Redefining 'Lying' (thesis)

Abstract

My definition of 'lying' is better able than the prevailing definition to capture common intuitions about what is a lie and what is not. It does so specifically by making novel inclusions to the definition, such as the role of the audience and their consent as well as the role of context in affecting what is implicated. Lying is, foremost, a speech act, and my definition clearly exposes what instances should be classified as 'lying.' Furthermore, it does so without regard to the moral valence of the act. Most speech acts, like promises and warnings for example, are defined completely independently of their moral valence, so it makes sense to treat lying in the same way. My definition does just this, which is the second biggest strength of my definition of 'lying.' Separating the definition from morality makes it such that calling something a lie becomes no worse than calling something the truth. This may be where people have the biggest criticism of my definition, because it feels incorrect to say that lying is not inherently morally wrong. While this may feel incorrect at first, in the end the moral work one can do with my definition far outweighs the ability of the traditional definition to declare all lies as morally wrong. In separating my definition from morality, it requires one to consider more carefully the exact situation in which the act occurs to determine its morality. X, Y, and Z may all be lies under my definition, but after determining that they fall under this category of speech act, we can pay closer attention to the specific moral landscape of the situation. Instead of using the definition as a crutch, we can do better moral reasoning by focusing on the presence -- or absence -- and the degree of actual harms caused by a lie. We can consider effects, intentions, and virtues surrounding the act, just as we would with any other act, to determine its morality. [From Conclusion]