Personal Identity in Illness

Abstract

Locke argues that personal identity consists in consciousness, not the substance of either the soul or the body. I raised objections to Locke and offered criticism of Locke raised by others. Determining that an element of bodily persistence is necessary for the continuity of personal identity, I presented my view building on Locke's. I relied on Havi Carel's distinction between the lived body and the biological body to argue that identity exists through the continuity of consciousness and consciousness is based on memories of the lived body. The lived body was once the biological body. In certain cases, specifically in times of illness and disability, there can by a disparity between the experiences of the lived body and the capabilities biological body. This disparity in memory and current capability creates a lapse in personal identity. I then tested my view against a variety of thought experiments and responded to objections. I concluded that personal identity does consist in consciousness when the lived body and the biological body align. In times where there is a disparity in the two bodies, then there is a disparity in identity. [From Conclusion]