SOUTH CAROLINA POLITICS

A Re-evaluation of Key

Submitted to The Department of Politics
of
Washington and Lee University

In Candidacy for a Degree with Honors

in
the

Department of Politics

by

Frank Langston Eppes

May 1983

Approved May 24, 1983

W Buchanan
Delos D Hughes
Milton Colvin
John R. Handelman
Craig McLaughlin
Lewis G. Joh
J. Holt Merchant

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Foreward

This paper is the culmination of an effort to learn about South Carolina politics. I may not have learned or written anything new, different, or creative, but I have learned a great deal about my home state. Some things I learned through research, some are only theories that I have developed from items that appeared in several sources. For a South Carolinian, these things should probably be important. For a political scientist in the United States, perhaps South Carolina is an example of forces that shaped the South as a whole.

I owe a debt of thanks to several people. First, to Professors Buchanan and Merchant I am grateful for their guidance in the editing and formation of the paper. I would also like to thank Carolyn Leech for enabling me to finish this on time. Also, I would like to thank my friends that helped me keep the paper straight and do so without losing my sanity. Finally, I would like to thank my father for giving me pride for my state and her leaders.

Introduction

In 1949, V.O. Key Jr.'s Southern Politics in State and Nation was published. This work soon became the classic work in the study of Southern politics. Key described in detail the government and political situation in each state of the South. He predicted that when the South overcame the forces which kept it primarily rural, oppressive to blacks, impoverished, and illiterate, it would join the mainstream of American politics. Key entitled his chapter on South Carolina "The Politics of Color." He perceived that South Carolina politicians and voters were, in 1948, preoccupied with the question of race. This issue, according to Key, aided state leaders in maintaining the state's all-white, one-party political organization. He also noted that the South Carolina Democratic Party had no long lasting factions and that individuals competing for the Democratic nomination in primary elections were supported by transient factions that changed from election to election. The factions which Key described fit into a pattern which he labeled "friends and neighbors" politics. In this pattern, a candidate received a large percentage of the vote in and around his home county and hoped to secure enough votes in other areas of the state to secure the election. For Key, "friends and neighbors" localism appeared to be the primary electoral force in the state, but he recognized the possibility of change.[1]

Noting that in a state as small as South Carolina, localism was only a short step from sectionalism, Key pointed out that major differences already existed between the aristocratic low-country with its large black population and the up-country with its predominantly white population of mill workers and small farmers. He believed that with the end of the "politics of color", a bipartisan split could take place, and that it might

occur along up-country versus low-country lines. Finally, Key pointed out that South Carolina had a legislative form of government with a weak governor and an almost "all powerful" legislature which was under the control of a group of conservative low-country legislators. Rarely, if ever did these legislators lose their re-election bids, and they voted alike on most legislative issues. Dubbed the "Barnwell Ring" and led by State Senator Edgar Brown of Barnwell, this group devoted itself to the maintenance of the status quo which included a balanced budget and the preservation of a government leadership that was greatly influenced by business interests.[2] Although the account was often criticized by South Carolina politicians, Key's description of South Carolina politics was long considered accurate; however, after thirty-four years, the situation should have changed somewhat. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the changes in the structure which Key described.

The changes have been many. The politics of color is gone. Issues can no longer be smothered by racial rhetoric. Blacks have become a viable and influential segment of the political community, and candidates as well as parties compete for their support. As Key predicted, bipartisanship has come about in South Carolina. The Democratic Party has been increasingly challenged by the Republicans. Despite Republican victories in all areas of the political spectrum, the Democrats are still firmly in control of the state government. With the rise of the Republican Party, factional politics along "friends and neighbors" lines is becoming less visible, but its existence is still undeniable. The new two-party system developed for several years along up-state versus low-state lines, much as Key predicted. More recently, however, this difference has diminished, and the main strength of the Republican Party seems to be

rooted in the cities. Legislative government is still a fact in South Carolina, although the powers of the legislature have diminished somewhat, and the influence of the governor appears to have been enhanced. "The Barnwell Ring" has disappeared, and its power has fragmented, even though a small group appears to retain a preponderance of power in the Senate. Finally, the business interests still seem to have a great deal of influence in state affairs. The state's efforts to attract industry have been very successful, increasing the government's pro-business image. This alliance with business appears to have both advantages and disadvantages for the people of the state.

Almost everyone would agree that these changes have occurred in South Carolina, but rarely have the overall changes in the picture which Key presented been discussed and documented. This paper is divided into four chapters. First, there is a brief description of the civil rights movement in South Carolina and the rise of black political participation which has made this group an important part of the state political community. Second, there is a description of the rise of the Republican Party and the role Republicans play in state politics today, and a study of the new voting patterns which have developed with the rise of two-party politics in the state. Third comes a description of the legislative form of government and major changes that have taken place over the last three decades. Finally, the state government's relationship with the business community is described. The changes detailed below are by no means the only ones that have come to South Carolina over the past thirty-four years; however, it is hoped that they illustrate both the internal and external forces which have, and will continue, to shape South Carolina politics for years to come.

Footnotes

[1]V.O. Key Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), pp. 130-135.

[2]Ibid., pp. 135-155.

Chapter I

The Rise of Black Political Influence

The change in the position of blacks in South Carolina was a crucial part of the state's overall political development. Between the end of radical reconstruction in 1877 and the onset of World War II, there was little significant change in the all-white, one-party politics of South Carolina.[1] When changes came, they were tied inextricably to the position of blacks in South Carolina society. The first major changes came in the area of civil rights. As Key predicted, the changes in the "politics of color" altered the state greatly. The rise of blacks politically, induced as it was by both internal state forces and external Federal forces, changed the party alignments, the candidate attitudes, and the political power structure of South Carolina in a remarkable manner. A brief documentation of the changes in the black position since 1944 is necessary to understand the alterations that came to the overall political situation.

Arguably, the civil rights movement began to cause changes in the overall situation well before the beginning of World War II, but it was only in 1944 that the first assaults were made on the all-white armor of South Carolina's government or its segregationist policies. In 1944, the United States Supreme Court found in the case of Smith vs. Allwright that the all-white Texas Democratic Primary was illegal.[2] Within weeks, South Carolina Governor Olin D. Johnston promised that "white supremacy will be maintained..., let the chips fall where they may." In a special session of the legislature, more than 200 laws were repealed in an effort to dissociate the all-white Democratic Primary from the state and preserve its segregated form.[3] In 1947, this tactic was also declared

illegal. Judge J. Waties Waring, a South Carolinian on the bench of the United States Fourth Circuit Court, found in Elmore vs. Rice that blacks could not be excluded from the South Carolina Democratic Primary.[4] Later, Waring told Democratic Party officials that efforts to violate his decisions would result in imprisonment.[5] Thus, in 1948, blacks were, for the first time, allowed to vote in the South Carolina Democratic Primary. Over 35,000 of the 215,000 voters in this election were black.[6] One source credited Judge Waring, whose decisions had caused this breakthrough, with having probably "done more than any other Southern white man to shatter the South's traditional racial patterns."[7] Over the next decade, progress in the area of black voter registration was limited in South Carolina. By 1960, only 58,122 blacks representing 15.6% of the black voting age population were registered to vote; however, as will be seen later, these voters had some influence on election results.[8]

Progress was also being made by civil rights leaders in other areas. In the area of education, civil rights progress is usually credited with providing the threat of integration which prodded South Carolina's government into beginning one of the most innovative programs in the history of the state. In 1951, the same year that a three-judge panel of the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court found the doctrine of "separate but equal" to be acceptable in the "Clarendon Case", Governor James F. Byrnes called for a $75 million bond issue to be paid for by a 3% sales tax. This bond would be spent entirely on improving the state's educational facilities and would, it was hoped, insure that school facilities for blacks and whites were equal.[9] In the eyes of South Carolinians, the program was a success. Over 1,200 school districts were consolidated into 102. By 1960, "Jimmie's tax" had provided over $200 million for the state schools.[10] This program greatly improved the state school facilities for both races,

but particularly for blacks. The number of accredited black high schools increased from 80 to 147 in just five years, and the property value of black schools went up from $29.2 million to $107.4 million. Admittedly, the education of blacks still lagged behind that of whites, but the material progress was heartening for black leaders.[11] Ironically, the equalization of facilities, due in large part to pressure to preserve "separate but equal" schools, is often cited as a factor which eased the difficulties of the desegration process when it came. It would be unfair to attribute the entire educational improvement program to efforts to avoid integration. Governor Byrnes seemed to have a genuine interest in the quality of South Carolina education; but, as one black leader noted, Byrnes "accepted cheerfully the notion that what he was doing slowed down integration."[12]

Also during the 1950's, South Carolina's leaders were expending a great deal of effort in attempts to avoid school integration. A constitutional amendment passed in 1952 which made it possible to shut down the state's schools in the event of court ordered desegregation.[13] In 1955, the Legislature established the State Segregation Committee to consolidate efforts to preserve segregation. This committee, composed of ten state legislators and five private citizens, made policy recommendations to the legislature. Over the next several years, all of its recommendations were approved. These new laws provided South Carolina with a "hard-line" stance against integration and included the abolition of the compulsory attendance law, a limit of one year on all contracts for teachers, and a law that if whites and blacks were assigned to the same schools, then state funds, which provided 75% of all school funds, would be denied to the newly integrated school.[14] Also, efforts were made to stifle opposition to segregation from internal sources. For example, the Dean of Education at the University of South Carolina

was fired for espousing integrationist beliefs.[15] Thus, as the 1950's ended, South Carolina blacks had some voting power and improved school facilities, but on the surface little appears to have actually changed. The 1960's would provide the majority of the changes which would greatly influence the state political scene.

In 1960, South Carolina leaders were still opposed to the integration of the schools on the grounds that their state was "not prepared to integrate." In addition, events such as those that occurred in Little Rock had created a distrust of the Federal Government's way of handling racial unrest.[16] Slowly, outward changes were beginning to occur. For example, the new state technical education program was integrated at its inception, and the State Law Enforcement Division (SLED) received two gubernatorially appointed black advisers.[17] In addition, beginning with a rash of "sit-ins" in February of 1960, and lasting for the next few years, events which one black historian described as "difficult and not summarizable" took place which caused lunch counters and many other public places to become integrated with "no loss of life, minimal property damage and little increase in overt racial animosities."[18] The situation was far from ideal, but progress was being made.

By 1963, however, South Carolina was the only Southern state that had not complied, even in part, with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Brown vs. The Board of Education. The year 1963 marked a dramatic turning point for the state civil rights effort, but several state leaders had begun to lay the groundwork for this change over a year before. In 1961, a group of the most prominent business and political leaders in the state met and concluded that as South Carolina's legal efforts to avoid integration failed, preparations had to be made to accept it peacefully. Efforts were made to

publicize the fact that should the pending lawsuit demanding the admission of a young black man, Harvey Gantt, to Clemson University be successful, the integration at the school would occur peacefully. Several influential business groups made statements that they would support the laws as interpreted by the courts, and the Board of Trustees at Clemson made a similar statement as well as stating that it would not "tolerate violence on the Clemson campus."[19] Then, on January 9, 1963, in his farewell address, Governor Ernest F. Hollings made perhaps his most memorable address to the General Assembly. His final remarks express an attitude that seems to have taken hold in South Carolina at this time. Hollings said:

> "We have all argued that the Supreme Court decision of May, 1954, is not the law of the land. But everyone must agree that it is the fact of the land. Interposition, sovereignty, legal motions, personal defiance have all been applied to constitutionalize the law of the land. And all attempts have failed. As we meet, South Carolina is running out of courts. If and when every legal remedy has been exhausted, this General Assembly must make clear South Carolina's choice, a government of laws rather than a government of men. As determined as we are, we of today must realize the lesson of one hundred years ago, and move on for the good of South Carolina and our United States. This should be done with dignity. It must be done with law and order. It is a hurdle that brings little progress to either side. But the failure to clear it will do us irreparable harm."[20]

Later in January, the court order to admit Harvey Gantt to Clemson was issued. Efforts in the legislature to oppose the court order were defeated with the support of the influential State Segregation Committee on the side of peaceful integration.[21] The state refused offers from U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy to send Federal officers, and, with memories of James Meredith's violent entrance into the University of Mississippi, devised what one newsman called "probably the most complete and carefully thought out /plan/ ever drawn up in the U.S. to meet the threat of racial violence."[22] The plan was carried out without incident and the integration of South Carolina schools was begun.

In the fall of 1963, three blacks enrolled in the University of

South Carolina, and, by 1963, 27 of the state's 30 colleges had at least one black student. In the state public schools, progress took place very slowly. In May of 1964, only ten blacks, representing .004% of the total enrollment were in previously all-white schools. By the fall of 1964, 1% of all students enrolled in previously all-white schools were black. In 1967, this figure had risen to 6.4%. Finally, in 1969, due to pressure from both the Federal government and the Governor's office, widespread desegregation began to take place.[23] In January of 1970, Greenville County, the state's largest school district, became integrated.[24] With this act, and the integration of the rest of the state's schools which rapidly followed, the longest fight of the civil rights effort in South Carolina ended.

