, only 20 miles from Seoul, was selected because of the military and psychological effect of the recapture of that capital city. This scheme was "opposed by powerful military influences in Washington," as MacArthur noted in his memoirs.¹¹ General Bradley, now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, strongly believed that amphibious landings were obsolete and no longer feasible as a tactical maneuver. Thus again did Bradley and MacArthur come into conflict over policy. The goal of the invasion was to interdict the Communist supply lines and to trap his forces between MacArthur on the north and General Walton Walker on the south. All of the Joint Chiefs opposed the landing, "especially as MacArthur tended to treat it as a private matter for his own decision."¹² General Collins, Army Chief of Staff, felt that the landings would not necessarily cut off the flow of supplies to the south and thus suggested a site farther down the peninsula. He also expressed the fear that MacArthur's light two-division force might meet superior forces around Seoul and be completely cut off and overwhelmed. If such a disaster would befall the invasion force, all of the effective Allied reserves would be wiped out in one stroke. Removal of the First Marine Brigade from the Pusan perimeter, Collins claimed, might fatally weaken the defense of that vital area.

The Navy had even more serious reservations. The average tides at Inchon were among the greatest in the world. During the proposed attack,

only two hours were available to traverse a narrow, mined channel to the beaches, secure the beaches and neutralize enemy opposition. After that time, the tide would recede, leaving a great mud flat which would trap many of the landing craft. Admiral Sherman and General Collins, in a special trip to Tokyo, expressed serious doubts whether the landing would be successful under these hazardous and exacting conditions. For they seriously doubted the feasibility of rigid adherence to such a strict time schedule under such a perilous situation. As Admiral Sherman declared, "If every possible geographical and naval hardship were listed, Inchon has 'em all."¹³ Yet in deference to MacArthur's stature and persuasive rhetoric, the two officers recommended approval of the plan. But just a week before the target date, the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked MacArthur to reconsider his intention to attack - "a message . . . which chilled me to the marrow of my bones," he later noted.¹⁴ For he feared that Bradley or Marshall, who had just become Secretary of Defense, had been working for a reversal of the decision. He thus replied vigorously that the landings would be held because they would not fail. In this message, he continued his disagreement with the global strategy of the Joint Chiefs, arguing that "it is plainly apparent that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to center their play for global conquest."¹⁵ His tenacity in supporting the Inchon landing was based upon this belief. This operation was even more successful than even MacArthur had envisioned. His estimate of its effect was bold but highly accurate. "Instantly it transformed a battered army . . . into a strong, aggressive force" and broke the myth of Communist invincibility.¹⁶

Thus, only after overcoming determined opposition from Washington, did he turn near-defeat into a resounding victory.

But the very success of the operation was a prophetic warning of future difficulty. For this direct confrontation of wills only increased the already considerable faith of MacArthur in his own powers of judgment and his contempt for the timidity of the Joint Chiefs. The incident also confirmed the strong personal animosity between himself and the Marshall-Bradley bloc. It reopened, or so he thought, Bradley's bitter remembrances of his rejection as commander of the invasion of Japan and it publicly faulted his tactical judgment. It must also be remembered that General Collins was a young division commander under MacArthur in 1943, when he was transferred to Europe. Thus it was a galling experience for MacArthur to be criticized by him in his nominally superior position as Chief of Staff. As we have portrayed him, MacArthur was a proud and extremely competent man, who unhappily suffered from feelings of persecution. His truly spectacular victory over the North Koreans and the Joint Chiefs only increased his confidence in his relative tactical ability. Thus it was an important milestone in the events leading to his dismissal.

His suspicions were further confirmed by the circumstances surrounding the Wake Island meeting in October, 1950, between himself and President Truman. In his memoirs, the General reveals that he had expected something momentous to occur from such a seemingly important gathering. Actually Truman was quite likely trying to establish more cordial and personal relations with his field commander, whom he had never met. Yet it was indeed a high-level meeting, attended by many who MacArthur

thought were his enemies. For our purposes there were two important ramifications of the conference. First, it decreased his respect for the knowledge of the President and his advisors on Asian affairs. He thus commented that what little of the Far East that Truman knew was a "strange combination of distorted history" and outlandish tales.¹⁷ His faith in Washington's knowledge of Asia had been low ever since Harriman's August visit to Tokyo. Thus his fears were confirmed.

More germane to our purpose was the bitter effect of the publication of the controversial "notes" of the conference. At the opening of the meeting, MacArthur's aide was informed by Charles Ross, the President's Press Secretary, that no notes were to be taken of the discussion. As General Courtney Whitney later commented, "MacArthur gave not a thought to it, however, until months later when General Bradley sprang the surprise in an apparent effort to discredit MacArthur."¹⁸ This surprise was a set of notes taken by Bradley's secretary who listened in on the conference through a partially opened door to a side chamber. This episode has been made to appear a sinister plot hatched to blame MacArthur for the defeat of his armies by the Chinese in November, 1950. For in response to a question concerning the chances for Chinese intervention, he is reported to have declared that:

Had they intervened in the first or second months it would have been decisive. We are no longer fearful of their intervention. We no longer stand hat in hand. The Chinese have 300,000 men in Manchuria. Of these . . . only 50/60,000 could be gotten across the Yalu River. They have no air force. Now that we have bases for our Air Force in Korea, if the Chinese tried to get down 19 to Pyongyang there would be the greatest slaughter.

Though MacArthur later called this version an "alleged but spurious report" that "completely misrepresented" his position, it has been verified by several other reports and is generally accepted as being reasonably accurate. In all fairness to the General, one must admit that this was the generally accepted viewpoint. No participant in the meeting (which included the Secretary of the Army, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Commander of the Pacific Fleet, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs) is reported to have taken issue with MacArthur over this statement. General Bradley even asked MacArthur how soon would four divisions be able to be redeployed to Europe. The advocates of MacArthur continue to persist, however, in describing this conference as an effort by the Joint Chiefs to associate themselves with his victory at Inchon, and to blame him for the success of the Chinese intervention. In any event, the conference only further embittered MacArthur's attitude toward his nominal superiors in Washington.

For the Chinese invasion marks the beginning of the final phase of the dispute between the Joint Chiefs and their Pacific commander. We have traced their increasingly troubled relationship from the end of the Second World War to the North Korean invasion in 1950. Both the Inchon controversy and the publication of the Wake Island notes served to heighten the policy dispute with intense personal animosities. With the appointment of George Marshall as Secretary of Defense, the difference became even more sharply drawn. As Chief of Staff, Secretary of State, and as Secretary of Defense, Marshall "followed policies to whose chief Pacific and Far Eastern aspects MacArthur was completely and fundamentally opposed."²⁰ Their mutual

antipathy has been previously discussed. It is mentioned again only to note the timing of Marshall's resumption of high office. MacArthur now faced both a hostile Joint Chiefs of Staff, supported by a long-time personal rival.

As United Nations' forces moved closer to the Manchurian border, increasing restrictions were placed upon their tactical actions. Certain places in North Korea close to the Russian border were placed off limits for both air and land forces. Violation of Manchurian air space was forbidden, even in hot pursuit (which is itself an interesting and worthwhile aspect to study). When he began to receive reports of increasing Red Chinese buildup across the Yalu, MacArthur requested permission to interdict the supply lines to the south by bombing the Yalu bridges. Expecting routine approval, he was shocked by Marshall's reply. Not only was he forbidden to attack the bridges, but he was also ordered to postpone all bombing within five miles of the Manchurian border. These measures were taken so as to avoid any provocation of Red China which she might use as a pretext for intervention. A vigorous protest from MacArthur brought forth a reconsideration: Only the Korean side of the bridges could be destroyed. Since the Yalu contained many sharp curves, the planes could only attack from certain angles. This restriction was soon apparent to the Chinese. They set up their anti-aircraft batteries on the Manchurian side, along the route which they knew the jets were forced to fly to avoid violating their air space. Protesting that he was being denied the power to protect the security of his troops, MacArthur contemplated resigning his post in protest, but was dissuaded by his chief of staff. Soon after-

ward, Marshall sent him a conciliatory message, noting that:

I understand, I think, the difficulty involved in conducting such a battle under necessarily limited conditions and the necessity of keeping a distant headquarters, in Washington, informed of developments and decisions. However, this appears to be unavoidable. 21 We are faced with an extremely grave international crisis.

MacArthur felt that not only did Marshall not understand the difficulties placed upon him (for he never had commanded troops in the field) but was placing inadequate priority upon Asian affairs.

On November 27th, two Chinese Army Groups, under the command of Lin Piao, attacked in full force. MacArthur was immediately aware of the size of the enemy opposite him and the numerical inferiority of his troops. On November 29, he requested permission to negotiate directly to obtain Nationalist Chinese forces for use in Korea. The Joint Chiefs replied that a firm answer would be delayed, for it would have "world-wide consequences. We shall have to consider the possibility that it would disrupt the united positions of the nations associated with us in the United Nations . . . the utmost care will be necessary to avoid the disruption of the essential Allied line-up of that organization."²² Left unstated at the time was the doubtful value of Chiang's forces in the minds of the Joint Chiefs. If they entered the war, they would have to be fully supported and equipped by United States troops, and thus would be more a burden than an aide. MacArthur's protests over this decision was one of the major causes of the December 6th Presidential directive, ordering that all statements on military policy must be first approved by the Department of Defense and that all statements on foreign policy be approved by the De-

partment of State. Though it was issued to all theater commanders, it was specifically aimed at MacArthur.

