Roosevelt and Yalta: The Myth and the Reality (A President Gambles for Peace)

Abstract

Because the Crimean happenings have had far-reaching consequences, it is my purpose to place Yalta in a more accurate and meaningful perspective. Because the United States seems to be moving toward a new rapprochement with the Soviets, it may be helpful to assess the implications of our past mistakes in forei gn policy. Have our failures been the fault of our elected national leaders, our foreign policies, or our society? This approach will be incomplete if it fails to investigate the charges of the revisionists and their impact on domestic and foreign events. Studies of past historical dealings with the Soviets may provide valuable tools for shaping our present policies. At least, they will be caution signals which warn of our past mistakes. A historical interpretation always faces the dual test of being both reasonable and responsible. With more information, less confusion and pressure, and greater time for thought, it will be easy to be hypercritical of policies that have failed. At some time in the past, these same actions may have been the most fruitful alternatives. Still judgements remind national leaders that their actions must pass the test of time. With this in mind, I shall attemp t to discuss Yalta critically, but objectively, as a myth and as a reality. [From Chapter 1]