As the fight for school integration continued, blacks had been making important inroads in other areas. State agencies receiving federal funds became integrated and Governor Robert McNair, who served from 1964 to 1971, appointed more blacks to public positions than did any of his predecessors.[25] Still, most of the progress that was made was considered "tokenism" by many blacks.[26] After school integration became widespread in 1970 and 1971, it seemed that a barrier of sorts had been broken and future social gains for blacks seemed easier to attain.[27] Blacks began to appear regularly on congressional and campaign staffs, and Matthew Perry of the NAACP was appointed to a federal judgeship.[28]

Other forces were also at work inside the state. The Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965 were greeted with enthusiasm by industrial leaders that needed workers in areas where blacks had not previously been allowed to work. This transition was aided by a series of seminars for textile plant managers in which John Cauthen, Executive Vice-President of the South Carolina Textile Manufacturers Association, and Dan McLeod, the State Attorney General, explained the requirements of the new laws and provided suggestions for

the avoidance of racial confrontations.[29]

It would be inaccurate to believe that South Carolina's racial changes came about in an entirely peaceful, though reluctant, manner. Three incidents occurred which will forever mar the civil rights history of the state. The first occurred in 1968 when three students were killed and 27 wounded by state officers in a disturbance in Orangeburg at South Carolina State College. The event was referred to by Governor McNair as "one of the saddest days in the history of South Carolina."[30] The incident has never been completely explained, but it is sufficient to say that officers probably reacted rashly in a volatile situation. The second incident occurred in 1969 when a 100 day strike took place among black hospital workers in Charleston. After over 900 arrests, the imposition of a curfew, and the arrival of 5,000 National Guardsmen, the black demands were accepted and order was restored.[31] In 1975, a series of demonstrations and boycotts occurred after five blacks were slain in separate incidents by white law officers. Little was actually accomplished. Few demands were met, but the NAACP's 10,000 person demonstration was the largest of its kind to ever take place in South Carolina.[32] These events showed South Carolina leaders that the state's blacks could become involved in situations just as volatile as those that occurred elsewhere. Black positions on controversial issues became more respected with each incident.

Perhaps the greatest and most influential change which occurred in the black political situation came with the Voting Rights Act. As is shown in the following chart, the number of black registered voters went from 58,122 in 1960 to 200,778 in 1968. The number of black voters continued to rise as did the percentage of eligible blacks that registered to vote. By 1978, 26% of South Carolina's registered voters were black.

The Increase in Black Voters
1960-1978

Year	# of Black Registered Voters	% of Black Voting Age Population	% of Total Number of Registered Voters
1960	58,122	15.6	---
1964	144,000	38.7	---
1968	200,778	54.1	---
1970	213,000	57.3	24.5
1978	-------	----	26

Compiled From: Havard, William C., The Changing Politics of the South, (Baton Rouge:L.S.U. Press, 1972), pp. 20-21, 598. " "T.V. Man" Ravenel Trails a New Ol' Strom," New Republic, 4 November 1978, p. 28.

Politically, it appears that the blacks of South Carolina have arrived at a point where they can influence state politics.

It could reasonably be argued that the civil rights movement and the increase in black voter participation was the primary catalyst for most of the major political changes of the past three decades. Three major areas of change are associated directly with the influence of blacks and the civil rights movement. These changes concern party alignments, candidate attitudes, and the state political power structure.

Perhaps the most obvious place to see the effects of the civil rights movement comes in an examination of the rise of the Republican Party. Beginning in 1948, South Carolinians began to show an ever increasing dislike for the relatively "liberal" policies of the United States Democratic Party. Of key importance among the issues was the Democratic position on civil rights. In 1948, Strom Thurmond and the Dixiecrat Party were able to carry South Carolina on a segregationist, states' rights platform. This was the first Democratic loss in a national election in South Carolina since 1877. Despite Thurmond's "favorite son" status, the loss marked the end of the era of absolute Democratic control in South Carolina elections. In 1956, after winning a close race in 1952, the Democratic ticket was outvoted by the combined votes of the Republican, Eisenhower, and an

Independent, Harry Byrd. In 1960, Kennedy won by less than 10,000 votes. In South Carolina, the central question in each of these races concerned the Negro issue. In 1964, after Barry Goldwater voted against the Civil Rights Act of 1964, he became the first Republican presidential candidate to win an election in South Carolina since 1876.[33] By the 1968 election, the Republicans had developed their "southern strategy" of conceding the Negro votes to the Democrats and advocating a racially conservative attitude which would attract white voters that were against the civil rights planks of the Democratic platform. According to former-NAACP attorney Matthew Perry, the attitude of state Republicans began to make clear the fact that blacks were no longer welcome in the Republican party.[34] In 1968, the "southern strategy" was effective and Nixon carried South Carolina(See Chapter II). The gubernatorial election of 1970 caused Republicans to rethink their position on race and eventually caused them to alter it. In 1970, the Republican candidate for governor, Albert Watson, was defeated by the racially moderate Democrat, John C. West. The election was marred by racial incidents and Watson is now remembered as the last serious segregationist candidate in state history. After Watson's defeat, most Republican leaders began to think that a candidate with a racist attitude could no longer win in South Carolina.

Even as Republicans were making efforts to discourage the black voter, the state Democrats were attempting to attract him. Even before the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Democratic leaders began to recognize that black voters could be attracted into and provide important support for their party.[35] As U.S. Senator Olin D. Johnston pointed out in 1963, "Their vote counts as much as anyone else's."[36] The voting bloc which developed joined blacks with white workingmen in a "neo-populist" alliance which emerged behind the Democrats as the "most powerful single force in South Carolina politics."[37] Although Republicans were winning presidential elections, Democrats remained firmly in control of state politics. Slowly, blacks became more involved in

the party machinery. In 1968, South Carolina sent the only unchallenged integrated delegation from the South to the Democratic National Convention.[38] In 1970, 200 of the 900 delegates to the State Democratic Convention were black, as was the convention's vice-chairman. It is highly probable that Democrats felt that black involvement was essential to their success at the polls. In 1968, voter registration practices were eased by the state legislature in a move believed to have been caused by the dependency of many lawmakers on the black vote.[39] Also in 1968, a clear correlation was found between the percentage of Negroes registered and the vote for Hubert Humphrey in the state's counties.[40] Even before the integration of the schools, the Democratic Party of South Carolina had integrated itself, at least partly because of its need for Negro votes.

Over the years since the Waring decision, the number of black voters increased every year. With each increase, the black influence on candidates appeared to increase. Black input has not been strong enough to elect many blacks to office, but there has often been sufficient black electoral strength to determine the winner in a contest between two white candidates. For example, when U.S. Senator Olin D. Johnston defeated Strom Thurmond in the Democratic Senatorial Primary of 1950, The Columbia Record reported that it was the "final irony" that Senator Johnston "owed" his renomination, more than anything else to the support of the negroes participating in the primary for the first time."[41] Also, blacks are credited with providing the margin of victory for Stevenson in 1952,[42] for Kennedy in 1960, and for U.S. Senator Ernest F. Hollings in 1966.[43] These were all general elections and it would be impossible to guess the outcome without the black vote. In that case, South Carolina could well have remained a one-party state.

Blacks had begun to realize their influence. One Negro leader stated quite simply "race is no longer the campaign issue it once was. All sensible politicians know they need our support to win statewide or national elections."[44] Another black leader pointed out that blacks were usually divided in their support for candidates; however, he added that if they found a candidate that was unacceptable to their interests as a group, they could and would vote as a group against him.[45] Occasionally, in addition to the Republican "southern strategy", a candidate would appear espousing traditional racist doctrine and receive enough votes to win, despite the almost complete opposition from black voters. Also, Senator Strom Thurmond, still not completely "reformed" from his Dixiecrat days was the state's senior United States Senator. In 1970, this situation was to be altered forever, although whether it was caused by actual or imagined political necessity is impossible to determine.

As previously mentioned, the 1970 gubernatorial race pitted Democrat John West against Republican Albert Watson in a contest that revolved around racial questions. Watson, a candidate "handpicked" by Senator Strom Thurmond and endorsed by President Nixon, railed against court ordered desegration at every opportunity. A racial incident in Lamar was attributed in part to a Watson speech. In November, West won by 29,915 votes, receiving 52.1% of the vote to Watson's 45.8%.[46] Weaknesses due to their racial position had already become apparent to some Republican leaders who blamed the 1968 loss of two-thirds of the Republican seats in the South Carolina General Assembly to the alienation of the black vote caused by Nixon's "southern strategy."[47] State political observers concluded that Albert Watson could not win because of his reliance on a segregationist platform. Black voters would not support this type of candidate and racial

rhetoric no longer appeared to attract sufficient white support to insure a candidate's election.[48] Twenty-one years after Key described it, the "politics of color" was judged by most, if not all, knowledgeable observers to be obsolete.

After Watson's defeat, racial extremism disappeared from the vocabulary of serious South Carolina political candidates. Several of the state's most ardent segregationists, notably Congressman Mendel Rivers and State Senator Marion Gressette, began efforts around this time to attract black voters.[49] Republicans also began to make efforts to attract black voters. The most obvious and effective effort of all was made by the former Dixiecrat presidential candidate, U.S. Senator Strom Thurmond. Among other things, Thurmond saw to it that the best known attorney for the South Carolina NAACP, Matthew Perry, was appointed federal judge, saved Benedict College from bankruptcy with a federal grant, and appointed blacks to his staff. Each of these actions and others were well publicized and Thurmond is now relatively popular among blacks. One observer referred to this attitude switch as "the smartest move Strom ever made."[50] The influence of black voters has destroyed the effectiveness of the "politics of color" as Key described it, and it has forced candidates to listen carefully to black interests.

In addition to influencing candidate attitudes, blacks began to assert influence as politicians. In 1970, three blacks were elected to the state legislature. By 1974, largely as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court's "one man- one vote" decision and the court ordered reapportionment of 1972, thirteen of the state's 124 House Members were black. A black caucus was formed to support policies to aid the blacks of the state. Their

influence appears to exceed their numbers. One source credits this phenomenon to the effect upon white legislators of seeing a black espouse black interests. It seems to remind white legislators of the black support which is necessary for victory in their always impending re-election campaigns. One progressive credits this psychological effect with making the support of one black as valuable in the House as the support of eight progressives. Over the years, the state government has become more responsive to black interests. The administration of John C. West from 1971 until 1975 provides a good example. West presided over the establishment of the State Housing Authority, the issuance of state bonds to help finance low and middle income housing, the expansion of the food stamp program, and the establishment of the strongest state commission in the South for the handling of discrimination complaints, the South Carolina Human Affairs Commission.[51] By the mid-1970s, black political power had become a reality in South Carolina.

The total influence of blacks on the politics of South Carolina is difficult to gauge, but it is clear that they are now extremely influential members of the state political community. Initially, their role was the relatively passive one of forcing the state's parties to essentially "choose sides" in the civil rights struggle. Then, slowly they began to have a direct influence on election outcomes. Now, the "politics of color" has become obsolete and blacks exert a direct influence on candidates for office and in the government of the state. The changes have been surprising. One political scientist, a non-South Carolinian, stated that "in no state did the political role of blacks change so completely, so quickly, or with fewer jagged edges."[52] Admittedly, the process of integrating blacks and whites in South Carolina may not yet be completed; however, as an old black preacher

once said,"We ain't what we should be; we ain't what we will be; but thank God we ain't what we was."[53]

Footnotes

[1]Ernest M. Lander, A History of South Carolina, 1865-1960 (Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 1960), p. vii.

[2]Ibid., p. 169.

[3]"Killbillies," Newsweek, 1 May 1944.

[4]Lander, p. 172.

[5]William B. Scott, "Judge J. Waties Waring: Advocate of 'Another' South." South Atlantic Quarterly, Autumn, 1978, p. 329.

[6]Ibid., pp. 328-329.

[7]The Greenville News, 3 February 1952, quoted in Scott, p. 331.

[8]William C. Havard, ed., The Changing Politics of the South (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1972), p. 20.

[9]I.A. Newby, Black Carolinians: A History of Blacks in South Carolina From 1895 to 1968 (Columbia: USC Press, 1973), pp. 289-290: Jack Bass, Porgy Comes Home: South Carolina After 300 Years (Columbia: The R.L. Bryan Co., 1972), p. 51.

[10]Raymond Moley, "Quiet South Carolina," Newsweek, 23 March 1964, p. 100.

[11]Newby, p. 308.

[12]Interview with Judge Matthew Perry, Federal Court Building, Columbia, 13 December 1982.

[13]Howard G. McLain and Henry G. Ruark,"Education or Segregation?," Christian Century, 1 April 1953, p. 377-379.

[14]Newby, p. 309.

[15]Harry L. Golden, "No Dissent in Dixie," Christian Century, 17 December 1955, Inside Cover.

[16]Interview with Donald Russell, Federal Court Building, Spartanburg, S.C., 21 December 1982: Raymond Moley, "Calm and Determined," Newsweek, 14 October 1957, p. 136.

[17]Robert Sherrill, "Senator Ernest Hollings: Education of a Conservative," Nation, 17 August 1971, p. 108.

[18]Newby, p. 33.

[19]George McMillan, "Integration with Dignity," Saturday Evening Post, 16 March 1963, pp. 15-21, reprinted in Ernest M. Lander, Perspectives in South Carolina History: The First 300 Years (Columbia: USC Press,1973), pp. 384-385.

[20]Ernest F. Hollings, "Farewell Address of the Governor, January 9, 1963," 1963 Journal of the South Carolina Senate, pp. 44-45.

[21]Newby, p. 344.

[22]McMillan, p. 389.

[23]Newby, p. 331.

[24]Bass, p. 8.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Newby, p. 336.

