Quine and the Enigma of Analyticity
or
What it is Like to Think Like a Quinean

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Quine's attack on what he considers to be two defunct dogmas of empiricism -the notions of analyticity and reductionism- is based on a misconception of the nature of language. Quine's fascination with the workings of scientific theory has led him to hold aa overly-simple conception of language in which the purpose of all language is to report on the passing flux of experience. For Quine, language does not have any other function. In "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," Quine argues that the traditional concept of analyticity as necessary truth has no place in language. Quine contends that the only non-circular and intelligible definition of analyticity is the empiricist definition. According to this explanation, analytic truths are those statements which are confirmed by any possible experience. In order to show that no statement satisfies the empiricist criterion, Quine presents his network theory of belief. Quine concludes that there are no necessary truths, statements that are true come what may. There are truths that are only more or less resistant to revision. I contend that there is an analytic/synthetic distinction to be drawn, but this distinction is not the classic "depends on language/depends on fact" distinction. To say that a statement is analytic is not to say something about the relationship between the statement and experience, but to say that the statement has a certain role in our language. In this paper, I will first examine the traditional empiricist concept of analyticity. I then will explicate Quine's view of a "more pragmatic" empiricism and will

attempt to show that Quine´s pragmatism leads to unacceptable results. Although I am not attempting to bring down the edifice of Quine´s philosophy, I hope that my exposition will at least point out a few weak points in the Quinean fortress.

The analytic/synthetic distinction is a development of the empiricist school of thought. This tradition holds that only statements which are derived from experience have cognitive significance. Hume, in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding asks about our scholarly tomes: "Does it contain any experiential reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion" (italics omitted).[1] How does Hume treat statements of logic and mathematics, statements which usually are characterized as having no basis in experience? Hume does not treat statements such as "X is either p or not-p" or "All triangles have three sides" as being senseless. According to Hume, that such statements "have a sense" is guaranteed by the existence of two types of knowledge: knowledge about relations between matters of fact and knowledge about relations between ideas. "Analytic statements are those which express certain arrangements of ideas which are necessarily linked together..to give any different arrangement is to commit a contradiction."[2] Thus, analytic statements are those statements which are true by virtue of the

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[1]D. Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P.H. Niddtich 3d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p.165.

[2]D. Hume, 1975, p.58.

the meanings?

How is this different from the view cited below and attributed to Kant?

relationship between the terms involved, not by virtue of any states of affairs in the world. To change the relationship between the concepts would be to utter a contradiction (e.g. To say "Not all triangles have three sides" is to utter a contradiction). Analytic statements have been characterized also as being those statements which are true by virtue of the meaning of the terms involved rather than by virtue of any sensory experience. (Give a note here.) This notion of analyticity is similar to Kant´s conception of the term. As Quine says, "Kant´s intent.. can be stated thus: a statement is analytic when it is true by virtue of meanings and independently of facts." [3] It is this conception of analyticity that has been the mainstay of empiricism and that which Quine first attacks in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism."

Quine believes that analyticity cannot be explained solely by virtue of meanings for the notion of "meaning" itself is quite enigmatic. Modern philosophy (e.g. Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations) has tarnished the acceptability of the idea that there exists a realm of entities which give words definite meaning. Following in this tradition, Quine believes that we must look to language itself for a criterion for analyticity. According to Quine, analytic truths have fallen into two main categories: truths of logic and statements that "can be turned into logical truths by putting synonyms for

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[3] W.V. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" in From a Logical Point of View, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1953), p.26.

synonyms."[4]   The former statements remain true under any reinterpretation of their components other than the logical particles. For example, "No p is a non-p" is a logical truth and the substitution of "married male" for "p" results in the explicitly analytic truth "No married male is an unmarried male." The second type of analytic truth is exemplified by "All bachelors are unmarried males." This implicitly analytic truth may be reduced to an explicitly analytic truth by substituting "unmarried male" for its synonym "bachelor".

