REVOLUTION IN KENYA

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CHAPTER ONE

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

To look at revolution as an isolated, discrete, historical accident is unrewarding in that we have no promise for the future discovery and prevention of such social chaos. However, if it is possible to discern pattern in revolution, if, in short, we can distinguish a phenomenon such as "revolutionary change" which can be understood in terms of certain signals--measurable units of probability which augur ill for the future viability of a political system, then we have fulfilled a valuable service to society.

In order to accomplish such a goal, the first attempts must be toward establishing a theoretical framework for all revolution. From this abstract basis, operationalization might provide a testing ground for the theory. However, the nature of revolution is such that we would hardly wish to create one for the purpose of scientific study. Therefore, the best approximation to testing the adequacy of revolutionary theory is the examination of revolutions which have already occurred.

Although the scope of this paper is quite limited--no predictions of future revolutions will be made and no significant advancement

of revolutionary theory will be attempted--it nevertheless represents a groping toward the analysis of one revolution within the framework of a theory of revolution.

The argument underlying the paper is that the revolution which rocked Kenya in 1952 was avoidable; despite the fact that this statement is meaningless (in the sense that avoidability becomes speculation after the fact), nevertheless post facto examination of this revolt may illuminate the methods of future conceptual analysis which will break the way for the elimination of revolution as a means of solving political problems. It should be stated at the outset that inadequacies in research method brought about both by the scope of the paper and the distance between Virginia and Kenya make all analysis heuristic and tentative--more historical than scientific--and further research must be done to determine the precise measurements of the indices of potential revolutionary fervor.

The Mau Mau revolt in Kenya has plagued political scientists in the past. James S. Coleman, after postulating several analytical categories for the study of African revolution as primarily nationalistic, concluded:

> In the case of the Mau Mau movement in Kenya we are confronted with a complex mixture of nationalism, with a strong traditional bias on the part of the Westernized leaders, and nativism, manipulated by the leaders, on the part of the masses. Both have been generated to an especially high level of intensity as a consequence of the acute and largely unassuaged sense of frustration on the part of the Westernized elite, growing out of the very bleak outlook arising from the almost total absence, until recently, of meaningful career and prestige opportunities within either the old or the new systems, and of the masses, resulting from the land shortage

> and the overcrowding on the reservations. The presence of a sizable Asian "third force," which virtually monopolizes the middle-class sector, and which has been and is politically conscious, provides a new variable of no little significance in the total situation. The fact that the pattern of organization and the strategy and tactics of the Mau Mau revolt indicate a higher level of sophistication than sheer nativism would imply suggests that our analytical categories need further refinement or qualification.[1]

Moving away from the admitted inadequacies Coleman found in nationalistic categories, let us turn to Chalmers Johnson, whose Revolutionary Change represents a more encompassing theory which does not limit itself to nationalistic interpretation.

In barest skeletal form, Johnson attributes revolution to the dissynchronization between the value and environmental structures of a social system. He begins with a definition of the value structure:

> Values are both explanations of a social situation (it does not matter whether the explanation is causal or mythical) and standards of appropriate action desired to produce some desired ("envalued") resolution or management of the situation.... In short, values are social gestalts or paradigms that, to the extent they are held in common (i.e., possessed by a group of people who recognize each other because of their mutual possession of them), lay a foundation of shared expectations and make possible the orienting of human behavior.[2]

Changes in this value structure can emanate both from without and within; therefore, Johnson distinguishes between exogenous and endogenous value-changing sources. In the process of colonization, exogenous sources dominate the tribal system. Forces for change assault the system, and in the forefront are missionaries confronting the natives with a strange

value structure, an amalgamation of Christianity and the European way of life. As the natives progressively adapt to this structure, trips abroad reinforce this value shock: "the effect of foreign education and travel on many students from European colonies was primarily to alter their values."[3] This influence is implied by Oginga Odinga, who said:

> But over the years it dawned on me that I had listened to many preachers and they seemed, all of them, to preach one thing in common--the suppression of African customs. They were not satisfied to concentrate on the word of the Bible; they tried to use the word of God to judge African traditions.[4]

Changes in social values can also develop within the system. As Johnson says, "Endogenous sources of value change are...generally speaking, changes in values that are brought about as a result of intellectual developments and the acceptance of creative innovations."[5] It is often difficult to bring about value changes within the systems because

> Being definitional and explanatory symbols of a system, values claim universality and exclusive jurisdiction within that system. They have the power to brand alternatives as deviant 'heresies' or mental aberrations, and defenders of a value structure frequently exercise this power.[6]

Furthermore, it is necessary to distinguish between "those innovations that impinge directly on a value structure, and...those that influence values secondarily, as a result of changes in the environment."[7] This distinction, it seems to me, is impossible to make perfectly clear in each instance of revolutionary change. The interrelationship between the value structure and the environmental structure is quite complex and cohesive,

and, if this blurring of distinctions is true in any social system, it is especially marked in a colonial system--which simultaneously imposes extreme stress on both the value and environmental structures of tribal life.

To clarify the concept of environmental structure it is perhaps fruitful to cite Talcott Parsons' concept of 'adaptation to environment":

> A...functional need is that of adaptation to the environment, including the differentiation and assignment of roles, the envalued distribution of scarce resources, and the anticipation of environmental changes. The roles and norms of economic activity are devoted to meeting this functional need (e.g. markets, central planning institutions, and technological intitutes).[8]

A change in the environmental (or economic) structure becomes significant in a systemic way if we examine its influence on the value structure:

> When the environment changes, for whatever reason, it becomes dissynchronized with the value of structure, encouraging men to formulate expressions of value which lead to changes in the value structure and which resynchronize values with the pattern of environmental adaptation.[9]

Before we look at the two sources of environmental change, let us note the complexity involved in mere recognition of the social system within which revolution (or dissynchronization) takes place in colonial society. In Kenya, for instance, there is not one but three social systems involved in the process of development--the British social system, from which settlers, missionaries, and governmental leaders come; the

tribal system, from which the Africans emerge; and the colonial system, which contains elements of all three but is nevertheless distinct. All the characters in the colonial system must interact with all three systems. There are very few who remain in their tribes, never seeing white men, and likewise few settlers remain in the Colony without receiving various influences from the mother country. Furthermore, there was a group of Africans who had experience in all three systems--Kenyatta, for instance, remembered growing up within the tribal structure and retained comprehension of what it was like to live in the emotional security of Kikuyu social system. He also was influenced by the Colonial missionaries and other Europeans in Kenya, feeling the pressure to abandon tribal ways and the pain of segregation. At the same time he had travelled extensively in Europe, living over a decade in England and gaining the sensations of being accepted, more or less, into European society.

Furthermore, the role of interaction between the three systems may have been vital in the pre-revolutionary period. World Wars I and II confronted many tribesmen with European and American value and environmental structures, providing them with a framework to restructure their own attitudes. As Waruhiu Itote (General China) stated:

> In 1944 we returned to India from the Kalewa battlefront. I took back with me many lasting memories. Among the shells and bullets there had been no air of superiority from our European comrades-in-arms. We drank the same tea, used the same water and lavatories, and shared the same jokes. There were no racial insults, no references to 'niggers,' 'baboons' and so on. The white heat of battle had blistered all that away and left only our common humanity and our common fate, either death or survival....

> Perhaps most important, I had become conscious of myself as a Kenya African, one among millions whose destinies were still in the hands of foreigners, yet also one who could see the need and the possibility of changing that situation.[10]

For this reason, although focus must be placed on the colonial system as the environment of the revolution, we should also constantly be aware of the tribal and European systems' influence on colonial life and the interaction of the three systems.

Returning to the typology, Johnson makes a distinction between exogenous and endogenous environmental change much as he did between the value changes. Exogenous environmental changes, he feels,

> include the introduction of modern medical knowledge into underdeveloped countries, which often rapidly alters birth and mortality rates; market stimulation as a result of foreign trade; imported technologies and skills; the migration of populations; and intersystemic diplomatic relations. One particularly important exogenous source of change is military conquest, which introduces new actors, who automatically fill the statuses of authority, into a division of labor. Much time is required for new values to develop which will synchronize with this new division of labor....[11]

In a country such as Kenya, where the environmental structure was quite primitive in relation to the European industrialized economy, there was to be expected an enormous influx of exogenous change. The natives were confronted with everything from cloth to railroads, medicine to knives, and the assimilation of these new articles and methods was both arduous and unending. Indeed, as soon as one change began to make headway upon their understanding, another would follow close on its heels.

Sources of endogenous environmental change, however, assume much less importance in the tribal system, which certainly placed less emphasis on change than stability. Johnson defines endogenous sources as

> internal technological innovations, such as the invention of the wheel or the railroad; and an analysis of the origins and acceptance of such innovations is identical with that already made with respect to values. Like innovations in values, technical innovations may be ignored, accepted as toys (as was gunpowder in China), or incorporated into the division of labor, in which case they will produce environmental change and a reverberatory effect on values.[12]

Although the Kikuyu were innovative in many ways, nevertheless tribal life was so stable when compared to the rapid changes in European society, it could almost be ignored. Furthermore, once the Europeans arrived in Kenya, so much Kenyan energy was devoted to the adaptation to exogenous environmental sources, endogenous innovations approached nullity.

Before examining a more empirical study of revolution, it is perhaps appropriate to make a comment about Johnson's typology, beginning indirectly with Anthony Wallace's concept of "revitalization." Wallace focuses on the individual rather than society:

> It is...functionally necessary for every person in society to maintain a mental image of the society and its culture, as well as of his own body and its behavioral regularities, in order to act in ways which reduce stress at all levels of the system. The person does, in fact, maintain such an image. This mental image I have called "the mazeway," since as a model of the cell-body-personality-nature-culture-society system or field, organized by the individual's own experience, it includes perceptions of both the maze of physical objects of the environment (internal and external, human and nonhuman) and also of the ways in which this maze can be manipulated by the self

> and others in order to minimize stress. The mazeway is nature, society, culture, personality, and body image, as seen by one person. Hallowell (1955) and Wallace (1955 and 1956) offer extended discussions of the mazeway and the related concepts of self, world view, and behavioral environment.[13]

The individual, when placed in a situation of societal stress, can react in many ways, one of which is a "revitalization movement:"

> We may now see more clearly what "revitalization movements" revitalize. Whenever an individual who is under chronic, physiologically measurable stress, receives repeated information which indicates that his mazeway does not lead to action which reduces the level of stress, he must choose between maintaining his present mazeway and tolerating the stress, or changing the mazeway in an attempt to reduce the stress. Changing the mazeway involves changing the total Gestalt of his image of self, society, and culture, of nature and body, and of ways of action. It may also be necessary to make changes in the "real" system in order to bring mazeway and "reality" into congruence. The effort to work a change in mazeway and "real" system together so as to permit more effective stress reduction is the effort at revitalization; and the collaboration of a number of persons in such an effort is called a revitalization movement.[14]

More exactly,

> A revitalization movement is defined as a deliberate, organized, conscious effort by members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture. Revitalization is thus, from a cultural standpoint, a special kind of culture change phenomenon: the persons involved in the process of revitalization must perceive their culture, or some major areas of it, as a system (whether accurately or not); they must feel that this cultural system is unsatisfactory; and they must innovate not merely discrete items, but a new cultural system, specifying new relationships as well as, in some cases, new traits.[15]

This personal-psychological interpretation of revolution does not run counter to Johnson's theory; on the contrary, Johnson recognizes that "as the disequilibrium of a social system becomes more acute, personal tensions are generated in all statuses."[16] But he focuses on the forces which organize and channel such frustrations:

> The dynamic element which overcomes the effects of multiple role playing and which leads to the development of lines of cleavage is ideology. With ideology, deviant subcultural groups, such as delinquent gangs, religious sects, and deviant patriotic associations, will be dissipated without directly influencing the social structure.[17]

In short, the point made here is that any single factor is insufficient in the explanation of revolution:

> Revolution is not a discrete, relatively isolable, purely political phenomenon; the factors that contribute to it are as manifold as the elements comprising society itself, and abstract generalizations about revolution must reflect this extreme complexity. The analyst must make use of sociological, psychological, military, and economic, as well as political, concepts and data.[18]

We must look at Johnson's typology, therefore, not as a single factor analysis of revolution, but as a framework within which all factors can be assessed.

To amplify this idea, we might focus on more recent attempts to examine strife (revolution being one aspect of strife) empirically. Notable in this endeavor is Ted Robert Gurr, whose insights and findings simultaneously reinforce and expand upon Johnson's theory.

The thesis with which Gurr works is summed up in the following passage:

The popular and sociological cliché is that "frustration" or discontent" or "relative deprivation" is the root cause of rebellion. Cliché or not, the basic relationship is as fundamental to understanding civil strife as the law of gravity is to atmospheric physics: relative deprivation, the phrase used in this research, is a necessary precondition for civil strife of any kind. The greater the deprivation an individual perceives relative to his expectations, the greater his discontent; the more widespread and intense is discontent among members of a society, the more likely and severe is civil strife. Relative deprivation is not whatever the outside observer thinks people ought to be dissatisfied with. It is a state of mind that I have defined as a discrepancy between people's expectations about the goods and conditions of life to which they are justifiably entitled, on the one hand, and, on the other, their value capabilities--the degree to which they think they can attain those goods and conditions.

This is not a complicated way of making the simplistic and probably inaccurate statement that people are deprived and therefore angry if they have less than what they want. Two characteristics of value perceptions are more important than this "want-get ratio": people become most intensely discontented when they cannot get what they think they deserve, not just what they want in an ideal sense; and when they feel they are making inadequate progress toward their goals, not whether they have actually attained them or not.

Underlying the relative deprivation approach to civil strife is the frustration-aggression mechanism, apparently a fundamental part of our psychobiological makeup. When we feel thwarted in an attempt to get something we want, we are likely to become angry, and when we become angry the most satisfying inherent response is to strike out at the source of frustration. Relative deprivation is, in effect, a perception of thwarting circumstances. How angry men become in response to the perception of deprivation is determined partly by the relative importance to them of alternatives they have yet to try; and the degree of the discrepancy itself. If angry men believe that collective protest or violence are legitimate responses to anger, and if they think that protest or violence will help alleviate their discontent, the impetus to civil strife is strengthened. If they believe that strife is unjustified and unlikely to succeed, they are more likely to contain their anger or to divert it into other activities.[19]

This theory, it seems, is quite similar to Johnson's analysis. However, Gurr's "intervening variables" deepen our theoretical understanding somewhat. First, the idea that coercive violence itself (which Johnson envisions as an index of potential revolution--"power deflation") is a variable:

> Great importance is attributed in psychological theory and equally, in theoretical and empirical studies of revolutionary behavior, to the inhibiting effects of punishment or coercion, actual or threatened, on the outcome of deprivation. The relationship is not necessarily a linear one whereby increasing levels of coercion are associated with declining levels of violence. Psychological evidence suggests that if an aggressive response to deprivation is thwarted by fear of punishment, this interference is itself a deprivation and increases the instigation to aggression. Comparative studies of civil strife suggest a curvilinear relationship whereby medium levels of coercion, indexed for example by military participation ratios or ratings of regime repressiveness, are associated with the highest magnitudes of strife. Only very high levels of coercion appear to limit effectively the extent of strife. No systematic comparative study has examined whether the curvilinear relationship also holds for levels of coercion actually applied. Comparative studies have, however, emphasized the importance of the loyalty of coercive forces to the regime as a factor of equal or greater importance than the size of those forces in deterring strife, and this relationship is almost certainly linear, i.e., the greater the loyalty of coercive forces, the more effective they are, ceteris paribus, in deterring strife.