[27]Jack Bass and Walter DeVries, The Transformation of Southern Politics: Social Change and Political Consequence Since 1945 (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1976), p. 51.

[28]Ibid., p. 259.

[29]Bass, p. 84: Bass and DeVries, p. 278.

[30]Jack Bass and Jack Nelson, The Orangeburg Massacre (New York: The World Publishing Co., 1970), pp. 76-101:McNair quote from p. 101.

[31]Bass, p. 71.

[32]Jesse Taylor, "Bloody Summer," Southern Exposure, 1981, no. 1, pp. 99-103.

[33]Donald L. Fowler, Presidential Voting in South Carolina, 1948-1964, (Columbia: University of South Carolina Bureau of Governmental Research and Service, 1966), pp. 1-14.

[34]Perry.

[35]Bass and DeVries, p. 249.

[36]"Smart Southern Politics," New Republic, 23 February 1963, p. 5.

[37]Ibid.

[38]Bass and DeVries, p. 260.

[39]Ibid., 258.

[40]Chester W. Bain, "South Carolina: Partisan Prelude," in The Changing Politics of the South, ed. William C. Havard (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1972), p. 614.

[41]"The Final Irony," New Republic, 24 July 1950, p. 7.

[42]Raymond Moley, "A Political Revolution," Newsweek, 15 December 1952, p. 108.

[43]Newby, p. 291.

[44]"Smart Southern Politics."

[45]Perry.

[46]Bass, p. 35: Alice V. McGillivray and Richard M. Scammon, America Votes 1980 Vol. 14, (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1981), p. 351.

[47]"The Way It Is in South Carolina," New Republic, 11 June 1969, pp. 32-33.

[48]Bass, p. 39.

[49]Bass and DeVries, pp. 259-261: "The Way it is in South Carolina."

[50]" 'T.V. Man' Ravenel Trails a New Ol' Strom," New Republic, 4 November 1978, pp. 28-30: "South Carolina: Young Pug Takes on Ol' Strom," Newsweek, 16 October 1978, pp. 34-35.

[51]Bass and DeVries, pp. 273-274.

[52]Ibid., p. 250.

[53]Ibid., p. 1-2.

Chapter II

The Rise of the South Carolina Republican Party and Its Effect on State Voting Patterns

"In the beginning, there was the Democratic Party." For many years this was a simplified history of South Carolina politics. Before 1948, the state was completely Democratic. In presidential elections, no county had, since at least 1900, given a majority vote to any slate of electors other than that of the United States Democratic Party.[1] On the state level, the South Carolina Democratic Party selected its nominees for all state and local offices through a primary election. A victory in the primary virtually assured candidates of victory in the general election. South Carolina politics was a one-party system; however, the state's Democratic Party was little more than an organization which provided the framework through which white candidates ran for state office as individuals. By 1948, the situation had begun to change. Over the next three decades, the Republican Party in South Carolina rose from the status of virtual non-existence to a point from which it could compete evenly with the Democratic Party in presidential and congressional elections and present competitive though still only limitedly successful candidates on the state level. The rise of the two-party system in South Carolina also had an effect on state voting patterns as a competitive second party developed.

It is interesting to note that one of the major causes of the rise of the Republican party in South Carolina was the United States Democratic Party.[2] Despite the fact that Franklin Roosevelt could have apparently, according to one source, won elections in South Carolina throughout the twentieth century, Harry Truman could not do so in 1948.[3] The report of Truman's Committee on Civil Rights in 1947 which recommended the enactment of laws prohibiting racial or religious segregation in public transportation,

lodging, or eating facilities, coupled with his subsequent endorsement of these recommendations created a furor amongst South Carolina leaders.[4] Many leaders perceived that as long as their state was "in the bag" for the Democrats, that their interests would be ignored by the national party.[5] Thus, after efforts to oust Truman from the Democratic ticket in 1948 failed, South Carolina Governor Strom Thurmond and many other South Carolina delegates walked out of the Democratic national convention and, with other Southerners, formed the Dixiecrat party and selected Thurmond as their presidential candidate.[6] In a race that revolved around the civil rights issue with other conservative Southern concerns such as alleged communist influence in the Federal Government and states' rights playing a secondary role, Thurmond received 72.1% of South Carolina's votes.[7] The era of complete Democratic domination of state politics was ended; however, it would be several years before the state's voters saw fit to vote for Republican candidates.

Over the next few years, the antagonism between South Carolina and the Democratic Truman Administration grew. The 1950 Democratic Senatorial race between incumbent Senator Olin D. Johnston and Governor Strom Thurmond developed into a vicious series of debates which mixed personal attacks with discussions of the relationship between the state and national Democratic Party organizations.[8] Governor James F. Byrnes, whose term began in 1951, began efforts to "call a halt to the steady encroachment of Federal power upon the state."[9]

In 1952, South Carolina was still considered a Democratic stronghold. Internally, state politics had been little affected by the 1948 presidential election, but state Democratic leaders were determined to assert themselves at the Democratic Convention.[10] When Stevenson was nominated, many of the

state's leaders were upset. One group, led by Governor Byrnes, chose to support Eisenhower. An organization known as the "Democrats for Eisenhower" was formed and secured enough signatures on a petition to place an independent slate of electors for Eisenhower on the state ballot. Eisenhower received over 49% of the vote, 46% as an "Independent" and 3% as a Republican. The "Democrats for Eisenhower" stressed the importance of states' rights, a fear of communism, and an intense dislike for Harry Truman and the leadership in the United States Democratic Party. Along with this platform, they asserted that Eisenhower was closer to the "Southern point of view" than Stevenson. Again, an important aspect of their effort was the Negro issue. The Democratic forces, as they had for over a decade and as they would for over a decade more, stressed the "bread and butter" programs such as Social Security and farm price supports which the Democratic Party provided for the people of South Carolina. Although Eisenhower received most of his votes as an "Independent," he was a Republican, and his success illustrates the popularity which conservative Republican attitudes were attracting in South Carolina.[12]

After the election, the "Democrats for Eisenhower" remained organized to fight against "socialist policies" and "the expansion of federal power." In 1954, this organization was influential in helping Strom Thurmond defeat the Democratic nominee for the United States Senate on a write-in vote. Senator Burnet R, Maybank had died suddenly, and rather than hold another primary, the State Democratic Executive Committee had voted to nominate State Senator Edgar Brown. Thurmond, protesting the violation of the people's right to a primary, became the first South Carolinian elected to the U.S. Senate since 1877 without the Democratic nomination.[13]

Until 1956, although voters had voted for non-Democratic candidates, no significant percentage of the state's voters had supported a Republican by

voting for him as a Republican. After the Democratic Convention nominated Stevenson again, a group of independents formed an organization for Byrd, and there was a Republican organization which supported Eisenhower. Both news reports and political advertisements indicate that the civil rights issue was important in the campaign efforts of the three contending parties. Also, the Republicans presented a clearly conservative position on economic policies while the Independents seemed to concentrate more on the racial issue.[14] These two slates were popular and the Democrats received only 45.4% of the vote while Byrd's 29.5% and Eisenhower's 25.1% together constituted a significant non-Democratic majority. This election showed that at least 75,700 South Carolinians were willing to vote Republican and more could probably be influenced to do so. As one Republican stated later, "We turned the corner in 1956."[15] Byrd and Eisenhower had shown that non-Democrats from outside South Carolina could attract the state's voters away from a national Democratic ticket. The era of total one-party domination had ended in South Carolina.

The election of 1960 showed that Republican presidential candidates were capable of receiving an influential number of votes in South Carolina. State Democrats were uncertain about the Kennedy-Johnson ticket, but most vowed to support it. One group of Democrats, however, supported Nixon and, in conjunction with the state's small Republican organization, formed an effective campaign organization. Once again, much of the campaign rhetoric concerned the racial question, but "economic conservative-liberal controversies" seemed to be playing a growing role. The Nixon-Lodge forces directed their appeal primarily towards the white residents of the low-country, and it was there that they received most of their support. Kennedy won by less than 10,000 votes with 51.2% of the total.[16] This seems to have been a signal to

many that the racially and economically conservative Republican Party had a definite place in South Carolina politics.

Changes had definitely occurred. Since 1948, the Democratic candidate had not polled over 51.2% of the vote,and twice, in the four elections, he had not even polled a majority of the votes cast. There was definitely a place in South Carolina for a party that was more fiscally and racially conservative than the U.S. Democratic Party had proven to be. Slowly, a viable state Republican organization began to appear, backed by wealthy businessmen, most notably Roger Milliken of Spartanburg. Food chain heir J. Drake Edens used a book on how to establish a political organization printed by the Committee on Political Education(COPE) of the AFL-CIO as a model for recruiting individuals to join the Republican Party and become precinct and county leaders.[17] Most of his success seemed to come amongst whites in the coastal counties with heavy black populations and amongst the upper and middle class residents of the growing urban and suburban areas. In 1961, a Republican candidate was elected to the South Carolina House of Representatives in a special election to fill a vacated seat. Over the next few years, South Carolina Republicans realized that their policies did not attract black votes, so the went "hunting where the ducks were" and pursued a segregationist policy which made blacks feel unwanted in the GOP.[18] In 1962, the Republicans fielded a candidate for the United States Senate who received 43% of the vote. This candidate, William D. Workman, based his campaign against the immensely popular incumbent, Olin D. Johnston, on the differences in the policies of the two parties. At the time, Workman's success was considered remarkable and it showed the existence of a group that appeared to be receptive to the overall policies of the Republican Party.[19]

In 1964, the Republican Party came of age in South Carolina. First,

Senator Strom Thurmond announced that he would become a Republican because the Democratic party had "abandoned the people,... and become the party of minority groups, power hungry union leaders, political bosses, and big businessmen looking for government contracts and favors."[20] The Republican Party strength and organization in the state had increased greatly during the three previous years. After Goldwater voted against the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which President Johnson had supported, the lines were drawn. The Republicans, "stressing conservative economic policies, a 'hard-line' toward the communists, opposition to the alleged socialistic trends in the Federal Government," and, above all, Goldwater's vote against the Civil Rights Act of 1964, attracted 58.9% of the state's votes. In South Carolina, the threat of a Republican victory in a statewide election became a reality.

Since Goldwater's victory, it can be argued that the Republicans have dominated the presidential elections of South Carolina. Victory in the presidential races appears to have been one of the growing party's major goals as opposition grew against the national Democratic Party's policies. In 1968, Nixon carried the state with 38.1% of the vote against 32.2% for Wallace and only 29.6% for Humphrey.[21] In 1972, Nixon again carried the state with 72.6% of the vote against perhaps the most "un-Southern" Democratic candidate of all time, George McGovern.[22] One of the keys to Nixon's success was his "southern strategy" by which he chose to let southerners know that they could handle their own civil rights problems without federal intervention were he in the White House. Jimmy Carter, a native southerner, did carry the state with 56.2% of the vote in 1976; however, he was defeated in his bid for re-election by Ronald Reagan who polled 49.4% of the state's votes to win the extremely close race of 1980.[23] In contests for federal offices, the Republican Party has become competitive with, if not dominant over, the Democratic Party in

South Carolina. The party's conservative economic policies, along with its devotion to national defense have attracted a large portion of the state's voters into the Republican fold. On the state level, however, despite Republican inroads, the Democratic Party appears to remain in control.

In state elections, Republicans began having some success in the mid-1960s. In 1966, Senator Thurmond and U.S. Representative Albert Watson, who had switched parties after having supported Goldwater in 1964 and been stripped of his seniority as a Democrat, were easily re-elected to become South Carolina's first regularly elected Republican members of Congress. In addition, the Republican candidate for the vacated seat of U.S. Senator Olin D. Johnston lost by less than 12,000 votes to Democrat Ernest F. Hollings. Also, in the Governor's race, the Republican candidate received a respectable 184,088 votes although he was soundly beaten by Democratic Governor McNair's 255,854 votes.[24] Furthermore, the number of Republican state legislators increased from one in 1964 to twenty-five, seventeen House Members and eight Senators.[25] The Republican showing of 1966, along with their previous successes pointed out to the Democrats that they finally had organized opposition in most South Carolina General Elections.[26]

As early as 1960, the state Democrats had begun to support platforms that came to rely increasingly on black support.[27] By the mid-1960s, according to one former Democratic official, the party had begun to convert its previously established organization from simply an agency for carrying out primary elections into an organization capable of campaigning in a general election. A permanent staff was developed. Largely for the sake of party unity, the Democratic gubernatorial candidates in 1966 and 1970, Governors McNair and West, were unopposed in the primary. One source states that by 1968, the South Carolina Democratic Party essentially accepted the fact that it would not always be able to carry a Democratic presidential nominee to victory and

concentrated on attracting votes at the state level.[29] In 1968, despite the presidential loss, state Democratic efforts were effective. Senator Hollings defeated the Republican candidate by over 150,000 votes to retain his seat . In the state legislature, the Republicans kept only eight of the twenty-five seats they had previously held.[30] On the state level, the Democratic position appeared to be secure.

In 1970, perhaps due to the fact that they did not have to be tied to Nixon's "southern strategy" which blacks abhorred, Republicans regained eleven seats in the legislature. Once again, the Democrats retained the office of governor. As the 1970's began, the South Carolina Democratic Party remained in control of the state government.[31] The Republican Party, however, was having some noteworthy success. It continued to stress the importance of "limited government, individual freedom, and capitalism" that large numbers of South Carolinians found appealing.[32] The GOP did particularly well in elections to the U.S. House of Representatives. In 1981, four of South Carolina's six Congressmen were Republicans. This success can perhaps be attributed to the same conservative forces that aid Republican presidential candidates, because all but one of these Congressmen came from the same coastal and metropolitan areas where Republican presidential candidates have received most of their support.