The substitution of synonyms leads to the problem of deciding when any two terms are synonymous. Synonymy, for Quine is as troublesome a concept as is analyticity itself.[5] Quine claims that "the major difficulty lies not in the first class of analytic statements, the logical truths, but rather the second class, which depends upon the notion of synonymy."[6] Quine first tackles the notion of synonymy by linking it to the act of defining terms. He claims that only in the case of the explicit creation of a term is synonymy really clear. In this case, "the definiendum becomes synonymous with the definiens simply because it has been created expressly for the purpose of being synonymous with the definiens..for the rest, definition rests on

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[4]Quine, 1953, p.23.

[5]I believe that the problem of synonymy is related to the problem of meaning in general. How is it possible that our physical universe should contain meaning? Or, how is it possible for one thing (e.g. a string of sounds) to stand for something else (e.g. an idea)?

[6]Quine, 1953, p. 24.

synonymy rather than explaining it." [7] Thus, Quine claims to
understand "conventional synonymy" but not pre-existing synonymy.
Grice and Strawson have pointed out that Quine's critique of
synonymy on these grounds is rather confused.

> "It is like the position of a man to whom we are trying
> to explain, say, the idea of one thing fitting into another
> thing..and who says: I can understand what it means to say
> that one thing fits into another, or that two things fit
> together, in the case where one was specially made to fit
> the other, but I cannot understand what it means to say
> this in any other case." [8]

Although this criticism is not fatal to Quine's project, it does
cast doubt as to whether Quine _really_ does not understand
synonymy. If Quine has no idea as to what synonymy is all about,
how is it that he can recognize that "bachelor" and "unmarried
male" are a synonym-pair [9]. It seems that Quine might just be
unclear as to all the cases in which it would be appropriate to
apply the predicate "synonymous" [10]

Quine decides that any explication of synonymy via
definition will be circular and unintelligible. He then examines
the notions of interchangability salva veritate and of semantical
rules as being criteria for synonymy. In the former case, Quine

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[7]Quine, 1953, p.26.

[8]H.P. Grice and P.F. Strawson, "In Defence of a Dogma,"
Philosophical Review 65 (1956): 141-158.

[9]Quine, 1953, p. 23.

[10]Grice and Strawson contend that this is similar to the
case in which Quine claims to be undecided as to whether or not
the statement "Everything green is extended" is analytic because
he does not understand the term "analytic." They argue that he
might just as well be undecided as to the proper _extension_ of
either "extended" or "analytic" (1956, p.154).

finds that in an extensional language, the fact that "bachelor" and "unmarried male" are interchangeable salva veritate rests on "accidental matters of fact" and not on any necessary basis. In the latter case, Quine finds that any rule of the sort "analytic-for language L" presupposes knowledge of what analyticity is rather than explaining the nature of analyticity. To sum up Quine's position: as of yet, no adequate, non-circular definition of synonymy has been proposed.

Quine's rejection of the above-described attempts of defining "analyticity" is based upon unduly restrictive criteria for determining what is an adequate definition of any term. For Quine, an adequate definition should break out of the circle of concepts related to the term being defined and should state the necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of the term. Quine's emphasis on ostensive learning of language has blinded him to the fact that some terms cannot be learned except in reference to related terms. For example, how do we learn the meaning of the word "dream"? To what do we point in the process of instructing a child who does not know the meaning of "dream"? All that we can do is to use such words as "nightmare", "real", "not real" "awake", etc.. Suppose that Johnny Jr. wakes up one night screaming for his parents. In order to calm him, his parents will say such things as "It's okay. It was only a dream. It wasn't real. Nightmare monsters can't hurt you." Through such consolations and explanations, the child eventually realizes that dreams are mental processes that occur when one sleeps.

Although the words used to explain "dream" are related to "dream", children still come to understand the meaning of "dream." [11]

Another criticism to be brought against Quine's criteria for adequate definitions focuses on his "necessary and sufficient" clause. Do most definitions of words specify all of the states of affairs in the world to which they may be applied? Does the definition of, say, "game" list all of its possible extensions? It seems not. Ambiguity of the extension of terms is found throughout language and yet this ambiguity does not hinder our understanding of the terms involved. Thus, I hold that Quine's criteria for adequate definition of terms is rather confused. Despite this confusion, Quine purports to have developed a definition of "analyticity" which satisfies his definitional criteria.