Gurr continues

> The second intervening variable is institutionalization, i.e., the extent to which societal structures beyond the primary level are broad in scope, command substantial resources and/or personnel, and are stable and persisting....

> Two underlying psychological processes are likely to affect the intensity of and responses to discontent. One is that the existence of such structures increases men's value opportunities, i.e., their repertory of alternative ways to attain value satisfaction. A complementary function is that of displacement: labor unions, political parties, and a range of other associations may provide the discontented with routinized and typically non-violent means for expressing their discontents. The proposed relationship is linear: the greater the institutionalization, the lower the magnitude of strife is likely to be.
>
> Given the existence of widespread discontent in a population, a great number of social and environmental conditions may be present that facilitate the outbreak and persistence of strife. They may be categorized according to their inferred psychological effects, for example, according to whether they facilitate interaction among the discontented, or provide the discontented with a sense that violent responses to deprivation are justified, or give them the means to make such responses with maximum effect, or shelter them from retribution. Two aspects of facilitation are treated separately in this study: past levels of civil strife and social and structural facilitation per se.[20]

Finally, Gurr adds a fourth intervening variable, "legitimacy of the regime," which is operationalized by such standards as the age of the regime, whether natives first instituted the government, etc.

Without going into the complex measures by which Gurr tested his hypotheses, we present his findings:

> The theoretical model of the causes of civil strife employed here dictated the construction of a number of aggregate indicators of not-easily-operationalized variables for 114 polities. Eight summary indicators proved to account jointly for two-thirds the variance among nations in relative magnitudes of civil strife during 1961-65 (R^2=.65). Of greater theoretical consequence, the initial analysis of partial correlation coefficients makes possible a number of more precise statements about the causal

interactions among the theoretical variables.

The fundamental proposition that strife varies directly in magnitude with the intensity of relative deprivation is strongly supported; the three deprivation variables alone provide an R of .60 (R^2=.36), and when a fourth state-of-mind variable, legitimacy, is added the R^2 increases to .43.

The effects of the intervening or mediating variables on the disposition to civil violence proved considerably more complex than those of the deprivation variables. Regime legitimacy apparently has no consequential mediating effect on deprivation but acts much as deprivation itself does: low levels of legitimacy, or by inference feelings of illegitimacy, apparently motivate men to collective violence. Levels of institutionalization, as reflected in high levels of unionization, party system stability, and large public sectors, have no direct mediating effect on deprivation; they are however important determinants of coercive potential and of social facilitation, variables which in turn crucially affect the outcome of short-term deprivation. Social and structural facilitation is the most potent of the intervening variables and appears to have some independent effect on magnitudes of strife. One inference is that the index of this variable reflects tactical decisions to engage in strife as a means of goal attainment. The measure of past levels of strife, 1946-1959, provides a partial test of what might be called the null hypothesis of human conflict, that the best predictor of future conflict is the level of past conflict. The measure has relatively weak relationships with magnitude of strife measures for 1961-65 and is an important mediating variable only among the causes of turmoil.

One striking finding is that nations' levels of persisting deprivation are consistently and directly related to their levels of strife. Deprivation attributable to such conditions as discrimination, political separatism, economic dependence, and religious cleavages tends to contribute at a relatively moderate but constant rate to civil strife whatever may be done to encourage, deter, or divert it, short only of removing its underlying conditions. One other result has important implications for theory, and also for policy, if it is supported by further research. The relation between coercive force size (the relative size of military and internal security forces) and the magnitude of civil violence is distinctly curvilinear: as the level of resources devoted to coercive forces

> increases, the magnitude of violence also tends to increase up to a certain point, and only at relatively high levels of coercive force does strife tend to decline. Moreover at the outer limit the relationship again tends to change direction: countries with the very largest coercive forces tend to have more strife than those with somewhat smaller forces. When one eliminates from analysis the countries that have experienced protracted internal or external conflict, the basic curvilinear relationship remains. The adage that force solves nothing seems supported; in fact force may make things worse.[21]

As a final theoretical addition to Johnson's contribution, let us examine the Feierabends' study of the influence of level of economic development on violence:

> Interest in the relationship between economic development and political violence has characterized a number of recent investigations. All begin with the common insight that the more advanced countries are less subject to political disturbances. This finding is corroborated by those who define development in political terms, as well as by those who define it in economic terms. The kernel of agreement among these investigators is that the highest level of development is accompanied by a decrease in violence, while levels that fall short of modernity are more prone to political unrest. The consistency of this general relationship has been corroborated using quite different measures of violence and different samples of nations. Its stability as a finding may be due to the fact that there is a sufficient sample of identifiable modern and transitional nations in the present-day world.
>
> It is not equally clear whether, in the relationship between development and violence, the least-developed countries show less of a tendency to violence than states at mid-levels or transitional stages of development. The problem of discovering the direction of the relationship between violence and development at the end of the modernity continuum is largely due to the fact that extremely few countries now qualify as traditional, in the

> sense that they are unaware of modernity.... Nevertheless, if we are willing to base our assessments on a very few cases, we find that countries at the lowest levels of development are less prone to political instability than are countries at the next higher stages of modernity. Political development, in combination with economic development, shows this pattern...as does economic development alone, but to a lesser degree.... Again, this slight tendency has been found by other researchers. If it is an actual trend, it corroborates theoretical insights regarding the gap between aspirations/expectations and their achievement, the effects of uncertainty of expectations, and the occurrence of motivational conflict .... All of these hypotheses point to the transitional stage of development as the most frustration ridden. Neither lower nor higher levels of development will be as prone to violence.[22]

These findings are corroborated by Gurr:

> By far the most striking differences among groups of nations are in deaths per million population. The rate in the least-developed nations, 841 per million, is 500 times the 1.7 rate in the most developed nations. The rates in the democratic and centralized countries, 12 and 19 per million, respectively, are about one one-hundredth of the 1,604 rate in the new nations that are characterized by elitist leadership and relatively weak and unstable political institutions. When nations are grouped according to geo-cultural region, civil-strife death rates appear to vary with the regions' relative levels of economic development. The rate is substantially the lowest in the European nations, 2.4 per million; some 30 times greater in Latin America, which is considerably less developed; and 150 to 200 times greater in the underdeveloped Asian and African states.
>
> It is not justifiable to conclude from these figures that increasing economic development leads directly to decreasing deaths from civil violence. It is a truism that people discontented with their poverty are more likely to rebel than people whose economic desires are satisfied, but even these descriptive data suggest that their political environment has a major influence on the consequences of rebellion. Democratic and centrist countries are likely to have

both the coercive capacity to restrain strife with minimal loss of life and the institutional structures that can provide alternatives to and solutions for violence. The least-developed countries that have relied on elitist or personalistic leadership, however, confront two interrelated and almost insoluble problems. Their economies produce too little to satisfy the economic aspirations of many of their citizens. Their leaders, for lack of will, ability, or resources, are often unable to establish strong and pervasive means of coercive and institutional control. When civil strife does occur in these countries, the regimes are usually strong enough to resist it but lack the capacity either to suppress it or to remedy its causes. The consequence is likely to be an escalating spiral of inconsistent and ineffective repression and increasing popular resistance, culminating in the peace of the charnel house that is statistically manifested in the table:

Table 1.--The human costs of civil strife, 1961-65, compared with the United States, 1963-68

Type of nation	Percentages of events with casualties		Average number of deaths per event			Deaths per million population
	Turmoil	Conspiracy	Turmoil	Conspiracy	Internal war	
All nations (114).....	59	42	18.1	17.2	13,900	238
United States, 1963-68.	--	--	--	--	--	1.1
Nations grouped according to level of economic development:						
High (37).....	56	38	3.5	9.2	160	1.7
Medium (32).....	59	45	28.4	22.1	12,000	264
Low (38).....	69	39	17.2	18.9	18,500	841
Nations grouped according to type of political system:						
Polyarchic (33).....	61	22	8.8	8.3	3,600	12
Centrist (28).....	54	52	38.9	23.1	2,200	19
Elitist (32).....	58	44	16.2	20.6	20,000	1604
Personalist (16).....	62	40	12.0	17.5	4,300	223
Nations grouped according to geocultural region:						
European (37).....	61	]5	11.5	0.4	220	2.4
Latin (24).....	63	44	5.9	16.2	2,900	76
Islamic (21).....	53	45	19.2	23.5	6,500	222
Asian (17).....	45	42	42.6	25.7	35,000	357
African (25).....	64	43	18.5	17.5	4,900	539

Examining Kenya's colonization from the perspective provided by Johnson's typologies aids in clarifying the various causes and symptoms of revolt, but the complexity of the colonial situation also points up the difficulty in distinguishing environmental from value changes. It is here that the other theoretical sources prove helpful, creating additional categories which function within Johnson's framework, isolating more variables and clarifying the process of revolution.

Perhaps the situation in Kenya can best be regarded as a series of shock waves which made rather basic alterations in both the value and environmental structures of the natives. To speak of dissynchronization in regard to these influences is perhaps misleading, since a basic wrenching of tribal ways of life occurred. Both value and environmental contexts were thrown into such turmoil that the tribes indeed had no social system into which to place themselves. They were forbidden to perform certain traditional ceremonies and "political" practices, and they had not yet gained understanding of the Europeans' way of life. It is also difficult to specify which came first and which dominated, since both environmental and value changes were altered to such extents by the Europeans, and change in one reinforced change in the other. Nevertheless, it is clear that exogenous changes accounted for the first major alterations in the aboriginal societal structure.

As the Kenyans began to learn the colonial ways, however, there emerged endogenous value system changes in the form of adaptive reactions to settlement. Dissynchronization within the European system itself now appeared on the ruins of the old tribal traditions; Christianity--a new

value structure--was taught to the young natives, but the realities of colonization, especially the allocation of labor--the environmental structure--placed the natives in a subordinate position. It was difficult to reconcile the discrepancy between love for all men preached by Christian missionaries and the racism practiced by the settlers. Furthermore, land which the natives thought had been "borrowed" by the Europeans was not being returned, and it was increasingly obvious that it would never be returned. The overpopulation and disruption in family life which accompanied both scientific advance and urban life produced a growing number of discontented youths in the cities. Certain Kikuyu began to emerge from the educational system established by the colonists, and some spent extended periods of time abroad. Exposed to the European way of life, these men saw that a certain role and status was prescribed for them in the colony, yet they had been shown the democratic principles of equality in Europe. They tried Western political methods of gaining a voice in government--forming political associations, sending spokesmen to Parliament, fighting for representation in the Kenya legislature--but the results were negligible.

To compare the Kenyan situation with the theoretical conditions promoting revolution is almost a recapitulation of every variable: dissynchronization of value and environmental structures (relative deprivation--"actors perceptions of discrepancy between their value expectations...and their value capabilities..."),[24] mazeway stress on the individual level, coercion used to prevent institutionalization and social and structural facilitation, a regime in no way legitimate in the eyes of the natives,

and an economic system advancing just past the primitive stage to the point that nascent urbanization and money economy produced acute anxiety and frustration for the tribesmen.

CHAPTER TWO

ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

As already stated, the social context of revolution must be examined before the causes can be distinguished, and certainly the Mau Mau revolt did not take place in a vacuum. However, before one can understand the natives' perspective in colonial society, it is imperative to understand the barest outlines of tribal life before the settlers arrived. Moreover, a comprehension of the life style which preceeded the white man's coming goes far in making possible an understanding of the dissynchronization which the natives must have experienced upon the shock of colonization. Needless to say, a complete anthropological study is here out of place, so focus will be only on those aspects of the tribal system which became most pertinent to the natives as they began to articulate their grievances within the colonial context. Also, the dominance of the Kikuyu in the African political movements and Mau Mau is undisputed; therefore they will be the cynosure of this analysis. Since land was so important to the Africans before and after the settlers arrived, it is perhaps a fitting starting-place.

Kenyatta provides an introduction to the importance of land for

tribal society in Facing Mount Kenya:

> In studying the Gikuyu tribal organisation it is necessary to take into consideration land tenure as the most important factor in the social, political, religious, and economic life of the tribe. As agriculturalists, the Gikuyu people depend entirely on the land. It supplies them with the material needs of life, through which spiritual and mental contentment is achieved. Communion with the ancestral spirits is perpetuated through contact with the soil in which the ancestors of the tribe lie buried. The Gikuyu consider the earth as the "mother" of the tribe, for the reason that the mother bears her burden for about eight or nine moons while the child is in her womb, and then for a short period of suckling. But it is the soil that feeds the child through lifetime; and again after death is is the soil that nurses the spirits of the dead for eternity. Thus the earth is the most sacred thing above all that dwell in or on it. Among the Gikuyu the soil is especially honoured, and an everlasting oath is to swear by the earth.[1]

To expand this idea and clarify:

> The Kikuyu image for viewing the relationship between man and social groups on the one hand, and land on the other, is a complex one for foreigners because it is put into a kinship idiom which, in English at any rate, would seem to be highly fanciful. The analogy, if such it be, hinges on the complexity of the concept mbari. An mbari results when a lineage (nyumba) is in possession of an estate (githaka). The lineage plus the estate (nyumba plus githaka), taken as a unit, is the mbari. Both the people, organized as a patrilineal lineage, and the land area are "members" of the mbari. Kikuyu describe the mbari as "one person" comprising the kinship groups and the land. They say that the two parts of the mbari are the male lineage, and the female land. The image which the Kikuyu use to explain the mbari is the image of the married couple.
>
> There are two sorts of mbari. The first is that

which is formed by all Kikuyu, who are descendants of Gikuyu and Muumbi, the mythical first parents, with all of Kikuyu land as its githaka. The second is that which is formed by the descendants in the male line of more recent ancestors--usually no more than five or six generations removed from the living, and specific estates or githaka which have been purchased or inherited by the smaller lineage. This distinction becomes vital, as will become apparent, in matters pertaining to the sale and purchase of estates.

To the image of marriage is added that of descent, for there may be sub-lineages which hive off to form what might be called colonies, which are regarded as "sons" of the mbari. Pieces of the land may, furthermore, be sold outright to other lineages, which is regarded as analogous to marrying off a virgin daughter.... Any piece of land sold is regarded as a virgin daughter for whom bridewealth has been received. Sale of the total githaka of any mbari is, however, the equivalent of divorce. Thus transfer of rights in land is considered a precise equivalent of transfer of rights in women. Rights in land and rights in women are, in some contexts at least, equated as a single type of "commodity."

