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dc.rights.licenseIn Copyrighten_US
dc.creatorMarmorstein, Richard J.
dc.date.accessioned2014-04-22T14:50:39Z
dc.date.available2014-04-22T14:50:39Z
dc.date.created2014
dc.identifierWLURG38_Marmorstein_ECON_2014
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11021/27314
dc.descriptionRichard J. Marmorstein is a member of the Class of 2014 of Washington and Lee University.en_US
dc.descriptionCapstone; [FULL-TEXT RESTRICTED TO WASHINGTON AND LEE UNIVERSITY LOGIN]en_US
dc.description.abstractIn this project, I investigate a particular model of punishment featured by some honor codes -- a single sanction. Under a single-sanction honor code, the student judiciary must expel any student found guilty of academic dishonesty. The judiciary has no power to institute a lesser punishment, even for minor infractions. . . . Past research has investigated a number of questions regarding honor codes and academic cheating. To what degree are honor codes effective in preventing cheating? Does this effect vary depending on characteristics of the institution, such as size or selectivity? Is an honor code more likely to prevent cheating by some types of students than others? I was unable to find any study examining specifically the effect of a single sanction. However, McCabe and Trevino (1993) survey students to report how severe they perceive their punishment will be if they are caught cheating --a related factor. [From Introduction]en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityRichard Marmorstein
dc.format.extent30 pagesen_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.rightsThis material is made available for use in research, teaching, and private study, pursuant to U.S. Copyright law. The user assumes full responsibility for any use of the materials, including but not limited to, infringement of copyright and publication rights of reproduced materials. Any materials used should be fully credited with the source.en_US
dc.rights.urihttp://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/en_US
dc.subject.otherWashington and Lee University -- Capstone in Economicsen_US
dc.titleAcademic Cheating and Workload Intensity: Theory and Simulationsen_US
dc.typeTexten_US
dcterms.isPartOfRG38 - Student Papers
dc.rights.holderMarmorstein, Richard J.
dc.subject.fastCheating (Education)en_US
dc.subject.fastStudents--Academic workloaden_US
dc.subject.fastComputer simulationen_US
dc.subject.fastSimulation methodsen_US
local.departmentEconomicsen_US
local.scholarshiptypeCapstoneen_US


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