If reinforcements from Formosa were not forthcoming, the United Nations Command in Korea was in a serious plight. In a December 3rd message to the Joint Chiefs, MacArthur stated that the entry of "an entirely new power of great military strength" created a new type of war in which his former directives for action were of little relevance. "This calls," he thus concluded, "for political decisions and strategic plans" to meet this new threat.²³ Under the present situation, the rapid and steady attrition of his forces must be contemplated. Thus he expressed an urgent need for not only more men and supplies, but also for a new war policy. He received his answer from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on December 29. This communication reveals the true extent of the gulf between this group and MacArthur, and is basic to an understanding of resulting events. The enemy, began the Joint Chiefs, appeared to have the capacity to drive the United Nations Forces from the peninsula. The only ways to prevent this was to commit more troops (as MacArthur had urged) or to make "the effort so costly to the enemy that they would abandon it."²⁴ Since it was not feasible to obtain more troops from the United Nations and the addition of more American forces would jeopardize our global commitments, the second course would be adopted. Thus MacArthur was ordered to defend in successive positions down the peninsula. If the enemy appeared to be able to destroy his forces, then withdrawal to Japan should be contemplated. In proposing this course of action, the Joint Chiefs were, in large part, confirming their stand upon Korea in 1947. The retention of Korea was desirable but not crucial to our security.

It was the forcefully expressed rationale of the decision that was so offensive to MacArthur. For it was the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that:

Korea is not the place to fight a major war. Further we believe that we should not commit our remaining available ground forces to action against Chinese Communist forces in Korea in the face of the eventual threat of general war. However, a successful resistance to Chinese-North Korean aggression at some position in Korea and a deflation of the military and political prestige of the Chinese Communists would be of great importance to our national interests, if they could be accomplished without sustaining serious losses.²⁵

In the mind of MacArthur, this constituted nothing less than a loss of the "will to win" on the part of the Joint Chiefs. As his aide, General Courtney Whitney bitterly remarked, "the most repugnant aspect of the message was a seeming intention of the Joint Chiefs not only to give up without a hard fight" but also to evade responsibility for the decision to withdraw to Japan.²⁶ For this was directly contrary to the type of war which MacArthur had always waged. He refused, as we noted in the previous chapter, to accept the basic premise of limited war: the national interest is paramount to military victory. To MacArthur, military victory was identical to the national interest. He was unable to perceive, as were the Joint Chiefs, the relation of military and political affairs. They saw war as did Clausewitz: subordinated to political goals. MacArthur not only disagreed with their political priorities but also the means to their goals.

This gap in understanding is amply revealed in his reply to the Joint Chiefs. In this message, he advocated that the Chinese were vulnerable in other areas, for the bulk of their forces were centered in Korea.

By (1) blockading the Chinese coasts; (2) destroying their industrial capacity to wage war; (3) using Nationalist Chinese forces in Korea; and (4) releasing the Nationalist Chinese from their restrictions upon action on the Chinese Mainland, the United Nations could "largely neutralize China's capacity to wage aggressive war."²⁷ Continuing to argue against the European priorities of Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he stated that:

I understand thoroughly the demand for European security and fully concur in doing everything possible in that sector, but not to the point of accepting defeat anywhere else - an acceptance which I am sure could not fail to insure later defeat in Europe itself.²⁸

Thus MacArthur reiterates his long held belief that the object of Russia is to hold at the center (Europe) and advance at the ends (Africa and Asia). This statement also illustrates his continuing unwillingness to accept the tenets of limited warfare. The reply which he received from the Joint Chiefs on January 9 thus served but to harden the final positions on each side: "There is little possibility of policy change or other eventuality justifying strengthening our position in Korea."²⁹ Formosan troops would not be introduced into the situation and China would be attacked only in retaliation for an attack on United States positions outside of Korea. As in the other message, there was no equivocation but a firm statement of policy.

In response to MacArthur's extremely pessimistic view of the possibility of success under the present limitations, the Joint Chiefs drew up a contingency plan. On January 12, they presented a sixteen-point memorandum concerning various plans of action to be put into effect if Korea

had to be evacuated. These proposals included the four recommendations of MacArthur in his December 29 reply to the Joint Chiefs. Both he and the Secretary of Defense received copies of this report. It must be emphasized that it was to be employed contingent to the fall of Korea to the Communists. Generals Collins and Vandenburg were sent to Korea on January 12 to examine the situation at first hand and to report their findings to the Joint Chiefs. After a five-day visit, they departed, relieved to find that the military situation was quite strong and evacuation no longer a probability. Thus the extreme measures, which they had foreseen necessary if Korea fell, were no longer considered.

At this point fate intervened - a bizarre breakdown in communications between the Joint Chiefs and MacArthur which adversely affected their already cool relationship. As they later testified, the January 12 proposals were meant by the Joint Chiefs to be strictly contingent upon either the fall of Korea or the hopeless restriction of United Nations forces to the Pusan perimeter. But through a regrettable clerical error, a paragraph in the preface of the document emphasizing the conditional nature of the recommendations was deleted from the final copy. The exact wording of the crucial part was ". . . as soon as our position in Korea is stabilized or when we have evacuated Korea and depending upon circumstances then obtaining."³⁰ MacArthur and his staff assumed, in General Whitney's words, "that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had finally overcome their illusion that fighting back against China would bring on global war," and had recommended a strategy in many ways similar to that of MacArthur's.³¹ For they took the Joint Chiefs at their word that "as soon as our position is stabilized

. . ." these extreme policies would be initiated. Whitney at least disputes the claim of that group that their proposals were only conditional. MacArthur does not even mention that but merely notes in his memoirs that the Joint Chiefs had approved a blockade of China, removal of restrictions on the Chinese Nationalists and logistical support for operations against the Chinese. Certain of their other, less drastic, proposals were later implemented, such as a more intensive economic blockade of China.

If one views the document from the position of the Joint Chiefs, one can readily see their true intention. For the reports that they had been receiving from their field commander were quite pessimistic, probably overly so. MacArthur was likely trying to impress upon them the gravity of the situation, so as to gain approval of his plan. From his viewpoint, the situation was daily becoming more stable and he was even preparing to counterattack. During the January visit of Generals Collins and Vandenburg, the city of Osan was attacked and overrun by the Eighth Army. While it was incumbent on the Joint Chiefs to fully explain their recommendations, it was rather unwise of MacArthur to believe that these long-time opponents of his policy, had so dramatically reversed their stand. It was quite unlikely that the same group which had informed MacArthur on January 9 that there was "little possibility of policy change" could have, just three days later, so drastically reversed their positions. One of the major efforts of this essay has been to illustrate the long record of acrimony between the Joint Chiefs and MacArthur - both collectively and as individuals. All the members of the former group, except one, were strongly committed to European priorities. They had repeatedly

stated that Korea was not the place to fight a major war, for it was not vital to American security. Under these circumstances, MacArthur's unquestioning acceptance of the memorandum can only be termed wishful thinking.

Yet much of the later debate was based on this point. The misreading of the message fooled the men in Tokyo into thinking that they had finally won over the Joint Chiefs and thus gained powerful support for an aggressive Asian policy. This was basic to MacArthur's increasingly bold actions in the spring of 1951. Even though the Joint Chiefs later rescinded certain of their supposed recommendations (use of Nationalist Chinese troops), he continued to depend on their support. His belief was that the Joint Chiefs were actually supporters of his policy but were countermanded by Bradley, Marshall and Truman. As he phrased it, the President's "political advisers were playing strategists and his military advisers playing politics."³² Thus, tragically for his cause, MacArthur was increasingly assured that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were, in the main, supporters of his overall strategy. When he was disabused of this illusion, the pattern of persecution of Washington-based officers would once again reappear. Therefore, he began his final months in Korea depending on the support of powerful elements in Congress and, so he thought, "on the backing of four men with more prestige than any corresponding group in the United States government."³³

It is important to view MacArthur's actions in February and March in this context. For during these months, bolstered by his supposed support, he began to more vigorously reply to criticisms of his actions. Both

he and his staff had always, as we have noted, been quite sensitive to criticism. This is one aspect of his high position which even MacArthur could seemingly not adapt to. His sensitivity to adverse comments "led him to equate criticism with disloyalty and to allay responsibility for his predicaments and failures upon his civilian and military superiors in Washington,"³⁴ another example of his persecution syndrome. This was most evident in the aftermath of his defeat by the Chinese in November, 1950. As Walter Millis has remarked, "the one salient act was that MacArthur had been taken by surprise and badly defeated in the moment of victory. And to MacArthur this was intolerable."³⁵ On November 28, he issued a special communique explaining his actions to the public. On November 30, he sent a reply to a column of Arthur Krock in the New York Times. On December 1, he had an interview with the editor of the U.S. News and World Report, and sent a telegram to the president of the United Press. His basic message was fourfold: (1) he had forced China's hand by his well-timed advance; (2) the Chinese attack was preplanned and not a reaction to that advance; (3) the retrograde movement of his troops was a "brilliant withdrawal" and not a retreat; and (4) his inability to defeat the Chinese volunteers was the result of restrictions "without parallel in history."³⁶ These statements, with his public avowal of the use of Chinese Nationalist troops, led Truman to issue his directive of December 6, which also forbade unapproved public statements on policy matters as well as personal interviews with news publications. This order, plus MacArthur's desire to win the Administration to his policy, kept him silent until February.

For, unable to reconcile his views with the restrictions on his actions, he made public his disagreement with the Administration's policy

in strong statements on February 13 and March 7. If he would just be allowed to use all the vast forces at his disposal, as had every commander in history, noted MacArthur, he would be able to administer both a military and a political defeat upon the Chinese. The object was not to destroy Chinese, as Ridgway was doing, but to destroy Chinese ability to make war. But with:

. . . existing limitations upon our freedom of counteroffensive action, and no major additions to our organizational strength, the battle lines cannot fail in time to reach a point of theoretical military stalemate. Therefore our further advance would benefit the enemy more than ourselves.