There is a complicating factor, however. Those who are buried in the soil of the githaka must, by definition, be members of the nyumba if a true mbari is to result. The nyumba may be the whole Kikuyu tribe, seen in this context as the nyumba of Gikuyu and Muumbi, the two founding ancestors of all Kikuyu. Thus, land can be sold outright to any Kikuyu individual or groups; as with Yoruba, this makes little difference after a generation has passed, for the same rights can be held by a nyumba as by an individual. Obviously, the minimal necessity, that the persons buried in the ground are of the nyumba of the purchasers, has been achieved.

However, to sell land to non-Kikuyu is tantamount to deserting the ancestors, and can produce serious results. It is this aspect of the man-land relationship which was foremost in the Mau Mau uprising, since in Kikuyu terms any Kikuyu would have more right to the land than would any non-Kikuyu, unless the latter had undergone the adoption ceremony into the mbari of the tribe. Moreover, land that was formerly

> not "owned" by Kikuyu in this sense, that is, land which formed the githaka aspect of a Kikuyu mbari, could not be bought without first turning the land into Kikuyu land by a method of "adopting" the ancestors buried in it.[2]

The importance of land can hardly be overemphasized; as A. R. Barlow pointed out to the Kenya Land Commission in 1932:

> The sense of family ownership is so strong and the instinct to preserve the integrity of the family githaka is so deep-seated that the inquirer into the system of tenure may at times find difficulty in disentangling family rights and individual rights. Under normal circumstances, family control over the land remains inconspicuous, and individual rights play the important part in the everyday life of the githaka. Every sub-division of the mbari, and every individual, down to the youngest son of the youngest wife of the most junior member of the family, have their indisputable rights in their respective portions of the land. And yet every transaction concerning any modicum of the land is preceded by consultation between the members of the mbari whose common interests are affected.[3]

A final aspect of the mode of land ownership which became relevant when the Europeans entered Kenya was the concept of tenant. The huts in which the Africans lived were quite mobile, so the tenants could move rather easily. They occupied another's land, helped farm it, and were able to live comfortably there. However, when the owner of the land needed more space, he gave the tenant due notice, and the tenant took his hut apart and sought another landowner willing to keep him. This became significant after the settlers bought Kikuyu land--each Kikuyu thought that the settlers were merely renting the land, so he

moved to another Kikuyu landowner's plot, awaiting to return to the land the settler had rented. Since there had been no formal ceremony linking the families of seller and buyer, the Kikuyu could not conceive that the land had actually changed hands and fully expected the future return of it. The settlers thought that the Kikuyu understood the purchase was formal when he moved away. It is easy to see how confusion added to the inevitable disequilibrium in such situations; needless to say, native bitterness at losing land was reinforced by feeling cheated.

In addition to the formal facets of Kikuyu land ownership, nature wreaked havoc on the entire settler situation. A drought swept through Kenya just before the settlers made headway into the countryside. Apparently large numbers of the natives sought refuge with relatives who lived away from the Highlands. Some tenants or a single member of the family stayed on the land, but the owners were elsewhere, escaping the bad period yet hoping to return as conditions improved. With an understanding of the process of land ownership, it should become clear that the original owners felt that the land was still theirs; absence by no means eliminated the conditions of possession.

Also, there were many types of land which were not under constant cultivation:

> Near homesteads there were also pasture lands, owing to the system of cultivating the lands in rotation, and besides this there was also woodland, reserved for building materials and firewood. The use of such land for grazing

> was restricted to the family group possessing it. They could give or withhold the permission to outsiders....
>
> If we consider for a moment the pasture lands, salt-licks, public meeting and dancing places, the woodlands, including big forests along the frontier of the Gikuyu and the neighboring tribes, we will at once see that there were big tracts of lands used for other purposes than cultivation and which were equally important to the community.[5]

Thus all the confusion was compounded by the fact that the settlers, seeing large sectors of uncultivated land, without questioning felt it to be unoccupied, whereas the natives believed that it was not only occupied but productive and vital to the life of their community.

Although land was probably of chief importance in the tribal society, there are other aspects of tribal life which must not be neglected if Mau Mau is to be understood. For instance, the process of education was quite different from Western methods. As Kenyatta says:

> In all tribal education the emphasis lies on a particular act of behavior in a concrete situation....
>
> It is with personal relations, rather than with natural phenomena, that the Gikuyu education is concerned right from the very beginning. Growing boys and girls learn that they have one thing to learn which sums up all the others, and that is the manners and deportment proper to their station in the community....
>
> It is in relation to this social ladder that the child's education must be studied if it is to be understood. His life is marked and his position known by the steps which denote his progress from one stage or status to another.[6]

There were various statuses or stages in a Kikuyu's life, but perhaps most important from the perspective of Mau Mau were the initiation

ceremony and the system of elders. The initiation procedure involved the circumcision of boys and girls, but this was merely the 'outward and visible sign' that the individual had achieved manhood or womanhood. After having undergone the socialization process, the young people would become adults with others in their age group. The significance of the initiation was great; in short, "...this operation is ...regarded as the very essence of an institution which has enormous educational, social, moral, and religious implications, quite apart from the operation itself."[7] This means that the operation is the culmination of a long, arduous yet meaningful process of formally growing up:

> The real anthropological study, therefore, is to show that clitoridectomy, like Jewish circumcision, is a mere bodily mutilation which, however, is regarded as the conditio sine qua non of the whole teaching of tribal law, religion, and morality.[8]

Another tribal tradition which became significant with the coming of the Europeans was the system of government. Apparently the system of land ownership and political organization were mutually exclusive sets:

> It has been known for some time that Kikuyu land use and land tenure was complicated by the fact that it embodied two principles and two sets of local groupings which did not coincide. The first of these principles was that which gave rise to what has been called the estate system of the Kikuyu, and which the Kikuyu themselves refer to as githaka. The second principle is that which leads to demarcation of ridges, called rugongo, which are the

> political units. Kikuyu country is crossed by fast-flowing streams that have cut canyons out of the hillsides, so the word "ridge" is to be taken more or less literally. Ridges were "governed" by a committee called "the council of nine," chosen by the various councils of nine of its subordinate, teritorially bounded units, called "fire-units" or mwaki. These fire-unit councils were appointed by the councils of nine of the village-group or itura. Matters concerning law and warfare were handled by the smallest possible council of nine. The British, on their arrival, put a chieftainship system on top of this indigenous committee system. The ridge with its subdivisions was a specifically compact and demarcated territorial unit, but it had nothing to do with exploitation of the environment. That was rather a feature of the estate system.[9]

The political system had other aspects later to assume importance:

> The tendency for secrecy and cliques ... is in conformity with the function of Kima (plural, Biama), the major political institution among the Kikuyu. The Kima was, at the same time, a court, a legislative council, and a private and secret club. Council-club secret initiations were common to nearly every unit of each age set. For example, the warrior council was responsible for decision on military operations, maintenance of internal order and discipline, education of the younger warrior set, provision of police protection for the elders, and public punishment, including execution. The women, too, had their council. They discussed and decided on matters for which they were primarily responsible. The important role of women in traditional Kikuyu polities has been noted by many observers, as has the important position of women in Mau Mau....The leader of the council (muthamaki) was not hereditarily appointed, but was chosen on the basis of qualities of leadership and judgment demonstrated over a long period of time. Nonetheless, as Lambert notes, there were "certain clans and subclans associated in the minds of others with qualities which are regarded as hereditary and likely to appear in

> every generation."
>
> A more significant aspect of indigenous Kikuyu political behavior ... is the attitude toward justice. Although the Kikuyu had a relatively highly developed sense of legislation, justice was determined more on the basis of ad hoc equity than on precedent or what we would call "law." Furthermore, the law that was legislated and promulgated by the senior rank of elders did not bind the succeeding age set when it assumed power. "Law passed and promulgated by the ruling age grade would have the force of law during its rule, but not a moment longer." Lambert adds that it was customary for the succeeding age set to repeal deliberately the legislation of its predecessors.[10]

To make clearer the importance of the system of elders in Mau Mau we quote Leakey:

> And so gradually an entirely new system of administration has been foisted upon the Kikuyu and is now an accepted part of their present day organization, although there are many among the senior elders who still doubt whether the new system works better than, or even as well as, the old system.
>
> Certainly there is far less respect for government 'chiefs' and government appointed headmen than there used to be for the opinions of councils constituted under the law and custom of the tribe. In fairness, however, it must be said that this is not wholly because the new system is less good than the old, or less honoured than the old. It is in part due to the fact that there has been a complete breakdown in the whole social system and a change over to rank individualism, instead of each person being merely a part of a well-knit unit, each member of which had well-defined responsibilities one to the other. The breakdown of the old system of authority and the failure up till now of the new system to get fully into its stride and to have become really accepted by the masses, has certainly been a contributory factor in making the present outbreak of lawlessness--fermented by the Mau Mau--possible.[11]

Still another social practice which gained significance after colonization was the traditional practice of marriage and polygamy. A major value change which was attempted by the missionaries was a stop to the practice of polygamy which had been important to the Kikuyu:

> There is a fundamental idea among the Gikuyu that the larger the family is the happier it will be. In Gikuyu the qualification for a status to hold high office in the tribal organization is based on family and not on property as is the case in European society. It is held that if a man can control and manage effectively the affairs of a large family, this is an excellent testimonial of his capacity to look after the interests of the tribe whom he will also treat with fatherly love and affection as though it were all part of his own family.[12]

Moreover, there was a second facet of marriage--that of the transaction of "marriage insurance" which also introduced havoc under colonization. Leakey describes the function of the insurance thus:

> Far from being a purchase, the handing over of such stock was a guarantee of good faith and of the belief on the part of the groom's family that the young man would make a good husband in accordance with law and custom. On the bride's side, the acceptance by her family of the stock was equally a guarantee that they, for their part, believed that the girl would make a good wife.
>
> If by any chance the marriage was later to break down as a result of the failure of the young man to behave properly, then his family would be liable to forfeit all the 'marriage insurance' stock, while the wife would be permitted to go back to her own people. On the other hand, if the marriage proved a failure owing to the girl's instability and through her fault, her family would have to hand back not only the stock received as marriage insur-

> ance, but also the computed (as distinct from actual) offspring...[13]

The introduction of a money system into the Kikuyu economy saw the alteration of this custom so that money was exchanged, with several negative results. First, young men began to engage in extra-legal activity to obtain the money to marry; thus the increase in crime was an indirect as well as a direct result of dissynchronization. Second, the function of the 'marriage insurance' was defeated, since the families would use the money to pay taxes or make purchases rather than retaining it. This had further consequences in that it (together with innumerable other changes in the Kikuyu social system) weakened the marriage bond. Leakey reports young couples migrating to Nairobi after their marriage, and, under the combined influence of strange surroundings, lack of finance, disorientation and anomie (a complex result of a complicated process of dissynchronization) breaking up. The result would possibly be one prostitute and one criminal, since no marriage insurance would provide a cushion and no family would give support and encouragement to the divorced individuals.

Finally, consideration of the Mau Mau revolt from the tribal perspective can hardly be undertaken without devotion of some attention to the role of magic and oaths. First, it must be noted that the Kikuyu were a very religious people, and this was evidenced by the foundation of religion in nature:

> We cannot speak of "Nature worship" as a department of the religion, but it is a quality that runs through the whole, vitalising it and

> keeping it in constant touch with daily need and emotions.[14]

Kenyatta goes on to describe religion as "being based on belief in a supreme being, Ngai, and on constant communication with Nature." Ngai was appealed to in almost every undertaking, and inextricably meshed with religion was the practice of magic to invoke aid in overcoming various difficulties. As Kenyatta says, "Gikuyu religion, in the wider sense, enters into magical and herbal practices. In many cases magical practices and religious rites go hand in hand, and sometimes it is not easy to separate the two, especially in dealing with beneficial magical practices."[15] In addition, magical practices had eleven aspects; suffice it to say that two main divisions could be drawn between beneficial magic and black or destructive magic (orogi).

In connection with the magical practices it is appropriate to note the nature of oaths for the Kikuyu:

> It was this absolute fear of magic powers that was the foundation stone of all Kikuyu ceremonies of oath taking, and in consequence the taking of a solemn oath was an act never lightly undertaken, and once sworn its effect upon the taker was very great. While no one was required to take an oath before giving evidence in judicial proceedings that he would 'speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth' as we do in our courts, the administration of an oath was the chief way in which a dispute was settled if the court which was trying the case had failed, as it sometimes did, to come to a satisfactory verdict.[16]

Oaths were only taken as the last resort, when, strangely enough, each of the disputants was certain the other was lying. In such an

event, both men would talk the affair over with their families, and, if they decided to go through with the oath, would undergo this ceremony publicly. They would invoke death upon themselves or a member of their (extended) family if they were lying. After having taken the oath, the men would not engage in sexual intercourse for a period of three and one half years and would castrate their cattle. If any member of the family died within this time, the family would acknowledge guilt by going through a cleansing ceremony to absolve the oath from further power to kill. The accumulation of powerful notions about the oath--that it applied to the entire family, that its effect lasted three years, and that someone must die during that period--all added up to the fact that the oathing ceremony was rare and quite powerful.

CHAPTER THREE

INCIPIENT DISSYNCHRONIZATION

How do these tribal traditions take on meaning in the light of revolutionary theory? The original intrusion of Europeans into tribal society produced the first radical wave of dissynchronization. The process did not terminate with these basic changes in native life, however, for the continued ingress of Western standards and technology created a geometrical progression of unceasing transformation. Analysis of this complex chain of events is extremely difficult since change proceeded on many fronts and all events were interrelated. The changes were so rapid and pervasive there was a delayed reaction on the part of the natives, who needed to become acculturated to Western ways before they were able to articulate their grievances politically. In the language of our theorists, dissynchronization or relative deprivation cannot exist without a value system, and the tribal value structure was inadequate in either explaining or criticizing the restructured environment. And if the Africans had no value structure sufficient to meet the challenge, they by no means had an ideological and organizational framework to transform feelings of discontent into political action:

> In 1923 the Africans had no institutions, no organizations by which they could force (the implementation of the Devonshire White Paper) either at the local or at the national level. For the next two decades the Europeans from their position of strength sought to increase their influence to the utmost, while the Africans in their weakness struggled to build up the institutions they needed to make their presence felt and gain greater consideration of their interests.[1]

It was only after the Africans had gained a degree of sophistication through contact with settlers and the missions' educational programs that they began to develop a rudimentary value structure, an amalgamation of tribal and Western values, to deal with the colonial situation. And finally the values began to take the form of genuine ideology. The cries for land and freedom incorporated a large group of the population only after the formulation of this ideology provided a framework to channel discontent.

Here we will try to clarify the process of dissynchronization by presenting evidence of the discrepancy between the natives' and settlers' stakes in Kenyan society and the development of the Africans' bitterness as this discrepancy increasingly impinged on their lives. Only in the next chapter will we fully turn to an examination of the more advanced stages of dissynchronization and the generation of deviancy, revolutionary ideology and finally organized violence on a massive scale.