Perhaps the greatest Republican triumph of the century occurred in 1974 when South Carolina elected its first Republican governor since 1876. The winner of the Democratic Primary had been Charles "Pug" Ravenel. Ravenel, who had used blanket media advertising in an unprecedented manner and perhaps changed South Carolina's campaign style forever, was declared ineligible to be governor due to a constitutional residency requirement. A state Democratic Convention met and chose William Jennings Bryan Dorn as its new nominee.

The Republican candidate, James B. Edwards, aided by Ravenel's refusal to endorse Dorn, a public resentment against a convention nominated candidate, and post-Watergate distrust of the established order, was elected with 50.9% of the vote.[33] Few, if any, observers viewed the election as proof that Republicans were now completely competitive with Democrats on the state level. Across the state and nation, the accounts of this election usually refer to it as a "fluke."[34] Despite this defeat, the Democrats remained firmly entrenched in the state government. As one observer stated, "It may not be 100 years before the Republicans elect another Governor, but it will be a long time."[35]

On the state level, the Democratic Party retains dominance, although victory in the Democratic Primary is no longer "tantamount to election." The number of Republicans in the legislature tends to remain around twenty. In 1980, for example, there were sixteen Republicans in the 124-member State House of Representatives and three in the forty-six member State Senate.[36] The Governor's Office was returned to Democratic control in 1978 when Richard "Dick" Riley received 61.4% of the vote. Overall, only three Republican candidates have won statewide elections to office in South Carolina, Governor Edwards, former State Agricultural Commissioner Bryan Patrick, an Edwards appointee who ran unopposed in 1978, and Senator Strom Thurmond whose personal appeal is such that he cannot be considered an accurate reflection of Republican strength.[37] None of these victories can be described as a triumph over a strong Democratic candidate by a strong "pure" Republican candidate. Today, South Carolina Democrats are loyal to the U.S. Democratic Party;[38] however, national issues rarely seem to appear in state elections. Perhaps this separation of state and national issues has allowed the Democratic Party to retain control of the state

government while Republican congressional and presidential candidates do well across the state. One source attributes Democratic preeminence on the state level to the fact that "ticket splitters" in the state tend to vote Democratic unless they perceive a specific reason to do otherwise. The fact remains that the situation has changed. It is no longer a gigantic upset if Republicans win an election. It is still an upset, but it is not unprecedented.[39]

Undoubtedly, the Republican Party has a core of support in South Carolina. It seems to mainly encompass the upper and middle-class citizens, notably the members of the new suburbia that is growing in South Carolina and the individuals who have moved south with industry. There also appears to be a fringe element of the state GOP which remains loyal due to racial motives.[40] Democratic strength is based upon an alliance of working class whites, blacks, the old South Carolina "courthouse establishment," the law enforcement establishment, academics, and an assorted group of liberals.[41] Today, these parties are the only consistently available alternatives presented to South Carolina voters.

There is, however, an undercurrent in South Carolina politics which surfaces from time to time. The state appears to have a "quasi-populist" tradition which survives to this day.[42] In 1973, a populist organization of sorts arose to represent the state's citizens against the powerful upper class. As the movement's leader, Tom Turnipseed stated, they believed that "the powerful men don't care a bit about you or your needs, or mine either, for their exploitation transcends color."[43] In 1979, Turnipseed's organization, The South Carolina Taxpayers Association, played a major role in utility rate hearings and created a public furor which effectively ended the practice by power companies of keeping powerful lawyer-legislators on retainer.[44] Although its success at the polls would be doubtful, this movement wields a suprisingly large amount of public influence from time to time.

Despite its populist undercurrent, South Carolina today has only two parties. Over the past thirty years, the Republican Party has become competitive in state politics, but it has yet to end Democratic domination on the state level. It is quite possible that this will occur in the future. For now, however, the Republican Party will have to content itself with equality in elections for federal office and an underdog's role on the state level.

Obviously, Key was correct in his prediction of the end of one-party politics in South Carolina. He also discussed the effects that two-party politics would have on voting patterns in the state. He foresaw that two-party politics could divide the state along up-country versus low-country lines. Key pointed out that the large manufacturing force of the Piedmont region and the aristocratic background and higher Negro population of the Coastal Plains region produced political differences that could provide the basis for two separate political parties(Map 1, p. 33). Key also predicted that party alignments would end multifactional "friends and neighbors" politics in South Carolina. Key noted that there was a tendency in the state for candidates to attract different groups of voters into factions which tended to be stronger in and around the candidate's home county. These groups which together became a faction would support their particular candidate in his race, but might never vote together in a similar manner again. With the rise of a bipartisan system, Key felt that this type of politics would disappear as individuals gave their support to the party that took positions in their best interest.[45] An examination of voting patterns since 1948 shows that party alignments did for a time show strong signs of up-state versus low-state differences which have persisted to some degree; however, today the primary party alignment appears to be along

MAP 1

Key's Division of South Carolina Into

Up-State and Low-State



Up-State (Piedmont)

Low-State (Coastal Plain)

urban-rural lines. Likewise, "friends and neighbors" politics has to a large extent disappeared, although the pattern still appears from time to time. Also, despite the rise of bipartisanship, it appears that some candidates still attract groups into unlikely, but unbeatable factions.

Writers since Key have examined the evidence of later elections to discover whether or not bipartisanship arose along up-state, low-state lines. Donald Fowler examined presidential voting in South Carolina from 1948 to 1964 and concluded that the Coastal Plains counties of the low-state, minus the area known as the Pee Dee region(Map 2, p. 35), along with certain metropolitan areas showed a stronger tendency to vote Republican than did the rest of the state.[46] Fowler hypothesized that the white voters of this region were made more conservative by the area's high Negro population and, thus, supported the Republican Party. In the metropolitan areas, it appeared that the growing upper and middle class were allying themselves with the Republicans. Also, Fowler pointed to the presence of strong Democratic organizations and Democratic programs to support the prices of tobacco and cotton as the reasons for continued strong support for the Democratic Party in the Pee Dee region.[47] An examination of maps showing the twenty-three counties, half of the state, with the highest percentages of Republican and Independent votes shows that the Coastal Plains counties, along with the metropolitan area around Greenville voted consistently more for non-Democratic candidate than did any of the state's other counties(Maps 3-7, pp. 36-39).[48] Fowler's study seemed to show that Key was correct. In these, the only statewide races in which the Republicans could hope to emerge victorious, the pattern of up-state versus low-state appears to be very real. Also, the tendency for the Republicans to receive a higher percentage of the vote in the expanding urban areas is also easily observed. Since

Map 2

Fowler's Division of South Carolina into Three Regions



Piedmont Region

Coastal Plains Region

Pee Dee Region

Note: Horry is sometimes considered a Pee Dee county

Source: Donald L. Fowler, Presidential Voting in South Carolina, 1948-1964, (Columbia: USC Bureau of Governmental Research and Service, 1966), p. 128.

Map 3

1952 Presidential Election



Twenty-three Counties With Highest Percentage of the Vote for Eisenhower

Source:Fowler, p. 20.

Map 4

1956 Presidential Election



Twenty-three Counties With Highest Combined Percentages of the Vote for Byrd and Eisenhower

Source: Fowler, p. 23.

Map 5

1960 Presidential Election



Twenty-three Counties With Highest Percentage of the Vote for Nixon

Source: Fowler, p. 24.

Map 6

1964 Presidential Election



Twenty-three Counties With Highest Percentage of the Vote for Goldwater

Source: Fowler, pp. 25.

the 1964 presidential election, however, this pattern has changed somewhat.

The 1968 presidential election did not show the clear cut patterns which were previously observable. Democrat Hubert Humphrey carried a plurality in the most counties, nineteen, but received only 29.6% of the vote. At the same time, Independent George Wallace carried only twelve counties and received 32.3% of the vote, and Republican Richard Nixon carried fifteen counties and the state with 38.1% of the vote. Nixon won because he carried the major metropolitan areas of the state. A comparison of maps 7 and 8 shows that Nixon won all but two of the counties that are today considered by the U.S. Census Bureau to be Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas. Nixon's margin of victory in these counties exceeded 40,000 votes, while his overall margin in the state was only slightly over 38,000 votes.[49] Interestingly, the top twenty-three counties for the Republican and Independent candidates did not follow the previous pattern(Map 9, p. 43). The up-state counties around Greenville, along with the major metropolitan areas, provided the best support for Nixon and Wallace. It is probable that low-state blacks, many registered for the first time because of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, voted so strongly against Nixon's "southern strategy" and Wallace's racist platform that they nullified the Republican and Independent vote in the area. The reason for support for non-Democrats in the up-state is difficult to ascertain, although one reasonable assumption would be that Wallace had a strong appeal with workingmen.[50] The metropolitan areas continued to exhibit strong support for Republicans.

George McGovern's unpopularity in the South renders the results of Nixon's victory in 1972 with 72.1% of the vote extremely difficult to evaluate.[51] Also, Democratic Southerner Jimmy Carter easily carried South Carolina in 1976. By examining counties where Ford polled over 40% of the vote, however,

Map 7

Metropolitan Areas in South Carolina



Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas

Source:U.S. Department of Commerce, 1980 Census of the Population, Vol.1, Ch Chapter B, Pt. 42, p. 5.

Map 8

1968 Presidential Election



Sources: Richard M. Scammon, ed., America Votes 1968, Vol. 8, (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1969) p. 347: 1980 Census of the Population, Vol.1, Chapt. B, Pt. 42, p.5.

Map 9

1968 Presidential Election



Twenty-three Counties With Highest Combined Percentages of the Vote for Nixon and Wallace.

Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas

Sources: Scammon: 1980 Census.

it is obvious that he did better in the metropolitan areas(Map 10, p. 45). Also, an examination of the twenty-three counties where Ford polled his highest percentages of the vote seems to show a slightly better performance in the low-state; however, this division is not nearly as obvious as those before 1964(Map 11, p. 46).

In the 1980 presidential election, Republican Ronald Reagan defeated Jimmy Carter by winning only fifteen of the states forty-six counties. The key was that Reagan carried all but one of the state's metropolitan counties (Map 12, p. 47). This election, more than any other, shows the strength of the Republicans in the rapidly expanding urban areas and illustrates the overall importance of metropolitan areas in statewide elections. Overall, Reagan also did slightly better in the low-country, particularly around Charleston(Map 13, p. 48). This could have been caused by a party alignment, or it could have been an endorsement for Reagan's pro-military stance by an area with seventeen military bases which provide the basis for 55% of its economy.[54]

Statewide general elections are rarely two-party affairs. As has been previously explained, the Democratic Party still retains control over most state offices. Since World War II, there have been twenty-three statewide elections for either the U.S. Senate or the Office of Governor. Of these, the winner received less than 55% of the vote only three times.[55] There are other statewide races, but they are virtually ignored, and only one Republican, who was previously appointed and unopposed, has ever been elected to one of these offices. The three most closely contested elections do seem to provide some evidence from which conclusions may be drawn.

In 1966, Ernest F. Hollings defeated Republican Marshall Parker by less

Map 10

1976 Presidential Election



Source: Alice V. McGillivray and Richard M. Scammon, America Votes 1976, Vol. 13, (Washington:Congressional Quarterly, 1977), p. 334. 1980 Census.

Map 11

1976 Presidential Election



Twenty-three Counties With Highest Percentage of the Vote for Ford

Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas

Sources: America Votes 1976: 1980 Census.

Map 12

1980 Presidential Election



Sources: America Votes 1980, p. 353: 1980 Census.

Map 13

1980 Presidential Election



Counties With Over 44% of the Vote for Reagan

Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas

Sources: America Votes 1980, p. 353: 1980 Census.

than 11,000 votes to win the United States Senate seat vacated upon the death of Olin D. Johnston. Hollings carried half of the metropolitan counties, the entirety of the strongly Democratic Pee Dee region, and slightly over half of the counties of both the up-country and the low-country(Map 14, p. 50).[56] Hollings appears to have done slightly better in the low-state, but this could be attributed to a number of factors including his low-state roots, or an influx of black voters after the passage of the Voting Rights Act. This election shows no particular up-state versus low-state pattern of a significance seen in the presidential elections of 1964 and before, despite the fact that it was the closest general election for a U.S Senate seat in South Carolina since World War II.

The 1970 gubernatorial election pitted Democrat John C. West against Republican Albert Watson in a campaign which often revolved around racial issues. West carried thirty-three counties, and Watson carried thirteen, four of the twelve metropolitan ones and only nine of the remaining thirty-four. (Map 15, p. 51).[58] An examination of the half of the state which gave West his highest percentage of support shows that he was far more successful in the Piedmont region than elsewhere(Map 16, p. 52) In this race, sectional issues seem to have split the state somewhat; however, again, the split is not nearly as clean as it was in the presidential elections between 1948 and 1964.

The 1974 gubernatorial election was perhaps the South Carolina Republican Party's finest hour. Their candidate, James B, Edwards, won the election, despite holding a majority in only fourteen counties. The important fact was that eight of the counties were from among the twelve metropolitan counties of the state. Edwards' majority in those counties exceeded 53,000 votes. Despite victories by his opponent, W.J. Bryan Dorn, in virtually all rural areas of the state with sometimes as much as 80% of the vote, Edwards

Map 14

1966 U.S. Senate Race
Hollings vs Parker



Counties in Which Hollings Received Over 50% of the Vote.

Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas

Sources: 1966 Election Returns, South Carolina Election Commission: 1980 CENSUS.

Map 15

1970 General Election for Governor



Counties in Which West won

Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas

Sources: 1970 General Election Returns, State Election Commission: 1980 Census.

Map 16

1970 Gubernatorial Election



Sources: 1970 General Election Returns, State Election Commission: 1980 Census.

won by over 17,000 votes (Map 17, p. 54).[59] Also, an examination of the counties where Edwards did best shows a fairly clear up-state, low-state division. (Map 18, p. 55) The evidence appears to indicate that the up-state, low-state split according to party is still visible, although it could be argued that the candidates' homes, Dorn's in the up-state and Edward's in the low-state, played a role in this.

Disregarding political parties, the question arises as to the survival of "friends and neighbors" factionalism. In 1969, Chester W. Bain pointed out that the multi-candidate primary races which Key observed to be a major component of "friends and neighbors" politics no longer occurred, In addition, Bain concluded that "friends and neighbors" politics has disappeared from the South Carolina political community.[60] Over the past decade, there has been some evidence which refutes Bain's claim. For example, it can be argued that the gubernatorial race in the 1974 general election exhibited several of the characteristics of Key's "friends and neighbors" concept. Both candidates were more successful around their homes and far less successful in many of the areas near their opponents home(Maps 17 and 18, pp. 54-55). At the same time, however, Greenville-Spartanburg, which is in Dorn's "backyard", voted overwhelmingly for Edwards. This implies the possibility that in the metropolitan areas, the keys to Republican strength, "friends and neighbors" politics has been subjugated by party loyalties. This example is unlike Key's examples in another important way. This example took place in a general election, and Key described only the Democratic primary. In an evaluation of the possibility for the survival of "friends and neighbors" politics, it is only proper that the two most prominent examples occurred in the gubernatorial primary. Specifically, these examples occurred in the primary elections of 1974 and 1978.

Map 17

1974 General Election

Governor



Sources: South Carolina General Election Results From November 5, 1974: 1980 Census.

Map 18

1974 General Election

Governor



Sources: South Carolina General Election Results From November 5, 1974: 1980 Census.

In 1974, there were three candidates that observers believed to be capable of winning the primary, Charles "Pug" Ravenel, W.J. Bryan Dorn, and Nick Zeigler. With a massive advertising campaign, Ravenel led all candidates, but he would later be required to face Dorn in a run-off. In the first primary, Ravenel was relatively successful around his home in Charleston. Around Dorn's home county, however, he received less than 25% of the vote in several counties. The most critical element seems to be that Ravenel received over 40% of the vote in three largest metropolitan areas of the state, Greenville-Spartanburg, Columbia, and Charleston(Map 19,p. 57).[61] There are elements of "friends and neighbors" multifactional politics to be seen in this race. The two dominant candidates did better in the area around their homes; but, Ravenel's success in Greenville, which is only 50 miles from Dorn's home, coupled with his lack of success in Jasper which is only 50 miles from his home provide sufficient proof that "friends and neighbors" politics is not as pervasive as it once was.

In the Democratic gubernatorial primary of 1978, a similar situation arose(Map 20, p. 58). Charlestonian Brantley Harvey carried his home and much of the surrounding area with over 50% of the vote. Further from his home, however, his voting strength became considerably weaker. In the home counties of his opponents, Bryan Dorn of Greenwood and Richard Riley of Greenville, he received less than 12% of the vote. At the same time, however, Harvey received 35.2% of the vote in Spartanburg which shares a border with Greenville. Once again, some of the characteristics of "friends and neighbors" politics appeared, but the concept which Key described has diminished a great deal.

Both of the preceding examples contain several elements of "friends

Map 19

1974 Democratic Primary

Governor



Source: South Carolina Democratic Primary Results From July 16, 1974

Map 20

1978 Democratic Primary

Governor



The Numbers Denote the Percentage of the Vote Received by Harvey

Source: South Carolina Democratic Primary Results From June 13, 1978

and neighbors" politics. Both races began with more than two candidates, both provided examples of candidates who did well near their homes and not so well in the area near the homes of their opponents. From this evidence, it seems clear that "friends and neighbors" politics, although not nearly as strong as it once was, survives in a diluted way. Perhaps this phenomenon occurs in all the states, or it may not, but it does occur in South Carolina. Interestingly, although Greenville gave overwhelming support to Riley in 1978, the cities of the state invariably provide the major exceptions to the "friends and neighbors" pattern. This implies that the increasingly urban society of the metropolitan areas may be developing party or ideological loyalties which the rural communities have never had cause to develop.

One characteristic of South Carolina politics which Key described that has not disappeared is the ability of certain individuals to attract groups of supporters that have little or nothing in common into factions that perpetually re-elect their leader. U.S. Senator Strom Thurmond is such an individual. This arch-conservative and former segregationist is popular amongst blacks, whites, the upper class, the lower class, textile workers, and textile owners. In six senate elections, he has yet to receive less than 55.5% of the vote.[62] As one black woman pointed out, "A lot of folks just like him, and they don't know why."[63] At the same time, there is a belief that Thurmond provides little help to other Republican candidates, and no one seems to ride into office on his coattails.[64] Looking to the future, Thurmond is considered unbeatable by state Democratic leaders. As long as Thurmond retains his Senate seat, it appears that one aspect of Key's description of South Carolina politics will remain intact.

Thirty-four years after Key, South Carolina party politics has changed

a great deal. The one-party system is gone. The Republican party provides a viable alternative in most important elections. On the national level, Republicans have been very successful. As a matter of fact, since 1950, each major party has won four presidential elections in the state. Also, the number of federal representatives is split with each party being represented by three House Members and one Senator. On the state level, however, Democrats retain control. With the rise of two-party politics, the voting pattern of up-state versus low-state appeared in a very strong form for a time; however, it seems to have abated somewhat. This may be due to the increased black vote in the low-state which could have "neutralized" a Republican majority among the whites. Also, "friends and neighbors" politics seems to have diminished as a characteristic of state politics. Although Senator Thurmond attracts a very diverse faction, he may be the last of his kind. Today, the key to South Carolina voting patterns appears to be the cities. There is Republican strength here. Without victories in the metropolitan areas, Republican candidates in South Carolina still cannot be successful. Also, the cities provide fewer examples of the type of "friends and neighbors" loyalty that can still be seen in rural areas such as Greenwood which can always be counted upon to support Bryan Dorn. It is possible that the metropolitan areas have abandoned the beliefs and lifestyle Key considered uniquely "Southern" in a more complete fashion than have the rural areas. Undoubtedly, some areas have changed faster than others, but, regardless of the future of party politics in the state, vestiges of the old order will remain for years to come.

Footnotes

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[2]J. Clyde Shirley, Uncommon Victory: The 1974 Gubernatorial Campaign of James B. Edwards (Columbia: The R.L. Bryan Co., 1978), p. 3

[3]Fowler, pp. 2-3.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Jack Bass and Walter DeVries, The Transformation of Southern Politics: Social Change and Political Consequence Since 1945 (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1976), p. 253.

[6]John E. Huss, Senator for the South: A Biography of Olin D. Johnston (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1961), p. 159.

[7]Fowler, pp. 3-4.

[8]Huss, pp. 19-23.

[9]"South Carolina: And Now Governor Byrnes," Newsweek, 24 July 1950, p. 26.

[10]Fowler, p. 4: James F. Byrnes, "The Principle of Local Government: Southern States Must Cooperate," Vital Speeches of the Day, 15 May 1952, pp. 450-451.

[11]Fowler, 5-6.

[12]"Byrnes, Ike, and the South," Newsweek, 15 December 1952, p. 31: Raymond Moley, "A Political Revolution," Newsweek, 15 December 1952, p. 108.

[13]Frank E. Jordan,Jr., The Primary State: A History of the Democratic Party in South Carolina, 1896-1962 Columbia: Unknown, 1966), pp. 80-81.

[14]Fowler, p. 8

[15]Ibid., pp. 7-8.

[16]Ibid., p. 11.

[17]Jack Bass, Porgy Comes Home: South Carolina After 300 Years (Columbia: The R.L. Bryan Co., 1972), p. 47: Bass and DeVries, p. 23: Shirley, p.5.

[18]Interview with Judge Matthew Perry, Federal Court Building, Columbia, 13 December 1982: Bass and DeVries, pp. 26, 255.

[19]Bass and DeVries, pp. 26, 255.

[20]"Notes From South Carolina," National Review, 16 October 1964, p. 852.

[21]Richard M. Scammon,ed., America Votes 1968 Vol. 8 (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1969), p. 347.

[22]South Carolina, Votes Cast in General Election (7 November 1972)

[23]Alice V. McGillivray and Richard M. Scammon, America Votes 1976 Vol. 12 (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1977), p. 334: Alice V. McGillivray and Richard M. Scammon, America Votes 1980 Vol. 14 (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1981), p. 353.

[24]Shirley. pp. 6-7: Bass and DeVries, p. 255.

[25]Shirley, p. 7

[26]Bass, p. 47.

[27]Ibid.

[28]Interview with Joe Sapp, Laurens Street, Columbia, 5 April 1983, (Telephone)

[29]Bass, pp. 47-49.

[30]Bass and DeVries, p. 255:McGillivray and Scammon, America Votes 1980, p. 351.

[31]Bass, p. 49.

[32]Shirley, p. 2.

[33]"South Carolina:Quarterback Sneak," Time, 14 October 1974,p. 18: Shirley, pp. 105-107, 137, 123: Bass and DeVries, pp. 267-269.

[34]Interview with J.C. Long, Mt. Pleasant, S.C., 16 December 1982: Bass and DeVries, p. 32: "A Lucky Fluke" The Economist, 18 January 1975, p. 54.

[35]"A Lucky Fluke"

[36]Lois T Shealy, ed. 1980 South Carolina Legislative Manual (Columbia: State of South Carolina, 1980), pp. 15-108.

[37]Chester W. Bain, "South Carolina:Partisan Prelude," in The Changing Politics of the South, ed. William C. Havard (Baton Rouge:LSU Press, 1972), p. 614.

[38]Sapp: McGillivray and Scammon, America Votes 1980.

[39]Shirley, p. 8.

[40]Bass, p. 46: Bass and DeVries, p. 25: Shirley, p. 3.

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[44]"Summers Denies SCE&G Has 'Fix' on Regulatory Process," The State, 31 ocyober 1979, p. 1-B.

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[46]Fowler, p. 112.

[47]Ibid., pp. 112, 42.

[48]Ibid, pp. 20-25, 112-113.

[49]Scammon, p. 347.

[50]Bain, p. 615.

[51]South Carolina, Votes Cast in General Election (7 November 1972).

[52]McGillivray and Scammon, America Votes 1976, p. 334.

[53]McGillivray and Scammon, America Votes 1980, p. 352.

[54]"Reconstruction in South Carolina," New Republic, 22 July 1972, pp. 10-11: South Carolina: Mendelian Domain," Time, 21 June 1968, pp. 21-22.

[55]McGillivray and Scammon, America Votes 1980, p. 351.

[56]South Carolina, Records of the Secretary of State, Annual Report Supplement, 1967, p. 3.

[57]McGillivray and Scammon, America Votes 1980.

[58]South Carolina, Votes Cast in General Election, (3 November 1970).

[59]South Carolina, Votes Cast in the General Election, (5 November 1974)

[60]Bain, p. 628.

[61]South Carolina, Democratic Primary Results, (16 July 1974)

[62]McGillivray and Scammon, America Votes 1980.

[63]" 'TV Man' Ravenel Trails a New Ol' Strom," New Republic, 4 November 1978, p. 28.

[64]Bain, p. 620.

[65]Chris Weston, "Is Thurmond Unbeatable?," Greenville News-Piedmont 2 January 1983, pp. 1-B, 6-B.

[66]McGillivray and Scammon, America Votes 1980.

Chapter III

Legislative Government Then and Now

As Key explained, South Carolina had, in 1949, a legislative form of government. For all intents and purposes, the governor's office had "nothing to it except honor."[1] The legislature itself was largely under the influence of State Senator Edgar Brown, the "Bishop from Barnwell," and a handful of other powerful politicians often referred to collectively as "the Barnwell Ring." In the years after the publication of Southern Politics, South Carolina has retained its legislative form of government. The legislature remains in control of the state; however, the overall powers of the legislature have been weakened somewhat, the power inside the legislature has been greatly fragmented, and the overall position of the governor has been significantly enhanced. Although portions of the old order remain, the situation inside the state government has changed greatly since 1949.

It is difficult to overemphasize the role of the legislature in South Carolina's government. In 1949, the legislature, in addition to being required to approve the final appropriations bill, provided two of the three members of the State Budget Commission. These men, the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, worked with the Governor on this committee to establish budget proposals. This majority on the State Budget Commission placed almost absolute control of state finances in legislative hands. The Governor, unless he agreed with legislative policy, had to ally himself with a legislator in order to get any input into the budget. In addition, the legislature controlled the state judiciary and major appointments for state agencies and commissions, notably the State Highway Commission and the

Public Service Commission which regulates the state's utility companies. Also, each county delegation to the legislature was responsible for fixing the county tax levy and making county appropriations. In addition, once county appropriations had been approved, the senator for each county retained the power to veto any expenditure as he saw fit.[2] Legislative preeminence was such that if there was a position that was accepted by the majority of the legislature, then that belief became part of state policy and any individual or group that could control the legislature could also control the state.

