W. V. Quine's Naturalized Epistemology and Rationality

Abstract

My aim in this essay is to portray Quine's naturalized epistemology, despite its points of departure from traditionalist rationalist and empiricist epistemologies, as a viable theory of knowledge. I will conclude by discussing the altered understanding of rationality that emerges from Quine' s account. In Chapter 2, I will discuss how Quine's epistemology entails a rejection of the a priori/a posteriori distinction. More specifically, I will discuss how his repudiation of the language/theory dichotomy effects this rejection as it identifies the basic empirical origin of all linguistic and theoretical acts. Furthermore, I will highlight Quine's particular rhetorical treatment of the notion of "intuition," as it implies a priori rational intuition. In subsequent parts of this essay, I will refer often to the views outlined in this chapter, as they are the basis for understanding Quine's motivations in developing his account of naturalized epistemology. I will go on in Chapter 3 to consider the opposing traditionalist foundationalism of Laurence BonJour. I will use his account to explicate the conception of a priori insight that Quine rejects. Furthermore, I will use BonJour's account to illustrate how Quine's epistemology differs wholly from that of the prototypical empiricist as well as of the prototypical rationalist. I will portray traditionalist epistemologies as foundationalist in terms of the concern with the normative requirement of linear propositional support. I will characterize Quine's antifoundationalism in terms of his flouting of this requirement by advocating the concept of reciprocal containment. Chapter 4 will ultimately identify the issues of normativity and justification as specific points of departure of Quine's account from traditionalist ones. I will begin first by considering Laurence BonJour' s direct arguments against naturalized epistemology, and then move toward offering a Quinean counter to these arguments. In the process, I will depict the hypothesis formation and testing process of science that naturalized epistemology seeks to clarify and improve. In terms of this purpose of clarification, I will show how Quine's account offers a viable theory of knowledge that more accurately captures the nature of human belief. Finally, in Chapter 5, I will discuss the view of rationality that is suggested by Quine's account and as it emerges out of my preceding characterization of naturalized epistemology. [From Introduction]