Having thus analyzed the situation from a military point of view, he concludes:

. . . vital decisions have yet to be made - decisions far beyond the scope of authority invested in me as the military commander . . . which must provide on the highest level an answer to the . . . unsolved problems raised by Red China's undeclared war in Korea.³⁷

In this statement, truly extraordinary for a field commander under civilian control, he publicly criticized the non-program of the Administration. After strongly hinting of the futility of a frontal attack, he arrogantly announces ^d that decisions must be made about our Korean policy. But as we have seen, decisions had been made and repeatedly communicated and explained to MacArthur. Presumably, he wished that these be reversed. For General Whitney notes that, on February 11, MacArthur discussed his own plan: dual amphibious attacks on either side of the peninsula, after having sown radioactive wastes across the border to interdict supplies and reinforcements. "It would be Inchon all over again, except on a far greater

scale."³⁸ Even so, this statement was quite out of the ordinary. To place the remark in context, let us compare it with the opening words of General Dwight E. Eisenhower's testimony to a Congressional committee in 1947. In this statement, he notes that he is appearing as a professional soldier, "to give you a soldier's advice regarding the national defense. I am not qualified to proceed beyond that field, and I do not intend to do so."³⁹ Apparently MacArthur was prepared to do so, or so it appeared to Washington.

On March 20, 1951, the Joint Chiefs informed MacArthur that the President was shortly to attempt to extend feelers to the Chinese concerning negotiations to end the war. He was also asked whether he would need any new authority to protect his troops during this period. MacArthur replied that his current directives were satisfactory. With this notice from its field commander, the Administration prepared its proposal. This statement declared that the original objective of the United Nations forces had been achieved and thus called for a cease-fire by the Chinese. If Peking refused to accept this offer, then the Allies would continue to press the fight. But before the Administration was able to present the proposed cease-fire to the Chinese, MacArthur issued a second extraordinary statement on March 24. In this "routine communique," as he later named it, he declared that China had failed in her attempt to drive the United Nations troops off Korean soil. "Of even greater significance than our tactical successes," he continued, "has been the clear revelation that the new enemy, Red China, lacks the industrial capacity to provide many critical items essential to the conduct of modern war." Thus its inability to fight a

modern war has been successfully demonstrated by the victory of the United Nations forces. Up to this point, MacArthur's statement is not considerably different from that of Truman. But then he continued:

The enemy, therefore, must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea, through an expansion of our operations to his coastal areas and interior bases, would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse.⁴⁰

The tone of this dispatch could only intimate to China that we would carry the war to her, if she did not capitulate soon. Naturally, there was little likelihood that China would shame herself by surrendering before such an arrogant public ultimatum. Her reply was quite predictable: "War-monger MacArthur made a fanatical . . . statement with the intention . . . to extend the war of aggression into China."⁴¹ Thus it destroyed any chance of success which Truman's statement might have had. As such, it was both intemperate and insubordinate.

His attack on public policy continued. On April 4, he was quoted in a newspaper interview as declaring that "the politicians must face up to the realities of the war in Korea . . . it is not the soldier who is encroaching upon the realm of the politician but the politician who has encroached on that of the soldier."⁴² The following day, House Minority Leader Joe Martin made public a letter he had received from MacArthur on March 21. The letter continued his extraordinary series of criticisms of long established Administration policy, noting:

It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for world conquest (an almost word-for-word repetition of his September, 1950, letter to the Joint Chiefs) . . . that if we lose the war to Communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable . . . There is no substitute for victory.⁴³

Although he attached "little importance" to the exchange of notes with Martin, MacArthur must have realized that he was violating long accepted military practices. It is one thing to criticize a policy in a communication with the Joint Chiefs, it is entirely another to do so with a leader of the opposition party.

This last outburst stirred Truman into action. He had planned to dismiss MacArthur after his statement of March 24, but was preparing to do so after some preparation. For MacArthur was "apparently never able to believe that his program had been rejected by military men on military grounds, not just by political men on political grounds."⁴⁴ His unwillingness to accept the decision of his nominal superiors left Truman with little choice but to dismiss him. On April 6, the President held a meeting with Dean Acheson, General Marshall, General Bradley and Averill Harriman, to discuss suitable reactions to MacArthur's statements. All present agreed that he should be dismissed. Truman notes, with some satisfaction, that "Bradley approached the question entirely from the point of view of military discipline . . . there was a clear case of insubordination and the general deserved to be relieved of his command."⁴⁵ Yet Bradley wished to consult the Joint Chiefs of Staff before making a final decision. Acheson also believed it "essential to have the unanimous advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff" before acting in this matter.⁴⁶ These remarks reveal the influence which the opinion of the military chiefs had on Truman and his understanding of the importance of their support against the charges of MacArthur. Another meeting was held on April 11. Bradley, who had consulted with the Joint Chiefs on the day before, reported their unanimous

recommendation that MacArthur be dismissed. General Marshall, who had spent the weekend reviewing the situation, declared that was his decision as well.

Though Truman contends, probably truly, that his mind was already made up, his decision to request the advice of the Joint Chiefs is quite significant. For his final decision was not announced until he had the support of Marshall and his fellow generals. This reveals, I contend, the personal and professional esteem with which Truman regarded these men. For throughout the Korean War, he largely followed their advice on the conduct of the war. This is not to say that they were the main instigators of his policies, but that Truman's long association with Bradley and Marshall had led him to hold their opinions in high regard. If the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and especially Marshall, had urged a change in policy, there was a great likelihood that the President would at least take their advice into serious consideration. What is not hypothetical is that their advice and support were fundamental to his program. In this sense, I disagree with the Rovere-Schlesinger thesis that it was only important, but not basic. That the case against MacArthur "would have been just the same - just as strong or just as weak," without the support of the military, is debatable, as I intend to discuss in the next chapter. Yet it is evident that the probability of successfully presenting that case to the nation would simply not have been the same, had the Joint Chiefs voted unanimously not to dismiss MacArthur. This point will be more fully explored in the following chapter.

In any case, MacArthur's removal from his posts was not really surprising to the informed military observer. General Mark Clark, who

was later to take over the United Nations Com^mand, visited him in the fall of 1950. During their conversation, MacArthur bitterly protested the restrictions on his command and "specifically, he was most critical of the Joint Chiefs," for not supporting his position. Thus, even though Clark was one of his staunch supporters in the military, his dismissal was "not exactly unexpected"⁴⁷ in view of his widely known feud with that group. Throughout this essay, we have attempted to regard the MacArthur controversy from a military point of view. It is from this standpoint that we have discussed the culmination of the long history of disagreement between the great general and the Defense Establishment.

In this chapter, we have attempted to illustrate several points of friction which arose during the Korean Conflict. The first was the seeming unwillingness of the Joint Chiefs to properly support the Korean Command in the early days of the war. Once again MacArthur felt that Europe was wrongly given the first priority in our defensive posture. The second incident was the dispute over the feasibility of the landing at Inchon. This provided, as we have shown, a direct confrontation between the Joint Chiefs and MacArthur on both policy and personal grounds. And, in a true sense, the General's victory in this argument was of both a professional and a personal nature. The conflict of personality was further embittered by the Wake Island meeting in October, 1950. Increasingly resentive in his restricted position and stung by personal criticism, MacArthur tried to clarify, and hopefully alter, Administration policy in the Far East. His tragic misunderstanding of the position of the Joint Chiefs after January, 1951, was the final event which ruptured any semblance

of normal relations between them. In publicly attacking the government's policy, he attempted to exonerate himself for his failure to defeat the Chinese. Finally, disobeying specific instructions to the contrary, he willfully misrepresented Administration policy in a blatantly political statement. Having repeatedly disregarded and disobeyed orders from his superiors during the entire Korean Conflict, Douglas MacArthur was dismissed from all commands, effective 11 April, 1951.

4. THE MACARTHUR HEARINGS

"Now, no man in the world is more anxious to avoid the expansion of war than I am. I am just 100% a believer against war . . . it is a form of mutual suicide . . . the entire effort of modern society should be concentrated in an endeavor to outlaw war."¹

General Douglas MacArthur

The specific offenses which led to the dismissal of MacArthur were threefold: one of a political and two of a military nature. The political reason: that he had publicly and consistently challenged the role of the President as formulator of American foreign policy, is the aspect most often considered by scholars. For our purpose, we have preferred to concentrate upon the military ramifications of the affair and thus will examine more closely the latter two reasons for his dismissal.

First, MacArthur had failed to obey the Presidential memorandum of December 6: "No speech, press release or other public statement concerning military policy should be released until it has clearance from Department of Defense."² A similar directive was sent out to the theater commanders pertaining to foreign policy and the State Department. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it was not so much that he had flaunted their directives in the past but that he might willfully do so in the future, with more serious repercussions ensuing. Secondly, MacArthur was dis-

missed because he "was not in sympathy with the decision to try to limit the conflict to Korea."³ In this chapter all of these reasons will be illustrated by examining the testimony offered during the Joint Congressional Hearings on the Military Situation in the Far East (hereafter referred to as the MacArthur Hearings, as they were popularly known).