If Quine wishes to dispute the validity of the concept "analyticity," he must first present a definition of the concept involved. [12] For Quine, the basis of analyticity is to be found in the verification theory of meaning. This theory contends that

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[11]Grice and Strawson argue that Quine can provide a non-circular definition of "analyticity." They define the related concept of logical impossibility in terms of not believing something and not understanding something. The same technique of explanation, they argue, may be used to explain "analyticity." The upshot of the argument is also that Quine's criteria are too stringent. H.P. Grice and P.F.Strawson, 1956, p.150-151.

[12]Nancy Tuana, "The Hidden Structure of Quine's Attack on Analyticity," Southern Journal of Philosophy 20 (1982): 257-262. Tuana claims that "one cannot deny the existence of analytic statements until they know what an analytic statement is" (p.258).

the meaning of a statement is determined by the conjunction of all those experiences which serve to confirm that statement plus the conjunction of all those experiences under which the statement is disconfirmed."[13]   An analytic statement is a statement which is confirmed by all experiences and disconfirmed by none. However, Quine, via his holism thesis, maintains that no statement singly admits of confirmation or infirmation. The truth value of a statement is determinate only in reference to other statements in the language. Quine's definition of analyticity may be expressed in the following way:

A statement, S, is analytic if and only if:
$$M(S) = (Cx * \char`\^Dx * CRs)$$

where M(S) is "the meaning of S", Cx is the group of all confirming experiences, ^Dx is the empty set of disconfirming experiences and CRs is the set of statements related or connected to S.   Such a definition requires that an analytic statement be confirmed by all experiences and by all possible revisions of our system of beliefs, Rs. (I am here indebted to Nancy Tuana).

How is it that Quine comes to reject this seemingly clear definition of analyticity? Tuana points out that Quine holds that "there is no statement from which the withdrawal of the assignment of the value "true" might not form a part of a revision of our system of beliefs" (emphasis added).[14] Quine believes also that a revision of a number of our empirical

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[13]Nancy Tuana, 1982, p. 259.

[14]Nancy Tuana, 1982, p. 261.

beliefs would entail a revision of our analytic beliefs. If this is true, then no statement could fulfil the latter part of Quine's definition of analyticity. Therefore, according to Quine, there are no analytic statements.[15] In making such a claim, is Quine making a point about the existence of the members of the class called "analytic statements" and saying that there are no members of that class? Or, is Quine making the stronger point that it is conceptually impossible for there to exist such a class of statements? (i.e. Any statement by its very nature is subject to revision in light of recalcitrant experience. Therefore, there are no necessary statements). Is the statement "No statements are immune from revision" itself not immune from revision? If it is immune from revision (which would be the case if Quine's statement is taken to be a conceptual point), then Quine would have to allow that there are necessary, or analytic truths. If the statement "No statement is immune from revision" is itself not immune from revision, then it could be revised to say that "Some statements are immune from revision." Quine's assertion that no statement is immune from revision creates a self-referential paradox out of which Quine is hard-pressed to escape.[16]

I understand "physically impossible" but what do "conceptually impossible"?

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[15]Such a conception of analyticity is similar to the case on which a person claims that bachelors are unmarried males and that there are no unmarried males. He then concludes that there can be no such thing as a bachelor.

[16]Quine's dilemma may be resolved if we allow that he is making the point that there are no members of the class "analytic statements" at the present time. Quine cannot argue that the predicate "statement subject to revision" is applicable to all

In order to uncover why Quine believes that there are no analytic statements, we must examine Quine's conception of the relationship between language and experience. Quine's denial of the existence of any analytic statement is grounded in Quine's view of epistemology. Knowledge of analytic statements would be certain knowledge because such statements are always confirmed by experience. Quine presupposes that our knowledge of experience can never be certain knowledge. Fallibilism always will be a characteristic of our knowledge. Even if we "get our language right," we will never know that it is right.[17] This conception of fallibilism is based upon the assumption that our judgments (made in linguistic form) somehow connect with experience and it is this connection which determines whether or not the judgement is correct. Only if the judgement "corresponds with" experience, is the judgement correct. As current experience which validates our present judgments may change, so too may these judgments turn out to be false in the future. Thus, we may never have knowledge which is necessary or confirmed by all experience.