Perhaps an appropriate starting point is land, for, as already indicated, it was vital to the natives' pre-colonial civilization. Although a complete history of British land policy is out of place here[2] the general tenor of that policy should be indicated. The first point to be

made in this regard is that British policy was (ostensibly at least) based on a fallacious assumption. In 1896 the Colonial Office, when asked for an opinion on Crown rights to land, replied:

> As regards Land Regulations, the Secretary of State's view is that the acquisition of partial sovereignty in a Protectorate does not carry with it any title to soil. The land is foreign soil, and does not become vested in Her Majesty, as is the case in territory which is actually annexed to the British dominions. It is therefore advisable to avoid making grants or leases or other dispositions purporting to be an alienation of land by the British authorities, to whom in fact it does not belong. Where native owners exist, it is not, of course, desired to interfere with them; but, where there are no such owners, and the land can be regarded as vacant, the object desired may be attained by other methods. In such cases the British authorities...may...permit a... person to take possession of...land, and may undertake to secure him in that possession, subject to any such conditions as the Protecting Power may think fit to impose. The granting of such permission is an Administrative Act, not a transfer of title; for practical purposes it will give to the occupier all that he requires; and a land certificate authorizing him to occupy the land,...will be a sufficient document of title and one which the courts would enforce.[3]

With an understanding of the Africans' system of land ownership and usage, it becomes clear that even this appearance of complete fairness would lead to misunderstanding and bitterness since many areas not under cultivation would be "occupied" according to tribal tradition. The problem was made even more complex by the loose interpretation of the Colonial Office's ruling:

> To understand the land question we must go back to the beginning of the century. At this time

> the problem presented itself as a conflict between the undoubted right of the native peoples, who had been taken (in theory by their own consent) under British protection, to remain in possession of their lands, and the necessity of economic development, which was assumed to entail the introduction of European farmers, and therefore of European rights in land. In principle, the solution was clear. Native occupation would be respected, while unoccupied land would be at the disposal of the Crown and available for allocation to immigrants. 'Native occupation', however, could be construed in two different ways. It could be construed narrowly, so that any land not actually in use was regarded as alienable. Or it could be held that each tribe was the owner of a territory, defined by a line drawn through its outermost settlements, so that only land falling outside any such territory could be assigned to colonists. On the whole, the Foreign Office leant at first towards the second interpretation, which was the easier to accept in that a fair proportion of the Highlands consisted of no-man's-lands to which no tribe could assert an effective claim. Before long, however, there were crucial departures from this policy. The claims of development were held to require that Europeans should have the use of land in the immediate vicinity of the railway, even when such land was indisputably tribal territory. Thus in 1903 large grants were made around Lake Naivasha in the Central Rift Valley regardless of the claims of the Masai, and in the following year the settlers arriving from South Africa and elsewhere were hastily assigned farms to the north of Nairobi, some of which clearly fell within the boundaries of the Kikuyu tribe. In these cases, indeed, there was some violation of the principle of native occupation even in its narrower construction. For a certain number of Kikuyu, probably of the order of 5,000 persons, were displaced, with compensation at the rate of 2 rupees an acre, from land which was theirs by virtue of beneficial occupation as well as of the more nebulous right of tribal ownership.[4]

This alteration in the intent of Colonial policy came from two different reasons. First, "...beginning with Sir Charles Eliot (The Com-

missioner for the East African Protectorate) British policy was to bring as many settlers as possible to the highlands." (Burke, "Political Evolution in Kenya," p. 199) The second reason was an outgrowth of the first, "the general inability of both the Colonial Office and the officials in the field to stand up to settler pressure...."

> Despite official opposition, wealthy settlers (as opposed to the small landowner) were able to increase their holdings, and there was 'no record of a transfer ever having been refused on the ground of undue accumulation of land.'[5]

This resulted in a situation which could easily spawn the feeling of "relative deprivation" on the natives:

> In 1901, there were but thirteen English settlers in Kenya. But, by the end of 1904, they had claimed 220,000 acres of land. Companies were also involved in the rush for land. In the early days, the East African Syndicate Ltd. took 350,000. Grogan Forest Concessions claimed 200,000, and Lord Delamere... laid claim to 100,000 acres for a lease period of ninety-nine years at a price of 1/2 cent per acre.[6]

Instead of improving, the situation worsened by increments. The first major setback as for the natives was the Crown Land Ordinance in 1915:

> This Ordinance, for all intents and practical purposes, completely nullified the Africans' legal rights to the land. For one thing, it brought almost every inch of land in Kenya under the legal authority of the Crown by defining Crown lands (which hitherto did not include land occupied by Africans and specially reserved for them) "as including all lands occupied by native tribes and all lands reserved for the use of any native tribe." Moreover, the Ordinance

> explicitly empowered the Governor of Kenya to "Grant by lease or otherwise alienate land...." Furthermore, the Ordinance of 1915 prohibited any further transfer or sale of land between whites and Africans without the prior consent of the Governor of Kenya. Thus, from the year 1915 on, it may be said that the Africans of Kenya possessed hardly any legal rights at all to the land.[7]

The second major blow occurred in 1932-33 when the Morris Carter Land Commission provided the British answer to the natives' complaints.

> The Commission's answer to the Kikuyu took up one-third of their Report. They clearly doubted whether any Kikuyu had actually purchased land from the Dorobo, and they rejected the githaka concept, scrupulously avoiding awarding any compensation to individuals. They found the Kikuyu evidence conflicting and exaggerated, and estimated that only some 60,000 acres of their land had been alienated by the Government for white settlement. As a result of expansion since 1895, the Kikuyu had already been allocated additional land by the Government, and so the Commission recommended an addition of only 21,000 acres in compensation for all claims, exhanges, and disturbances. For future requirements some 350-400 square miles of poor agricultural land, largely waterless, in the Yattas were made available....
>
> The general effect of the Commission's recommendations was to institutionalize the tribally and racially organized land system that had gradually developed in Kenya since the turn of the century. The closing of the frontier had now been legalized. Africans and Europeans were both to have the maximum possible security in their own separate tribal and racially defined land units....
>
> All claims and rights that Africans had to land in the White Highlands were extinguished with a small payment of compensation to the Local Native Councils.[8]

The full significance of what was happening to the Africans only

becomes clear when their situation in the reserves and the plight of the squatters are brought to light. First, the agricultural Kikuyu were overcrowded in their reserves; Professor Buell states:

> The reserves set aside for the Kikuyu and Kavirondo people, which contain the majority of the native population, are...over-populated. A District Commissioner testified in 1919 that the density of population in Kikuyu reserve land between Nairobi and Limoru was about four hundred to the square mile and that population was increasing there. 'This density of population is from five to seven times as great as in the South African Reserves wher they are increasing the native holdings....' In Nyeri and Fort Hall reserves the population is about two hundred and twelve per square mile....[9]

Furthermore, those who did not live on the reserves and chose to work for the farmers faced another set of problems. As squatters, they did not lead enviable existences; Mugo Gatheru recalls the life of squatters thus:

> (The) Squatter system was introduced into Kenya as a result of European settlement in the highlands. It can be defined as a form of modified neo-feudalism whereby a European farmer would permit several Africans to farm on small strips or plots of land, growing only enough food to live on, in return for labour on the European farm. In addition to these small strips of land some European farmers used to pay their Squatters some six to eight shillings a month. Some, too, offered their Squatters large plots or smaller, depending on the discretion of the European farmer concerned. Squatters had to work long hours, from seven in the morning to five in the evening.
>
> A Squatter's life was very frustrating, uncertain, and miserable. For example, there were no medical facilities available for the Squatters, no recreation of any kind, and no schools were encouraged for the children of the Squatters, though certain isolated European farmers did permit some Christian Squatters to build churches near their villages on

> the farm. There were also a very few individual settlers who had allowed their Squatters to operate small elementary schools at which some Squatter children could learn to read and write in their vernacular languages, and very elementary arithmetic.[10]

Those Africans who lived on the farms must have realized another blatant factor--the lack of utilization of European owned land:

> --a great part of the cultivable land in Kenya was neither effectively occupied nor under cultivation. This was due, in the main, to the fact that the area of land alienated was more than the small European population in Kenya could effectively utilize. As Professor Fitzgerald has pointed out, "Of the area alienated the Europeans are quite unable, by reason of their small number--29,500 in 1948--to occupy effectively or to cultivate more than a tiny fraction (about 5 percent)." For instance, in 1922 the total area occupied by Europeans was 3,804,158 acres, of which 234,055 acres were under cultivation--a percentage of 6.15 cultivated to total occupied land; in 1923, 3,985,371 acres were occupied, of which 274,310 acres were under cultivation--a percentage of 6.88 cultivated to total occupied land; in 1924, 4,192,731 acres were occupied, of which 346,988 acres were under cultivation--a percentage of 8.28 cultivated to total occupied land; and in 1925, 4,420,573 acres were occupied, of which 392,628 acres were under cultivation--a percentage of 8.88 cultivated to total occupied land.[11]

A final important aspect of the land situation was the fact that the natives lost good land and were presented with bad. Norman Leys said:

> ...The land the Kikuyu lost is all good land--Europeans wanted no other kind. It all lies at from 5,000 to 7,000 feet above sea level, and is well watered by streams from the mountain above. ...[12]

To summarize the land problem is also an introduction to the economic problem:

> It is clear that the generalization of Sir Henry Maine was right. In the trend from a society which holds social and political organization to be central, which Maine called "status," to one which holds organization of production to be central, which is one aspect of Maine's "contract," a fundamental, basic change is occuring. There is probably no single force greater than rapid change in "land tenure" for creating anomie by establishing new factual situations of neighborhood and local groups, while not affecting greatly the values of kinship and neighborhood.
>
> Industrial society demands that the factor aspect of land be uppermost, and the only way Europeans and Americans have found to achieve this situation is through a social organization based on the principle of contract. Non-industrial African societies, for all their variety, have in common the fact that the spatial aspect of land is uppermost, and it is integrated by non-economic, certainly non-contractual, mechanisms. Industrialization apparently means the end of such forms of social integration. It will be interesting to see the extent to which the emergent nations develop in accordance with the hypothesis that industrialization means enlarging the sphere of contract as the principle of social organization, with concomitant shrinking of the spheres of other principles such as kinship or hierarchy.
>
> Changes in the land custom of African countries have been induced by colonial powers, by economic development, and by the people of African nations in their drive toward industrialization and modernization. These changes usually stem from economic considerations, and draw political and social consequences in their wake. Probably there is no area of change to which less conscious attention has been given. And probably there is no area of change that has been more far-reaching.[13]

The interrelationship of problems is difficult to untangle, since, as we have seen, even land enmeshes with social, psychological, political

and economic realms of tribal life. Nevertheless, it might be propitious at this time to extract economic concerns and focus on them. C. C. Wrigley deals with economic problems quite well in "Kenya: The Patterns of Economic Life, 1902-45" in the Oxford History of East Africa, and the following is largely an attempt to summarize Wrigley's findings there.

Perhaps the heart of the problem can be cited at once:

> The real economic and social problem in the pre-war period was not land but labour. If the Highlands had become a true farming colony, with an economy based on wool or even on wheat, little difficulty would have arisen. But the development of labour-intensive plantation agriculture, together with railway and road construction and an influx of wealthy sportsmen in need of safari porters, created a demand which far outran the voluntary supply. The natural result should have been a rise in the price of labour, which...did in fact occur to some extent. Employers, however, were unanimous in believing that higher wages did not and would not bring about an increase in the total amount of work done; and it is almost certainly true that the required result could have been achieved only by an increase in costs so steep as to put a large proportion of the settlers out of business. For the conditions of labour supply were peculiar. The crux, of course, was that, unlike the working classes of Europe, the native peoples of East Africa were in possession of the means of subsistence. A money income was a luxury rather than a necessity, so that their bargaining position was a very strong one. In the very first years of European contact, labour had been forthcoming with gratifying promptness, for both the work itself and the consumer goods with which it was rewarded had had the attraction of novelty. But the supply curve thereafter rose very steeply, for few young men could see the point of engaging in regular menial toil, for which there was no precedent in their customary way of life, for the sake of accumulating additional consumer goods. Leisure preference, in other words, was extremely high.[14]

The only way to solve the labor problem was either to curtail native agriculture, provide a positive incentive to work on the farms, or reduce demand by eliminating some of the European farms. The latter was not looked upon with favor by either the farmers or the government, which wanted rapid development. The white farmers were also reluctant to yield even a hint that there was competition from the natives, so they placed last priority on the stifling of independent African production. The method chosen was a variation on the theme of the incentive motif--but from a negative direction. Rather than raising wages, the Government imposed taxes upon the Africans, thereby forcing them to seek money, rather than livestock, food, or subsistence, and pushing them to the farms. The following chart graphically demonstrates this phenomenon:



FIG. I--NATIVE AND NON-NATIVE DIRECT TAXATION FOR A QUARTER OF A CENTURY IN KENYA. ALSO THE TOTAL CUSTOMS REVENUE FROM IMPORT DUTIES (AND EXPORT DUTIES UP TO 1922).[15]

Although the taxation system may not seem altogether ethical, nevertheless more extreme forms of coercion were used:

> There remained the most obvious solution of the problem: the reinforcement of economic pressures and incentives by pressures of a more direct kind.