Though the dismissal was ostensibly a political decision, it was the very political vulnerability of the Administration which forced the Joint Chiefs to bear "the chief burden" of defending its policies. Secretary of State Acheson's influence was largely used up by the increasing hostility toward him in Congress and throughout the nation. Of the prestige of the President, the less said the better. Both Truman and Acheson realized this situation, as we have seen in the details of their decision to recall the General. Yet it was also incumbent upon Marshall and the Joint Chiefs to defend the policies of the Truman Administration. For, in a real as well as symbolic sense, these were their policies as well. President Truman had long had great faith in the wisdom and experience of General Marshall. In 1944, when Franklin Roosevelt was still alive, he called the general "the greatest living American." In 1945, ^{Truman} he asked Marshall to go to China as his special envoy. From January, 1947, to January, 1949, the two were in daily and close association during Marshall's term as Secretary of State. And it is symbolic of Truman's admiration of the man that, in September 1950, during the darkest days of the Korean War, the President should once again call upon the general to be a close advisor to him. ^{Marshall's} ~~His~~ opinion carried a great weight in the cabinet, as well. Dean Acheson had been an assistant of his during his

two years as head of the Department of State. Of all the other members, he was the senior in high level service in Washington. Thus I submit that the differences between MacArthur and Marshall had a substantial effect on the MacArthur controversy in 1951, for Marshall did have a major voice in the policy decisions. For all his breadth of intellect and experience, he was still basically a military man in his training and thought. As Senator Wiley asked him at the opening of his testimony at the Hearings: "How are we supposed to address you now, as Mr. Secretary or General?" Marshall's reply was illuminating: "I react more quickly to General."⁴

Recognizing the influence of Marshall in the Cabinet and his basic military orientation, this affair can be viewed not only as a civil-military crisis but also as a confrontation of intra-military factions themselves. Throughout this essay, we have attempted to trace the long pattern of conflict between the Marshall and MacArthur officers. From the standpoint of both personality and policy, the MacArthur Hearings were the final, most direct and most important confrontation between these two groups. All the various patterns of dispute are unravelled in these many days of testimony. And not the least of these is the situation of MacArthur opposing the whole of Washington officialdom. It was this aspect, in the end, which was basic to the case of the military chiefs against MacArthur. Like all soldiers, he took the oath to obey his superiors in his service to his country. For "obedience is the cardinal virtue of the military profession."⁵ To challenge this concept is therefore to challenge the authority of the Chiefs of Staff. It was the fact, in General Ridgway's words, that MacArthur "clearly disregarded, if he did not deliberately ignore, the lawful orders of his superiors," that brought about his demise.

On May 3, 1951, the hearings officially began. First to testify was General MacArthur, recently returned from a thunderous reception in New York City. Arguing in purely military terms, his message was that in war, "there is no alternative than to apply every available means to bring it to a swift end."⁶ This was the only sure means to victory - therefore victory was not the goal of the Truman Administration. MacArthur then offered a positive program to end the war: we must defeat the Chinese armies in the field and destroy their capacity to wage offensive war. To this end, he outlined the measures contained in his December 29th memorandum to the Joint Chiefs: blockading the coast of China, bombing Manchuria, tightening the economic embargo, removing the restrictions on Chiang Kai-shek and, lastly, carrying the war to China. This plan, he declared, would not require a great increase in troop commitments, only "a certain amount of Navy and Air" personnel. Most important to his case was that, on January 12, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had informed him of their support for the plan. And "as far as I know," he continued, "the Joint Chiefs have never changed their recommendation."⁷

It was on this purported unanimity with the Joint Chiefs that MacArthur was to base the major portion of his argument. Yet one pressing question was never successfully answered by him: if they supported his plan in January, why did their later messages not reveal this sentiment? When his policy was not enacted, why did they not protest as he did? Was MacArthur the only general with the courage to fight for his convictions, was he the only "honorable" man among them? So it must have seemed to him in 1951. Even at this distance from the controversy, one must admire

the audacity of the man. For in our examination of the communications between Tokyo and Washington, we have seen that the Joint Chiefs clearly expressed the opinion that Korea was not the place to fight a major conflict. Yet MacArthur still insisted that "the entire control of my command and everything I did came from our own Chiefs of Staff."⁸ Thus once again he attempted to create an impression of united military support for his actions. Continuing to base his statements on the January 12 message, he declared that, far from being opposed by the Joint Chiefs, their recommendations were "almost identically" the same as his. It is almost inconceivable that, during the visit of Generals Collins and Vandenburg on January 12, the two sides could not have been aware of their wide discrepancy of opinion over this document. Yet so it seems. This oversight was to be most damaging to MacArthur's seemingly impressive position.

MacArthur was convinced that we could defeat China in an all-out war, without bringing the Soviet Union into the conflict on the side of China. Unless the Russians were inclined to intervene anyway, air attacks on Manchuria would not precipitate any retaliation. The posture of the Soviet Asiatic forces was "largely defensive" and MacArthur did not believe that it was within their capability to "mass any great additional increment of force to launch any predatory attack from the Asian mainland."⁹ The reluctance of our European allies to adopt such a policy was quite natural, noted MacArthur. The Europeans were most interested in the security of their own continent and thus were not favorable to any addition of force in Asia. For every such increment decreased the

defenses of their homelands. As he had so often stated to the Joint Chiefs "if the fight is not waged with invincible determination to meet the challenge here in Asia, it will be fought, and probably lost, on the battlefield of Europe."¹⁰ The first line of defense for Europe was in Korea, not in Germany.

The major weakness in MacArthur's argument, which was to be so greatly emphasized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was first expressed by Senator MacMahon. He asked MacArthur what he would do if, indeed, war with Russia and China did break out, due to the implementation of his program. The General replied that it was not his responsibility to concern himself with global affairs. He was "desperately occupied" by the many duties of Pacific Commander. The Senator replied:

General, I think you make the point very well that I want to make: that the Joint Chiefs and the President of the United States, the Commander-in-Chief, have to look at this thing on a global basis and a global defense.

You as a theater commander, by your statement, have not made that kind of study, and yet you advise to push forward with a course of action that may involve us in a global conflict.¹¹

Thus we see that MacArthur retained the basic world outlook of the Old Army. War must be waged as a crusade, without limitations. While he probably did not believe in as sharp a division between military and political aspects as some scholars have charged, he nevertheless did believe that politically oriented officials should not inhibit the field commander from achieving a military victory. Thus he rejected limited warfare as a practical concept. Attempting to identify himself and the Joint Chiefs with similar programs, he charged that the military were being overruled

by ignorant civilian officials. Yet he must have ^{had} tongue in cheek when he noted that "if there has been any friction between us, (J.C.S. and MacArthur), I am not aware of it."¹² This was simply not true. Instead, he charged, "Mr. Truman's policy reversed United States military doctrine of a centry^u and a half from reliance on attack to defense."¹³ That, indeed, was the principle of containment. As to the "grotesque" charge of insubordination for his March 24 message to the Chinese field commander, he characteristically relied on his knowledge of history, saying that:

From the beginning of warfare, it has not only been a right but a duty for a field commander to take any steps within his power to minimize the bloodshed to the soldiers of his command.¹⁴

Besides, declared MacArthur, he was a professional soldier and always obeyed the commands of superior officers. Thus he stated unequivocally that "there isn't any possibility of my disagreeing with any order I might have received whether I regarded it as good, bad, or indifferent." Thus did he defend his actions and his philosophy to the joint committee and the rest of the nation.

The next witness was Secretary of Defense George Marshall. His testimony set the tone of the Administration's defense by defending its policy and attacking MacArthur's criticisms on largely military grounds. Marshall's performance was a superb and restrained introduction to the later testimony of his generals. He discussed the differences between the Joint Chiefs and MacArthur much as had Senator MacMahon. For the stated that:

This divergence arose from the inherent difference between the position of a field commander and the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense and the President, who are responsible for the total security of the United States.¹⁵

Thus it was natural and proper that MacArthur should be so highly interested and informed about his area of operations. That he should be rather biased about its relative importance was also to be expected as the result of such long service in the Pacific. His disagreement with certain of the Administration's policies was also not unusual. But what was "wholly unprecedented," said Marshall, was the "situation of a local theater commander publicly expressing his displeasure at, and disagreement with, the foreign and military policy of the United States."¹⁶ MacArthur had been first warned to use discretion and then forbidden to make any statement without Defense Department approval. He directly disobeyed this order by his statements in February, March, and April, of 1951. Thus there existed "no other recourse but to relieve him." An officer's duty is to obey. If he feels that he cannot obey, he must either resign or register his dissent through the proper channels.

In the eyes of Marshall, General MacArthur was like any other theater commander: he must go through the chain of command to register his protests. After the decision has been made by his superiors, he must not hesitate to obey. In answer to the question of whether or not MacArthur's statements were harmful, Marshall stated that in the case of his March 24 declaration, it made it "necessary to abandon the effort" to reach an armistice, "thus losing whatever chance there may have been at that time to negotiate a settlement."¹⁷ By this one act, MacArthur broke a regulation, attempted to change the foreign policy of the Administration and betrayed a massive lack of sympathy for the restriction of the war to Korean soil. The major effect of this action was to raise in the minds

of the officials in Washington, concern over the lack of his effective control by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For this was not the first time such an incident had occurred. In October of 1950, when the United States forces were proceeding rapidly to the Manchurian border, the Joint Chiefs ordered MacArthur not to send American troops within a certain distance of that line. Only South Korean troops were to be sent up to the Yalu. The object of this tactic was to convince the Chinese that the United States had no aggressive designs upon Manchuria. In his official directive of October 24, however, MacArthur ordered several American units to proceed all the way to the Yalu River line. In his testimony, General Collins related this incident in detail, noting that MacArthur pleaded "military necessity" when reprimanded by the Joint Chiefs. Collins continued, saying that "this was one indication among many others . . . that led us gradually to fear that just as he violated a policy in this case without consulting us, perhaps the thing might be done in some other instance of a more serious nature." ¹⁸ The fear was justified by the March 24 statement.