In <u>Word and Object</u>, Quine argues that we need only look at how we actually learn language in order to uncover the fallibilism which permeates all of our beliefs about experience.

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statements for the predicate would be vacuous. This solution was brought out in a conversation about the "thin ice" problem with Ramsey Martin.

[17]Quine's "love affair" with science is manifest in his belief that just as the scientific models of experience have continuously changed so too will all of our knowledge continuously change. There will never be one, correct view of experience.

For Quine, all that we have to go on in learning language are surface irritations.[18] As Gibson has pointed out, "language is a social art..that we acquire..on the evidence solely of other people's overt behavior under publicly recognizable circumstances." [19] Thus, ostensive learning as reflected in observation sentences is the basic building block for the Quinean analysis of language. Quine says that "observation sentences are the gateway to language.[20] We can learn observation sentences first because we have only to key them to current episodes." [21] Sentences such as "It is raining" or "Fido is sleeping" are examples of observation sentences. This type of statement will be learned prior to such statements as "T.H. Green was the greatest proponent of Oxford Idealism" because the sense of the former class of statements is determined directly by empirical fact (a term which itself is quite problematic). These facts may be pointed out rather easily to anyone learning the language. The "stimulus, or empirical, meaning" of observation sentences is rather fixed across the entire range of the speakers of a certain

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[18]W.V. Quine, Word and Object, (Cambridge, Mass.: The Technology Press of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1960) p.26.

[19]R.F. Gibson, Jr., The Philosophy of W.V. Quine: an Expository Essay, (Tampa: University of Florida Press, 1982) p.31.

[20]In fact, Quine claims that "it is ultimately through (observation sentences) that language in general gains its meaning." W.V.Quine and J.S. Ullian, The Web of Belief, 2d. ed., (New York: Random House, 1970) p. 28.

[21]W.V. Quine, 1960, p. 41.

language. Speakers of the language will either almost all assent to or dissent to a query about an observation sentence given approximately the same environmental circumstances. "A sentence is observational insofar as its truth value on any occasion would be agreed to by just about any member of the speech community witnessing the occasion." [22] For Quine, observation sentences provide the most reliable beliefs that we can have about experience. He claims that "there is scope for error and dispute only insofar as the connections with experience whereby sentences are appraised are multifarious and indirect..there is none insofar as verdicts to a sentence are directly keyed to present stimulation." [23]

Error and dispute enter into language only as one travels away from direct reportage of experience. Sentences such as "All bachelors are unmarried males" do not require any specific stimulations to guarantee their truth or falsity as do such sentences as "It is sunny out." The former type of sentence, termed "occasion sentence" is logically distinct from observation sentences. When learning observation sentences, a child must uncover "the distinctive trait shared by the episode appropriate to that observation sentence." [24] Such learning may be, for example, an instance of direct conditioning. Occasion sentences, which make up the vast majority of the repitoire of

How are we taught the meaning of 'fact', 'true' and 'knowledge'?

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[22] W.V. Quine, 1960, p. 39.

[23] W.V. Quine, 1960, p. 44.

[24] W.V. Quine, 1960, p. 43.

our sentences, are learned in quite a different manner. These sentences are built up from parts of other sentences that the person has already mastered and are based on <u>analogies</u> with the way those parts have been noted to occur in those other sentences. Such learning is termed "analogic synthesis." An example will elucidate the matter. A child has the ability to say three sentences: "<u>Foot!</u>"; "<u>Hand!</u>"; and "My hand hurts!". By noting how the word "hand" functions in the last sentence, the child is able to make an analogical hypothesis that it is also correct to say "My foot hurts!"[25]

For Quine, the difference in the methods of learning different types of sentences is deadly for the empiricist theories of reductionism and of analyticity. Many empiricists (e.g. Carnap) believe that the meaning of any term or statement depends upon the perceptual conditions under which it is verified. Quine claims that "the notion lingers that to each statement..there is associated a unique range of possible sensory events such that the occurrence of any of them would add to the likelihood of truth of the statement." [26] Thus, any term referring to objects may be reducible to reports of sensory events or data. In "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," Quine argues that such a project of reductionism has not succeeded and will never

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[25]Quine claims that a major source (of our acquisition of language) is an elaborate and largely unconscious process of abstraction and generalization working partly from what we have previously learned by ostension and depending heavily on imitation of observed use." W.V.Quine, 1970, p. 27.