> From the beginning the Government had found itself unable to meet its own needs for porters and road-makers without resorting to informal measures of conscription; and the private employers, who for the most part assumed that as members of the ruling race they had a right to the services of the subject peoples, were not slow to demand that labour should be supplied to them by similar methods, to be paid at the 'standard' rates. For some time the authorities seem to have had few qualms about complying with this request. In 1908, however, the Liberal Government declared that forced labour could not be tolerated within the British empire and the edict went forth that conscription for private employers must cease. The resultant situation was confused and unsatisfactory. Though officials could no longer order natives to enter employment they were not debarred from encouraging them to do so, and the distinction between command and persuasion was, in the circumstances, a very fine one, which individual administrators drew in widely different ways according to their personal sympathies. Thus the settlers could not be sure of their labour supply, but neither could the Africans be sure of their freedom.[16]

Two legal changes now become important, since they marked subtle movement from the coercion discussed above. The first was the Resident Natives Ordinance of 1918, resulting from settler discontent at the course of tenant farming. The white farmers felt that the laxity of the system produced little more than an extension of the reserves--natives would theoretically farm the land, but in reality they would revert back to the subsistence level rather than produce profit. What the farmers wanted, to reiterate, was labor, not mere inhabitation. The Ordinance of 1918

> decreed that no consideration other than labour should be exacted or accepted, and that no African should live on European land unless he had contracted to work for the proprietor for 180

> days in the year. It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of this measure, which did more than any other act of government to determine the future structure of agrarian society in Kenya. Villeinage--family subsistence agriculture modified by the rendering of work to a superior in exchange for land and protection--is well suited to a society in a rudimentary stage of development. As conditions become more settled the lines of possible evolution are various. It may give way to large-scale estate farming with full-time paid labour, or to tenant-farming, or, if the landowners have become functionless, to peasant proprietorship. Here, however, the two latter possibilities were excluded in advance. In the future, as in the present, Africans were to be allowed to live outside the reserves only as villeins or as labourers. A long step had been taken towards the division of the country into two sections with permanently differing economic and social systems.[17]

The second legal change was a peripheral result of the Carter Land Commission:

> Another important consequence was a subtle change in the whole basis of the economy evolved by the Kikuyu in the first decade of the century to meet the problems posed by the redefinition of their frontier situation. The Commission induced the Europeans to reconsider the development of their land unit. Its defense depended on a growth in their relative power, and this depended in turn on a rapid increase in European immigration. This in its turn postulated an intensive form of development to replace the extensive system in vogue up to this time. An intensive system might well require a large labor force, as in the past, but it would be of a different character. In place of the African family sharing the European farm as a permanent fixture in an extension of the tribal way of life, the need was for a temporary laborer without livestock and without roots who would serve out his time and then retire to his Reserve. What the implementation of the Kenya Land Commission Report portended for the Kikuyu people, then, was not merely the closing but also the contraction of their frontiers and a further massive increase in economic problems already intractable enough.[18]

The results of such governmental activity became manifest rather quickly in several ways. First was the smaller role of African production:

> One of the most striking contrasts between the economy of the 1920's and that of the pre-war period was the far smaller part now played by independent African production in the export trade. In 1912-13, at a conservative estimate 70 per cent. by value of the agricultural exports had been 'native produce'. In 1928 the proportion was less than 20 per cent. Even in absolute terms the increase had been small, and since 1925 there had actually been a noticeable decline. Moreover, of the 479,000 contributed from the African reserves, well over half was represented by hides and skins, the automatic by-product of subsistence pastoralism.[19]

Second and most portentous for the political future of Kenya was the changing form of the labor force itself and the potential creation of a quasi-proletariat. The overpopulation in the Reserves has already been noted, and

> While pressure on the land was building up within the reserves, the safety-valve, emigration to the European-owned areas of the Highlands, was being closed. The 'squatter' system, which had suited both parties in the early stages of development, became less and less appropriate as the land filled up.... Up to about 1928 there had been a continuous net inflow of resident labourers and their families, until in that year the number of Africans resident on European farms reached a total of 112,000, of whom 33,000 were adult males. But after 1930 the trend was reversed. By 1938 they numbered 104,000, and of these only 28,000 were adult males, although the total farm labour force had considerably increased. At the same time there was a tendency, assisted by fresh legislation in 1937, to curtail the rights, or privileges, of the labour-tenants, especially in respect of grazing land, which, with the general shift from arable to stock-farming, was becoming

> increasingly scarce.
>
> Thus at all points the security and freedom of the subsistence peasant were being gradually eroded. The old egalitarian pattern--to each woman her little patch of maize, to each man his little flock of goats--could not much longer be maintained. In the future there would be landless men, dependent on others for the means of life. In our period this impending change, the unavoidable concomitant of economic growth, cast only a faint shadow over the land. But the shadow was there, and it was ominous.[20]

Perhaps Donald Barnett describes the darkening of this shadow thus:

> About a fourth of the entire African adult male population was engaged in some form of wage employment. Of this number, just under 50 per cent were engaged in agriculture, 20 per cent in Government service, 11 per cent in manufacturing and 11 per cent in domestic employment. The great mass of African labor was unskilled and the wage level, in both absolute and relative terms, was extremely low. In 1948, for example, a total of 385,000 African workers earned the equivalent of 28 million dollars--an average of $73 per worker per year, which included estimated food and housing allowances. Asian workers numbering 23,500 earned 17.4 million dollars--an average of $741 per worker per year. And European wage earners numbering 11,500 garnered a total wage of 20 million dollars--an average of $1,739 per worker per year.[21]

The significance of these figures is probably in that

> The African found himself trapped in a vicious circle. It was assumed that his productive capacity would have to rise in order to bring about real wage increases, but the low wages paid inhibited him from acquiring the training for the skills necessary for higher productivity.[22]

This breakup in work patterns was accompanied by an increase in the

move to cities; Barnett says:

> By 1948 over a quarter of the Kikuyu population, some 273,000 persons out of a total of 1,026,000 were living and working outside the confines of their insufficient reserve. Of these, about four-fifths (218,000) were engaged as wage and contract laborers or 'squatters' on the European plantations and mixed farms of the White Highlands, while most of the remainder had entered the urban centers of Nairobi (51,475) and Mombasa (3,304) as unskilled laborers.[23]

The conditions in Nairobi were not optimal for the Africans, for "From the start Nairobi was laid out to accomodate a European and Indian population, not an African one."[24] George Delf has described the situation in this way:

> Those Africans who lived within the old tribal framework at least had enough to eat, but conditions in Nairobi were bad, and getting worse. Even as late as 1955 the East African Royal Commission found that only 5 per cent of African workers in the city had an income which could support a normal family, and said, "the conditions of life for...the majority of the Africans in the towns have been deteriorating over a considerable period... Moreover their deterioration has not yet been arrested...." With its startling gap between rich and poor, Nairobi was passing through the same stage of social and economic chaos as the towns of industrial England a hundred years before.[25]

The Royal Commission thus cites a "deterioration" in 1955, yet conditions were quite bad much earlier. Since Nairobi was built for the Europeans, small villages surrounding the city were emerging as the Africans' homes. But conditions in these "suburbs" were bad shortly after they sprung up. Pumwani is cited as having only 317 houses for a

population of 3,996 in 1931, ten years after it was built.[26]

The ultimate role of the cities was to be that of a catalyst, aiding in the formation of groups to voice discontent. Winston Churchill observed as early as 1908 that

> One would scarcely believe it possible, that a centre so new should be able to develop so many divergent and conflicting interests, or that a community so small should be able to give to each such vigorous and even vehement expression. There are already in miniature all the elements of keen political and racial discord, all the materials for hot and acrimonious debate.[27]

Although Churchill addressed himself primarily to the European segment of the population, the Africans were soon to begin political activity:

> As Nairobi was the locus of Kenya African politics, so Pangani was the focal point within the city. After the war, the Pangani hotelis (tea shops) became the nerve-center of African political discussion and the meeting place for town and country. Every Sunday afternoon, cooks and servants employed in the expanding European and Indian residential areas on the other side of the river went across to the mass meetings on the sports-ground there, Nairobi's and Kenya's Hyde Park Corner.[28]

The nascence of political discussion in Nairobi makes an appropriate transition for a return to consideration of tribal life. For, although the cities marked the most intense political activity, discontent was surfacing among the tribesmen. We have already examined the radical changes in native life which were occurring as the settlers moved in. However, African reaction was not immediate:

> Until 1923 there had been little overt African opposition to the teaching of the missionary churches that female circumcision, non-burial of the dead, and ngomas (dances) were indecent and barbaric practices. The CSM (Church of Scotland Mission) had first started systematic instruction against these practices in 1906, and by the 1920's it could look back on considerable success. Specifically, motions had been passed by the African elders of the CMS, the CSM, the AIM, and the GMS condemning the practice of female circumcision by Christian Kikuyu. The authority of the missionary churches seemes unimpeachable as they continued to expand their influence.
>
> From 1923 onward, however, the Kikuyu increasingly began to question missionary motives and objectives, no longer taking this authority for granted. The need to abandon Kikuyu customs, in particular the circumcision of girls, in order to become or remain a true Christian, began to be challenged. The KCA stood as a champion of Kikuyu cultural nationalism; its members did not seek the rejection of Christianity, but the preservation of selected aspects of Kikuyu culture. Indeed, it seemed to them that it was not Christianity which was in danger, but Kikuyu culture, as the processes of modernization deepened and spread across their country. There was a growing demand by the Kikuyu for a more selective approach to social change. But such a demand implied a direct challenge to the cultural assumptions of the colonial state, which had always proclaimed as its mission the imposition of western civilization in Kenya.[29]

Obviously, the movement has begun to ideological concerns, and, since most documentation by the natives of their feelings is retrospective, it is difficult accurately to picture the first stirrings of discontent. However, Leakey records the fact that many tribesmen disinherited their sons because, after they underwent mission training, they refused to continue certain tribal customs. As long as they remained within the family, not participating in the traditions as expected, the ancestral spirits would be offended. Therefore, their formal spiritual exclusion

from the family was the only way to assuage ancestral suffering at the outrage.[30]

Oginga Odinga presents a vivid picture of the natives' reaction to the Europeans:

> We connected Whites and Government with five main things. There were the inoculations against the plague from which the children ran in fear. There were the tax collections. There was the order to the villagers to work on the roads. There were clothes, kanzu, the long robes copied from Arab garb at the coast, given free to the chiefs and elders to wear to encourage others in the tribe to clothe themselves in modern dress. There were the schools, which came later, and to which, in the beginning, only orphans, foster children, poor nieces and nephews and never the favourite sons were sent, for the villagers distrusted the pressure on them to send their children out of the home and away from herding the animal; and the more alert objected to the way the Christian missions taught 'This custom (yours) is bad, and this (ours) is good', for they could see that the children at the missions would grow up to despise Luo ways.[31]

Kenyatta simultaneously reinforces Oginga's description of discontent and foreshadows the ideological form the expression of this discontent will take:

> "In the past there has been too much of "civilising and uplifting poor savages." This policy has been based on preconceived ideas that the African cultures are "primitive," and as such, belong to the past and can only be looked upon as antiquarian relics fit only for museums. The European should realise that there is something to learn from the African and a great deal about him to understand, and that the burden could be made easier if a policy of "give and take" could be adopted. We may mention here that the African who is being civilised looks upon this "civilisation" with great fear mingled with suspicion.

> Above all, he finds that socially and religiously he has been torn away from his family and tribal organisation. The new civilisation he is supposed to acquire neither prepares him for the proper functions of a European mode of life nor for African life; he is left floundering between the two social forces. European educationalists and others, especially those who are guided by racial prejudice and preconceived ideas of what is good for the African, usually fail to take cognizance of this vital fact. This may be due to studied indifference or to an inexcusably meagre knowledge of the functions of African institutions and a lack of intimate contact with the real social life of the people they presume to teach."[32]

Odinga limns the native perspective on the European governors rather dismally:

> The District Commissioner was remote from the people. He lived in Kisumu and we heard about him as the head of all the chiefs, but the people never or rarely saw him. The Provincial Commissioner seemed like a king, so far away and exalted that we doubted his existence. As we heard there was a King and a Governor, so we heard there was a Provincial Commissioner: we knew little about him. The government was feared rather than respected. Agricultural instructors came to inspect our fields for cotton, but they never taught us anything. They only asked questions and if we did not answer quickly or did not give them the answers they wanted, they beat us with a hippo whip. Veterinary inspectors came too, but they wanted to be respected as chiefs, and they accepted as good and loyal only those villagers who gave them beer parties and presents. As a boy I watched from a distance the goings-on at the barazas. The Chief was harsh in both his language and his treatment of the people, and did not hesitate to slap an elder if the man did not stand quickly or sit where he was told. Any instructions given to the people were accompanied by beatings. The askari Kanga was cruel and weighed heavily into the people singled out by the Chief. When the District Commissioner was due at a baraza, the atmosphere was tense and the people were frightened. As the

> Commissioner approached all had to stand and if you were slow to rise to your feet the askaris might seize a chair and hit out with it. Sometimes people were beaten to a point of helplessness and near death. The Government, I decided, had come not to help us but to instill fear into us, and, out of fear, obedience.[33]

Thus we see the outline of a rather bleak impression made by the Europeans on the natives: land, economics, social and political life all held the roots of discontent, and the growth of overcrowded urban centers provided a focal point for this dissatisfaction and a spawning ground for the growth of an ideological sophistication. It is to the development of the organizations which arose to channel the discontent that we now turn.

CHAPTER FOUR

ORGANIZATION - REPRESSION - REVOLT

We have seen the growth of a situation which seems potentially revolutionary only in a vague way, due to the actors' low sophistication in responding and giving expression to their deprivation. Revolution is an almost insanely radical way to solve problems, and, for a sufficient number of the population to be drawn into such endeavors, the amorphous discontent we have seen must both be shaped and intensified. Ideological organizations give form to these feelings, while repression intensifies them. As Gurr found, the "intervening variables" act to close possible alternatives to revolt, and, when legal forms of dissent fail, only then do people turn to more violent and radical methods of altering the society in which they live.

If our theorists are correct, revolution can be prevented by providing legal channels for this dissent. The "intervening variables" can therefore exist as shock absorbers instead of intensifiers, giving dissatisfied sectors opportunity for expression and an arena for reform. In Kenya, these routes were closed, and the natives turned to violence:[1]

> In summary, then, the articulation of African grievances was a vital underlying and conditioning factor with regard to the 'Mau Mau Revolution' we shall be examining. For over thirty years, and through a wide variety of African associations, a nationalist ideology was evolved which, to the Kikuyu peasant and worker, came to be symbolized in the expression and demand for 'Land and Freedom.' The tendency of this ideology to become more radical was a reflection of the intensifying struggle between a subordinant African majority, increasingly aware of its potential power, and a ruling European minority, ever fearful that its privileged position might be swept away in the rising current of African nationalism. The pattern of events in this struggle should also be clear: constitutional demands--Government repression--militant reaction.[2]

We shall turn now to an examination of the actual dissynchronization as it took revolutionary form. First focus will be on the role of deviants--the increasing number of people whose psychological makeups were altered by the stress of colonialism in sufficient degree to make their behavior abnormal. Then we will turn to the ideological structure within which dissent was beginning to be channelled, seeing that of its two manifestations--reform and violent overthrow of the existing system--violence dominated as reform efforts failed. Finally we will examine the organization of dissent, closely related with its ideological formulation and observe the governmental suppression of discontent, which led to violent revolutionary tactics to achieve reform.