What is more, declared Marshall, the Joint Chiefs had warned MacArthur on several other occasions. Reading from a recent report of the Joint Chiefs, he noted that "he (MacArthur) further stated that he would, under no circumstance, extend the boundaries of his authority as theater commander." ¹⁹ Therefore he knew quite well what his limits of authority were and when he had transgressed them. The January 12 memorandum of the Joint Chiefs on Korea was, Marshall further emphasized, merely a "planning study" and not a directive. This was evidence of a breakdown in communications between MacArthur and his superiors in Washington. Thus his removal was

not surprising to the Chiefs of Staff. Bradley stated that "it was necessary to have a commander more responsive to control from Washington."²⁰

For the General had become increasingly antagonistic and even unreceptive to the advice of the military chiefs. General Collins admitted that the possibility of dismissal "had run through my mind . . . if the situation continued to develop"²¹ in a similar manner. The rupture had become so serious that even Mark Clark was surprised at the bitterness of MacArthur's reflections on the Joint Chiefs. Admiral Sherman, who had served with MacArthur in the Pacific, was forced to remark that "the normal relationships which are desirable between one echelon of command and another," had been seriously impaired by January 1951.²²

Yet it was apparent in Marshall's testimony that the relationship between himself and the Joint Chiefs was quite close throughout this period. During his testimony, Marshall frequently referred to the recommendations which they had given him, saying that "when I refer to the views of the Joint Chiefs, I think I am correct in saying that I am referring to a very vital opinion as to what is best to be done."²³ He had, as we have seen, both a personal and professional regard for several of these men who had served under him during the war. No previous administration, declared Marshall, was "so fortunate as to have such a collection of experience at one time in the Chiefs of Staff."²⁴ This open rapport made their influence upon policy all the more effective. Their agreement upon policy issues also enabled them to more strongly oppose the pressure of MacArthur for the alteration of that policy.

Much of MacArthur's case was based on his superior credentials as America's senior military officer and on the supposed unanimity of his arguments with those of the Joint Chiefs. For some unknown reason, he clung to the belief that this group supported his program but were thwarted by Marshall and Acheson. Marshall himself left no doubt on this score. Concerning the use of Nationalist Chinese troops, he noted that the "Joint Chiefs were concerned that these forces would not be effective in Korea,"²⁵ and thus disapproved of their use. He was even more emphatic in discussing the controversial January 12th memorandum, stating unequivocally that "none of the proposed courses of action were vetoed or disapproved by me or any higher authority."²⁶ Thus he strongly countered MacArthur's contention that political officials muzzled the views of the military.

The next witness in defense of the Truman Administration was General Omar Bradley. In many ways, he was the most effective and successful proponent of the pragmatic position. For he quickly got to the point:

The fundamental military issue which has arisen is whether to increase the risk of global war by taking additional measures that are open to the United States . . . the Joint Chiefs believe that these same measures do increase the risk of global war and should not be taken.²⁷

Thus, in one quick stroke, he destroyed MacArthur's contention that the views of the Joint Chiefs "corresponded almost identically with my own beliefs on the matter."²⁸ Bradley reiterated Marshall's statement that the higher headquarters were better able than any theater commander to assess the risks of general war. The basic error in MacArthur's analysis was an incorrect assignment of strategic priorities. The two great leaders of power blocs, noted Bradley, were the United States and the Soviet Union.

It is in Europe against Russia that all of our efforts must be centered. The engagement in Korea, no matter how large it became, must be looked upon in this perspective. It is the control of the "Eurasian land mass," declared Bradley, which could give Russia the "broad base upon which to build the military power to rule the world."²⁹

What policy should the United States follow? ^{Because of} ~~Due to~~ our strategic weaknesses, he states, we cannot fight a major war in Asia without harming the defense of Europe. Thus we are forced to fight a limited war in Korea, while we increase our strength in other parts of the world. As Bradley succinctly remarked, "we are not in the best position for a showdown."³⁰

On June 24, 1951, the United States possessed only eleven combat divisions, one of which was an armored division. The bulk of these forces were in ^{was} Korea and Europe, leaving the country with only a minimal reserve to meet unseen contingencies. Thus a major war in Asia, in 1951, would be, in Bradley's now famous phrase, "the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy."³¹ The limited war in Korea was useful in that it brought the United States both time and the impetus to rearm and properly defend its global interests.

Therefore Bradley and the Joint Chiefs declared their full acceptance of the concept of limited warfare. "Your objectives in war are not entirely military," he commented, "you use the military to gain your political objectives."³² Army Chief of Staff Collins agreed, adding that "you cannot separate the military reasoning from your political background" - instead, a union of both goals must be sought.³³ On purely military grounds, the expansion of the war in Korea was not feasible. Victory could not be assured,

for there were too many unknown factors which could not be accurately measured. In Bradley's opinion, "victory over China would be many years away" and thus the reward was not worth the cost. Completing his refutation of MacArthur's position, Bradley lastly stated that the Joint Chiefs had never been overruled in their recommendation on Korean policy. In other words, the Far Eastern policy of the Truman Administration was the policy which they had originally proposed. This course of action, concluded Bradley, "is paying off and I see no reason to let impatience alter it in the Far East."³⁴

A most important achievement of the testimony of the Joint Chiefs was to give the "purely military" consequences of the political effects of MacArthur's proposed Asian policy. When General Marshall was asked to comment on the probable military effects of that program, he replied that it raised:

. . . the possibilities of the loss of our allies, the loss of construction and development of collective action, and collective defense, and the hazard of . . . a general war . . . and might result in a great increase in casualties without a decisive finish.³⁵

It would, he stated, very seriously jeopardize the security of Europe, by weakening our already minimal defensive alignment in that theater. Therefore, it would necessitate a drastic adjustment of General Eisenhower's war plans. An extended war in Korea would not only weaken our global posture but would not lead to a quick decision as MacArthur had promised. Bradley fully agreed with his superior's prognosis. The major effect of MacArthur's proposals would be to "tie down additional forces, especially our sea and air power," without reaching a decisive conclusion. To bring

China to its knees, he contended, a full-scale invasion would be necessary: I do not believe you could get any decision by naval and air action alone."³⁶ Furthermore, any attempt to extend the war would open up Japan, Okinawa, and Formosa to air and naval attack by China. Like Manchuria, Bradley noted, these areas were "privileged sanctuaries" of supply and support. All were quite vulnerable to air attacks and would therefore suffer from an extension of the war. The Chinese "are not bombing our ports and supply installations," argued Bradley, "and they are not bombing our troops," in Japan, but would if MacArthur's plans were adopted.

Both General Collins and Admiral Sherman agreed with this analysis. Collins noted that the full implementation of the MacArthur program would require "considerably" more troops in Korea, even if the Chinese mainland were not invaded. ^{Because of} ~~Due to~~ the ineffectiveness of Chinese Nationalist troops, the new increments would have to come from the United States. We would have to withdraw units from Europe and create new units at home. This, commented Collins, was unacceptable. For if the Soviet Union were to initiate a global war in response to our attack upon China, he believed that we had "sufficient forces in the far East to hold out there. I think that we have sufficient forces in Alaska to hold out there. I do not think we have sufficient forces in Europe."³⁷ Admiral Sherman testified that MacArthur's estimate on the effectiveness of the economic blockade of China was overly optimistic. Without the aid of our allies, the effort would "leak like a sieve." Port Arthur and Darien were Soviet-controlled ports and:

If the United Nations should declare a naval blockade, the Russians would probably respect it, as they did the United States blockade of Korea. If the United States should declare a blockade unilaterally, the Russians might not respect it, and it is considered that they might oppose it by force . . . the fact is that our allies have been unwilling to join in a naval blockade of China, and have been slow to establish a tight economic blockade.³⁸

In other words, the prospects for success were dim. Even if a blockade were created, the Soviet Union would still supply China by land routes or by her large supply depots in China proper. If we imposed a unilateral stoppage, we would estrange our allies and destroy the effectiveness of the newly created North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Perhaps the most important and most neglected testimony was that of Air Force Chief of Staff, Hoyt Vandenburg. His technical arguments destroyed what remained of the allegation that politics had affected the decisions of the Joint Chiefs. Vandenburg strongly opposed the bombing of Manchuria and China because of the heavy attrition which these efforts would cause in his supply of aircraft. "While we can lay the industrial potential of Russia to waste," he commented, "or we can lay the Manchurian countryside to waste . . . we cannot do both, again because we have got a shoestring Air Force."³⁹ Full application of our air power upon China would neutralize our power to destroy the Soviet Union. In addition, China's vital supply centers were located in the Soviet Union itself. The Russians could continue to resupply their Chinese allies by land and might even enter the fray themselves. Thus the "single potential which has kept the balance of power in our favor," our air superiority, might be wasted upon the Manchurian countryside.⁴⁰ For neither China nor Manchuria had any strategic

targets worth bombing. The Air Force, guessed Vandenburg, would have to be at least twice as large before the implementation of the MacArthur plan could be contemplated. As it was, the losses in such a campaign in 1951, could not be replaced by the existing aircraft industry until 1953, leaving the United States, "naked for several years to come."

The young Chief of Staff presented yet another serious objection to the MacArthur program. For, in attacking China, we would be alienating our allies and thus forced "to go it alone" in Europe, as well as Asia. That would mean the loss of highly desirable European air bases. For as late as July 10, 1951, the Strategic Air Command possessed only 87 B-36 long range heavy bombers. Thus the Air Force was forced to rely on its shorter-range medium bombers for most of its striking force. The production rate of the large bombers was only three per month in 1951; therefore, Vandenburg viewed the loss of European bases with understandable alarm.⁴¹ Bombers from these bases could strike the Soviet Union with more power and with more frequency than could American-based aircraft. Planes in Europe could complete 20 missions per month versus three per month for planes from North America. The loss of such valuable bases would require a tremendous increase in aircraft strength: at least five to six times the present number, noted Vandenburg. Thus the implementation of MacArthur's plan would greatly weaken both the effective strength of the Air Force and also our nuclear capability. His program "probably would not be conclusive" unless the full power of our Air Force were employed, and that, declared Vandenburg, would adversely affect the plausibility of our deterrent power.