[26]W.V. Quine, 1953, p. 40.

succeed. As there is a logical gap (as reflected in the manners of learning the sentences) between statements that are observational in nature and statements that are theoretical in nature (e.g. occasion sentences), one cannot work backwards from theoretical terms (or sentences) to observational terms (or sentences). The fact that language learning includes several disparate methods dooms any hope of a reductionist project of achieving the certain knowledge which is afforded by observation sentences.[27]

If the project of reductionism is thus discredited, then the analytic/synthetic distinction is also discredited for the latter is said to depend upon the former. The support is described in the following way: "as long as it is taken to be significant in general to speak of the confirmation and infirmation of a statement (by sensory experience), it seems significant to speak also of a limiting kind of statement which is vacuously confirmed, ipso facto, come what may; and such a statement is analytic."[28] If it makes no sense to say that statement S is confirmed by experiences X,Y and Z, then it makes no sense to say that statement T is confirmed by all experiences. Thus, Quine's conception of the language learning process provides a main avenue of attack on the notion of analyticity.

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[27]We might say that the reason for the disparate methods of learning these various terms is due to the various roles that the terms play in language.

[28]W.V. Quine, 1953, p. 41.

Another line of attack which is given only cursory examination in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" is based on Quine's holism thesis. No sentence has a unique range of confirming experiences which determine the sentence's meaning. Any sentence (including statements) has meaning only within a language. For example, the statement "John is a bachelor" has a meaning which can be confirmed only in relation to statements regarding marital status and gender. In Word and Object, Quine says that "in an obvious way this structure of interconnected sentences is a single connected fabric including all sciences, and indeed everything we say about the world." [29] This so-called "field of force" connects with experience only along its periphery (i.e. at the point of observation sentences). "A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the field." [30] As there is a gap between the observation sentences at the periphery and the more theoretical statements within the field, "there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to reevaluate in the light of any single contrary experience." [31] Quine goes on to say that "no *particular* experiences are linked with any *particular* statements in the interior of the field" (emphasis added).[32] Thus, given any one experience, we are free to reevaluate our interior

i.e. every belief is a kind of thread; but the 'fabric' is composed of things other than thread — it is a motley. Quine sees homogeneity where there is heterogeneity

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[29] W.V. Quine, 1960, p. 12.

[30] W.V. Quine, 1953. P. 42

[31] W.V. QUine, 1953, p. 42.

[32] W.V. Quine, 1953, p. 43.

beliefs in any way we like. We can hold on to any belief even if we are faced with a recalcitrant experience (by, say, pleading the influence of hallucinations). Conversely, any statement can be revised if we make drastic enough changes in our web of belief.[33] Even the statement, "All bachelors are unmarried males" could come to be revised. However, in making such a revision, we are only making a trivial change in the definition of a term (e.g. "bachelor"). We are not making a revision of our judgments about the world. The underlying assumptions of Quine's holism thesis are based on Quine's conflation of the categories of revision of the meaning of a term and revision of our judgments which rely on the term. Thus, I contend that

will this always be reasonable? will it make sense in any circumstances?

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[33]A large scale revision of our beliefs is tantamount to the adoption of an alternate conceptual scheme. Only through such an adoption is the "revision" of analytic statements possible. This view regards the role of analytic statements as being similar to the role of certain scientific concepts and laws (e.g. $E=1/2MV^2$). Putnam (1975) claims that such statements "can be overthrown only if someone incorporates principles incompatible with those statements in a successful conceptual scheme (p.46). However, there is one major difference between "energy" and "bachelor": the former, but not the latter, may be used in many statements some of which may conflict with each other. The term "bachelor" is used primarily in one way. It is used to identify members of the class of unmarried males. There will arise no conflict between any two statements in which the term "bachelor" is used (i.e. the term "bachelor" itself will not be a source of conflict). This characteristic of "bachelor" allows one to use the statement "All bachelors are unmarried males" to determine whether or not "bachelor" applies in any given case. Putnam claims that all analytic statements can be reinterpreted into the form: "Something (someone) is an A if and only if it (he,she) is a B, where A is a single word" (p.55). Analytic statements are those statements that are immune from revision unless our beliefs and, hence, our criteria of judgement (or, more precisely, the meaning of the term) are revised.