The set of beliefs that were held by most state legislators are still an integral part of the South Carolina government's philosophy. The most dominant of them concerned fiscal responsibility. Over the years, the state's leaders have been proud of their ability to keep the budget balanced. In addition, legislators over the years have tended to be men of substance, bankers, lawyers, businessmen, or large scale farmers, and they have shown a tendency to protect the established order while working to improve the state economically through the attraction of outside industry and through the increased education of its populace.[3] These attitudes, often referred to as "pro-business," have greatly shaped legislative policy.

Beliefs are important, but they are not "flesh and blood." The South Carolina legislature was and is an organization of people and like any organization, it had its leaders. Undeniably, there was a "Barnwell Ring." It consisted mainly of the two most powerful men in the legislature from the 1940s until the early 1970s, Senator Edgar Brown and House Speaker Sol Blatt, both from Barnwell County. Senator Brown, President Pro Tempore of the Senate and Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, was the "predominant internal leader of state politics from 1926 to at least 1966." With the power which was found in his legislative posts, and the

unquestioning obedience of many state legislators, along with his "unmatched experience, political sagacity, familiarity with government, personality and charm," Brown could sway the Senate vote on virtually all issues. He was particularly effective in the Conference and Free Conference Committees which were invariably formed each year concerning the State Appropriations Bill. As Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Brown was automatically a member of the Senate delegation to these committees, and he always controlled the vote of at least one of his two colleagues. Since a majority from each chamber's delegation had to approve any decisions, Brown could and did create a stalemate whenever he perceived it to be necessary. In essence, the Senator's demands had to be met.[4] One member of the House noted that Senator Brown worked with the attitude that "if you don't want it, I'll go to the beach and wait 'til you do."[5] In 1966, despite two small reforms that had loosened his control somewhat, Senator Brown could still say, "I've never lost an appropriations bill I wanted through /sic/, although it's harder now than when I started out."[6] Until his retirement in 1972, "the Bish" was the most influential man in the Senate and, arguably, in the entire state.

The other half of the "Barnwell Ring" was House Speaker Solomon Blatt. Blatt held the post from 1937 until 1973, with the exception of the two terms beginning in 1947 and 1949 when he stepped down for the state's best interest.[7] As Speaker, Blatt had the power to make committee assignments, assign bills to committee, and control debate on the floor. These powers coupled with his "strong personality helped mold the speakership into one of the most powerful positions in state government."[8] He presided fairly, but with an "iron hand encased in a velvet glove."[9] The basis for his power seems to be quite simple. As one source close to the legislature explained, "Everybody owed a favor to Mr. Sol and he knew

when to call them in."[10] An example of Blatt's influence came in 1954 when he felt compelled to give up the Speaker's gavel and work on the House floor for the passage of the "right to work law". All efforts to oppose or alter the bill were defeated in such short order that one representative remarked, "If Jesus Christ were to come down out of Heaven tonight and try to put an amendment through this House, He would be voted down."[11] Speaker Blatt's power was comparable to that of Senator Brown's and when the "two old warhorses" of Barnwell County agreed on a bill, it soon became a law.

In many if not most cases, Blatt and Brown did see eye to eye, particularly in the area of fiscal responsibility. Brown listed fiscal responsibility as the most important interest he had had since entering the legislature in 1927.[12] Late in his career he said, "I manage the state's money like I manage my own. I don't spend what I don't have."[13] Blatt has said that of all his accomplishments, he is proudest of his part in guaranteeing the financial balance of the state year after year.[14] Both leaders freely admitted that at times they had opposed social programs for financial reasons. As Blatt said, "It's probably true that from time to time and temporarily, we could have satisfied more of the requests from education and the various departments for larger appropriations by going into debt, but largely we've played it safe, thereby preventing serious cut backs or even bigger debts in slower years by not over anticipating."[15] Both also believed that it was necessary that governmental power reside in the legislature. Brown referred to the legislature as "not only the balance wheel, but the driving wheel of government."[16] Blatt concurred with Brown in the belief that the legislature should be the dominant branch of government.[17] On these and many other issues, Blatt and Brown were in

firm agreement; but, despite what many observers believe, from time to time they had major disagreements.

Senator Brown once described the "Barnwell Ring" as "two old men who sometimes agree and sometimes disagree."[18] This appears to be an accurate interpretation of the situation. Despite the fact that they were from the same county, Blatt and Brown were never close friends and each seems to have had his own independent political base in Barnwell. Former Governor Donald Russell said they "maintained a surface relationship. /However/, both had their own power base in Barnwell." He added that their disagreements rarely became known because they made it a point never to take public positions against each other.[19] J.C. Long, a former state senator and a friend of both described them as "mere casual friends" who "often /disagreed/ ... in Columbia and in their little county."[20] In their respective biographies, Blatt and Brown admitted that they often violently disagreed on subjects.[21] When they feuded, the governmental process of the state was disrupted.[22] Often, John K. Cauthen, a prominent textile lobbyist and a friend of both, was called upon to keep the peace between the two.[23] The worst dispute occurred in 1962. Their origins were unknown, but bad feelings between Blatt and Brown became well known after Senator Brown stood silently by as one of his colleagues railed against Blatt on the Senate floor. Also, a disagreement arose as to whether or not Brown was covertly supporting Blatt's opponent in the 1962 legislative election. This disagreement caused "one issue after another /to be/ deeply influenced by Barnwell resentments." At the time, one legislator stated that "a few years ago everyone was trying to break up the 'Barnwell Ring'; now everybody is trying to save it."[24] Overall, despite its outward appearance of cohesiveness, the Barnwell Ring was often in disagreement. Blatt and Brown were not two

old cronies that together planned how they would run South Carolina.

Both Brown and Blatt pointed out that without legislative support, their power would not exist. Blatt, who prided himself on being a "team player," said on occasion, "I am only one of one-hundred seventy-five members of the legislature."[25] Brown thought that unless the Senate was satisfied with his actions, they would not allow him to lead.[26] Both felt an obligation to serve the entire state, and being the most highly visible legislative figures, they often received the bulk of criticism for legislative actions.[27] As one political observer pointed out, they were the victims of the oft observed political phenomenon wherein the voters dislike the actions of a chamber, but still favor their own representative.[28] Despite criticism, it appears that Blatt and Brown used their power conscientiously. John Cauthen, admittedly a friend and associate of both, found that their record over the years showed "remarkably little evidence of high-handedness."[29] J.C. Long agrees, stating that "being from a small county, they had the time to give to issues in the General Assembly. With their knowledge of /legislation/ they could influence, and appropriately so, most of the members of the General Assembly in whatever they favored." He added, "They wouldn't favor any /legislation/ simply because some individuals were in favor of it, unless the /legislation/ was actually for the benefit of the people."[30] Also, State Senator Pete Marchant said of Senator Brown, "anyone with his power could've wrecked the state, basically, he's been good for the state." He was quick to add,"he's also been extra good to Senator Brown and Barnwell County."[31] Despite the immensity of their power, it seems doubtful that Blatt and Brown ever consciously ruled the state together, and their influence was rarely opposed strongly or effectively by anyone for the duration of their careers.

It is not within the scope of this paper to evaluate Blatt's and Brown's leadership in relation to that of other states; however, it must be pointed out that without their influence the vast majority of major programs begun by the legislature between 1948 and 1972 would not have occurred. (See Chapter IV)

The fact remains that, until Brown's retirement in 1972, the Barnwell Ring could justly have been accused of effectively exerting control over state government. Despite the length of time during which the Barnwell Ring appeared to retain control of state politics, changes had occurred and would occur more frequently in the future. These changes primarily concerned four areas, the influence of the governor, the power structures in the Senate, the power structures in the House, and the overall power of the legislature.

To the observer of state constitutions, the office of the governor of South Carolina has increased in power only slightly since 1949. In a 1965 study, the office was judged to be the weakest of its kind in the United States.[32] Over the last three and a half decades, however, South Carolina's governors, aided by the increasing complexity of government, have found it possible to increase, if not their actual power, their influence in the state legislative process.

The first important aspect of the increase in gubernatorial influence is the fact that, with the exception of Strom Thurmond, who served from 1947 to 1951, and Republican James Edwards, who served from 1975 to 1979, South Carolina's governors have made a conscious effort to work through legislative leaders to insure the passage of bills which they have favored. In all probability, no other way would have been effective. This fact was illustrated well by the gubernatorial career of Strom Thurmond. Thurmond

in 1946 had campaigned as an opponent of the Barnwell Ring and been elected. His candidate for Speaker, Bruce Littlejohn, was elected after Sol Blatt stepped down in the best interest of the state.[33] Thurmond essentially had control of the House and many of his proposals were approved in this chamber; however, Senator Brown and the more conservative Senate often opposed and put an end to his proposals.[34] In the future, governors recognized the power of both chambers and sought support from their leaders and their membership. Particularly effective in this regard were Governors Byrnes, Hollings, and McNair. Byrnes, governor from 1951 through 1955, proposed and presided over the implementation of the three percent sales tax and accompanying school building project. The Charlotte Observer, amongst other publications, credited the passage of the bill to "extensive and intensive lobbying on the part of the Governor's office."[34] Hollings, who served from 1959 to 1963, was similar to Byrnes in his approach to the legislature. He attempted to use his powers of persuasion to convince legislative leaders that his proposals were in the state's best interest.[35] In addition to working with legislative leaders, Hollings used legislative floor leaders. They had been effective to a point for Governor Thurmond, and after Hollings, legislative floor leaders have appeared for most of South Carolina's governors.[36] Governor McNair also worked very closely with legislative leaders, often behind the scenes. During his term, and due largely to his efforts, the State General Appropriations Bill was passed for the first time in history without the convening of a Conference or Free Conference committee.[37] Rather than floor leaders, McNair had two lobbyists who presented his views to legislators, and he himself met on a regular basis with legislative leaders to express his views on particular pieces of legislation.[38] These three governors, along with Governor West,

who served from 1971 until 1975,[39] and Governor Riley, who has been in office since 1979, all chose to work through the established legislative leadership, and all were rewarded by seeing the passage of many programs which they favored.

As gubernatorial programs proved successful, the governor's influence seemed to grow somewhat. It is doubtful that this increase in influence could be attributed solely to the governor's willingness to work with the legislature, because under a legislative form of government, no other alternative is possible. Other factors have increased the governor's influence. First of all, as government becomes more complicated, only the Governor's Office has the facilities to understand overall situations. For example, federal grants often come with extremely complicated instructions and only the Governor's Office has the means to comprehend them.[40] As Speaker Blatt put it, "The Governor has information the members of the legislature do not have."[41] In addition, the increase in overall media coverage has enhanced the position of the governor of South Carolina. He is the center of mass attention. His speeches are printed and shown on television because he represents the entire state. In 1972, a poll of legislators showed that 65.5% of Senators that responded and 52.5% of House members stated that it was far more difficult to oppose a program which the governor advocated in a well publicized address.[42] These factors appear to have enhanced the governor's overall influence to a certain extent, and a few structural changes have also enhanced his position.

The first noteworthy change occurred when the State Budget Commission was expanded from three members to five with the governor as chairman and renamed The State Budget and Control Board. Now, in addition to the Governor, the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, and the Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, two elected state officers,

the Comptroller General and the State Treasurer, are part of the Board. This change has significantly diluted the power of the legislature and likewise enhanced the governor's overall influence on this, the Board that writes the state budget and has authority over such things as state bonds, the construction of buildings, public lands, the state retirement system, and the direction of personnel practices. Also, this committee has to approve any transfer of funds which might occur after an appropriations bill has been passed. Due to this change, recent governors appear to have had more influence in state budget decisions than they did in the past.[43] The governor's office has also accrued some new appointive powers to add to the several hundred appointments that it was already empowered to make. Among the newer appointments are those to such things as the State Election Commission and the Commission on Higher Education. Also, the Governor retains the power to appoint officers to the State Law Enforcement Division (SLED), an FBI like organization whose Chief, J.P. Strom, has been reappointed by each governor since the organization's creation in 1947. Other than SLED, the governor has no major agencies under his direct control. Most key state positions are still either appointed by the legislature or, in the case of cabinet-like posts, such as Treasurer, Attorney General and Comptroller General, are elective offices. More recently, the governor has become able to serve two consecutive four-year terms. As the first two-term governor is only beginning to serve his second term, it is difficult to assess the influence of the constitutional change, Former Governor Donald Russell expects no effect from the change; however, former House Speaker Bruce Littlejohn expects a new legislative respect for the Governor's position. As he put it, "Now the governor won't be gone in four years and legislators will be more anxious to cooperate."[44] These constitutional changes also seem to appear to have enhanced gubernatorial influence somewhat, but the governor's overall constitutional power appears to have been altered only slightly.