MacArthur, foreseeing the probable arguments of his opponents, had charged that "if you let it go on indefinitely in Korea, you invite a third world war," by maintaining a high level of tension.⁴² Marshall described the policy of the Administration as to:

. . . inflict terrible casualties on the Chinese Communist troops. If we break the morale of their armies, but, more particularly, if we destroy their best trained armies as we have been in the process of doing, there, it seems to me, you develop the best possibility of reaching a satisfactory negotiatory basis.⁴³

Our best interests, both political and military, were served by containing the war to Korea, if at all possible. Fighting a defensive war in that sector, while inflicting maximum casualties upon the enemy, would give us the necessary time to build up our defense elsewhere. The Chinese, as Collins noted, did not possess "endless trained manpower" and would eventually reach the point of exhaustion, and negotiate. The effectiveness of Generals Ridgway and Van Fleet in smashing the fourth Communist offensive during the Hearings, supported this viewpoint. While the strategy would not produce military victory in Korea, "neither will this strategy risk the disaster which so nearly befell MacArthur when he guessed wrong about Chinese intentions in 1950."⁴⁴ His predictions were incorrect in 1950 and were discounted in May, 1951. The program recommended by the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense, would thus contain Chinese aggression, force the Chinese to negotiate, while maintaining an increasingly powerful defensive posture in Europe. The alternate case of action urged by MacArthur, was, "by his own admission, on the basis of limited knowledge and responsibility, and at a time of perilous unpreparedness."⁴⁵ Thus it ran the very considerable risk of precipitating a global conflict.

The combined testimony of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff effectively destroyed the premises upon which MacArthur based his program. First, their testimony revealed that he had repeatedly violated both the spirit and the letter of direct orders. The most blatant of these offenses was his March 24 declaration, which effectively halted the efforts of the Administration to procure an armistice. Secondly, the Chiefs of Staff revealed that they were unable to exercise effective control over the actions of their Far Eastern Commander. For he repeatedly ignored or disobeyed their policy directives to him. MacArthur thus understood his original orders to stay below the 38th Parallel as "permissive, not restrictive." He also blatantly disregarded their clear order not to allow American forces to approach the Manchurian border. As the generals repeatedly explained, he refused to recognize his proper position as a theater commander and had overruled several orders from his military superiors. This, if nothing else necessitated his removal. For these actions violated a cardinal military principle: orders from a superior are always obeyed, whether one likes them or not. As General Marshall commented, MacArthur's actions were "contrary to my precepts and understanding as a soldier."⁴⁶ This was not the sole principle of the military code that MacArthur violated. For, as General Collins noted, from December, 1950, there was a "growing conviction that General MacArthur was not in sympathy with the basic policy under which he was operating."⁴⁷ His sin was not that he did not approve of these policies but that his disapproval was open, sharp, and frequent. His complaints in November, 1950, that he was being kept from victory by the men in Washington, would have been ample justification alone for his removal. All

commanders have the right and the duty to argue for a position before the decision is handed down by their superiors. But once that decision is made, no questions are allowed. The spectre of a military man taking his case to the people is anathema in the American military tradition. Thus the statements by MacArthur in February, March, and April were not only in violation of a Presidential directive, but a serious break in the code of traditional military conduct. The Joint Chiefs realized and feared this aspect of the MacArthur problem. Thus it was not surprising that this group was unanimous in advising the President that MacArthur should be dismissed from his posts.

Probably the most telling blow of the Joint Chiefs was their testimony that the MacArthur program was not feasible on "purely military grounds." These actions would not necessarily bring about the defeat of China and very likely would cause the intervention of the Soviet Union. Naval and air power would not be sufficient - large troop increases would also be required. The proposed naval blockade would likely not be supported by our allies, and thus would be largely ineffective. Our defenses in Europe would be weakened, thereby inviting aggression by the Soviets in that area. The application of the necessary amount of air power to properly support MacArthur's designs would cripple our deterrent power, affect the loss of our European bases, and very likely not be as effective as he had optimistically envisioned. General Bradley succinctly expressed their collective opinion, declaring that "it is fundamental that our foreign policy must be based upon our military capabilities to back it up."⁴⁸ The net effect of the MacArthur program would be the military bankruptcy of the United States. Not only did Marshall and the Joint Chiefs illustrate their agreement with the primacy of Europe in our global strategy but they also expressed their unanimous support for the policies necessary to implement that strategic outlook.

5. AFTERMATH

"And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my military career and just fade away - an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty."¹

Douglas MacArthur returned from Japan a national hero, greeted by massive and enthusiastic crowds in both San Francisco and New York. All over the country, Truman was personally denounced, the General fulsomely praised, and his recall vocally deplored. The emotional apex of his return was his famous address to the joint session of Congress on April 19, 1951. During this "unforgettable performance," MacArthur criticized both the European priority of our defensive system and the concept of limited war. In its dramatic and emotional appeal, it was a superb presentation of his program. Yet, unfortunately for MacArthur, it proved only too prophetic of his fate. For the Joint Chiefs unanimously supported Truman in the Hearings: "the storm broke, and then, like MacArthur, it faded away."² Their testimony revealed that he was urging possible involvement in a greatly expanded conflict from quite questionable military reasoning. Therefore, they persuasively argued that the program which MacArthur proposed

not only created unacceptable risks, but also was impractical with the present state of military preparedness. Due to its effective rebuttal of MacArthur's major points and to its extended duration, "the Senate inquiry had pricked the huge bubble of emotion generated by the recall."³

Thus the Hearings served as the culmination of the long pattern of conflict between the Marshall and MacArthur factions. For Marshall soon followed his adversary into retirement in September, 1951, as did Bradley in August, 1953. It is difficult to state conclusively the effect of the investigation upon MacArthur's political career. Some observers feel that it resulted in his overexposure to the American public, who thus quickly lost interest in his cause. Whatever the case, they quite likely harmed his case, if not his personal standing, with the American populace. For "it became clear during the hearing that public opinion did not want MacArthur's 'victory' in Korea;"⁴ for it was widely thought that it would lead to the expansion of the Army's manpower requirements. The general public was tired of the war and wished to get out of Korea as soon as possible. For while many admired MacArthur and deplored the manner of his removal, few supported his potentially costly policy for Asia. Thus, despite the defeat of his program, he "went down with his colors flying, his many admirers cheering, and his reputation as an authentic hero probably assured for all time."⁵

The effect of this defeat upon the philosophy of the military was also somewhat mixed. Most officers were driven to finally renounce war as a purely military exercise, unrelated to political conditions. This acceptance of war as a policy instrument was especially widespread in the Army but

was also evident in the Air Force and the Navy. For the Marshall-MacArthur controversy signaled the clear victory of the pragmatic, European-oriented generals in the Army hierarchy and the dominance of the philosophy which they espoused. All of the Army Chiefs of Staff after Collins: Ridgway, Taylor, Lemnitzer, Wheeler, Johnson, and Westmoreland - subscribed to the concept of limited war in the nuclear age. Increasingly, Army officers are chosen for higher commands on the basis of both their military and diplomatic talents. From 1963 to 1969, General Lemnitzer held the highly political post of Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe - head of all military forces under NATO. General Westmoreland, the present Chief of Staff, held the highly delicate position of Commander of United States Forces in Vietnam from 1965 to 1968.

The rise of General Earle G. Wheeler to his present prominence is a case in point. Appointed Chief of Staff by President Kennedy in 1962, he has been Chairman of the Joint Chiefs since 1964. He was recently nominated for a record sixth year by President Nixon. General Wheeler has been described as a "steady and reliable officer who seeks realistic policies and avoids flamboyant gestures designed to electrify a crowd."⁶ His tour of duty in the Pentagon has been roughly equal to our involvement in Vietnam yet his public statements on the issue have been "sharply limited." Thus he has successfully attempted to avoid the type of public controversy such as was aroused in 1951. Many observers agree that "one of the main keys to General Wheeler's popularity is his ability to deal successfully with both military men and politicians."⁷ He recognizes the concept of limited war and his proper role in the military hierarchy. The recently retired Com-

mandant of the Marine Corps, General Shoup, has spoken out sharply and repeatedly for the recognition of the limitations of American military power abroad. General Westmoreland, while in Vietnam, also recognized and accepted the pragmatic policy of the Johnson Administration. MacArthur's dismissal resulted from the fact that he could not recognize, and thus could not accept, this restriction on his action. His failure resulted from his inability to win the Joint Chiefs over to his goals and from his rejection of their superior position in the military hierarchy. Westmoreland carefully avoided this situation in Vietnam.

Yet all officers were not won over to this pragmatic acceptance of limited warfare. Several senior officers - James Van Fleet, Mark Clark, Claire Chennault, Rosie O'Donnell - supported the thesis of MacArthur. All refused to allow political considerations to impede the proper conduct of war. The absolutist feeling has been especially strong in the Air Force. The Air Force Chiefs of Staff after Vandenburg: Nathan Twining and Curtis Lemay, were both advocates of the absolutist doctrine of massive retaliation. General Lemay, in particular, became the symbol of the absolute philosophy during his tour as Chief of Staff. His attitudes resulted largely from his long association with the Strategic Air Command, first as deputy commander, and then as commander of that important force. Lemay's firm belief in the effectiveness of air power led him to advocate sometimes extreme military solutions for essentially political problems. Thus, during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, he advised Kennedy to use an immediate and massive air strike to knock out the missile sites. The creation of the Strategic Air Command has affected the view of certain of the younger officers as well.

The senior officers of the Navy have also tended to seek absolutist solutions in war. Bradley's successor as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Radford, fully supported the Dulles doctrine of massive retaliation. Though this feeling was strongest in the 1950's, it still exists today. This was evidenced by Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp's recent criticism of MacNamara's limitation on bombing in North Vietnam for political reasons. Thus a tendency still exists, and probably always will exist, to seek absolute solutions in military affairs. This is apparent in the mixed reactions of the military to the war in South Vietnam. For the military way has long been "marked by a primary concentration of men and material on winning specific objectives of power with the utmost efficiency."⁸ The lure of this philosophy continues despite the increasing evidence of the devastation of all-out-war.