Quine's "pragmatic empiricism" is still a form of verificationism which ignores the richness of our language.

In part six of "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," Quine describes our knowledge as a man-made fabric which impinges upon experience only along the edges. This conception of language depicts language as a tool which may be re-shaped in order to satisfy man's needs. As Dilman has noted, the tool's purpose is "to deal with, organize, or expedite in the most efficacious manner the flux of experience."[34] Quine likens language to a boat which floats upon the seas of experience. We are in the process of rebuilding the boat plank by plank while we try to stay afloat.[35] As the waves lap at our epistemic boat, the rotten planks are discarded while new planks wash up against the boat. Thus, we are able to stay afloat even as we alter our conceptual scheme. Quine states that he is able to "think of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in light of past experience."[36] In order to cope with the barrage of sensory stimulation, certain concepts are introduced into the conceptual scheme. For example, "thing-talk" is introduced into every child's conceptual scheme in order that he may learn to cope with his environment. Thus, a child learns to talk first of the "book on top of the

[handwritten margin note: planks that are really rotten? How are we able to make these determinations?]

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[34]Ilham Dilman, Quine on Ontology, Necessity and Experience: A Philosophical Critique, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984), p.116.

[35]W.V. Quine, 1960, p.3.

[36]W.V. Quine, 1953, p.44.

chair" or "Fido being by the door" and only later does he talk of T.H.Green and Oxford Idealism.

As our conceptual schemes are man-made, we have freedom to decide what concepts we will allow in the particular scheme. Quine's pragmatism allows for a person to talk of things as well as of sense-data. According to Quine, most people believe it to be more efficacious to talk of things rather than sense-data. Statements which seem to have a high degree of efficacy in dealing with the flux of experience are not easily given up by the language users. The statement "All bachelors are unmarried males" seems to have proven itself to be highly useful in our everyday life (e.g. in our making certain judgments about people). Therefore, we will be very reluctant to give up such a statement. The statement "There are centaurs" seems to have proven itself to be very inexpeditious and so we have dropped such a belief from our conceptual scheme. Any belief may be dropped if we believe that it does not help us in our everyday dealings with the flux of experience. Conversely, any belief may be adopted if we believe that its adoption will be efficacious. The only criteria for evaluating conceptual schemes and individual statements within the schemes are considerations of coherency and simplicity both of which are reflected in our dealings with the world.

Quine's conception of the role of beliefs within any conceptual scheme is such that all beliefs are on the same epistemological footing. Statements which are centrally located

in the scheme differ only in degree and not in kind from statements near the periphery. The former class of statements includes those highly-expedient beliefs such as "All bachelors are unmarried males" and other statements usually termed "analytic." As they are so centrally-located, analytic beliefs are usually retained in light of any recalcitrant experience while other, less theoretically-valuable statements are revised. If faced with a recalcitrant experience, rather than revise a law of logic, we usually revise a statement that has more empirical import. "Our natural tendency to disturb the total system as little as possible would lead us to focus our revision upon these specific statements concerning brick houses or centaurs"[37] or some such other empirically-oriented statement. Even though we usually retain certain statements in our web of belief, there is no logical necessity as to which statements we retain. For Quine, we could revise any statement within our conceptual scheme even if such a revision entails a drastic overhaul of the majority of our beliefs. Quine believes that even the laws of logic may be amended in order that we may deal more easily with experience. Thus, all statements, from those concerning logic to those concerning the house down the street, are on the same footing concerning immunity from revision. Quine claims, "I believe in physical objects and not in Homer's gods..in point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind."[38] Both classes of entities are

actual ∧ seeming? isn't there a problem here?

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[37] W.V Quine, 1960, p.13.