Overall, the office of Governor of South Carolina has become slightly more influential in state politics than it once was. The governor has become more visible and the administrative organization over which he presides provides him with information which legislators lack. Also, the increase in his constitutional power has increased his influence in a minor degree. Still, as one scholar points out, the governor is simply one of several influential actors in state government.[45] The key to his success appears to be his willingness to work with the legislature and use his powers of persuasion to achieve his goals.[46] As former governor Donald Russell states, the governor's power "depends on how people perceive him, that gives him his strength."[47]

In addition to changes in the influence of the governor, the situation has changed somewhat in the State Senate. With Senator Brown's retirement, the two men that replaced him, State Senator Marion Gressette as President Pro Tempore and State Senator Rembart Dennis as Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, became the major power holders in the Senate. Senator Gressette, referred to by one source in 1979 as "one of the two most powerful men in the state,"[48] is also Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, "Gressette's Graveyard," through which it is estimated that between 75% and 80% of all Senate bills must eventually pass. They may be referred to other committees first, but eventually, Gressette gets to provide a great deal of influence either for or against the vast majority of bills that come before the Senate.[49] Dennis retains the Finance Committe chair which still carries much of the influence which Senator Brown had wielded. Despite the power which they obviously have, one state paper said that there was absolutely no evidence to support the claim that Gressette and Dennis had the same all-encompassing leadership capabilities as Senator Brown.[50] In days gone by, Senator

Brown's support was necessary to insure the passage of a bill. Today, bills have been known to pass without the approval of either Gressette or Dennis. As Senator Dennis approaches 68 and Senator Gressette approaches 82, one can only suspect that Senate leadership will become even weaker in the future.

Already, rules have been established which have weakened the strength of established leaders. While Senator Brown still presided, he "allowed" two reforms to go through. One allowed Senators to choose their committees in order of seniority rather than be invited to join a committee by the committee's established members. This allowed senators to switch committees from term to term. The other reform allowed Finance Committee members to oppose committee recommendations on the Senate floor. The ability of members to dissent has weakened the Finance Chairman's persuasive powers by ending the united front which his committee formerly presented.[68] More recently, a rule was passed limiting Senators to one committee chair. This helped fragment leadership somewhat. Marion Gressette, for example, was forced to give up his Rules Committee chairmanship in order to remain Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee.[51]

Despite the fragmentation of power, and these few rules changes, the South Carolina Senate retains, more than any other part of state government, its links with the past. The seniority system, whereby older, and usually more financially and socially conservative, members acquire the major committee chairs, is still in effect and has been written into the Senate Rules. Beyond that, the Senate, with only forty-six members, remains a very cohesive group. Members are still from very similar backgrounds. For example, in 1980, twenty-five of the forty-six were graduates of the University of South Carolina School of Law.[52] In 1973, the atmosphere amongst the "Old Guard" on the Senate floor was described by one progressive as "psychologically and physically intimidating." He added, "They'll cut you to pieces on the floor... They'll attack you

personally and it's not only verbal abuse,... there's an atmosphere of violence. No one will admit it, but it's there." In addition, opponents of the majority often found that punishment, usually in the form of a bill's defeat or a loss of committee assignment, was forthcoming for their transgressions. Senators attempting reform report that the attitude is "go along or get out."[53] In the past several years, reform efforts have increased, but the ways of the "old guard" persist. The old leaders are slowly disappearing, but for now, the Senate remains a predominantly Democratic, all-white legislative body which is still primarily in the hands of old school politicians.

In the State House of Representatives, the overall situation has changed more dramatically; but until very recently, Speaker Blatt's influence was still extremely strong. After he retired as Speaker in 1973, Blatt became Speaker Emeritus of the House.[54] In this office, he continued to exert a large amount of influence on legislative activity. As recently as 1979, he was still considered by many to be "one of the two most powerful men in the state."[55] Over the past few years, Blatt has been ill and his influence is no longer felt on the House floor.

After Blatt stepped down as Speaker, the House leadership's role was altered. The new Speaker, Rex Carter of Greenville, announced that he desired for House members to share the leadership responsibilities with him. Under Carter, and now under Speaker Ramon Schwartz, the House is not nearly as tightly run as it used to be.[56] This is due in part to the change in leadership, but a large portion of the change is due to another factor, single-member districts. In 1964, the U.S. Supreme Court made its famous "one man-one vote" decision in the case of Reynolds vs. Sims. In 1974, South Carolina held its first election using the Federally ordered single-member districts. One change was immediately obvious, the number of blacks in the legislature

increased from three to thirteen.[57] Other changes were slightly more subtle. Political observers believe that single-member districts "broke the back of House leadership." The reason for this is relatively simple. Previously, House members were elected in delegations from the various counties. In representing their entire counties, lawmakers were required to consider the interests of a wider variety of voters than they are required to consider today. As former House member Harry Chapman said, "Lawmakers have become guilty of parochial interests in that they vote a very narrow line-not in a statewide scope."[58] Legislators no longer appear to be concerned with state or even county interests.[59] This has led to a fragmentation of formerly cohesive, and for House leaders, predictable alliances. Speaker Emeritus Blatt complained in 1982, "I don't know who the House leadership is. Everybody thinks he or she is the leader." Even the approximately twenty blacks and twenty Republicans, respectively, do not vote in cohesive blocs as they once did.[60] Overall, single member districts have greatly fragmented the power structure of the House of Representatives, so that no man or small group can absolutely control it, although many veteran leaders still retain certain major powers.

Another interesting change took place in the state government which reduced South Carolina legislative power considerably. With the "one man-one vote" decision, South Carolina was forced to change its legislative districts in a way that overlapped county lines. This raised serious questions about equal representation for citizens if the county legislative delegations were to continue to be in control of county taxes and appropriations. Serious efforts were made to find an efficient way to amend the State Constitution. In 1968, a study committee recommended that the legislature propose an amendment to the Constitution of South Carolina that "would allow an article by article substitution procedure whereby an entire article could be offered to voters as a substitution for an existing one." In November of 1968, this amendment was

approved by the voters. Each amendment was prepared as legislation by a steering committee composed of five Senators and five House members. Several major changes occurred as the amendments were passed by both legislators and voters. Two stand out in regard to state government. First, the court system was expanded and unified under the control of the Supreme Court. Second, and more important, the Home Rule Amendment passed. This amendment transferred the government of each of the counties from the county legislative delegation to one of five types of county government. One form the county voters could select would have allowed legislative delegations to retain control, but it was declared unconstitutional by the State Supreme Court under a new provision which required all acts of the legislature to apply equally to all the counties of the state.[61] Thus, the county legislative delegations lost a great deal of influence in the government of their home counties.

On the state level, however, South Carolina retains a legislative form of government. As recently as 1980, The Economist referred to the South Carolina legislature as the "all-powerful" branch of the state's government. Changes have occurred over the past thirty-four years. The Barnwell Ring no longer exists. The power of the governor has been enhanced somewhat. No longer does one group control either the House or the Senate. The power structures of both have been weakened, although the Senate retains many more elements of the past. Also, legislative power has been weakened somewhat. The legislative delegation no longer controls county taxes and appropriations. The legislature, however, still retains many of its powers of appointment, notably over the judiciary, the State Highway and Public Transportation Commission, the State Board of Education, and the State Public Service Authority.[62] Overall, despite the changes that have occurred, the strength of the legislature remains the preeminent force in the state.

Footnotes

[1]V.O. Key,Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p. 150.

[2]Ibid.,pp. 151-152.

[3]Ibid.

[4]W.D. Workman, The Bishop From Barnwell: The Life and Times of Edgar Brown (Columbia: The R.L. Bryan Co., 1963),p. 56.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Ibid., p. 63.

[7]Lois Shealy, ed., The 1980 Legislative Manual (Columbia: State of South Carolina, 1980), p. 62: Blatt stepped down to avoid conflict with Governor Thurmond who had campaigned against the "Barnwell Ring" to be elected.

[8]Bill Rose, Jr., "Blatt's Farewell Speech Reflects South Carolina Progress," The State, 8 June 73, p. 24-A.

[9]John K. Cauthen, Speaker Blatt: His Challenges Were Greater (Columbia: USC Press, 1965; reprint ed., Columbia: USC Press, 1978), pp. 150, 179.

[10]Daniel Klaus, "Out of Bounds: Frank McGuire and Basketball Politics in South Carolina," Southern Exposure, Autumn, 1979, p. 104.

[11]Cauthen, p. 153.

[12]Workman, p. 38.

[13]Jack Bass and Walter DeVries, The Transformation of Southern Politics: Social Change and Political Consequence Since 1945 (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1976), p. 278.

[14]Cauthen, p. 146.

[15]Ibid., pp. 145-146.

[16]Workman, pp. 24-25.

[17]Cauthen, p. 181.

[18]Jack Bass, "Introduction," in Speaker Blatt:His Challenges Were Greater, by John K. Cauthen (Columbia: USC Press, 1978), p. vi.

[19]Interview with Judge Donald Russell, Federal Court Building, Spartanburg, S.C., 21 December 1982.

[20]Interview with J.C. Long, Mt. Pleasant, S.C., 16 December 1982.

[21]Workman, p. 98: Cauthen, pp. 135-136.

[22]Bass, "Introduction," p. ix.

[23]Bass and DeVries, p. 278.

[24]Cauthen, pp. 132-138.

[25]Ibid., pp. 12, 128, 198.

[26]Workman, p. 125.

[27]Ibid., p. 66: Cauthen, pp. 180. 185.

[28]Interview with Judge Bruce Littlejohn, Spartanburg County Courthouse, Spartanburg, S.C., 20 December 1982.

[29]Cauthen, p. 185.

[30]Long.

[31]Workman, p. 59.

[32]Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines, eds, Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1965), p. 229.

[33]Shealy, p. 62.

[34]Charlotte Observer, 18 April 1951, quoted in Almond Leroy Way, "The Role of the Governor in the State Legislative Process: A Case Study of South Carolina" (Ph.D Dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1974), p. 344.

[35]Jack Bass, Porgy Comes Home: South Carolina After 300 Years (Columbia: The R.L. Bryan Co., 1972), p. 83: Bass and DeVries, p. 250: Citizens Committee for Ernest F. Hollings, Hollings (Columbia: Citizens Committee for Ernest F. Hollings, 1980), pp. 10-11.

[36]Almond Leroy Way, "The Role of the Governor in the State Legislative Process: A Case Study of South Carolina" (Ph.D Dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1974), pp. 326-328, 337.

[37]Cauthen, p. 247-248.

[38]Way, pp. 351,340.

[39]Ibid., p. 342.

[40] Bass and DeVries, p. 276.

[41]Cauthen, p. 159.

[42]Way, pp. 360-366.

[43]Way, p.71: Bass and DeVries, pp. 276-277: Shealy,p. 300.

[44]Littlejohn:Russell.

[45]Way,p. 436.

[46]Ibid.

[47]Russell.

[48]Klaus.

[49]Way, p. 261.

[50]"Senate Looser After Brown," Columbia Record, 1 August 1973, p. 2-A quoted by Way, p. 246.

[51]Way, p. 261.

[52]Bass and DeVries, p. 280: Shealy, p. 170.

[53]Bass and DeVries, p. 281: Shealy, pp. 15-36.

[54]Shealy, p. 62: Cauthen, p.129.

[55]Klaus.

[56]Way, p. 336.

[57]Bass and DeVries, pp. 274-275,13.

[58]Shiels Allee, "Single Member Districts Brought Changes to House," Greenville Piedmont, 17 May 1982, p. 2-C.

[59]Ibid.: Littlejohn.

[60]Allee.

[61]Harold E. Albert, "Home Rule and a New Constitution: Article by Article in South Carolina," National Civic Review 66 (1977) pp. 491-495.

[62]Bass, p. 53: Shealy. pp. 339, 318.

Chapter IV

Government and Business

Key wrote in 1949 that South Carolina was firmly in the control of the "20,000 dollars a year men." By this, he meant that business interests in South Carolina seemed to have a great deal of influence in the government. Today, it seems that the business community in South Carolina still plays an important role in the state's government. The government of South Carolina has taken the position that the progress of the state and the improvement of the lives of the people are dependent upon the success and expansion of native industry, along with the attraction of new industry. This attitude has made for a government that works very closely with the business community to expand present industry and to attract new industry. Also, business and government leaders have often been able to work together to develop programs for the betterment of the state. In addition, there have been several situations where the alignment of government leaders with the business community may have been to the detriment of the state and its citizens.

Efforts to build up industry in the state began after World War II. Beginning with Strom Thurmond, the state's governors, aided in large part by Greenville contractor Charles Daniels, became "travelling ambassadors" for the state. They travelled across the country espousing the natural advantages which South Carolina had for industry, especially cheap available land, and enthusiastic, low paid, and non-union workers.[1] Soon, the legislature became active in efforts to develop South Carolina industrially. Their attitude, as Speaker Blatt once explained it, was that they "/wanted/ more

jobs for our people through the expansion of existing industry and the attraction of new ones. /and/ the best and quickest way I know to stimulate business in general and to provide the revenues for upgrading our people is to develop the overall economy. That takes understanding between business and government."[2] Efforts to aid industry in the 1950's included the passage of the "right-to-work" law forbidding closed union shops, the rescission of a franchise tax which was detrimental to out-of-state corporations, the passage of a law which stated that for tax purposes new plants would be assessed only 40% of their property value, a $21 million ports development project which saved manufacturers thousands of dollars in transportation costs, a freeze on electrical power taxes, and a strengthening of the State Development Board to, essentially, provide free assistance to developing industry.[3]

By the end of the 1950's, results of state efforts to attract industry had appeared. For example, in the early 1950's, South Carolina builders contracted for only one percent of the nation's buildings. By 1960, over five percent of all United States building contracts were from South Carolina.[4] The success was pleasing to the state's leaders and in the future efforts to attract and expand industry were increased.