While the Marshall-MacArthur confrontation in 1951 signaled a change in traditional military thought, it did not signify the total victory of the advocates of a pragmatic theory of war. This is amply revealed in the basic military doctrine of the Eisenhower Administration: massive retaliation. For Dulles largely accepted MacArthur's premise that the spread of Communism must be actively combated, not just contained within its present borders. On the face of it, it would seem that the pragmatists were without influence. Yet it must be remembered that one of the most important military decisions made by that Administration stemmed from pragmatic principles. Less than a year after fighting ended in Korea, Vietnam was lost to the West. Dulles had recommended that the United States send 250,000 men to support the French effort. The Joint Chiefs successfully argued against this policy,

stating that the loss of these men would fatally weaken our overall defensive posture - a basic argument of the Joint Chiefs against MacArthur in 1951. So, not even in the 1950's, were the pragmatic officers without a certain amount of influence. Since the dismissal of MacArthur, the struggle between the two philosophies has continued, with pragmatism remaining largely dominant.

The MacArthur Hearings also aired our general strategic weakness, as well as the differences in military philosophies. A rapid buildup of our forces thus began. ^{Because of} ~~Due to~~ the policies of the Eisenhower Administration this increase was largely centered in the Air Force. For on June 24, 1951, the United States had but one assembly line for the B-36 bomber. The Air Force subsequently developed the B-52 and B-58 jet bombers, the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, and a host of tactical aircraft. The Navy developed the huge Forrestal class of heavy aircraft carriers. The position of the Army in this buildup was of minor importance. Its troop increases were only nominal, though it did receive a large increase in its tank forces. This was directly in line with the testimony of the Joint Chiefs. They had emphasized the usefulness of the war in Korea as an impetus for military preparedness. Thus they touched on what many consider to be the most important question raised during the Hearings: "Can a democracy compete in peacetime military preparation with a totalitarian society?"¹⁰ MacArthur had not believed that this could be done, while the Joint Chiefs had emphasized that "time was on our side" in the race for global strategic supremacy. They had persuasively argued that "a nation that does not prepare for all forms of war should then renounce the use of war in national

11
policy." While the pragmatic philosophy was to a certain extent ignored in the 1950's, the strategic weaknesses^{es} which the Joint Chiefs described in refuting MacArthur's program were remedied by the Eisenhower Administration.

There were two other significant effects of the Marshall-MacArthur dispute upon the military establishment. First, it signified the general acceptance of at least the concept of coalition warfare in the nuclear age. Throughout the testimony of the Joint Chiefs, we have seen them refer to the "utmost care . . . necessary to avoid the disruption of the essential Allied line-up" of the war effort.¹² Thus they continually reaffirmed their acceptance of the need for coalition warfare and of the sublimation of national interests which it entailed. MacArthur, on the other hand, rejected the thesis that considerations of the political effect of military operations should restrict his freedom of action. Therefore, when questioned on this point during the Hearings, he stated that, if necessary, the United States "should go it alone" in Asia. Thus he attempted to repudiate coalition warfare as well as limited warfare. The defense of this concept by the Joint Chiefs solidified the military's support for NATO and subsequent mutual security organizations. For most officers realized the limited strength of the United States throughout the world and therefore accepted the need for politico-military cooperation with the nations of the Free World. This policy has been recently reaffirmed by our actions in Vietnam. Thus again was the MacArthur controversy influential in reshaping traditional American military thought.

The final major effect of the Marshall-MacArthur affair was the loss of prestige by the Joint Chiefs as a direct result of their defense of the Truman Administration. For, as we have attempted to illustrate, their participation was crucial to the successful presentation of Truman's policies to the nation. These men had specific influence with the members of Congress, built up during the long period of cooperation during the Second World War and the post-war period. ^{Because of} ~~Due to~~ the partisan nature of the dispute over Korea, the Republican Congressmen were particularly displeased with the impressive performance of the Joint Chiefs. This, in itself, is evidence of the importance of their testimony. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff "could command senatorial attention, for they combined the role of World War II heroes and technical experts."¹³ But in their vigorous attack upon MacArthur's program, they "squandered much of their wartime prestige and reputation for political neutrality."¹⁴ In this vein did Senator Taft declare, after the Hearings, that he no longer possessed any faith in the judgment of General Bradley. Thus did Senator Joe McCarthy attack Marshall and the generals as part of the notoriously "monstrous" plot to subvert the position of America in the world.

In any dispute between the legislative and the executive branches, the military chiefs possess an influential position by virtue of their reputation for professionalism. The members of the Joint Chiefs had built up such a reputation in long service at high levels in Washington. Their role in the dismissal of MacArthur seriously diminished their image in the eyes of many Congressmen. Thus, ironically, by the same act in which they employed this prestige, they effectively destroyed much of their influence

in Congress. In consideration of this fact, it is enlightening to note that since the MacArthur Hearings, the military chiefs have toiled diligently to rebuild their former status, cautiously avoiding any incidents which may tarnish this image. Thus did General Matthew Ridgway declare in 1967, that the military "must insist rigidly on civilian control of the shaping of our foreign policy" if they are to retain a position of respect in the American government.

EPILOGUE

In our discussion of the role of the Joint Chiefs in the dismissal of MacArthur, we have argued that the policy dispute concerning Korea represented the culmination of a long pattern of conflict between the Marshall men and the supporters of MacArthur. Two of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Bradley and Collins, and the Secretary of Defense, Marshall, had old personal and policy rivalries with the General. MacArthur had disapproved of certain of their actions during the Second World War and believed that this had created ill-feeling between himself and the three men.

Prior to the invasion of Korea, Bradley and Collins had clashed with their Far Eastern Commander concerning the proper strategy in Asia. MacArthur had argued for the primary importance of this continent in our global struggle against Communism. The Joint Chiefs believed, however, that our future destiny lay in the security of Western Europe and not in the freedom of the Chinese mainland. Thus the loss of China in 1949 was attributed by MacArthur to the "faulty system of priorities." This was, in his mind, a grave error. His analysis of the Communist threat was based upon the traditional American attitude that war can only be justified as a crusade against evil. He perceived Communism more as an ideological force than an expansionist movement controlled by the Soviet Union. Therefore, the advance of Communism must be actively combatted, and especially in Asia. His bitter reaction to the loss of China thus foreshadowed the later dispute over Korean policy.

Relations between Washington officialdom and MacArthur became further embittered by certain policy conflicts during the early months

of the Korean War. The military chiefs did not send all the troops which he had requested to contain the invasion, giving as their reason the press of our global responsibilities. This incident awoke in MacArthur the old fear of lack of proper support by Washington officials. This fear was confirmed by the opposition of the Joint Chiefs to his plans for the Inchon landing. The experience of MacArthur at the Wake Island meeting only served to confirm the suspicion that his long-time enemies were attempting to gain his dismissal. A misinterpretation of a crucial memorandum from the Joint Chiefs completed the rupture between Tokyo and the Pentagon. MacArthur became increasingly unhappy with his restrictions, unresponsive to control by Washington, and finally, publicly critical of the policies supported by his military superiors. Thus, in April, 1951, they unanimously approved his dismissal from all commands.

In the Senate Hearings which followed MacArthur's removal, the Joint Chiefs achieved final victory by countering his criticisms of American foreign and military policy. We have contended that, ^{because of} ~~due to~~ the extreme unpopularity of the Administration officials (with the notable exception of Marshall), they were given the major share of the defense of Truman's policies. It was a fortunate circumstance for the President that his defenders were not only highly respected for their wartime service, but also long-time personal rivals of his major critic. Thus was exhibited "his extreme reliance"¹⁵ on General Marshall as both a major adviser and a major defender of his policies.

It has been our contention that the Marshall-MacArthur confrontation over Korea was a milestone in the adjustment of the American military

establishment to the conditions of conflict in the nuclear age. The "Great Debate" which it occasioned revealed shortcomings in both our military preparedness and in our traditional attitudes toward war. For it clearly illustrated that "the traditional American belief in the separation of military and non-military factors . . . cannot, unless revised, fail to be harmful, even disastrous at a time of global involvement."¹⁶

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War (New York, Macmillan, 1963), p. 426.
2. George Kennan, Memoirs (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), p. 389.
3. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960), p. 293.
4. Richard Rovere, The General and the President (New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1951), p. 190.
5. Courtney Whitney, Douglas MacArthur: His Rendezvous With History (New York, Alfred Knopf, 1956), p. 473.
6. Robert Allen, The Truman Merry-Go-Round (New York: Vanguard Press, 1950), p. 473.
7. Omar Bradley, in Richard Danielson, "Bradley and MacArthur," The Atlantic Monthly (July, 1951), p. 79.
8. Ibid., p. 80.
9. James Gavin, "Patton and MacArthur," The Atlantic Monthly (February, 1965), p. 58.
10. Clark Lee, Douglas MacArthur (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1952), p. 166.
11. Ibid., p. 181.
12. Janowitz, p. 296.
13. Allen, p. 474.
14. Omar Bradley, A Soldier's Story (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951), p. 20.
15. Forrest Pogue, George Marshall: Education of a General (New York: The Viking Press, 1963), p. 256.
16. Janowitz, p. 296.
17. Fehrenbach, p. 544.
18. Bradley, p. 205.

19. John Brown, "First Class Fighting Man," Saturday Review (September 26, 1953), p. 26.
20. Janowitz, p. 298.
21. Pogue, p. 285.
22. Bradley, p. 228.
23. Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 68.
24. Pogue, p. 282.
25. Ibid., p. 401.
26. U.S. News and World Report (February 17, 1956), p. 52.
27. George Faber, George Marshall: Soldier and Statesman (New York: Ariel Books, 1969), p. 208.
28. George Kenney, General Kenney Reports (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pierce, 1949), p. 31.
29. James Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 17.
30. Janowitz, p. 300.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. David Rees, Korea: The Limited War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), p. xi.
2. Ibid.
3. Fehenbach, p. 428.
4. Frank Waldrop, MacArthur On War (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pierce, 1942), p. 306.
5. Vorin Whan (ed.), A Soldier Speaks (New York: Praeger Press, 1965), p. 356.
6. Janowitz, p. 299.
7. Kenman, p. 390.
8. Janowitz, p. 310.
9. Ibid., p. 309.
10. U.S. News and World Report (February 17, 1956), p. 49.
11. Whitney, p. 461.
12. U.S. Department of Defense, The Armed Forces Officer (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 17-18.
13. Bradley, p. xi.
14. Chicago Tribune (May 27, 1951), p. 6.
15. Ibid.
16. Matthew Ridgway, The Korean War (New York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 153.
17. Ibid., p. 145.
18. Dean Acheson, Sketches From Life (New York: Popular Library, 1962), p. 136.
19. Robert Leckie, Conflict (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1962), p. 267.
20. MacArthur, p. 109.