Our first consideration is the role of deviants, which has been theoretically delineated by Johnson:

> When the system is disequilibrated, however, the envalued definitions of crime and sickness--that is, the outer limits on personality variability--

> are relaxed, and this relaxation presents a serious analytical problem for the student of revolution. In a stable system acts of deviancy committed by actors whose particular mazeways lie beyond the limits of toleration established by the system will be identified as criminals or lunatics, even though they themselves may label acts as "revolutionary." But in the disequilibrated system, some degree of personal tension will be experienced by every actor, possibly leading him to relieve it through behavior that he would have considered deviant before the system lost its equilibrium. Moreover, at these times it becomes increasingly more difficult for other actors in a system to differentiate between behavior that represents a dysfunction-inspired protest and behavior that represents the now-disguised deviancy of a formerly eccentric personality. In a disequilibrated situation, some people will engage in antisocial action because of dysfunction-induced tensions and others will participate because their personalities embody a socially intolerable resolution of biologic and cultural demands. The latter group would have been considered deviants in the equilibrated system, and they will again be controlled as deviants after equilibrium is restored by revolution or otherwise.[3]

Frantz Fanon touches upon this concept of deviancy in relation to Kenya when he says:

> In Kenya, in the years preceding the Mau-Mau revolt, it was noticeable how the British colonial authorities multiplied intimidatory measures against the lumpenproletariat. The police forces and the missionaries coordinated their efforts, in the years 1950-51, in order to make a suitable response to the enormous influx of young Kenyans coming from the country districts and the forests, who when they did not manage to find a market for their labor took to stealing, debauchery, and alcoholism. Juvenile delinquency in the colonized countries is the direct result of the existence of a lumpenproletariat.[4]

This picture is reinforced by Rosberg and Nottingham, and their documentation illustrates the difficulty in separating deviancy which emanates

from a dissynchronized system from that present in any social situation:

> After the War economic pressures and rural underemployment drove ever larger numbers of Africans to Nairobi. Neither the Government nor the European-dominated Municipal Council faced up to the massive social problems that this enormous influx of Africans presented. By 1949 and 1950 there was increasing resort to strong police action in vain attempts to clear the city of the unemployed. However, as fast as the "vagrants" were returned to the Reserves they flocked back in again. The chronic problem of the dispossessed was an essential factor in Nairobi's postwar history. Among these elements were to be found many of the most politically militant and committed men, in terms of a willingness to employ direct action against the colonial regime. Their organization and activities were to be the vital focus for impelling political action along an ultra-radical path.[5]

George Delf records an impression of the "Forty Group" which corresponds rather closely with a form of deviancy:

> ...the "Forty Group"...consisted of those Kikuyu men who had come of age in 1940. Many of them had seen action during the war in far-off lands, and life in the country was now too tedious for them. Hundreds had failed to find work in Nairobi and they banded together into a rowdy group, with a potentially dangerous knowledge of modern weapons. Politics for them became a source of excitement and they...(provided) the semi-criminal element from which no nationalist movement is free.[6]

This idea of deviancy is perhaps close to Wallace's "mazeway", and this similarity becomes most evident in the religious tangent deviancy may take. Kenyatta provides introductory insight into the nature of the religious confusion which fostered such a reaction:

> The Gikuyu are no more where they used to be; that is to say, "All is confusion." Religious rites and hallowed traditions are no longer observed by the whole community. Moral rules are broken with impunity, for in place of unified tribal morality there is now, as anthropological readers will be well aware, a welter of disturbing influences, rules and sanctions, whose net result is only that a Gikuyu does not know what he may or may not, ought or ought not, to do or believe, but which leaves him in no doubt at all about having broken the original morality of his people. The rules of hospitality and kinship are disregarded, commercialisation of tribal mutual assistance institutions is becoming more and more pronounced every day.[7]

That is to say, "Religiously, too, the African in the Kenya of 1947 was in a desperate state. A former Government psychiatrist described the situation as 'psychologically chaotic.'"[8] This psychological chaos can be expressed in a number of ways--from suicide to crime, as George Pettee noted:

> Given that cramp exists, that is, that institutions are out of adjustment to life in a given society, individual purposes feel maladjusted. The consciousness of maladjustment creates an individual tension which leads the maladjusted individual to ponder his situation. Given his imaginative and intellectual powers, this may result in anything from getting drunk to writing a book.[9]

However, as the discontent grows it can become articulated politically, and this is the role of ideology. As Johnson says:

> The dynamic element which overcomes the effects of multiple role playing and which leads to the development of lines of cleavage is ideology. Without ideology, deviant subcultural groups, such as delinquent gangs, religious sects, and deviant patriotic associations, will not form alliances; and the tensions of the system, which led particular

> groups to form these associations, will be dissipated without directly influencing the social structure.[10]

Thus ideology gives form to the inner tension by providing a channel for action. Johnson defines ideology thus:

> ...we reserve the word ideology to refer to an alternative value structure, which becomes salient only under disequilibrated conditions and which is addressed to these disequilibrated conditions. An ideology, in this sense, may evolve into a value structure if it is instrumental in resynchronizing the system; but as an "ideology," it is always a challenger, an alternative paradigm of values.[11]

The Kenya "alternative" was counterpoised against the colonial status quo with the European minority ruling the country. Its channelling effect functioned both in respect to the individual and the society as a whole:

> ...ideologies perform various psychological functions for the management of personal tensions created by disequilibrated conditions. Seen from a micro perspective, ideologies attempt to relieve the tensions generated by disequilibrium, just as seen from a macro perspective, they attempt to show the way toward value-environmental resynchronization. Ideologies arise in disequilibrated systems as the competitors to an old value structure, and they define and explain the disequilibrated system in a way comparable to the value structure's definition and explanation of a functional system.[12]

Let us turn to the nature of the Kenyans' ideology. In so doing, we are necessarily drawn into consideration of the organizations which arose to implement their beliefs. The reaction of government to the organizations affected both the structure and ideology of these as-

sociations by increasing their radical aspects.[13]

As we have already implied, the organizational sophistication of the protest movement did not develop until the twenties, with the formation of the Kikuyu Association:

> In 1920 the Kikuyu Association was formed. Comprised largely of chiefs and headmen, it focused major attention on grievances concerning the alienation of Kikuyu land and Government's increasingly compulsive labor policies. A second group, known as the Young Kikuyu Association (YKA), emerged in June 1921. Headed by Harry Thuku, a Government telephone operator, and comprised mainly of low grade clerks, office boys and domestic servants, the YKA protested through mass meetings and petitions against (1) the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1915, (2) continued evictions of Kikuyu sub-clans and alienation of their land for European occupation, (3) the doubling of the Hut and Poll Tax from five to ten rupees, (4) the one-third reduction in African wages imposed in 1921, and (5) the kipande or labor registration system introduced in 1920 according to which all African males aged sixteen or over were fingerprinted and made to carry, on penalty of imprisonment, a combined identification and employment card.[14]

The government's reaction to the YKA was a foreshadowing of its later practices: as the YKA grew in effectiveness, Thuku was arrested and deported (March 15, 1922). Although there was a certain group among the YKA which supported Thuku's arrest and subsequent deportation, it was nevertheless apparent that dissent among the natives was rather pervasive, even in the twenties. Thuku was supported by a mass demonstration when between seven and eight thousand Africans gathered outside the Nairobi police station where he was held. The tensions ran high, and between 20 and 50 natives were killed when shooting began. The

coroner's report has been quoted as saying the crowd was "hostile, dangerous, and determined."[15a]

Other political organizations arose in Kavirondo, but the next major developments were among the Kikuyu:

> In 1929 the Church of Scotland, always more ready in Kenya than the Anglican Church to make political and other pronouncements, laid it down as a matter of discipline that its adherents should have nothing to do with the practice of female circumcision. This rite de passage, common to many African peoples, was regarded by the Kikuyu as an essential element in their social customs. The Kikuyu Central Association sprang to its defence. This was the former Young Kikuyu Association, renamed after the Harry Thuku troubles. It first came into prominence under its new title in 1925 when, at Fort Hall, it petitioned the Governor--among other requests--for permission for Africans to grow coffee, for the appointment of a Kikuyu paramount chief, for the publication of the laws of the country in Kikuyu, and for the release of Harry Thuku. In the matter of female circumcision the K.C.A. was taking up a popular issue, and as a result it grew rapidly in numbers, laying claim in 1931 to 10,000 members, of whom 8,000 were said to be paying a subscription of 6d. a month. It published a newspaper, Muiguithania, which continued intermittently until the Government suppressed the Association in 1940.[15b]

The protest against the CSM was to lead to another vital development with political effects--the creation of independent schools and churches:

> In Kenya the break with the mission led to the formation of splinter churches and, because of the mission's educational work, to the establishment of independent schools. In their numerous petitions and memoranda the various Kikuyu associations constantly mentioned the educational needs of the tribe. Now they attempted, through the Kikuyu Independent Schools Association and its offshoot in Kiambu, the Karinga Schools Association, to meet this themselves. As the schools

> arose from a politico-religious clash, so later they increasingly became vehicles for Kikuyu 'nationalism'.[16]

At this point it must be noted that there was little cohesion or unity among the political groups;[17] they can, however, be divided into two general camps:

> Throughout Kikuyuland during these years there was widespread support for a policy of reform through cooperation. The basic principle of the developing moderate approach to politics emphasized the responsibility of the colonial government to effect reform. Since the government was all powerful, the best way to advance African interests was to cooperate fully with "constituted authority." ....The Kikuyu Association, whose leaders were the chiefs and headmen dominating the affairs of southern Kiambu, remained the strongest organized framework for this viewpoint....
>
> We have mentioned two approaches to Kikuyu politics. The second not only was concerned with preparing petitions of grievances and presenting them to the Government, but also emphasized alternative ways of achieving reform. These other leaders were ready to adopt a wider range of political action to achieve their objectives. They soon found that the predominantly rural organizations they built to express their beliefs had to be adapted to meet the needs of the tribal views over a broad range of issues covering not merely political and economic grievances, but cultural matters as well.... Finally, this group had to contend with the apparent impossibility of any immediate change in the political structure of the colonial-settler state. The Kikuyu Central Association, which first emerged in 1924 and also called the Central Kikuyu Association at this time was the most important embodiment of this second kind of approach.[18]

With the growth of the KCA we see the emergence of a more highly developed ideology, according to Johnson's definition. Although there was, as yet, no genuine revolutionary ideology, the actions of the

government perhaps were to assure the future of such beliefs. According to Johnson, there is a wide range of response patterns open to the leaders of a system confronted with widespread discontent:

> The courses of action open to a system's leaders during a power deflation range from "conservative change" to its polar opposite, "elite intransigence." The successful implementation of conservative change depends primarily upon two factors: the elite's familiarity with social conditions, and its ability to determine which elements of the value structure are indispensable to the continuity of the culture. ...The task of the elite is then to revise the applied code of good behavior of the myth, to deduce from the central truth new rules of practical conduct. If it can do this, the system will move toward resynchronization, the power deflation will disappear, and no revolution will take place....
>
> Elite intransigence, by contrast, always serves as a remote cause of revolution. In its grossest form, elite intransigence is the frank, willful pursuit of reactionary policies by an elite--that is, policies which exacerbate rather than rectify a dissynchronized social structure, or policies that violate the formal, envalued norms of the system which the elite is charged with preserving....
>
> Between the two poles of conservative change and elite intransigence, the policies of an elite in a disequilibrated system may vary from the barely adequate to the demonstrably incompetent....[19]

The actual course the government took was forecast both by the arrest and deportation of Thuku and by its efforts at suppression of the KCA:

> ...in March 1929 the Governor of Kenya announced that he was planning to take action against "those Kikuyu who were giving their allegiance to such associations as the Central Kikuyu Association and that it was strengthening the Native Authority Ordinance so as to stop the collection of money by natives without permission...." And within less than a year the Under Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs reported to the British Parlia-

> ment that "orders were issued through the native authorities in Kenya early in the year [1930] to regulate the collection of money among natives in the Reserves." In addition to curbing the Association's ability to collect funds among the Kikuyus for purposes of financing its activities, the Colonial authorities took steps to prohibit certain songs and dances practiced among the Kikuyus on the ground that they were "seditious" and of an "indecent nature." Furthermore, the Colonial authorities moved to curb the actions of the leadership of the Kikuyu Central Association; thus in the summer of 1930 Joseph Kangethe, who was the President of the Association, was arrested on the charge that he illegally partook in a public meeting prohibited by the Native Ordinance of Kenya.[20]

Political activity between the wars was perhaps exemplified by the tribesmen's testimony to the Carter Land Commission; four groups testified to the Commission, and their political positions ranged from extreme loyalist to the KCA's early ideological stance. Essentially, the tribesmen were unable to consolidate their grievances within any general structure or integration. As George Bennett said, "Characteristic of the inter-war period is the local association and the local agitation."[21] Although many small political groups grew up both east and west of Kikuyu country, they were marked by tribal exclusiveness and lack of any unified plan. This is probably why Fred Burke could state:

> (Kenyatta) returned to Kenya in 1946, to a country which, from an African point of view, was only slightly altered from that which he had left seventeen years earlier. There had been some progress in the development and reorganization of local government, and, in 1944, the first African had been appointed to the Legislative Council. However, settler control of the polity was--if anything--more secure than it had been in 1929 when he had left. True, Harry Thuku had been allowed

> to return from exile and had defeated Joseph Kangethe for the presidency of KCA. However, the incipient Kikuyu nationalist movement was badly split into moderate and radical wings. In 1935, the unhappy Thuku, now leader of the moderate forces, withdrew from the KCA and attempted to establish a rival group, the Kikuyu Political Association. It could not compete, however, successfully with the more radical KCA.[22]

It is a mistake, however, to look upon these as barren years for the African political leaders. In a negative way, direction had been given the movements, when, in 1940, the KCA was banned. A Luo who was in close communication with Kikuyu political developments at this time said:

> The banning of the KCA as an illegal organization sent Kikuyu political organization underground once more; it had been said that if there is any one event which ignited the fuse which led to the armed revolt of the Emergency period, it was this banning of the KCA, that a state of emergency can be said to have begun not in 1952 but in 1940. KCA fires never went out; the organization of the people around land grievances never stopped; there was a general training in agitation and in secrecy lest the movement be betrayed to the government. Land was the one burning issue; female circumcision was another.[23]

This has been corroborated somewhat by Donald Barnett, whose analysis approaches the idea that repression and coercion, rather than stifling dissent, gave it unity and direction:

> The banned Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), though retaining its own identity, was of course influential and active within KAU, the trade union movement and the independent church and school movement. In a relatively small-scale society such as Kenya, with its broad peasant

> base, high illiteracy rate and deepening cleavage between white and black, it comes as no shock to find a numerically small but dedicated core of educated or semi-educated African leaders assuming more or less important roles in a fairly wide range of associations. The existence of a dominant European caste and colonial regime, combined with a subordinant African population whose aspirations were growing yet repeatedly frustrated, provided a large number of African groups with a common 'enemy' or set of obstacles and, hence, a unifying base of shared interests and aims.... This cross-linking of various African associations was tending to produce a single movement....[24]

Bennet also states:

> The Kenya African Union proclaimed by its title that it sought to organize the Africans of the whole Colony. With it we reach the first sustained African attempt to create a 'Congress-organization.' Formed in 1944 as the Kenya African Study Union, it took the name by which it has become more widely known at its second Annual Delegates' Conference in 1946. It appealed for funds to the whole population of Kenya, and its Secretary reported that Africans and Asians had responded, but not Europeans.[25]

A key event in this unification and politicization was the return of Kenyatta, who "displayed ...a dictatorial attitude and control" in further ordering the movement.[26] The KAU was gaining in strength:

> By the time it was suppressed, in 1952, it laid claim to more than 100,000 members paying 5s. a year. Kenyatta was addressing mass meetings with crowds of thirty to forty thousand, which were so organized that on one occasion forty bus-loads of people went from Nairobi to Nyeri, a distance of 95 miles.[27]

The KAU's goals were clearly delineated; at its first Conference in

1947 it published a declaration of aims:

> 1. That the political objective of the Africans in Kenya must be self-government by Africans for Africans, and in that African state the rights of all racial minorities would be safeguarded.
> 2. That more African seats should be provided immediately in the Kenya Legislative Council....
> 3. That more land be made available both in the Crown Lands and in the highlands for settlement of Africans.
> 4. That compulsory and free education for Africans, as is given to the children of other races, is overdue.
> 5. That the Kipandi [i.e., the registration policy] with all its humiliating rules and regulations be abolished immediately.
> 6. That the deplorable wages, housing and other conditions of African labourers be substantially improved and that the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' be recognized.[28]

Although the KAU was to continue its attempts at constitutional reform, its ideological framework had shifted. Vital to an understanding of this shift was the alteration in the oathing ceremony's role; Oginda Odinga describes this change:

> KCA membership was bound by oath-taking, the traditional sanction of African society; it bound members to allegiance of their cause.... Oaths had begun to have political significance in the twenties when the land agitation started in force, but a new type of oath--the administration of a mass oath to a whole community--emerged in 1947-48.... The oath taken on that occasion was not the entry to a secret society of the select, but a community pledge--a commitment to a kind of verbal constitution....[29]

We have already discussed the role of oathing ceremonies and magic in tribal society, so it is clear that a mass oath founded on an ideo-

logical base would be inimicable to its sacred function. Helpful in understanding how the transition between sacred ceremony and political proselytizing could be made is Max Gluckman's essay, "The Magic of Despair." In it he quotes Evans-Pritchard's Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, which, Gluckman says, "penetrated the essence of these movements:"

> Yet perhaps the associations assist Azande to fight against the pessimism and loss of confidence that their sophisticated manners cannot entirely conceal. In so far as the magic of the associations is not redundant it is directed against the vagaries of European rule. Azande, faced with a power they can neither stand up against or avoid, have found in magic their last defence.[30]

Hopefully it has been shown that the indications of social, economic, and political stresses placed on the natives were not met wholly with a religious response. Nevertheless, in a developing country like Kenya there were many stages of individual sophistication, ranging from the educated elite to those who were much more primitive in their "mazeways". The oath takes on significance, therefore, less as a purely atavistic return to tribal methods than as a political tactic to enlist the broadest possible support. Barnett, though not specifically addressing himself to the religious issue, explains this ideological-tactical move:

> KCA leaders decided to radically shift their policies of recruitment. They set out to boldly expand KCA membership and to become, in effect, an underground mass movement. While the specific reasons behind this move remain unclear, it is fairly certain that it was influenced greatly by the dashed hopes for democratic reforms, combined

> with a growing pessimism regarding the possibility of achieving their political objectives through purely constitutional means and an increasing fear that the settler political machine was gaining ground in its struggle for an autonomous or 'independent' white-dominated Kenya on the pattern of Southern Rhodesia. The overall strategy of KCA was to forge an iron-clad unity among all Kenya Africans, beginning with the more politically conscious Kikuyu, in order to press their political demands as a single integrated body and be prepared to use various forms of pressure, such as the general strike, massive boycotts of European goods and ultimately force, if such a line of action became necessary.[31]

Here we must be careful to analyze these oaths within the structure of revolutionary theory. Thus it makes little difference to which segment of the populace the oath appealed, if its attraction was based on societal disequilibrium. As Johnson said:

> If a system is basically functional--and that includes being free from foreign domination or interference--efforts at artificial mobilization will fall on barren soil and be rejected. True revolutionary conditions cannot be 'imported' into a social system.[32]

Thus the more encompassing, radical oath which began to sweep the country was one unifying factor, broadening the political base of the KAU. Another vital development was the inclusion of other organizations into the KAU. For instance, the suppression in 1950 of the Trade Union Congress extended the membership of the KAU greatly:

> The years after the war were also the heyday of the trade union movement. The spiralling cost of living sparked off spontaneous workers' strikes. There was the shooting during the Uplands Bacon Factory strike and the imprisonment of Chege

> Kibachia who had led the African Workers' Federation. Its successor, the East African Trades Union Congress was led by Makhan Singh and Fred Kubai on charges of being officers of an unregistered trade union organization, there was a general strike in protest. Fred Kubai was not only president of the Trade Union Congress but he was also chairman of KAU Nairobi Branch. An influx of trade union strength into KAU revived the Nairobi Branch and greatly increased KAU's membership and militancy.[33]

KAU's membership was at this time listed as 150,000, and this did not show the underground elements, or the increased militancy. George Delf describes this situation, taut to the breaking point, very accurately:

> By 1950, when Mau Mau was officially banned, the psychological chaos among the Kikuyu tribe was degenerating into a kind of collective insanity in which reason played little or no part. "Detribalized" politicians and thugs roamed the Reserves rousing the bewildered peasants from their apathy, and enforcing oaths of secrecy which were a pathetic and lunatic distortion of the traditional tribal oaths. But it was only the aggravation of a disease which had set in much earlier.[34]

Delf then goes on to quote Eliud Mathu, and the quotation deserves inclusion here since it illustrates the effect suppression had as an "intervening variable"--increasing militancy rather than eliminating it:

> Those who still cherish their former freedom and common rights bitterly resent having to apply for permission to meet together for any purpose whatever. Naturally the law is evaded and they meet at night behind locked doors with a sentry outside; they meet in caves, in the depths of banana groves or in swampy valleys away from the habitations of their fellow men to avoid detection. Yes, they must meet together, these 'free, happy Africans'

> of His Majesty's Colony of Kenya, like felons, with all the humiliating circumstances and methods they are forced to adopt; whispering and cursing the Europeans and their own headmen who administer an oppressive and unjustified law. One day their repressions are bound to burst out, with the usual unhappy consequences for all.[35]

We have finally reached what Johnson terms "revolutionary ideology:"

> When an ideology is developed enough to be a full-blown revolutionary ideology, it will combine the ideas of "goal," "instrument," and "value." Such ideologies are what Wallace has called "goal cultures," or what we would call images of a new value-environmental symbiosis. They also define the means for reaching the goal--that is to say, they contain a "transfer culture," or "a system of operations which, if fully carried out, will transform the existing culture into the goal culture...."[36]

Furthermore, the genuine revolutionary ideology does not envisage happiness in the hereafter, rather "it is a program for immediate renovation in the here-and-now."[37] Although it may incorporate religious beliefs, as this revolt certainly did, its overall policy is reform in the imminent world. Moreover, the final ingredient in revolutionary ideology is its inclusion of violence into the tactics for achieving reform. Johnson says:

> True revolution is neither lunacy nor crime. It is the acceptance of violence in order to cause the system to change when all else has failed, and the very idea of revolution is contingent upon this perception of societal failure.[38]

The best illustration of the ideological role of violence might be a speech of Kenyatta just before the Emergency. This particular speech

is recalled by Karari Njama, but most of Kenyatta's oratory at this time was similar, and Njama's reaction was a typical one:

> I was struck by its (the flag's) red colour in the middle of black and green, which signified blood. An hour passed without any description of the KAU flag. Most of the time I was pondering how and when we shall officially hoist that National flag to signify the Kenya African freedom. I recalled Kenyatta's words in 1947 at a KAU rally on the same ground. 'The freedom tree can only grow when you pour blood on it, but not water. I shall firmly hold the lion's jaws so that it will not bite you. Will you bear its claws?' He was replied with a great applause of admittance.
>
> When Kenyatta returned on the platform for the third time, after a few other speakers, he explained the flag. He said, 'Black is to show that this is for black people. Red is to show that the blood of an African is the same colour as the blood of a European, and green is to show that when we were given this country by God it was green, fertile and good but now you see the green is below the red and is suppressed.' (Tremendous applause!) I tried to figure out his real meaning. What was meant by green being 'suppressed' and below the red? Special Branch agents were at the meeting recording all the speeches so Kenyatta couldn't speak his mind directly. What he said must mean that our fertile lands (green) could only be regained by the blood (red) of the African (black). That was it! The black was separated from the green by red; the African could only get to his land through blood.[39]

Although the leadership expressed willingness to use violence to achieve ends, the expression was metaphorical, and we cannot know the extent to which Kenyatta and the other key KAU members were directing the early guerrilla activities. George Delf interprets Kenyatta as desperately trying to stave off the violent elements in the KAU, yet his speeches seem to indicate a recognition that, as constitutional

efforts failed, violence would be the only alternative. Nevertheless, if the revolt is viewed in the theoretical framework we do not have to posit any rational exercise of force. The conditions for violence existed, and, when the titular leadership of the KAU was arrested, violence could emerge outside the organizational framework:

> Thus, the "siege" of Kikuyuland and the formation of units of resistance in the forests, led for the most part by men not associated with the leadership of pre-Emergency political groups, altered the scope of violence qualitatively, bringing it to a level far beyond the capacity of pre-Emergency organizations, whether African or governmental.[40]

In other words,

> The arrest of Kenyatta, the proclamation of the Emergency, and the banning of KAU brought a halt to organized political activity and substituted violence in its place. All nationwide political organizations were proscribed; among the Kikuyu, meetings of more than three people were proscribed.[41]

Thus the radical components of the colonial system--the deviants--began to dominate the political situation:

> Leadership passed into the hands of the now unlinked district and lower-level councils of Nairobi and the rural areas and a number of militant, though semi-educated or illiterate, local leaders began moving into the forests which would become their future bases of operation.[42]

Barnett also makes clear the range of motives for fighting; as has been pointed out, the dissynchronized system makes deviants' behavior seem plausible as political action to many who would have abhorred vio-

lence normally. This accounts for the participation of many Africans who, under the influence of dissynchronization and cross-pressures, joined the forest fighters:

> In general terms, this movement to the forests might be described as a 'withdrawal', stimulated in the main by fear of Government repressive measures and reprisals. Obviously, however, there was a considerable range of variation with respect to individual motives and specific external stimuli. Fear was frequently combined with anger, with a desire to fight back or retaliate or with a sense of mission, a dedication to the Movement and the struggle of 'right' against 'might'. As with all revolutions, less lofty motives could also be found--such as the desire for personal safety, power or material advantage. In most cases... a number of these factors combined in varying degrees within a single individual.[43a]

From the preceeding pages it should already be clear that Mau Mau was a total revolution, aiming at "supplanting the entire structure of values and at recasting the entire division of labor."[43b] The revolution had broad mass support, it was framed by ideological concepts, and it aimed at the total restructuring of the very foundation of colonial society. Perhaps a summary of the numbers involved will reinforce a conception of the depth of Mau Mau influence:

> Kimathi's capture in October 1956 marked the end of the operational phase of the Emergency. The costs were considerable: Mau Mau, 11,503 killed, 12,585 captured; Security Forces, 63 Europeans, 3 Asians, 101 Africans killed and 101 Europeans, 12 Asians, 1,469 Africans wounded; Civilians, 1,819 Africans, 32 Europeans, 26 Asians killed and 916 Africans, 26 Europeans, 36 Asians wounded; total number of Mau Mau and supporters in detention camps, 40,000--it was as high as 77,000 at the end of 1954; Emergency expenses, £ 55,585,424.[44]

It was figured that each Mau Mau fighter cost the Government £ 10,000.[45] Needless to say, the social disruption caused by the fighters was immense, and they had to have tremendous support among the civilian population to continue fighting so long. However, it is readily apparent that the numbers of African Loyalists killed far outnumbered the European dead, demonstrating that Mau Mau efforts were aimed at African ranks as well as British. Furthermore, the rebels were quelled. How is this explained?

Perhaps most important in understanding the disintegration of the guerrilla forces is perception of their lack of national leadership. At the very outset of the fighting, forest integration was simple, informal, and therefore vulnerable:

> In structure, the forest groups of this period were quite simple. Integration existed, for the most part, only at the primary level, with relations between individual members of each group being articulated by a chosen leader. Normally, such leaders were selected on the basis of demonstrated abilities, popularity, reputation, previous position in the Movement or some combination of these factors. The process of selection was informal, much as in pre-colonial times, and was usually accomplished through simple consensus. The responsibilities of a leader toward his followers, and their loyalty to him, were in most cases reinforced by strong kin and neighborhood ties.
>
> The position of leader was not ordinarily circumscribed by any special privileges during this period; nor did those holding such a position normally possess a formal title or rank.... Regulatory and adjudicative powers and procedures were neither formalized nor consistent from group to group.
>
> As to their relations with other groups within the Movement, the only formal link maintained by these early forest groups was with their respective sub-location or location groups and councils.[46]

Even when this exceedingly informal basis of coordination grew into more organized and larger camps, the problems continued. Minor power struggles arose between the primary forest leaders; Njama documents the dissent existing between Kimathi and Mathenge which ultimately divided the fighters to the point of impotence:

> Kimbo told me that he...and a few others had talked and agreed to form a new association which would be exclusively organized by the illiterate leaders. I tried to persuade him to criticise the Parliament and to better it by any amendments within it. He told me that it was difficult for anyone to...amend the Kenya Parliament under Kimathi without creating enmity.
>
> I warned him that even forming another association would also create enmity. He replied that an enemy within its party had no defense but an enemy from another party would be defended by his party.
>
> I asked him what were the real causes of forming another party, which would only divide our fighters. ...He told me that the reason was that Kimathi had ignored Stanley Mathenge the elected leader because he was illiterate and instead he was promoting the 'Yes, yes, men' who disassociated themselves with the revolution when it became red-hot, being afraid of death--while illiterate leaders were afraid of the same fate.[47]

In addition to the formal military structure, the ideological framework of the fighters had fallen apart. We have already learned that a dissynchronized system leads all kinds of disheartened and disequilibrated individuals to strike out aggressively at something. And we have seen the importance of ideology in giving structure to this amorphous amalgamation of individuals with varying motives. With the Africans' leadership imprisoned, the framework of the rebels' ideological commitment was quite weak. Karari Njama's account is perhaps the best representation of the

lack of structure in forest life. He tells of violence used in oathing ceremonies to coerce individuals to terminate any British support, criminal elements attracted to the free-wheeling environment of the forest, and even cowards drawn there simply to escape the cross-pressures confronting them in the Reserves. All these groups served the rebel cause well--for a time. However, conditions in the forest were not glamorous; despite Frantz Fanon's idealized statements of the psychologically purifying aspects of violence,[48] it must be remembered that these men were living like animals. They sometimes went days on end without a cooked meal, and their shoes and clothes wore out early in the war, forcing them to sleep and hike in occasionally freezing weather with no shoes and ragged clothes. A description of one of the camps might indicate the conditions in the forest environment:

> Between the two camps was a small pond in which the rhinos, buffaloes, elephants and all the other animals drank. The two camps drank the same stagnant filthy water, full of animals dung and urine; frogs, toads, mosquitoes and various types of insects bred there.... None of these camps I visited in the Ruthaithi area built any huts. They used tents or slept in the open during the dry seasons.[49]