[38] W.V. Quine, 1953, p.44.

merely myths or posits, but the former "has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience."[39]   Such a view of language is rather simplistic.   To conflate the categories of scientific, or empirical, statements and religious statements is to overlook how each type of statement functions.   That the role of each   is distinct   may be noted in how each statement responds to experience.   There exists a wealth of sense data that we would take as   being evidence   either for or against certain scientific statements.   What would count as evidence for or against a religious statement   such as   "Zeus lives on Mount Olympus" ?   We justifiably have trouble accounting for the nature of the connection between religious statements and experience.   This connection is not the same as   the connection between scientific statements and experience.   Quine unwittingly conflates disparate categories of statements when he argues that all statements are epstimologically equivalent.

Quine conflates even the laws of logic with the laws of natural science. We can revise the law of the excluded middle just as   easily as we can revise the laws governing the action of phlogiston. According to Quine, the statement "All bachelors are unmarried males" is reducible to the logical statement "No P are non-P". If logic itself is revisable, then there can be no necessity governing those statements which are reducible to truths of logic.   In "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," Quine argues

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[39]W.V. Quine, 1953, p.44.

that "reevaluation of some statements entails reevaluation of others, because of their logical interconnections-the logical laws being in turn simply certain further statements of the system."[40] The idea that logical laws may be responsive to experience has gained some acceptance over the past several years. For example, Putnam (1983) argues that advances in the field of quantum mechanics have led to changes in Boolean logic. The reason for these revisions is "that fallibilism extends also to the laws of logic..The laws of logic are not principles that a rational man is forbidden to revise."[41] If, in the course of one's dealings with experience, one believes it efficacious to revise one's logic, then one has every right to so revise it. For Quine, the purpose of logic is akin to the purpose of all language: to help expedite our dealings with the flux of experience. Thus, if our experiences change, then our logic will have to change as well. However, in revising logic in order to expedite matters in physics (or in other conceptual schemes), the laws of logic themselves are not subject to any sort of empirical investigation.[42] The scientist does not make a hypothesis about, say, modus ponens and look for either confirming or disconfirming evidence. The change in logic happens after other experiments

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[40]W.V. Quine, 1953, p.42.

[41]H. Putnam, "Two Dogmas Revisited" in Realism and Reason, (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1983) p.206.

[42]If the truth of certain logical statements such as "If P, then Q" is under question, by what standard do we judge its truth? By some higher-order logic? If so, how can we be sure that the second logic is true?

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are run and the scientist decides that certain experimental results might be accommodated if there were a change in logic. Thus, it seems as if the truths of logic do have a different role in our language; they do not report directly on experience as do empirical statements.

To claim that the truths of logic are revisable is not say that there is no necessity in regards either to the logical truths or other statements that we accept at any one time. In order to make this claim, we must distinguish two types of necessity: external and internal. The former category depends upon a unique relationship between language and experience. The latter category depends upon the very function of language. For Quine, a statement should be revised if it does not square with our experience and if this thereby hinders our dealings with experience. Although Quine purports to be an enlightened pragmatist, he still believes that true statements are those statements which somehow correspond with experience. There are many problems with correspondence theories of truth. I will consider only one here. In order to have knowledge that a statement does not square with experience, we must have knowledge of the correspondence relation. How do we know that the relation that we perceive is the correct relation? We must have knowledge that the relation itself agrees with experience. We must then have knowledge that the relation of "the relation of the statement and experience" agrees with experience. Off we go on an infinite regress. Although this problem may not be fatal to

the correspondence theory of truth, I hope that it does point out that there may be problems with a view which claims that necessity in language can be generated only by the agreement of statements with experience.[43]

I hold that an internal, or provincial, type of necessity is characteristic of any language regardless of whether or not the statements within the language correspond with experience. This internal necessity is governed by the relationship among the various statements of our conceptual schemes and is characteristic of the class of analytic statements. Language's effectiveness as a means of communicating information and of influencing people's actions depends upon our ability to make judgments. Thus, we may have the rule which governs our language "All bachelors are unmarried males" and while this is a rule of language the statement may be considered to be a necessary truth in that there are no exceptions allowed by the rule. That is not say that the rule might change (as we have seen in the case of the generally slothful bachelors). The nature of making judgments necessitates that we give a definite answer to any query such as "Is John a bachelor?" In order that any answer may be given, we must be able to say something that has a sense within the language game. Analytic statements provide the rules of language whereby we can judge what to count