21. Forrestal, p. 18.
22. John Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 68.
23. Ibid., p. 67.
24. Ibid., p. 83.
25. Janowitz, p. 294.
26. Rovere, p. 284.
27. U.S. News and World Report (February 17, 1956), p. 49.
28. Ridgway, p. 147.
29. Whitney, p. 319.
30. MacArthur, p. 320.
31. Carl Berger, The Korea Knot (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957), p. 183.
32. Harry Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1965), p. 295.
33. Harry Truman, Memoirs (vol. 2), (New York: Doubleday, 1956), p. 447.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. Time (June 5, 1950), p. 20.
2. MacArthur, p. 332.
3. Ibid., p. 337.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid., p. 340.
6. U.S. News and World Report (December 10, 1954), p. 89.
7. U.S. Army, U.S. Army in the Korean War (vol. 2) (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 58.
8. Fehrenbach, p. 45.
9. U.S. News and World Report (April 13, 1953), p. 31.
10. MacArthur, p. 341.
11. Ibid., p. 346.
12. Lee, p. 202.
13. MacArthur, p. 348.
14. Ibid., p. 349.
15. Ibid., p. 350.
16. Lee, p. 203.
17. MacArthur, p. 361.
18. Whitney, p. 391.
19. Rovere, p. 258.
20. Lee, p. 229.
21. MacArthur, p. 370.
22. Ibid., p. 376.
23. Spanier, pp. 138-39.
24. Ibid.
25. MacArthur, pp. 377-78.

26. Whitney, p. 431.
27. MacArthur, p. 379.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid., p. 380.
30. MacArthur, p. 340.
31. Whitney, p. 432.
32. MacArthur, p. 342.
33. Spanier, p. 199.
34. Ibid., pp. 49-50.
35. Walter Millis, Arms and Men (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1936), p. 332.
36. Spanier, p. 190.
37. Ibid., p. 198.
38. Whitney, p. 461.
39. Edward Furniss, American Military Policy (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1957), p. 147.
40. MacArthur, pp. 387-88.
41. Rovere, p. 168.
42. Lee, p. 226.
43. MacArthur, p. 386.
44. Rovere, p. 165.
45. Truman, p. 447.
46. Ibid.
47. Mark Clark, From the Danube to the Yalu (London: Harrap and Company, 1954), pp. 33-34.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. Rees, p. 268.
2. U.S. News and World Report (April 20, 1951), p. 40.
3. Spanier, p. 206.
4. U.S. Congress, Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings before the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee, United States Senate (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 406.
(Hereafter Known as the MacArthur Hearings)
5. Spanier, p. 3.
6. Ibid., p. 222.
7. Ibid., p. 223.
8. Walter Lafebre, America, Russia and the Cold War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967), p. 101.
9. Spanier, p. 225.
10. Ibid., p. 228.
11. Ibid., p. 226.
12. Rovere, p. 186.
13. U.S. News and World Report (February 12, 1956), p. 49.
14. Ibid., p. 51.
15. MacArthur Hearings, p. 325.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 344.
18. Spanier, p. 129.
19. MacArthur Hearings, p. 717.
20. Rees, p. 216.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. MacArthur Hearings, p. 501.
24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., p. 336.
26. Ibid., p. 324.
27. Rovere, p. 283.
28. Ibid., p. 186.
29. Ibid., p. 284.
30. Trumbull Higgins, Korea and the Fall of MacArthur (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 30.
31. Rovere, p. 285.
32. Rees, p. 273.
33. Ibid.
34. MacArthur Hearings, p. 375.
35. Ibid., p. 354.
36. Rees, p. 275.
37. Spanier, p. 249.
38. Ibid., p. 243.
39. Leckie, p. 281.
40. Rees, p. 277.
41. Spanier, p. 25.
42. Rovere, p. 189.
43. Spanier, p. 26.
44. Thomas Phillips, "Setback For Aggression," The New Republic (January 25, 1951), p. 11.
45. The New Republic (May 14, 1951), p. 5.
46. MacArthur Hearings, p. 380.
47. Chicago Tribune (May 27, 1951), p. 5.
48. U.S. News and World Report (April 22, 1951), p. 74.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. Spanier, p. 216.
2. Fehrenbach, p. 448.
3. Rees, p. 283.
4. Ibid., p. 268.
5. Higgins, p. 179.
6. U.S. News and World Report (May 5, 1969), p. 16.
7. Ibid.
8. A. Vagts, The History of Militarism p. 111; in Janowitz,
p. 36 (footnote #1).
9. Rovere, p. 237.
10. Rees, p. 282.
11. Fehrenbach, p. 701.
12. MacArthur, p. 376.
13. Spanier, p. 272.
14. Ibid.
15. Ridgway, p. 222.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

- U.S. Congress, Military Situation in the Far East
Hearings before the Armed Services Committee and Foreign Relations Committee,
United States Senate, 82nd Congress,
1st Session. Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1951.
- U.S. Department of Defense, The Armed Forces Officer.
Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1965.
- U.S. Army, U.S. Army in the Korean War (vol. 2):
Truce Test and Fighting Front.
Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1966.

BOOKS

- Acheson, Dean. Sketches From Life.
New York: Popular Library, 1962.
- Allen, Robert. The Truman Merry-Go-Round.
New York: Vanguard Press, 1950.
- Almond, Edward. "General Almond Speaks,"
U.S. News and World Report,
(December 10, 1954), pp. 86-90.
- Berger, Carl. The Korea Knot. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957.
- Bradley, Omar. A Soldier's Story.
New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951.
- Brown, John. "First Class Fighting Man," Saturday
Review, (September 26, 1953), pp. 25-26.
- Clark, Mark. From the Danube to the Yalu.
London: Harrap & Company, 1954.
- Danielson, Richard. "Bradley and MacArthur,"
Atlantic Monthly, (July, 1951), pp. 78-80.
- Dean, William. General Dean's Story.
New York: Viking Press, 1954.

- Deitchman, Seymour. Limited War.
Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1964.
- Eccles, Harry. Military Concepts and Philosophy.
New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1965.
- Eisenhower, Dwight. Mandate for Change.
Garden City: Doubleday, 1963.
- Faber, George. George Marshall: Soldier and Statesman.
New York: Ariel Books, 1964.
- Fehrenbach, T. R. This Kind of War.
New York: Macmillan, 1963.
- Forrestal, James. The Forrestal Diaries.
New York, The Viking Press, 1951.
- Furniss, Edward. American Military Policy.
New York: Rinehart and Company, 1957.
- Gavin, James. "Patton and MacArthur," The Atlantic Monthly, (February, 1965), pp. 55-61.
- Higgins, Trumbull. Korea and the Fall of MacArthur.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1960.
- Janowitz, Morris. The Professional Soldier.
Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960.
- Kennan, George. Memoirs.
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967.
- Kenney, George. General Kenney Reports.
New York: Duell, Sloan and Pierce, 1949.
- Knapp, Robert. "Of War, Time and Generals,"
The Reporter, (January 13, 1966), pp. 49-53.
- Leckie, Robert. Conflict.
New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1962.
- Lee, Clark. Douglas MacArthur.
New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1952.
- Lafebre, Walter. America, Russia and the Cold War.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967.
- MacArthur, Douglas. Reminiscences.
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964.
- Marshall, S. L. A. The River and the Gauntlet.
New York: Morrow, 1953.

- Millis, Walter. Arms and Men.
New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1956.
- Phillips, Thomas. "Setback For Aggression," The New Republic, (January 25, 1951), pp. 10-12.
- Pogue, Forrest. George C. Marshall: Education of a General. New York: The Viking Press, 1963.
- _____. George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope.
New York: The Viking Press, 1967.
- Rees, David. Korea: The Limited War.
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964.
- Ridgway, Matthew. The Korean War.
New York: Doubleday, 1967.
- Rovere, Richard. The General and the President.
New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1951.
- Spanier, John. The Truman-MacArthur Controversy.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959.
- Truman, Harry. Memoirs (vol. 2).
New York: Doubleday and Company, 1956.
- Waldrop, Frank (ed.). MacArthur on War.
New York: Duell, Sloan and Pierce, 1942.
- Whan, Vorin (ed.). A Soldier Speaks.
New York: Praeger Press, 1965.
- Whitney, Courtney. MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1956.

NEWSPAPERS

- Chicago Sunday Tribune. 1951.
- New York Herald Tribune. 1951.
- New York Times. 1951.
- Washington Post. 1951, 1969.
- Washington Star. 1951.

PERIODICALS

Army Digest. "NATO - Shield of Atlantic Alliance."
(April, 1969), pp. 18-27

The New Republic. (April 23, 1951), pp. 5-6.
_____. (May 14, 1951), p. 5.
_____. (June 25, 1951), pp. 3-12.

Scholastic. May 23, 1951.

Time. (June 5, 1950), p. 20, p. 34.
_____. (May 26, 1952), p. 24.
_____. (June 23, 1952), pp. 23-24.

U.S. News and World Report. (April 20, 1951), pp. 38-45.
_____. (April 22, 1951), pp. 74-75.
_____. (May 11, 1951), pp. 30-33.
_____. (May 18, 1951), pp. 19-30.
_____. (April 13, 1953), p. 31.
_____. (February 17, 1956), pp. 49-51.
_____. (May 5, 1969), p. 16.