Faced with this situation, the criminal element, known to the forest fighters as the Komerera, would raid their own supporters to get food and clothing. This did much to discredit the rebels with their "passive wing" of civilian support. When combined with an intensive conversion or liquidation effort to break any British support among the Africans, the result was the killing of many Kenyans who wished to remain out of the political hassle. The rebels thus lost even more support:

> Although the Security Forces--represented by the Police and the Military in all their diverse branches--are naturally playing a very big part against the militant Mau Mau, the people who are in most constant opposition to them...are the Kikuyu Home Guards....
>
> This designation 'loyalist' is often misunderstood outside Kenya and is wrongly thought to indicate people who wholeheartedly support the policy of Government and of the Europeans in general. This is not quite the true position. I would say, rather, that the 'loyalists' are people who disapprove most strongly of Mau Mau's methods of trying to achieve their objective.[50]

Add to all the internal factors leading to disruption the combined might and intelligence of the British counter forces and ultimate European success seems inevitable; the wonder is not that they succeeded in squelching the fighters, but that it took so long. Donald Barnett gives a very brief account of a small part of the British operation, and its sophistication is impressive. In addition to constant bombing of the mountains, which created acute anxiety among the fighters even without scoring direct hits, the Security Forces utilized de-oathing ceremonies and other tribal devices to "cleanse" the suspects and rehabilitate them. Caravans of the fighters' families would be permitted to enter the forest to coax their husbands and fathers back to the reserves. As the forest support waned, the Government devoted much effort to informing the fighters that amnesty awaited them if they surrendered. Barnett discusses this campaign which was:

> designed to bring about the surrender of forest guerrillas by offering a general amnesty for crimes committed during the emergency. While very few fighters surrendered during this period, it is clear...that the dire conditions prevailing

> in the reserve, the Government amnesty offer and their own plight in the forest, resulted in widespread demoralization amongst Aberdare fighters. The Kikuyu peasantry, it seems, had for the most part lost both the means and the will to resist. The villagization and communal labor schemes combined with bad harvests to produce widespread hunger and a mounting toll of deaths from starvation among children and the aged. Cut off from the fighters in the forest and seeing no chance of winning, a growing number of Kikuyu peasants, therefore, yearned only for an end to the struggle.[51]

It was in this context of military disintegration and fatigue that Mau Mau went down in defeat. Nevertheless, the fighting has been interpreted as vital in the movement of the Kenyans to freedom. A. Marshall MacPhee said:

> That (Dedan Kimathi) and the other Mau Mau leaders failed in their objective of bringing down the Government and driving out the British does not alter the fact that Kenya was never the same country again. International politics and events in other parts of Africa were to have a more profound effect on the movement towards independence; but the Mau Mau revolt was an ever-present reminder of the costly nature of alien rule when it became unacceptable to a powerful section of the people.[52]

Albert Meister found that

> Perhaps the most tangible result of the war was the change in African attitudes, their skepticism about the "good intentions" of Britain and their determination to win independence. From then on Christianity, community development, cooperative assistance, housing policy, political concessions, and all the other aspects of "good will" were interpreted as harmful to independence.
>
> The fight for the dignity of the Kikuyu tribe and later for the liberty and independence of black people gave Africans the feeling of participating in a great moment in history. When they returned

> to civilian life or were released from prison, young Africans after 1956 were full of self-confidence and very different from the timorous pre-war natives. Although defeated, they were proud that such immense military resources had to be called into play to quell their resistance....[53]

Chapter One
Footnotes

[1]James S. Coleman, "Nationalism in Tropical Africa," The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXVIII (June, 1954), No. 2, p. 409.

[2]Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change. (New York: 1966), p. 21.

[3]Ibid., p. 65.

[4]Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru. (New York: 1967), p. 42.

[5]Johnson, op. cit., p. 65.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Ibid., p. 66.

[8]Quoted in Ibid., p. 51.

[9]Ibid., p. 66.

[10]Waruhiu Itote, 'Mau Mau' General, (Nairobi: 1967), p. 27.

[11]Johnson, op. cit., p. 69.

[12]Ibid., p. 70.

[13]Anthony F. C. Wallace, "Revitalization Movements," American Anthropologist, LVIII (April, 1956), p. 266.

[14]Ibid., pp. 266-7.

[15]Ibid., p. 265.

[16]Johnson, op. cit., p. 81.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Ibid., p. xi.

[19]Ted Robert Gurr, "A Comparative Study of Civil Strife." From Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., The History of Violence in America. (New York: 1969), pp. 594-597.

[20]Ted Robert Gurr, "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," The American Political Science Review, LXII (December, 1968), No. 4, pp. 1105-1106.

[21] Ibid., pp. 1123-1124.

[22] Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Betty A. Nesvold, "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross National Patterns." From Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, eds. The History of Violence in America. (New York: 1969), pp. 670-71.

[23] Gurr, "A Comparative Study...", pp. 594-5.

[24] Gurr, "A Causal Model...", p. 1104.

Chapter Two
Footnotes

[1]Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya, op. cit., p. 22.

[2]Stanley Diamond and Fred G. Burke, eds., The Transformation of East Africa. (New York: 1966), pp. 145-7.

[3]Report of the Kenya Land Commission, p. 3023. Quoted in Martin Kilson, "Land and the Kikuyu: A Study of the Relationship Between Land and the Kikuyu Political Movement," Journal of Negro History, Vol. XL, No. 2 (April, 1955), p. 108.

[4]The concept of tenantry and the confusion resulting when the Europeans came is discussed in L. S. B. Leakey, Mau Mau and the Kikuyu, (New York: 1952), pp. 5-15.

[5]Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya, op. cit., p. 37.

[6]Ibid., pp. 102-3.

[7]Ibid., p. 128.

[8]Ibid., p. 128.

[9]Diamond and Burke, The Transformation of East Africa, op. cit., p. 144.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Leakey, Mau Mau and the Kikuyu, op. cit., pp. 37-38.

[12]Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya, op. cit., p. 169.

[13]Leakey, Mau Mau and the Kikuyu, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

[14]Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya, op. cit., p. 232.

[15]Ibid., p. 270.

[16]Leakey, Mau Mau and the Kikuyu, op. cit., p. 52.

Chapter Three
Footnotes

[1]Rosberg and Nottingham, The Myth of Mau Mau, op. cit., p. 70.

[2]For more complete treatment of the land issue, see "Kenya Land Policy" in History of East Africa, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 672-689. Also, Martin L. Kilson, Jr., "Land and the Kikuyu: A Study of the Relationship Between Land and Kikuyu Political Movements," The Journal of Negro History, Vol. XL, No. 2 (April, 1955), pp. 103-153.

[3]History of East Africa, Vol. II, op. cit., pp. 673-4.

[4]Ibid., pp. 227-8.

[5]C. H. Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya, (Oxford: 1966), p. 204.

[6]Fred G. Burke, "Political Evolution in Kenya," From Stanley Diamond and Fred G. Burke, eds. The Transformation of East Africa. (New York: 1966), p. 201.

[7]Kilson, "Land and the Kikuyu..." op. cit., p. 114.

[8]Rosberg and Nottingham, The Myth of Mau Mau, op. cit., pp. 156-7.

[9]Kilson, "Land and the Kikuyu..." op. cit., p. 122.

[10]R. Mugo Gatheru, Child of Two Worlds: A Kikuyu's Story. (New York: 1964), p. 9.

[11]Kilson, "Land and the Kikuyu..." op. cit., p. 124.

[12]Ibid., p. 125.

[13]"Land Use, Land Tenure and Land Reform" from The Transformation of East Africa, op. cit., pp. 148-149.

[14]History of East Africa, op. cit., pp. 229-230.

[15]W. McGregor Ross, Kenya From Within: A Short Political History. (London: 1968)

[16]History of East Africa, pp. 230-31.

[17]Ibid., pp. 238-39.

[18]Rosberg and Nottingham, The Myth of Mau Mau, op. cit., pp. 157-58.

[19]History of East Africa, op. cit., p. 243.

[20]Ibid., pp. 257-58.

[21]Donald Barnett, Mau Mau From Within, op. cit., p. 27.

[22]Rosberg and Nottingham, The Myth of Mau Mau, op. cit., p. 205.

[23]Barnett, Mau Mau From Within, op. cit., p. 34.

[24]Rosberg and Nottingham, The Myth of Mau Mau, op. cit., p. 23.

[25]George Delf, Jomo Kenyatta, op. cit., p. 129.

[26]Rosberg and Nottingham, The Myth of Mau Mau, op. cit., p. 24.

[27]Winston Churchill, My African Journey, (London: 1962), p. 14.

[28]Rosberg and Nottingham, The Myth of Mau Mau, op. cit., p. 25.

[29]Ibid., pp. 112-13.

[30]L. S. B. Leakey, Mau Mau and the Kikuyu, op. cit., p. 59.

[31]Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

[32]Jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya, op. cit., p. 120.

[33]Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

Chapter Four
Footnotes

[1]As stated in the beginning of this paper, the fact that violence occurred according to a pattern similar to the theorists' does not prove their theories to be correct, however. This is one of the paper's professed limitations--it offers no hope for proof, only the fact that the Kenya revolt can profitably be regarded within a theoretical framework, especially one which does not limit analysis to one factor but encompasses as much of society as possible.

A second limitation is more serious, but must be stated. The measurement of such factors as deviancy and coercive force size is almost wholly based on inference and needs great refinement. The fact that students of the situation report incidents of deviance as being widespread does not provide adequate indication of the "measurable units of probability" we need to forecast revolution. To approach precision in the analysis of Mau Mau will take much effort toward collecting and refining the facts surrounding the fighting. Deviancy must be examined in terms of the fluctuation of such indices as crime, suicide, and mental illness over a prolonged period of time. Coercive force size should be similarly regarded, and in this paper the picture of all these elements is largely speculative.

[2]Barnett, Mau Mau From Within, op. cit., p. 42.

[3]Johnson, Revolutionary Change, op. cit., pp. 75-76.

[4]Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth. (New York: 1968), p. 129.

[5]Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of Mau Mau, op. cit., pp. 239-40.

[6]Delf, Jomo Kenyatta, op. cit., p. 137.

[7]Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya, op. cit., p. 241.

[8]Delf, Jomo Kenyatta, op. cit., p. 129.

[9]Johnson, Revolutionary Change, op. cit., p. 73.

[10]Ibid., p. 81.

[11]Ibid., p. 82.

[12]Ibid., p. 83.

[13]It should not be assumed that the British Government consisted of a monolithic force which repressed all African sentiment, however. There was considerable dissent within the European ranks. Bennett gives a lengthy account of the various organizations which arose as expressions of the Euro-

peans' different viewpoints (Bennett, "Development of Political Organizations in Kenya," pp. 113-118). Nevertheless, Elspeth Huxley gives a picture of the growth of political activity of the settlers, who were definitely militant in their reaction to any increase in the role of Africans:

> In Nairobi, the Convention of Associations had not been idle. Their "misguided childlike faith" in the Government had been shattered by the jettisoning of the Milner Settlement. They meant to safeguard their adopted country for the British race however much Britain's rulers seemed determined to discard it. They formed an embryonic cabinet, the Vigilance committee, to advise Convention on any action to be taken on the Indian question.
>
> It consisted, at first, of five members of whom Delamere was one. They met in secret. Their task was a difficult one. They had to map out a plan which would enable a handful of settlers, unrepresented in England and scattered in Kenya, to defeat the avowed intentions of the Government...and to persuade the Colonial Office to reverse its policy.
>
> (Elspeth Huxley, White Man's Country, Vol. II, p. 126)

Although we do not wish to be myopic in our analysis, positing a unity which simply did not exist, at the same time we must judge British policy by the final shape it took. And, as has already been shown, the settlers wielded considerable power, and the ultimate result was repression of native expression. Furthermore, extreme repression stifled any effective organizational articulation of grievances.

[14]Barnett, Mau Mau From Within, op. cit., p. 36.

[15a]The Coroner's Report is cited in Ross, Kenya From Within, op. cit., p. 233.

[15b]Bennett, "Development of Political Organizations in Kenya," op. cit., p. 121.

[16]Ibid.

[17]At this point it is important to note that perhaps too much emphasis has been placed on the failure of the natives historically to articulate a political form of protest. This should not prevent recognition of the fact that Kenyans amassed a history of negative reactions to colonization. As Fred Burke notes:

> The Kikuyu were among the first East African people to appreciate the fact that European penetration

> would result in the employment of Africans to further European enrichment and power.
> (Burke, "Political Evolution in Kenya," op. cit., p. 197)

Furthermore, there was conflict between the tribesmen and the colonists from first contact; however, the natives' organization and expression of discontent was without direction until much later, and did not become effective politically until the twenties.

[18]Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of Mau Mau, op. cit., pp. 84-86.

[19]Johnson, Revolutionary Change, op. cit., pp. 94-97.

[20]Kilson, "Land and the Kikuyu," op. cit., p. 146.

[21]Bennett, "Development of Political Organizations...", op. cit., p. 125.

[22]Burke, "Political Evolution in Kenya," op. cit., p. 207.

[23]Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru, op. cit., p. 96.

[24]Barnett, Mau Mau From Within, op. cit., p. 41.

[25]Bennett, "Development of Political Organizations...", op. cit., p. 127.

[26]Ibid., p. 125.

[27]Ibid.

[28]Ibid., pp. 148-49.

[29]Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru, op. cit., pp. 96-97.

[30]Quoted in Max Gluckman, "The Magic of Despair," in Order and Rebellion in Tribal Africa, (New York: 1963), p. 137.

[31]Barnett, Mau Mau From Within, op. cit., pp. 41-42.

[32]Johnson, Revolutionary Change, op. cit., p. 162.

[33]Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru, op. cit., p. 108.

[34]Delf, Jomo Kenyatta, op. cit., p. 145.

[35]Ibid.

[36]Johnson, Revolutionary Change, op. cit., p. 84.

[37]Ibid., p. 85.

[38]Ibid., p. 12.

[39]Barnett, Mau Mau From Within, op. cit., p. 75.

[40]Rosberg and Nottingham, Myth of Mau Mau, op. cit., p. 278.

[41]Burke, "Political Evolution in Kenya," op. cit., p. 213.

[42]Barnett, Mau Mau From Within, op. cit., p. 125.

[43a]Johnson, Revolutionary Change, op. cit., p. 139.

[43b]Barnett, Mau Mau From Within, op. cit., p. 149.

[44]A. Marshall MacPhee, Kenya. (New York: 1968), p. 144.

[45]Ibid., p. 135.

[46]Barnett, Mau Mau From Within, op. cit., p. 154.

[47]Ibid., p. 401.

[48]"At the level of individuals, violence is a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect." From The Wretched of the Earth, op. cit., p. 94.

[49]Barnett, Mau Mau From Within, op. cit., p. 316.

[50]L. S. B. Leakey, Defeating Mau Mau. (London: 1954), p. 110.

[51]Barnett, Mau Mau From Within, op. cit., pp. 426-27.

[52]MacPhee, Kenya, op. cit., p. 143.

[53]Albert Meister, East Africa: The Past in Chains, the Future in Pawn. (New York: 1968), p. 59.

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