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[43]Another problem which crops up in such correspondence theories is that of evidence. Is there a separate fund of evidence "uncorrupted by language" against which we can judge the truth of our statements? Language and experience are not mutually exclusive realms.

as an answer whether true or false, correct or incorrect. These
rules, be they explicit or implicit, enable us to classify people
or things in certain ways (e.g. John as being a bachelor). How
could we, knowing that John is an unmarried male, answer the
query "Is John a bachelor?" if we could not rely on the constancy
of the truth value of "All bachelors are unmarried males" ? As
Dilman says, analytic truths or "propositions which we regard as
necessary are rules of our language-games; they characterize our
language-games." [44] The statement "All bachelors are unmarried
males" governs our talk of marital status and gender. It
expresses what expressions we will accept as having a sense in
the language game.[45] Without such fixed points in our language,
the games could not be played. However, as Putnam has pointed
out, to have a rule that certain statements shall not be given up
is distinct from saying that the rule itself shall not be given
up.

As we inherit many of the language games that we play, the
rules of the games are largely beyond our control. We may
adjust the rules in certain areas (e.g. as in the changes in

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[44]I. Dilham, 1984, p. 95. Wittgenstein also has similar
ideas on the role of such propositions for our language games.
See Philosophical Investigations paragraphs 240 and 242. He
claims that the rules are "part of the framework on which the
workings of our language is based" (#240).

[45]For example, "Red is a colour" may be taken to be an
analytic statement. It tells us what we will take to be a
statement when using the word "red." We can judge that this
fireplug is red, but we do not judge that this drink tastes red.
If we made such an assertion, we would be accused of not knowing
how to use colour-words. We do not have to follow this rule,
only act in accordance with it.

logic brought about by quantum mechanics), but we cannot overcome our need as rational creatures capable of making judgments to have rules as such. Language tends to have a life of its own, a life independent of any specific individuals. This point is missed by Quine when he claims that any statement may be revised if we find that such a revision suits our needs. "There is no sense in Quine of language as having an independent life into which men are born, in which they grow, develop their ability to reason, and find themselves."[46] Nor is the idea that "men serve the language they speak as much as the language serves those who speak it"[47] to be found in the writings of Quine. The pragmatic empiricism of Quine ignores the interdependence of man and language and thereby hinders the function of language by allowing for relativism within the language.[48] Analyticity may be best defined (as *by referring to ?*) those statements within a conceptual scheme which enable one to judge the truth value (truth as relative to language itself not to experience) of other statements and which are not subject to the same type of evaluations themselves. Although, such a definition does need further elucidation, it does circumvent many of the problems into which the traditional notion of analyticity runs. The latter notion is based on facts

[46] I. Dilham, 1984, p. 102.

[47] I. Dilham, 1984, p. 102.

[48] By "relativism" I mean a type of chronic ambiguity which makes successful communication impossible. I do not want to deny that there is ambiguity within language but this latter type of ambiguity does not always hinder our communication. Quine's position may be called a form of "scientific skepticism."

or confirming experiences, not in terms of the role that certain statements actually have in our language. My suggested "linguistic" definition of analyticity does not run into the problems of the correspondence theory of truth or of the possible conflation of various categories of statements. Analytic statements do not have a unique connection to an independently-existing flux of experience. Rather, they have only a unique connection to other statements. Even though Quine claims that he is a pragmatist emancipated from the bondage of a defunct empiricism, Quine's rejection of analyticity depends upon an empiricist notion of language. I believe that Quine's attack on analyticity should have been focused on the term's usefulness rather than on its intelligibility. Quine's attack on its intelligibility leads to a gross over-simplification of the diverse nature of language. I hope that my sketchy characterization of analyticity suggests that the term is intelligible. It may turn out that "analyticity" is not needed in certain semantic theories. However, that does not mean that the term itself is unintelligible. Quine's position is based on the identification of the intelligibility of a term with the usefulness of a term. Such a position, in my opinion, is untenable.

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