The 1960's began with one of the most innovative and far-sighted programs in the state's history. The Technical Education Program helped industry, and it prepared many of the state's citizens for jobs. Begun in 1961, this program established eight Technical Education Centers (TECs) fully staffed and equipped to prepare workers for jobs in manufacturing. A major part of the project was dedicated to temporary training programs which, at state expense, provided corporations with fully trained work forces when their

factories opened. Between 1961 and 1977, 59,000 workers were trained in this program alone. It was estimated in 1974 that the complete program had provided some training to over half of the state's one million plus work force.[5] In a survey taken between 1969 and 1971, manufacturers ranked the technical training program as one of the five most influential incentives that affected their decision to build in South Carolina.[6] In addition to this program, the 1970's brought a five-year moratorium on corporate property tax. Also, the state continued its policy of assessing neither a wholesale sales tax nor a property tax on manufactured inventories.[7] With these incentives, and others, the South Carolina government has made it clear that it is the friend of business as it builds, expands, and prospers in the state. In addition to these seemingly attractive incentives, the South Carolina government has greatly developed its use of "public relations" in efforts to attract outside investment and visitors to the state.

The state's "open arms" attitude and its effort to help new and potential industry are far-reaching.[8] For example, the state now has overseas offices that attempt to recruit foreign individuals and corporations to invest capital and resources in the state. Another example was provided by a potential builder who, when he asked about state taxes, "suddenly found himself in the office of the tax commissioner sipping cokes and getting answers." Still another example of these efforts occurred when, as a favor, the limit on tax free liquor imports was altered so that foreign executives could have their native wines without tax.[9] In addition to the courtesies extended to outside investors, state administrative processes have

been streamlined to attract industry. As one foreign executive pointed out, "You can get everything from building permits to bank credit lines in five days. You can be in business six months earlier here than in Germany."[10]

The "open arms" policy plus the other legislated incentives are believed to have been, in conjunction with the state's natural attractiveness to industry, influential in bringing to the state much noteworthy progress over the past three decades.

The results have been relatively impressive. Billions of dollars have been pumped into the state by new and expanding corporations such as DuPont, Celanese, Owens Corning Fiberglass, General Electric, Lockheed, Union Carbide, Campbell Soup, Hoechst Fibers, and Michelin.[11] Personal income per capita has risen from $787 per year in 1949 to $7057 per year in 1979. More importantly, the per capita income of the state has risen from 59.1% of the average per capita income in the United States in 1949 to 80.4% of the average in 1979. Despite this improvement, South Carolina ranked no higher in 1979 amongst the states of the nation in per capita income than it did in 1949 (See Chart, p. 86). These improvements cannot be attributed directly to the government, but the association is often made. Despite the perceived improvements in state standards of living, South Carolina still ranks near the bottom of all states in per capita income and average SAT scores (an indication of educational levels).[12] A comparison with the United States average, along with the statistics from other nearby Southern states shows that despite what they may think, South Carolina leaders have not led the state to heights unachieved by other Southern states. In spending for education and per capita income, the state seems to have progressed at the same rate as other Southern states. In terms of workers employed in manufacturing,

A Comparison of Important Statistics, 1950-1980

	U.S.		S.C.		Ga.		N.C.		Miss.	
	1950	1980	1950	1980	1950	1980	1950	1980	1950	1980
Education:										
Expenditure Per Pupil (Rank)	$197	$2350	$115 (46)	$1560 (47)	$107 (48)	$1652 (44)	$127 (44)	$1992 (36)	$77 (50)	$1536 (48)
Manufacturing:										
% Employed in Manufacturing	33.4	27.4	46.4	42.6	36.1	30.7	45.9	42.7	28.1	34.0
Income:										
Per Capita Income	$1439	$10,517	$838	$8,050	$958	$8,960	$956	$8,679	$702	$7256

Sources: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1952, 1953, 1958, 1960, and 1981-1982 Editions. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census.

South Carolina exceeds the United States average percentage. However, in 1950, the state also exceeded the average for the United States in this area. It is interesting to note that Mississippi, the only state with a higher percentage of black citizens, is the only Southern state which ranks below South Carolina in all of the above categories. From an observation of these statistics, it appears that the state government's "pro-business" attitude has not helped South Carolina exceed the progress which other Southern states have experienced.

Today, the optimism that appeared among state leaders a decade ago seems to be fading. The expansion of state industry has slowed considerably.

Efforts to attract industry appear to have decreased. The state's unemployment level exceeds the national average. Particularly hard hit is the textile industry. Former Governor Robert McNair believes that only an aggressive expansion of programs to attract new industry will prevent South Carolina from sliding backwards economically.[13]

In addition to helping the state to grow economically, the government's relationship with the business community has often been influential in improving the lives of citizens. According to former Governor McNair several industrial leaders, notably John Cauthen, the Executive Vice-President of the South Carolina Textile Manufacturers Association, and Buck Edwards of Southern Bell played a major role in government efforts to improve the lives of its citizens. Cauthen seems to have played a particularly important role in business efforts to help the state. For example, in 1962 Cauthen along with Charlie Daniels, played a major role in the issuance of influential statements by several of the major business associations in the state stating that the state should peaceably allow Harvey Gantt to enter Clemson if and when the Federal Court so ordered it.[14] In addition, Cauthen, accompanied by Attorney General Dan McCleod held seminars with plant managers across the state to aid them in complying with the Civil Rights Act of 1964.[15] Perhaps his most noteworthy achievement was accomplished during Governor McNair's term when Cauthen's behind the scenes work with industrial leaders made "politically acceptable" a 20% increase in corporate income taxes and a 33% increase in sales taxes to finance the "significant expansion of services in public schools, higher education, mental health, mental retardation, corrections, and other areas."[16] The help of industrial leaders in situations such as these has enhanced their position with the South Carolina government. At the same time, there are situations in

which the alliance of the state government with business may have harmed the state.

On several occasions, South Carolina's efforts to increase industrial development and the closeness of political and business leaders may have been detrimental to the state or its citizens. The most prominent example concerns nuclear energy. South Carolina's leaders were once proud of the state's nuclear development which includes the billion dollar Savannah River Atomic Project and several large nuclear power facilities.[17] In 1979, while 10% of the nation's electricity was supplied by nuclear power, over 50% of South Carolina's electricity was produced in this manner. Also, for many years the state accepted nuclear waste as if it were "gold." Recently, this policy has come into question because no one knows precisely what nuclear energy's effect is on future generations.[18] Particularly in nuclear energy, but also in other pollution related areas, South Carolina's enthusiasm for industrial development has often been questioned.[19]

The state government's relationship with business has also produced some questionable ethical situations. As in most states, lobbyists in South Carolina play an important role in government, particularly as sources of information. As Speaker Blatt once said, "How do you learn about things unless you listen to those most directly concerned?"[20] Organizations such as the railroad,[21] the tobacco industry,[22] textiles, and the paper mill[23] industry have lobbied both for and against legislation. There are occasions from time to time that call into question the ethics practiced by these groups and legislators. One critic points out that one of the reasons that the primarily Democratic state government supports

textiles is that, with the possible exception of Roger Milliken, the entire industry discreetly supports the state Democratic Party.[24] The motivations are subject to debate, but the facts presented are accurate. The Democratic administration of South Carolina does do many things to help this, the state's primary industry. An additional and far less subtle, example revolves around the practice by the public utility companies of keeping several prominent lawyer - legislators on retainer. In 1979, amongst those attorneys kept on retainers by the South Carolina Electric and Gas Company were Speaker Emeritus Sol Blatt of the South Carolina House, President Pro Tempore Marion Gressette of the State Senate, and Chairman Rembart Dennis of the State Senate Finance Committee. These were arguably the three most powerful men in the legislature, and the legislature appoints the Public Service Commissioner which regulates the state's power companies. The South Carolina Taxpayers Association, led by Tom Turnipseed, accused SCE & G of having a "fix" on the public service commission. After a large controversy, SCE & G agreed to end the practice of keeping lawyer-legislators on retainer, but continued to retain the services of Blatt, Gressette, and Dennis due to past loyalties.[25] This practice may or may not have helped SCE & G in its rate hearings, but it appeared unethical. This type of incident has caused criticism against legislative - business ties over the years.

Overall, the close ties between the business community and the government of South Carolina are undeniable. One recent account said, "Business has just controlled this state."[26] This position appears extreme; however, its efforts to attract

industrial development have made South Carolina's government particularly responsive to business desires. In addition, the business community has often been helpful to state leaders and its cooperation has aided in the development of some social programs. South Carolina still ranks at or near the bottom of many standard-of-living indexes. Also, the state is amongst the least generous in the area of welfare payments.[27] For these reasons, it would be difficult to argue that the government relationship with business has produced completely progressive results. In addition the relationship South Carolina's leaders have had with business has brought chemical elements into the state which may adversely affect its future, and from time to time, instances of unethical practices appear that may have a detrimental effect on the best interest of the populace.

Footnotes

[1]"The Northerners Surrender to Charlie Daniels," Fortune, October, 1954, pp. 144-156.: "Welcome Ya'll," Forbes, 15 November 1974, p. 113.: David F. Kern, "Farewell to Tobacco Road: Judge Timmerman Worked Hard to Change the South's Image," The State, 6 September 1981, p. 4-B.

[2]John K. Cauthen, Speaker Blatt: His Challenges Were Greater (Columbia: USC Press, 1965 ; reprint ed. . Columbia: USC Press, 1978), p. 13.

[3]Cauthen, pp. 14-15: "Northerners Surrender to Charlie Daniels": William D. Workman, The Bishop From Barnwell: The Political Life and Times of Edgar Brown (Columbia: The R.L. Bryan Co., 1963) p. 79: "South Carolina's New Plant Boom," Business Week 26 March 1960, p. 126.

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[5]James C. Cobb, The Selling of the South: The Southern Crusade for Industrial Development, 1936-1980 (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1982), pp. 167-169.: "Welcome Ya'll": "Here's Do-it-yourself Unemployment Cure," Nation's Business September, 1963, pp. 62-68.

[6]Cobb, p. 169.

[7]"Welcome Ya'll."

[8]Cobb, p. 7(?)

[9]Cobb,pp.189-190.

[10]"Oompah in the Bible Belt," Time, 25 July 1977, p. 50.

[11]Cauthen, pp. 14-15: " South Carolina's New Plant Boom" : Cobb, 188-190: "Oompah in the Bible Belt.": "Welcome Ya'll":"A Southern Curiosity," The Economist, 23 December 1978, p. 26.

[12]Collier's Encyclopedia, 1979 ed., s.v. "South Carolina".: "South Carolina's New Plant Boom."

[13]Interview with Robert McNair, Bankers Trust Building, Columbia, S.C., 15 December 1982.

[14]Jack Bass, Porgy Comes Home: South Carolina After 300 Years (Columbia: The R.L. Bryan Co., 1972), p. 24. Jack Bass, "Introduction," in John K. Cauthen, Speaker Blatt:His Challenges Were Greater (Columbia: USC Press, 1978) p. xi.

[15]Bass,p. 84.: Bass and DeVries, p. 278.

[16]Bass, "Introduction," p. xii: Bass and DeVries, p. 260.

[17]Cauthen, 14-15.

[18]Cobb, p. 250.

[19]Ibid., p. 230.

[20]Cauthen, p. 160.

[21]Interview With J.C. Long, Mt. Pleasant, S.C., 16 December 1982.

[22]Cauthen, p. 130.

[23]Long.

[24]Bass and DeVries, p. 278.

[25]"Summers Denies SCE & G Has 'Fix' on Regulatory Process," The State, 31 October 1979, p. 1-B.

[26]Bass and DeVries, p. 280.

[27]Collier's Encyclopedia, 1979 ed., s.v. "South Carolina".

Conclusion

Obviously, many of the statements which Key made about South Carolina are now obsolete. The politics of color has disappeared and blacks are today an important and influential part of the South Carolina political scene. As Key predicted, the end of the politics of color appears to have brought bipartisanship to the state. The Republican Party has enjoyed a great deal of success on the national level. Also as Key predicted, voting patterns have changed. "Friends and neighbors" politics has begun to fade from the scene as individuals have, in many cases, begun to vote for the party that best represents their interests. The up-state, low-state differences, which Key predicted, arose, and they still exist to some degree. Of perhaps more importance is the cleavage that has developed between city-dwellers and those of rural areas. These and other changes have tended to make Southern Politics an unlikely source to use in the study of South Carolina politics today.

At the same time, however, much of what Key wrote is still applicable to South Carolina. Despite their advances, blacks are still not fully assimilated into the South Carolina political community. For example, the State Senate is still all-white. Also, the Democratic Party, despite the end of its complete control, is still in firm control of politics at the state level. In addition, there is strong evidence that a diluted form of "friends and neighbors" politics still exists, particularly in rural areas. Finally, South Carolina's government is still controlled by a legislature with close ties to the business community. Admittedly, the Barnwell Ring is gone, and legislative power has fragmented; but, the legislature is still the preeminent force in the state. Today, despite the dramatic changes, the situation which Key described has not completely disappeared.

Despite the changes, Key is not obsolete. Without clear and concise views of what was, it is very difficult to perceive how things are. Today, undoubtedly, much of the past is still alive in South Carolina. Some praise this and some condemn it. Many in the state simply observe it and "go about their business." Today, looking back, many South Carolinians are proud of the progress that they have made. Some believe that the state is about to completely assimilate itself into the mainstream of American culture. Only the rural areas seem to lag behind. The benefits of this progress both politically and socially are difficult to ascertain. Whatever does come, however, will retain elements of the political system which Key described in 1949.

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Map

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